

PLATONIS OPERA

RECOGNOVIT
BREVIQUE ADNOTATIONE CRITICA INSTRVXIT

IOANNES BURNET
TOMVS I-II



OXFORD CLASSICAL TEXTS

ΠΛΑΤΩΝ
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ

Greek+English edition

Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903.

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327a

κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος προσευζόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἅμα τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες. καλὴ μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι ἦττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἢ οἱ Θοῤῃκες ἔπεμπον.

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προσευζάμενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες ἀπῆμεν πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ. κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὠρμημένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν παῖδα περιμεῖναι ἐκελεῦσαι. καὶ μου ὀπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, κελεῦει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖναι. καὶ ἐγὼ μετεστράφην τε καὶ ἡρόμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἴη. οὗτος, ἔφη, ὀπισθεν προσέρχεται· ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων.

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καὶ ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον ὃ τε Πολέμαρχος ἦκε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφός καὶ Νικήρατος ὁ Νικίου καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς. ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτέ μοι πρὸς ἄστυ ὠρμηῆσθαι ὡς ἀπόντες.

οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

ὀρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν;

πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ἦ τοῖνυν τούτων, ἔφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ' αὐτοῦ.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐν λείπεται, τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι;

ἦ καὶ δύναισθ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πεῖσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας;

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων.

ὡς τοῖνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε.

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328a

καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ἄρά γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἴστε ὅτι λαμπὰς ἔσται πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἀφ' ἵππων τῇ θεῷ;

ἀφ' ἵππων; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καινόν γε τοῦτο. λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἀμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις; ἦ πῶς λέγεις;

οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Πολέμαρχος. καὶ πρὸς γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἦν ἄξιον θεάσασθαι· ἐξαναστησόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα θεασόμεθα. καὶ συνεσόμεθα τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων αὐτόθι καὶ διαλεξόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μένετε

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καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε.

καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων, ἔοικεν, ἔφη, μενετέον εἶναι.

ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.

ἦμεν οὖν οἴκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Λυσίαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν

καὶ Εὐθύδημον, τοὺς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἀδελφούς, καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον
τὸν Καλχηδόνιον καὶ Χαρμαντίδην τὸν Παιανιᾶ καὶ Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν
Ἀριστωνύμου· ἦν δ' ἔνδον καὶ ὁ πατήρ ὁ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου Κέφαλος, καὶ
μάλᾳ πρεσβύτης μοι ἔδοξεν εἶναι· διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ

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ἐωράκη αὐτόν. καθῆστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος ἐπὶ τινος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ
δίφρου· τεθυκῶς γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ. ἐκαθεζόμεθα οὖν παρ' αὐτόν·
ἔκειντο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλῳ.

εὐθύς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ εἶπεν· ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ δὲ
θαμίξεις ἡμῖν καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ. χρῆν μέντοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔτι
ἐν δυνάμει ἢ τοῦ ῥαδῖος πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, οὐδὲν ἂν σέ ἔδει δεῦρο
328d

ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἂν παρὰ σέ ἦμεν· νῦν δέ σε χρὴ πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναι.
ὥς εὔ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε ὅσον αἰ ἄλλαι αἰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἠδοναὶ
ἀπομαραίνονται, τοσοῦτον αὖξονται αἰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ
ἠδοναί. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τοῖσδε τε τοῖς νεανίσκοις σὺνισθι καὶ
δεῦρο παρ' ἡμᾶς φοῖτα ὥς παρὰ φίλους τε καὶ πάνν οἰκείους.

καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, χαίρω γε διαλεγόμενος

328e

τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις· δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι χρῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι,
ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυθῶτων ἦν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποῖα
τίς ἐστιν, τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή, ἢ ῥαδία καὶ εὐπορος, καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως
ἂν πυθοίμην ὅτι σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ δὴ ἐνταῦθα ἦδη εἰ τῆς ἡλικίας ὃ ἡ
ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ

φασιν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταί, πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου, ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ
ἐξαγγέλλεις.

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ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, νῆ τὸν Δία ἐρῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἷόν γε μοι φαίνεται. πολλάκις
γὰρ συνερχόμεθά τινες εἰς ταῦτόν παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες,
διασῶζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν· οἱ οὖν πλεῖστοι ἡμῶν ὀλοφύρονται
συνιόντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἠδονὰς ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀναμνησκόμενοι περὶ
τε τάφροδισια καὶ περὶ πότους τε καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα ἃ τῶν τοιούτων
ἔχεται, καὶ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὥς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ
ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες.

329b

ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν οἰκείων προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρωος ὀδύρονται, καὶ ἐπὶ
τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν ὅσων κακῶν σφίσιν αἴτιον. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν,
ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτοι οὐ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιᾶσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτ' αἴτιον, κἂν ἐγὼ
τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπεπόνθη, ἔνεκά γε γήρωος, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ἐνταῦθα
ἦλθον ἡλικίας. νῦν δ' ἔγωγε ἦδη ἐντετύχηκα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσιν καὶ ἄλλοις,
καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτε τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμην ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπὸ τινος·
πῶς, ἔφη,

329c

ὦ Σοφόκλεις, ἔχεις πρὸς τὰφροδίσια; ἔτι οἷός τε εἶ γυναικί συγγίγνεσθαι; καὶ ὅς, εὐφήμει, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· ἀσμενέστατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποδράς. εὖ οὖν μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν ἐκεῖνος εἰπεῖν, καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἦττον. παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία· ἐπειδὴ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσωνται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσιν, παντάπασιν τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, 329d

δεσποτῶν πάνυ πολλῶν ἐστι καὶ μαινομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων περὶ καὶ τῶν γε πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους μία τις αἰτία ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γήρας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἂν μὲν γὰρ κόσμιοι καὶ εὐκολοὶ ὦσιν, καὶ τὸ γήρας μετρίως ἐστὶν ἐπίπονον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ γήρας, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ συμβαίνει. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεῖς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, βουλόμενος ἔτι 329e

λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Κέφαλε, οἴμαί σου τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγῃς, οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀλλ' ἡγεῖσθαι σε ῥαδίως τὸ γήρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλήν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι· τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραμύθια φασιν εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἶονται· ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους εὖ ἔχει, ὅς τῷ Σεριφίῳ λοιδορουμένῳ καὶ λέγοντι

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330a

ὅτι οὐ δι' αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμοῖ, ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν αὐτὸς Σεριφίος ὦν ὀνομαστὸς ἐγένετο οὐτ' ἐκεῖνος Ἀθηναῖος. καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ γήρας φέρουσιν, εὖ ἔχει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ὁ ἐπαικὴς πάνυ τι ῥαδίως γήρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι οὐθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπαικὴς πλουτήσας εὐκόλος ποτ' ἂν ἐαυτῷ γένοιτο.

πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, ὦν κέκτησαι τὰ πλείω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω;

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ποῦ' ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις γέγονα χρηματιστῆς τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος ἐμοὶ σχεδὸν τι ὅσην ἐγὼ νῦν οὐσίαν κέκτημαι παραλαβὼν πολλάκις τοσαύτην ἐποίησεν, Λυσανίας δὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἔτι ἐλάττω αὐτὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νῦν οὐσης· ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ ἐὰν μὴ ἐλάττω καταλίπω τούτοισιν, ἀλλὰ βραχεῖ γέ τιτι πλείω ἢ παρέλαβον.

οὗτοι ἔνεκα ἡρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα

330c

ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσιν, ταῦτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματιστάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἐαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν ἤπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ συγγενέσθαι

εἰσιν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

330d

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ μοι ἔτι τοσόνδε εἰπέ· τί μέγιστον οἶει ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέναι τοῦ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι;

ὁ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ἦ τοῦ οἰεσθαι τελευτήσῃ, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντίς περὶ ὧν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσῆει. οἱ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι

330e

δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσιν· καὶ αὐτός—ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρωος ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὦν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον τι καθορᾷ αὐτά—ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δειμάτος μεστός γίγνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη καὶ σκοπεῖ εἰ τίνα τι ἡδίκησεν.

ὁ μὲν οὖν εὐρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος δειμαίνει

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331a

καὶ ζῆ μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος· τῷ δὲ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ ἄδικον συνειδότι ἡδεῖα ἐλπίς αἰετάρεσσι καὶ ἀγαθῇ γηροτρόφος, ὡς καὶ Πίνδαρος λέγει. χαριέντως γὰρ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν, ὅτι ὁς ἂν δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως τὸν βίον διαγάγῃ,

γλυκεῖα οἱ καρδίαν

ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος συναορεῖ

ἐλπίς ἃ μάλιστα θανάτων πολὺστροφον

γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ.

Pindar Frag. 214, Loeb εὖ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὴ τοῦτ' ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πλείστου ἀξίαν εἶναι, οὗ

331b

τι παντὶ ἀνδρὶ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπείκει καὶ κοσμίῳ. τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατήσῃ ἢ ψεύσασθαι, μηδ' αὖ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπέναι δεδιότα, μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσις συμβάλλεται. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας χρείας πολλὰς· ἀλλὰ ἔν γε ἀνθ' ἐνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θεῖην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

331c

παγκάλως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ' αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι ἂν τίς τι παρὰ του λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ἐνίστε μὲν δικαίως, ἐνίστε δὲ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν; οἷον τοιονδε λέγω· πᾶς ἂν που εἴποι, εἰ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονοῦντος ὄπλα, εἰ μανεῖς ἀπαιτοῖ, ὅτι οὔτε χρή τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα πάντα ἐθέλων τάληθῃ λέγειν.

331d

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

οὐκ ἄρα οὗτος ὅρος ἐστὶν δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἃ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Πολέμαρχος, εἴπερ γέ τι χρὴ Σιμωνίδῃ πείθεσθαι.

καὶ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον· δεῖ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος;

πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς γελάσας, καὶ ἅμα ἦει πρὸς τὰ ἱερά.

331e

λέγε δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος, τί φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης;

ὅτι, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι· τοῦτο λέγων δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς λέγειν.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδῃ γε οὐ ῥάδιον ἀπιστεῖν—σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ—τοῦτο μέντοι ὅτι ποτὲ λέγει, σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τιнос παρακαταθεμένου τι ὅτω οὖν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι

332

332a

ἀποδιδόναι. καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενόν ποῦ ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ παρακατέθετο· ἦ γάρ; ναί.

ἀποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδ' ὅπως οὖν τότε ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ; ἀληθῆ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἄλλο δὴ τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικεν, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι.

ἄλλο μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη· τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις οἴεται ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι δρᾶν, κακὸν δὲ μὴδέν.

μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ—ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσιν ὅς ἂν τῷ χρυσίον ἀποδῶ παρακαταθεμένῳ, ἐάνπερ ἢ ἀπόδοσις

332b

καὶ ἡ λῆψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ ὥσιν ὃ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὁ ἀποδιδούς—οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

τί δέ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέον ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ ὀφειλόμενον;

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ γε ὀφείλεται αὐτοῖς, ὀφείλεται δέ γε οἷμαι παρά γε τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακὸν τι.

ἠνίξατο ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς

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τὸ δίκαιον ὃ εἶη. διενοεῖτο μὲν γάρ, ὡς φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶη δίκαιον, τὸ προσῆκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν ὀφειλόμενον.

ἀλλὰ τί οἶει; ἔφη.

ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο· ὦ Σιμωνίδῃ, ἢ τίσιν οὖν τί

ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη ἱατρικὴ καλεῖται; τί ἂν οἶει
ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι;
δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἡ σώμασιν φάρμακά τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά.
ἡ δὲ τῖσιν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ
καλεῖται;

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ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα.

εἶεν· ἡ οὖν δὴ τῖσιν τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο;
εἰ μὲν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὧ Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις, ἡ
τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδούσα.
τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει;
δοκεῖ μοι.

τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς
νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν;

ἱατρός.

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τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον;
κυβερνήτης.

τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατώτατος φίλους
ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν;

ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ συμμαχεῖν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

εἶεν· μὴ κάμνουσι γε μήν, ὧ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, ἱατρός ἄχρηστος.

ἀληθῆ.

καὶ μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης.

ναί.

ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρηστος;

οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο.

χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη;

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χρήσιμον.

καὶ γὰρ γεωργία· ἡ οὐ;

ναί.

πρὸς γε καρποῦ κτῆσιν;

ναί.

καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική;

ναί.

πρὸς γε ὑποδημάτων ἂν οἷμαι φαίης κτῆσιν;

πάνυ γε.

τί δὲ δὴ; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρεῖαν ἢ κτῆσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν
χρήσιμον εἶναι;

πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια, ὧ Σώκρατες.

συμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο;

κοινωνήματα δῆτα.

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ἄρ' οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεπτῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεπτευτικός;

ὁ πεπτευτικός.

ἀλλ' εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ;

οὐδαμῶς.

ἀλλ' εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ τε καὶ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικός τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων;

εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

πλὴν γ' ἴσως, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δέῃ ἀργυρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδόσθαι ἵππον· τότε

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δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἵππικός. ἢ γάρ;

φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης;

ἔοικεν.

ὅταν οὖν τί δέῃ ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων;

ὅταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

οὐκοῦν λέγεις ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι;

πάνυ γε.

ὅταν ἄρα ἄχρηστον ἢ ἀργύριον, τότε χρήσιμος ἐπ' αὐτῷ

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ἢ δικαιοσύνη;

κινδυνεύει.

καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέῃ φυλάττειν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ· ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, ἢ ἀμπελουργική;

φαίνεται.

φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέῃ φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὀπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν;

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα δὴ πάντα ἢ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστῇ χρήσιμος;

κινδυνεύει.

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οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον εἴη ἢ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὄν τυγχάνει. τότε δὲ σκεψώμεθα. ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι; πάνυ γε.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

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ἀλλὰ μὴν στρατοπέδου γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός, ὅσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν
πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλευόμενα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις;
πάνυ γε.

ὅτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φῶρ δεινός.

ἔοικεν.

εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεινός.

ὥς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει.

κλέπτῃς ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἀναπέφονται, καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρ'
Ὀμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος

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τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως πρὸς μητρὸς πάππον Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ φησιν
αὐτὸν πάντας

ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνη θ' ὄρκῳ τε

Hom. Od. 19.395. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σὲ καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον
καὶ κατὰ Σιμωνίδην κλεπτική τις εἶναι, ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ μέντοι τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ
βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγε;

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι ἔλεγον· τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε
δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

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φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἐκάστω χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ
τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι, καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως;
εἰκὸς μὲν, ἔφη, οὕς ἂν τις ἡγῇται χρηστοὺς φιλεῖν, οὕς δ' ἂν πονηροὺς
μισεῖν.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς
πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τὸναντίον;
ἁμαρτάνουσιν.

τούτοις ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι;

πάνυ γε.

ἀλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς

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ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν;

φαίνεται.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοι τε καὶ οἷοι μὴ ἀδικοῦν;

ἀληθῆ.

κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν.

μηδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος.

τοὺς ἀδίκους ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὠφελεῖν;
οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται.

πολλοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, συμβήσεται, ὅσοι διημαρτήκασιν

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τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάπτειν—πονηροὶ γὰρ
αὐτοῖς εἰσιν—τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς ὠφελεῖν—ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ· καὶ οὕτως ἐροῦμεν

αὐτὸ τοῦναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν.
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω συμβαίνει. ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα· κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ
ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι.

πῶς θέμενοι, ὦ Πολέμαρχε;

τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστὸν, τοῦτον φίλον εἶναι.

νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταθώμεθα;

τὸν δοκοῦντά τε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν φίλον·

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τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μέν, ὄντα δὲ μή, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ εἶναι φίλον. καὶ περὶ τοῦ
ἐχθροῦ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ θέσις.

φίλος μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦτ' αὖ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ
πονηρὸς.

ναί.

κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες
δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακῶς· νῦν πρὸς τοῦτ' αὖ
ὥδε λέγειν, ὅτι ἔστιν δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ'
ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν;

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πάνυ μὲν οὔν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίου ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν καὶ ὄντινον ἀνθρώπων;

καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη· τοὺς γε πονηροὺς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεῖ βλάπτειν.

βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χεῖρους γίνονται;

χεῖρους.

ἄρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετὴν, ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων;

εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χεῖρους γίνονται εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀλλ'
οὐκ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρετὴν;

ἀνάγκη.

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ἀνθρώπους δέ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν, βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπεῖαν
ἀρετὴν χεῖρους γίνεσθαι;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

ἀλλ' ἢ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεῖα ἀρετὴ;

καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη.

καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἀδίκωτέρους
γίνεσθαι.

ἔοικεν.

ἄρ' οὖν τῇ μουσικῇ οἱ μουσικοὶ ἀμούσους δύνανται ποιεῖν;

ἀδύνατον.

ἀλλὰ τῇ ἵππικῇ οἱ ἵππικοὶ ἀφίππους;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ καὶ

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συλλήβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοῦς;

ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον.

οὐ γὰρ θερμότητος οἶμαι ἔργον ψύχειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

ναί.

οὐδὲ ξηρότητος ὑγραίνειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

πάνυ γε.

οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

φαίνεται.

ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός;

πάνυ γε.

οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ ἀδίκου.

παντάπασι μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

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εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι φησὶν τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὠφελίαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφός ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὃν βλάπτειν.

συγχωρῶ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

μαχούμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῇ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ φῇ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιπτακὸν εἰρηκέναι ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν.

ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη, ἔτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης.

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ἀλλ' οἴσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν;

τίνος; ἔφη.

οἷμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἢ δικαιοσύνη ὃν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίη εἶναι;

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καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὥρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύετο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον· ὥς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὥς διαρπασόμενος.

καὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δείσαντες διεπτοήθημεν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος, τίς, ἔφη, ὑμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία

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ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ τί εὐηθίζεσθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὥς ἀληθῶς βούλει εἶδέναι τὸ δίκαιον ὅτι ἔστι, μὴ

μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων ἐπειδὴν τίς τι ἀποκρίνηται, ἐγνωκῶς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥῆον ἐρωτᾷν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποκρίναι καὶ εἶπε τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι τὸ

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δεὸν ἐστὶν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι ἐὰν ὕθλους τοιοῦτους λέγῃς.

καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐξεπλάγην καὶ προσβλέπων αὐτὸν ἐφοβούμην, καὶ μοι δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἐωράκη αὐτὸν ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐμέ, ἄφωνος ἂν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἡνίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἤρχετο ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος,

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ὥστε αὐτῷ οἷός τ' ἐγενόμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, καὶ εἶπον ὑποτρέμων· ὦ Θρασύμαχε, μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἴσθι· εἰ γὰρ τι ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὁδε, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνομεν. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἷου, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἡμᾶς ἐκόντας εἶναι ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ ζητήσῃ καὶ διαφθεῖρειν τὴν εὐρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ζητοῦντας, πρᾶγμα πολλῶν χρυσίων τιμιώτερον, ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἀνοήτως ὑπεῖκειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὅτι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό.

οἷου γε σὺ, ὦ φίλε. ἀλλ' οἴμαι οὐ δυνάμεθα· ἐλεεῖσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς πολὺ

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μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἐστὶν πού ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἢ χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν· ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὕτη 'κείνη ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεῖα Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τοῦτοις προύλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσεις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσεις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἰ τίς τι σε ἐρώτῃ.

σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· εὖ οὖν ἤδησθα ὅτι εἰ τίνα ἔροιο ὅποσα ἐστὶν τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενος προεῖποις

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αὐτῷ— ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι ἔστιν τὰ δώδεκα δις ἕξ μηδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ' ὅτι ἐξάκις δύο μηδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία· ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι σου ἐὰν τοιαῦτα φλυαρῇς —δῆλον οἴμαί σοι ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖτο τῷ οὕτως πυνθανομένῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ σοι εἶπεν· ὦ Θρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν; πότερον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, μηδ' εἰ τούτων τι τυγχάνει ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἴπω τι

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τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; τί ἂν αὐτῷ εἶπες πρὸς ταῦτα;

εἶεν, ἔφη· ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ.

οὐδέν γε κωλύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὅμοιον, φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἥττον τι αὐτὸν οἶει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ, ἐάντε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἐάντε μῆ;

ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις· ὧν ἐγὼ ἀπεῖπον, τούτων τι

ἀποκρινῇ;

οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· εἴ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὕτω δόξειεν.

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τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δείξω ἑτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης, βελτίῳ τούτων; τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν;

τί ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἢ ὅπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότι; προσήκει δέ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἀξιῶ παθεῖν.

ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότεισον ἀργύριον.

οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴν μοι γένηται, εἴπων.

ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων. ἀλλ' ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, λέγε· πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσοίσομεν.

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πάνυ γε οἶμαι, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξῃται· αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνῃ λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ.

πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τίς ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, ἔπειτα, εἴ τι καὶ οἶται, περὶ τούτων ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἶη ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὣν ἡγεῖται ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου; ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μάλλον

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εἰκὸς λέγειν· σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναι καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ ἐμοὶ τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσης καὶ Γλαῦκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

εἰπόντος δέ μου ταῦτα, ὅ τε Γλαῦκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος φανερὸς μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν ἴν'

εὐδοκιμήσειεν, ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην· προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. τελευτῶν δὲ συνεχώρησεν,

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κἄπειτα, αὕτη δὴ, ἔφη, ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία· αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιόντα μανθάνειν καὶ τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι.

ὅτι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι δὲ οὐ με φῆς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδῃ· ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὅσην δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω. ὥς δὲ προθύμως τοῦτο δρῶ, ἐάν τις μοι δοκῇ εὖ λέγειν, εὖ εἶση αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὴν ἀποκρίνῃ· οἶμαι γὰρ σε εὖ ἐρεῖν.

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ἄκουε δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς· φημί γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθελήσεις.

ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἔφην, τί λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὐπω οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῆς συμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ που τὸ γε τοιόνδε φῆς· εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιαστής καὶ αὐτῷ συμφέρεи τὰ βόεια κρέα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ

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σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἡττοσιν ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον.
βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταύτη ὑπολαμβάνεις ἢ ἂν
κακουργήσας μάλιστα τὸν λόγον.

οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἶπε τί λέγεις.
εἴτ' οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννοῦνται, αἱ δὲ
δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει, τὸ ἄρχον;

πάννυ γε.

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τίθεται δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἡ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτῇ συμφέρον,
δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικούς, τυραννὶς δὲ τυραννικούς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
οὕτως· θέμεναι δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι
συμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ
ἀδικοῦντα.

τοῦτ' οὖν ἐστίν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὃ λέγω ἐν ἀπάσαις

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ταῖς πόλεσιν ταύτων εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον·
αὕτη δὲ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε συμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι
τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον.

νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ μὴ, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ
συμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι—καίτοι
ἔμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρinoίμην—πρόσεστιν δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι
τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος.

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σ μικρά γε ἴσως, ἔφη, προσθήκη.

οὐπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ ἀληθὴ λέγεις,
δῆλον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ
προστιθεῖς καὶ αὐτὸ φῆς εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτέον
δὴ.

σκόπει, ἔφη.

ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἶπε· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν
δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι;

ἔγωγε.

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πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἱοί τι
καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν;

πάντως που, ἔφη, οἱοί τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν.

οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασιν, τοὺς δὲ
τινας οὐκ ὀρθῶς;

οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τὸ τὰ συμφέροντά ἐστι τιθεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς
ἀσύμφορα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

οὕτως.

ἂ δ' ἂν θῶνται ποιητέον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον;
πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

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οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος
συμφέρον ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑνάντιον, τὸ μὴ συμφέρον.

τί λέγεις σὺ; ἔφη.

ἂ σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ· σκοπῶμεν δὲ βέλτιον. οὐχ ὡμολόγηται τοὺς
ἄρχοντας τοῖς ἀρχομένοις προστάττοντας ποιεῖν ἅττα ἐνίοτε διαμαρτάνειν
τοῦ ἑαυτοῖς βελτίστου, ἂ δ' ἂν προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς
ἀρχομένοις ποιεῖν; ταῦτ' οὐχ ὡμολόγηται;

οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

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οἷου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσι τε καὶ
κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὡμολογήσθαι σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἄκοντες
κακὰ αὐτοῖς προστάττωσιν, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῆς ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ ἐκεῖνοι
προσέταξαν — ἄρα τότε, ὦ σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον
συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὕτως, δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τὸ ὑνάντιον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ
γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀσύμφορον δήπου προστάττεται τοῖς ἥττοσιν ποιεῖν.

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ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, σαφέστατά γε.

ἐὰν σὺ γ', ἔφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσης, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ὑπολαβὼν.

καὶ τί, ἔφη, δεῖται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν
ἄρχοντας ἐνίοτε ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ προστάττειν, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα
ποιεῖν.

τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων δίκαιον
εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος.

καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὦ Κλειτοφῶν, συμφέρον

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δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο. ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφοτέρωθεν θέμενος ὡμολόγησεν αὐτὸ ἐνίοτε τοὺς
κρείττους τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀσύμφορα κελεύειν τοὺς ἥττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους
ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος
συμφέρον δίκαιον ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ μὴ συμφέρον.

ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὃ ἡγοῖτο ὁ
κρείττων αὐτῷ συμφέρειν· τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἥττονι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον
τοῦτο ἐτίθετο.

ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἐλέγετο.

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οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ νῦν οὕτω λέγει
Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχόμεθα. καὶ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο
ἦν ὃ ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι
τῷ κρείττονι, ἐάντε συμφέρῃ ἐάντε μὴ; οὕτω σε φῶμεν λέγειν;
ἦκιστα γε, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οἶμαι καλεῖν τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα ὅταν

ἐξαμαρτάνῃ;

ἔγωγε, εἶπον, ὦμην σε τοῦτο λέγειν ὅτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὠμολόγεις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι ἀλλὰ τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν.

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συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἱατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαμαρτάνει; ἢ λογιστικόν, ὃς ἂν ἐν λογισμῷ ἀμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἀμαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀμαρτίαν; ἀλλ' οἴμαι λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ ἱατρὸς ἐξήμαρτεν καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξήμαρτεν καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής· τὸ δ' οἴμαι ἕκαστος τούτων, καθ' ὅσον τοῦτ' ἔστιν

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ὁ προσαγορευόμεν αὐτόν, οὐδέποτε ἀμαρτάνει· ὥστε κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογῇ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἀμαρτάνει. ἐπιλειπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός· ὥστε δημιουργός ἢ σοφός ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ἦ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ὁ ἱατρὸς ἤμαρτεν καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἤμαρτεν. τοιοῦτον οὖν δὴ σοι καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νυνδὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὅν, τὸν ἄρχοντα, καθ'

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ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν, μὴ ἀμαρτάνοντα δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ποιητέον. ὥστε ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον δίκαιον λέγω, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμφέρον.

εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· δοκῶ σοι συκοφαντεῖν;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

οἶει γὰρ με ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργοῦντά σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἡρόμην;

εὔ μὲν οὖν οἶδα, ἔφη. καὶ οὐδέν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται·

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οὔτε γὰρ ἂν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε μὴ λαθὼν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναιο.

οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἡμῖν τοιοῦτον ἐγγένηται, διόρισαι ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἄρχοντα τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα, τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, οὗ τὸ συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ ἥττονι ποιεῖν.

τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἔφη, λόγῳ ἄρχοντα ὄντα. πρὸς ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει, εἰ τι δύνασαι—οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι—ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἷός τ' ἦς.

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οἶει γὰρ ἂν με, εἶπον, οὕτω μανῆναι ὥστε ξυρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκοφαντεῖν Θρασύμαχον;

νῦν γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπεχειρήσας, οὐδέν ὦν καὶ ταῦτα.

ἄδην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι· ὁ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἱατρὸς, ὃν ἄρτι ἔλεγες, πότερον χρηματιστής ἐστίν ἢ τῶν καμνόντων θεραπευτής; καὶ λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι ἱατρὸν ὄντα.

τῶν καμνόντων, ἔφη, θεραπευτής.

τί δὲ κυβερνήτης; ὁ ὀρθῶς κυβερνήτης ναυτῶν ἄρχων ἐστὶν ἢ ναύτης; ναυτῶν ἄρχων.

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οὐδὲν οἶμαι τοῦτο ὑπολογιστέον, ὅτι πλεῖ ἐν τῇ νηϊ, οὐδ' ἐστὶν κλητέος ναύτης· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν κυβερνήτης καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἔστιν τι συμφέρον;

πάνυ γε.

οὐ καὶ ἡ τέχνη, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπὶ τούτῳ πέφυκεν, ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ συμφέρον ἐκάστῳ ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἐκπορίζειν;

ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστιν τι συμφέρον ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι;

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πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;

ὥσπερ, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ με ἔροιο εἰ ἐξαρκεῖ σῶματι εἶναι σῶματι ἢ προσδεῖται τινος, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ἱατρικὴ νῦν ἠϋρημένη, ὅτι σῶμά ἐστιν πονηρὸν καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. τούτῳ οὖν ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ συμφέροντα, ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρεσκεύασθη ἡ τέχνη. ἢ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκῶ, ἔφην, ἂν εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων, ἢ οὐ;

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

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τί δὲ δῆ; αὐτὴ ἡ ἱατρικὴ ἐστὶν πονηρά, ἢ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἔσθ' ὅτι προσδεῖται τινος ἀρετῆς—ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοὶ ὄψεως καὶ ὦτα ἀκοῆς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δεῖ τινος τέχνης τῆς τὸ συμφέρον εἰς αὐτὰ ταῦτα σκευομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριούσης— ἄρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τέχνῃ ἐνι τις πονηρία, καὶ δεῖ ἐκάστη τέχνη ἄλλης τέχνης ἣτις αὐτῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκέπεται, καὶ τῇ σκοπομένην ἑτέρας αὖ τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπέραντον;

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ἢ αὐτὴ αὐτῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκέπεται; ἢ οὔτε αὐτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης προσδεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς πονηρίαν τὸ συμφέρον σκοπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἀμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ προσήκει τέχνῃ ἄλλῳ τὸ συμφέρον ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀκέραιος ἐστὶν ὀρθὴ οὔσα, ὥσπερ ἂν ἡ ἐκάστη ἀκριβὴς ὅλη ἥπερ ἐστίν; καὶ σκόπει ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ· οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως ἔχει;

οὕτως, ἔφη, φαίνεται.

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οὐκ ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἱατρικὴ ἱατρικῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ ἀλλὰ σῶματι. ναί, ἔφη.

οὐδὲ ἵππικὴ ἵππικῇ ἀλλ' ἵπποις· οὐδὲ ἄλλη τέχνη οὐδεμία ἐαυτῇ—οὐδὲ γὰρ

προσδεῖται—ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ οὐ τέχνη ἐστίν.

φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχνηαι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου οὐπὲρ εἰσιν τέχνηαι.

συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόγις.

οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη γε οὐδεμία τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἥττονός τε καὶ ἀρχομένου

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ὑπὸ ἐαυτῆς.

συνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠμολόγησεν, ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲ ἱατρὸς οὐδεὶς, καθ' ὅσον ἱατρός, τὸ τῷ ἱατρῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ κάμνοντι; ὠμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῆς ἱατρὸς σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής. ἢ οὐχ ὠμολόγηται;

συνέφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ ναύτης;

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ὠμολόγηται.

οὐκ ἄρα ὃ γε τοιοῦτος κυβερνήτης τε καὶ ἄρχων τὸ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ συμφέρον σκέπεται τε καὶ προστάξει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ναύτῃ τε καὶ ἀρχομένῳ.

συνέφησε μόγις.

οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, οὐδὲ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ὃ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκείνῳ συμφέρον καὶ πρέπον, καὶ λέγει ἅ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἅ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.

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ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἤμεν τοῦ λόγου καὶ πᾶσι καταφανὲς ἦν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς τούναντίον περιειστῆκει, ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τίττη σοι ἔστιν; τί δέ; ἣν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτᾶν; ὅτι τοί σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γινώσκεις.

ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; ἣν δ' ἐγώ.

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ὅτι οἶει τοὺς ποιμένας ἢ τοὺς βουκόλους τὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ τῶν βοῶν ἀγαθὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέποντας ἢ τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας, οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν, ἄλλως πως ἡγῇ διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ ὥσπερ ἂν τις πρὸς πρόβατα διατεθεῖη, καὶ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖν αὐτοὺς διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἢ τοῦτο,

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ὅθεν αὐτοὶ ὠφελήσονται. καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἴ περὶ τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας, ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη

καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τοῦναντίον, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐθηκῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, οἱ δ' ἄρχόμενοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαιμόνα ἐκεῖνον ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες

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αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν. σκοπεῖσθαι δέ, ὧς εὐηθέστατε Σώκρατες, οὕτωςι χρή, ὅτι δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει. πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμβολαίοις, ὅπου ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ κοινωνήσῃ, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εὖροις ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινωνίας πλεον ἔχοντα τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀλλ' ἔλαττον· ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τέτινες εἰσφοραὶ ᾧσιν, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων πλεον εἰσφέρει, ὁ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅταν τε λήψῃς,

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ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ πολλὰ κερδαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀρχὴν τινα ἄρχῃ ἐκάτερος, τῷ μὲν δίκαιῳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ζημία, τὰ γε οἰκεῖα δι' ἀμέλειαν μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὠφελεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπεχθέσθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλῃ αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον· τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τάναντία ὑπάρχει.

λέγω γάρ

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ὄνπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν· τοῦτον οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ βούλει κρίνειν ὅσω μᾶλλον συμφέρει ἰδίᾳ αὐτῷ ἀδίκον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ῥᾶστα μαθήσῃ, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς, ἢ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθέντας καὶ ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς, ἢ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τ' ἀλλότρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βίᾳ ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ

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συλλήβδην· ὧν ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ, ζημιοῦται τε καὶ ὄνειδ' ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα—καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρῆχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται—ἐπειδὴ δὲ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασιν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσῃται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀνομάτων εὐδαιμόνες καὶ μακάριοι

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κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν ἡδικηκότα· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμενοι ὄνειδίζουσιν οἱ ὄνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὕτως, ὧς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης ἐστὶν ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸ δ'

ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ συμφέρον.

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ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῷ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι, ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν
καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὥτων ἀθρόον καὶ πολὺν τὸν λόγον· οὐ μὴν εἰσάσας
γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ' ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομεῖναι τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν
εἰρημένων λόγον. καὶ διὴ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς πάνυ ἐδεόμην τε καὶ εἶπον· ὦ
δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε, οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι πρὶν διδάξαι
ικανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως

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ἔχει; ἢ σμικρὸν οἶει ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι ὅλου βίου διαγωγὴν, ἢ
ἂν διαγόμενος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν λυσιτελεστάτην ζωὴν ζῶη;
ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν;
ἔοικας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ—ἦτοι ἡμῶν γε οὐδὲν κήδεσθαι, οὐδὲ τι φροντίζειν εἴτε
χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα ἀγνοοῦντες ὃ σὺ φῆς εἶδέναι.
ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, προθυμοῦ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐνδείξασθαι—οὕτοι

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κακῶς σοι κείσεται ὅτι ἂν ἡμᾶς τοσούσδε ὄντας εὐεργετήσης—ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ
σοι λέγω τὸ γ' ἐμὸν, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὐδ' οἶμαι ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης
κερδαλέωτερον εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔάν τις αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ διακωλύῃ πράττειν ἅ
βούλεται. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ
λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι, ὅμως ἐμέ γε οὐ πείθει ὥς ἔστι τῆς δικαιοσύνης
κερδαλέωτερον. ταῦτ' οὖν

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καὶ ἕτερος ἴσως τις ἡμῶν πέπονθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγώ· πεῖσον οὖν, ὦ μακάριε,
ικανῶς ἡμᾶς ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευόμεθα δικαιοσύνην ἀδικίας περὶ
πλείονος ποιούμενοι.

καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νυνδὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεισαι, τί σοι ἔτι
ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον;
μὰ Δι', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ σὺ γε· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν, ἅ ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔμμενε τούτοις, ἢ
ἔάν μεταπιθῇ, φανερώς μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπάτα. νῦν δὲ ὀρθῶς, ὦ
Θρασύμαχε—ἔτι

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γὰρ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψόμεθα—ὅτι τὸν ὥς ἀληθῶς ἱατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον
ὀριζόμενος τὸν ὥς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ὥου δεῖν ὕστερον ἀκριβῶς
φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ παινεῖν οἶει αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθ' ὅσον ποιμὴν ἔστιν, οὐ
πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα ἀλλ', ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ
μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι, πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς τὸ

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ἀποδόσθαι, ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα. τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δῆπου
ἄλλου του μέλει ἢ ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ—ἐπεὶ
τά γε αὐτῆς ὥστ' εἶναι βελτίστη ἱκανῶς δῆπου ἐκπεπόρισται, ἔως γ' ἂν
μηδὲν ἐνδὲρ τοῦ ποιμενικῆ εἶναι—οὕτω δὲ ὥμην ἔγωγε νυνδὴ ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθ' ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ

βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ

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ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ, ἔν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ. σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, ἐκόντας οἶει ἄρχειν;

μὰ Δί' οὐκ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα.

τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε; τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἐκὼν, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφελίαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ

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τοῖς ἀρχομένοις; ἔπει τοσόνδε εἰπέ· οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φαμέν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι, τῷ ἑτέραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν; καί, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν.

ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέρα.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὠφελίαν ἐκάστη τούτων ἰδίαν τινὰ ἡμῖν παρέχεται ἀλλ' οὐ κοινήν, οἷον ἱατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίειαν, κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως;

πάννυ γε.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθόν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις· ἢ τὴν ἱατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἢ ἑάνπερ βούλῃ ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ ὑπέθευ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἐὰν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιῆς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ συμφέρον αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἔνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἱατρικὴν;

οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.

οὐδὲ γ', οἶμαι, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, ἐὰν ὑγιαίνει τις μισθαρνῶν.

οὐ δῆτα.

τί δέ; τὴν ἱατρικὴν μισθαρνητικὴν, ἐὰν ἰώμενός τις μισθαρνῇ;

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οὐκ ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τὴν γε ὠφελίαν ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαν ὠμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; ἔστω, ἔφη.

ἦντινα ἄρα ὠφελίαν κοινῇ ὠφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὅτι κοινῇ τινι τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρῶμενοι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὠφελοῦνται.

ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

φαμέν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένους ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρῆσθαι τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς.

συνέφη μόγις.

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οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάστῳ αὕτη ἡ ὠφελία ἐστίν, ἢ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις, ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἢ μὲν ἱατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, ἢ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν, καὶ ἢ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἢ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ αὐτῇ ἐπομένη μισθόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι οὕτως τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον

ἐργάζεται καὶ ὠφελεῖ ἐκεῖνο ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτῇ προσγίγνηται, ἔσθ' ὅτι ὠφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; οὐ φαίνεται, ἔφη.

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ἄρ' οὖν οὐδ' ὠφελεῖ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργάζεται; οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἤδη δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτῇ ὠφελίμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ', ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἥττονος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος.

διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Θρασύμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδὲνα ἐθέλειν ἐκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθοῦντα,

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ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξειν οὐδέποτε αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ· ὣν δὴ ἔνεκα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τιμὴν, ἢ ζημίαν ἐὰν μὴ ἄρχῃ.

πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς γινώσκω, τὴν δὲ ζημίαν ἥντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἴρηκας, οὐ συνῆκα.

τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἄρα μισθόν, ἔφην, οὐ συνιεῖς, δι' ὃν

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ἄρχουσιν οἱ ἐπικεκέστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλωσιν ἄρχειν. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἔστιν; ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτε χρημάτων ἔνεκα ἐθέλουσιν ἄρχειν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε τιμῆς· οὔτε γὰρ φανερώς πραττόμενοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἔνεκα μισθὸν μισθωτοὶ βούλονται κεκληῖσθαι, οὔτε λάθρα αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς λαμβάνοντες κλέπται. οὐδ' αὖ τιμῆς ἔνεκα· οὐ γὰρ εἰσι φιλότιμοι. δεῖ δὴ

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αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσεῖναι καὶ ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν—ὅθεν κινδυνεύει τὸ ἐκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἵεναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι—τῆς δὲ ζημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃ ἄρχειν· ἦν δεισαντές μοι φαίνονται ἄρχειν, ὅταν ἄρχωσιν, οἱ ἐπικεκίς, καὶ τότε ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν οὐχ ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθὸν τι ἰόντες οὐδ' ὡς εὐπαθήσοντες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ'

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ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἑαυτῶν βελτίσιον ἐπιτρέψαι οὐδὲ ὁμοίοις. ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο, περιμάχητον ἂν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν ὥσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἂν καταφανὲς γενέσθαι ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ· ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γινώσκων τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἔλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν.

τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε οὐδαμῇ συγχωρῶ

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Θρασυμάχῳ, ὡς τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰς αὐθις σκεψόμεθα· πολὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖ μεῖζον εἶναι ὃ νῦν λέγει Θρασύμαχος, τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω ἢ τὸν τοῦ δικαίου. σὺ οὖν ποτέρως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, αἰρή; καὶ πότερον ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι;

τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἔγωγε λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶναι.

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ἤκουσας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα ἄρτι Θρασύμαχος ἀγαθὰ διῆλθεν τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου; ἤκουσα, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐ πείθομαι.

βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πειθόμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθα πη ἐξευρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει; πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἂν μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγωμεν αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὅσα αὐτὸ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὐθις οὗτος, καὶ ἄλλον ἡμεῖς, ἀριθμεῖν δεήσει

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τάγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν ὅσα ἑκάτεροι ἐν ἑκατέρῳ λέγομεν, καὶ ἤδη δικαστῶν τινων τῶν διακρινούντων δεησόμεθα· ἂν δὲ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἀνομολογοῦμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἅμα αὐτοὶ τε δικασταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα. πάννυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ὅποτερως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει.

οὕτως, ἔφη.

ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀποκρίναι ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν τελέας οὔσης δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῆς εἶναι;

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πάννυ μὲν οὖν καὶ φημί, ἔφη, καὶ δι' ἃ, εἴρηκα.

φέρε δὴ, τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μὲν που ἀρετὴν αὐτοῖν καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν;

εἰκός γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἡδιστε, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὐ.

ἀλλὰ τί μήν;

τούναντιον, ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἦ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν;

οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάννυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν.

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τὴν ἀδικίαν ἄρα κακοήθειαν καλεῖς;

οὐκ, ἀλλ' εὐβουλίαν, ἔφη.

ἦ καὶ φρόνιμοί σοι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι;

οἷ γε τελέως, ἔφη, οἷοι τε ἀδικεῖν, πόλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑπ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι· σὺ δὲ οἶμι με ἴσως τοὺς τὰ βαλλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας

λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἥ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάνπερ λανθάνῃ· ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἄξια λόγου, ἀλλ' ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον.

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τοῦτο μὲν, ἔφην, οὐκ ἄγνοῶ ὃ βούλει λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τιθεῖς μέρος τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις.

ἀλλὰ πάνν οὕτω τίθημι.

τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥδη στερεώτερον, ὧ ἔταίρε, καὶ οὐκέτι ῥάδιον ἔχειν ὅτι τις εἴπῃ.

εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὡμολόγεις εἶναι ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἂν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες· νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἰ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα αὐτῷ πάντα προσθήσεις

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ἃ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετιθεμεν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφία ἐτόλμησας θεῖναι.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, μαντεύῃ.

ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποκνητέον γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελεῖν σκοπούμενον, ἕως ἂν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἄπερ διανοῇ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖς σύ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὐ σκώπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν.

τί δέ σοι, ἔφη, τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις;

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οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι πειρῷ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τί σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλεον ἔχειν; οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀστεῖος, ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ εὐήθης.

τί δέ; τῆς δικαίας πράξεως;

οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας, ἔφη.

τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου πότερον ἀξιοῖ ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῖτο;

ἡγοῖτ' ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο.

ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν

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δικαίου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλεον ἔχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου; ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει.

τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἀδίκος; ἄρα ἀξιοῖ τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως;

πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη, ὅς γε πάντων πλεον ἔχειν ἀξιοῖ;

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου γε ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἀδίκος πλεονεκτῆσει καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ;

ἔστι ταῦτα.

ὥδε δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔφην· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ

ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ

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τοῦ ἀνομοίου;

ἄριστα, ἔφη, εἴρηκας.

ἔστιν δέ γε, ἔφην, φρόνιμός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερος;
καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, εὔ.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ
δίκαιος οὐκ ἔοικεν;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ἔφη, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὦν καὶ εἰκέναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ
εἰκέναι;

καλῶς. τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷσπερ ἔοικεν;

ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει; ἔφη.

εἶεν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· μουσικὸν δέ τινα λέγεις, ἔτερον δὲ

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ἄμουσον;

ἔγωγε.

πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα;

τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν δήπου φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἄμουσον ἄφρονα.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ἂ δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν;

ναί.

τί δὲ ἱατρικόν; οὐχ οὕτως;

οὕτως.

δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν τις σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ ἀρμοστόμενος λύραν ἐθέλειν
μουσικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ
ἄξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν;

οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

τί δέ; ἀμούσου;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

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τί δὲ ἱατρικός; ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἂν τι ἱατρικοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ
ἀνδρὸς ἢ πράγματος;

οὐ διῆτα.

μὴ ἱατρικοῦ δέ;

ναί.

περὶ πάσης δὴ ὅρα ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης εἰ τις σοι δοκεῖ
ἐπιστήμων ὅστισοῦν πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἰρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅσα ἄλλος ἐπιστήμων ἢ
πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταῦτά τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πράξιν.

ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο γε οὕτως ἔχειν.

τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως μὲν ἐπιστήμονος

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πλεονεκτήσειεν ἂν, ὁμοίως δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονος;

ἴσως.

ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός;

φημί.

ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός;

φημί.

ὁ ἄρα ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἐθελήσει πλεονεκτεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναντίου.

ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

ὁ δὲ κακός τε καὶ ἀμαθής τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

φαίνεται.

οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ἄδικος ἡμῖν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὁμοίου πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;

ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

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ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτῇσει, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου; ναι.

ἔοικεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ.

κινδυνεύει.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὠμολογοῦμεν, ὦ γε ὁμοῖος ἐκάτερος εἴη, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐκάτερον εἶναι.

ὠμολογοῦμεν γάρ.

ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται ὦν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός.

ὁ δὲ Θρασύμαχος ὠμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, οὐχ

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ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥαδίως λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐλκόμενος καὶ μόγις, μετὰ ἰδρωτός θαυμαστοῦ ὅσου, ἄτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος—τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ, πρότερον δὲ οὐπω, Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα—ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὖν διωμολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτω κείσθω, ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρόν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν. ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε;

μέμνημαι, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε οὐδὲ ἂ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. εἰ οὖν λέγοιμι, εὔ οἶδ' ὅτι

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δημηγορεῖν ἂν με φαίης. ἢ οὖν ἔα με εἰπεῖν ὅσα βούλομαι, ἢ, εἰ βούλει ἐρωτᾶν, ἐρώτα· ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶν ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγουσῆς, εἶεν ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι.

μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρὰ γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν.

ὥστε σοί, ἔφη, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδὴ περ οὐκ ἔῃς λέγειν. καίτοι τί ἄλλο βούλει; οὐδὲν μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, ποίει· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐρωτήσω. ἐρώτα δὴ.

τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξῆς διασκεψώμεθα

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τὸν λόγον, ὅποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὃν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχθη γάρ που

ὅτι καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἶη ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δέ γ',
ἔφην, εἴπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν δικαιοσύνη, ῥαδίως οἶμαι φανήσεται
καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἡ ἀδικία—οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι
τοῦτο ἀγνοήσκειν—ἀλλ' οὐ τι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὡς Θρασύμαχε, ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ,
ἀλλὰ τῇδὲ πη σκέψασθαι·

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πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως
καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ' ἐαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην;
πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη. καὶ τοὔτό γε ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα
οὔσα ἄδικος.

μανθάνω, ἔφην, ὅτι σὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ τόδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ·
πότερον ἢ κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν
ταύτην ἔξει, ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης;

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εἰ μὲν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες ἔχει—ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία—μετὰ
δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἀδικίας.

πάνυ ἄγαμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεις μόνον καὶ
ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνη πάνυ καλῶς.

σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι.

εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε· δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν ἢ
στρατόπεδον ἢ ληστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κοινῇ ἐπὶ τι ἔρχεται
ἀδίκως, πρᾶξαι ἂν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῖεν ἀλλήλους;

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οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

τί δ' εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖεν; οὐ μᾶλλον;

πάνυ γε.

στάσεις γάρ που, ὡς Θρασύμαχε, ἢ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις
παρέχει, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν· ἦ γάρ;

ἔστω, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι.

ἀλλ' εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὡς ἄριστε. τόδε δέ μοι λέγε· ἄρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον
ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις
ἐγγιγνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι
κοινῇ μετ'

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ἀλλήλων πράττειν;

πάνυ γε.

τί δὲ ἂν ἐν δυοῖν ἐγγένηται; οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσουσιν καὶ ἐχθροὶ
ἔσονται ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις;

ἔσονται, ἔφη.

ἐὰν δὲ δῇ, ὡς θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἐνὶ ἐγγένηται ἀδικία, μὴν μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὐτῆς
δύναμιν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἥττον ἔξει;

μηδὲν ἥττον ἐχέτω, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινὰ φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἶαν, ὥς ἂν ἐγγένηται,
εἴτε πόλει τινὲ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ εἴτε

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ἄλλω ὀτῶοῦν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν μεθ' αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι, ἔτι δ' ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ; οὐχ οὕτως;

πάνυ γε.

καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ δὴ οἴμαι ἐνοῦσα ταῦτά ταῦτα ποιήσει ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις· ἦ γάρ;

ναί.

δίκαιοι δέ γ' εἰσίν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ οἱ θεοί;

ἔστω, ἔφη.

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καὶ θεοῖς ἄρα ἐχθρὸς ἔσται ὁ ἄδικος, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλος. εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἔφη, θαρρῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐγωγέ σοι ἐναντιώσομαι, ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι.

ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μοι τῆς ἐστιάσεως ἀποπλήρωσον ἀποκρινόμενος ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲ πράττειν μετ' ἀλλήλων οἴοι

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τε—ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὕς φαμεν ἐρρωμένως πώποτε τι μετ' ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πρᾶξαι ἀδίκους ὄντας, τοῦτο οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθὲς λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μῆτοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ' οὓς ἦσαν ἅμα ἀδικεῖν, δι' ἣν ἐπραξαν ἃ ἐπραξαν, ὥρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικία ἡμιμόχθηροι ὄντες, ἐπεὶ οἱ γε παμπόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἄδικοι τελέως εἰσὶ καὶ πράττειν ἀδύνατοι—ταῦτα

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μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει μανθάνω, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον ζῶσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι εἰσίν, ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προυθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, σκεπτέον. φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν· ὅμως δ' ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρή ζῆν.

σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη.

σκοπῶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι λέγε· δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον;

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ἔμοιγε.

ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἦ μόνω ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα;

οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη.

ἀλλ' ὥδε· ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς;

οὐ δῆτα.

τί δέ; ἀκούσας ἄλλω ἢ ὤσιν;
οὐδαμῶς.
οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φαρμέν ἔργα εἶναι;
πάνυ γε.

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τί δέ; μαχαίρα ἂν ἀμπέλου κλῆμα ἀποτέμοις καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς;
πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ἀλλ' οὐδενὶ γ' ἂν οἷμαι οὕτω καλῶς ὥς δρεπάνω τῷ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐργασθέντι.
ἀληθῆ.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο τούτου ἔργον θήσομεν;
θήσομεν μὲν οὖν.

νῦν δὴ οἷμαι ἄμεινον ἂν μάθοις ὃ ἄρτι ἡρώτων, πυνθανόμενος εἰ οὐ τοῦτο
ἐκάστου εἴη ἔργον ὃ ἂν ἡ μόνον τι ἡ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζεταιται.

ἀλλὰ, ἔφη, μανθάνω τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἐκάστου

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πράγματος ἔργον εἶναι.

εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ὥπερ καὶ ἔργον τι
προστέτακται; ἴωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν· ὀφθαλμῶν, φαρμέν, ἔστι τι ἔργον;
ἔστιν.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔστιν;

καὶ ἀρετή.

τί δέ; ὥτων ἦν τι ἔργον;

ναί.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετή;

καὶ ἀρετή.

τί δὲ πάντων περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οὕτω;

οὕτω.

ἔχε δὴ· ἄρ' ἂν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς

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ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς
κακίαν;

καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἔφη· τυφλότητα γὰρ ἴσως λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὀψεως.

ἦτις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετὴ· οὐ γὰρ πω τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ
μὲν ἀρετῇ τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακία δὲ κακῶς.

ἀληθές, ἔφη, τοῦτο γε λέγεις.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὥτα στερόμενα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον
ἀπεργάσεται;

πάνυ γε.

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τίθεμεν οὖν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ἴθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι. ψυχῆς ἔστιν τι ἔργον ὃ ἄλλω τῶν ὄντων
οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ πράξει, οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε· τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ

βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαῖμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι;

οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ.

τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; οὐ ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι;

μάλιστα γ', ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι;

φαμέν.

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ἄρ' οὖν ποτε, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ψυχὴ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα εὖ ἀπεργάζεται

στερομένη τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον;

ἀδύνατον.

ἀνάγκη ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὖ πράττειν.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴν γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ

ἀδικίαν;

συνεχωρήσαμεν γάρ.

ἢ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὖ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄδικος.

φαίνεται, ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

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ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τάναντία.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμων, ὁ δ' ἄδικος ἄθλιος.

ἔστω, ἔφη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, εὐδαίμονα δέ.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

οὐδέποτε· ἄρα, ὦ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης.

ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδίοις.

ὑπὸ σοῦ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδὴ μοι πρῶτος ἐγένου καὶ

χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω. οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε

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εἰστίαιμαι, δι' ἐμαυτὸν ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ· ἄλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ ἀεὶ

παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἀρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως

ἀπολαῦσαι, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω, πρὶν ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὐρεῖν,

τὸ δίκαιον ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφόμενος ἐκείνου ὀρμῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ

αὐτοῦ εἴτε κακία ἐστὶν καὶ ἀμαθία, εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος

αὖ ὕστερον λόγου, ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἢ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ

ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν

ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν

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εἰδέναι· ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ ἐστιν, σχολῇ εἶσομαι εἴτε ἀρετὴ τις

οὔσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ

εὐδαίμων.

Republic

English translation

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I[*] went down yesterday to the Peiraeus[*] with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions[*] to the Goddess,[*] and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration.[*] I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show, made by the marching of the Thracian contingent.

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After we had said our prayers and seen the spectacle we were starting for town when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us from a distance as we were hastening homeward[*] and ordered his boy[*] run and bid us to wait[*] for him, and the boy caught hold[*] of my himation from behind and said, Polemarchus wants you to wait. And I turned around and asked where his master[*] was. There he is, he said, behind you, coming this way. Wait for him. So we will, said Glaucon,

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and shortly after Polemarchus came up and Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a few others apparently from the procession. Whereupon Polemarchus said, Socrates, you appear to have turned your faces townward and to be going to leave us. Not a bad guess, said I. But you see how many we are? he said. Surely. You must either then prove yourselves the better men[*] or stay here. Why, is there not left, said I, the alternative of our persuading[*] you that you ought to let us go? But could you persuade us, said he, if we refused to listen? Nohow, said Glaucon. Well, we won't listen, and you might as well make up your minds to it.

Do you mean to say, interposed Adeimantus,

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that you haven't heard that there is to be a torchlight race[*] this evening on horseback in honor of the Goddess? On horseback? said I. That is a new idea. Will they carry torches and pass them along to one another as they race with the horses, or how do you mean? That's the way of it, said Polemarchus, and, besides, there is to be a night festival which will be worth seeing. For after dinner we will get up[*] and go out and see the sights and meet a lot of the lads there and have good talk. So stay

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and do as we ask.[*] It looks as if we should have to stay, said Glaucon. Well, said I, if it so be, so be it.

So we went with them to Polemarchus's house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, yes, and[*] Thrasymachus, too, of Chalcedon, and Charmantides of the deme of Paeania, and Kleitophon the son of Aristonymus. And the father of Polemarchus, Cephalus, was also at home.

And I thought him much aged,

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for it was a long time since I had seen him. He was sitting on a sort of couch with cushions and he had a chaplet[*] on his head, for he had just finished sacrificing in the court. So we went and sat down beside him, for there were seats there disposed in a circle.[*] As soon as he saw me Cephalus greeted me and said, You are not a very frequent[*] visitor, Socrates. You don't often come down to the Peiraeus to see us. That is not right. For if I were still able to make the journey up to town easily there would be no need of your resorting hither,

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but we would go to visit you. But as it is you should not space too widely your visits here. For I would have you know that, for my part, as the satisfactions of the body decay,[*] in the same measure my desire for the pleasures of good talk and my delight in them increase. Don't refuse then, but be yourself a companion to these lads and make our house your resort and regard us as your very good friends and intimates. Why, yes, Cephalus, said I, and I enjoy talking with the very aged.

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For to my thinking we have to learn of them as it were from wayfarers[*] who have preceded us on a road on which we too, it may be, must some time fare—what[*] it is like—is it rough[*] and hard going or easy and pleasant to travel. And so now I would fain learn of you what you think of this thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that the poets call the threshold[*] of old age. Is it a hard part of life to bear or what report have you to make of it? Yes, indeed, Socrates, he said, I will tell you my own feeling about it.

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For it often happens that some of us elders of about the same age come together and verify[*] the old saw of like to like. At these reunions most of us make lament, longing for the lost joys of youth and recalling to mind the pleasures of wine, women, and feasts, and other things thereto appertaining, and they repine in the belief that the greatest things have been taken from them and that then they lived well and now it is no life at all.[*] And some of them

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complain of the indignities that friends and kinsmen put upon old age and thereto recite a doleful litany[*] of all the miseries for which they blame old age. But in my opinion, Socrates, they do not put the blame on the real cause. [*] For if it were the cause I too should have had the same experience so far as old age is concerned, and so would all others who have come to this time of life. But in fact I have ere now met with others who do not feel in this way, and in particular I remember hearing Sophocles the poet greeted by a fellow who asked,

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How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your natural force still unabated? And he replied, Hush, man, most gladly have I escaped this thing you talk of, as if I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master. [*] I thought it a good answer then and now I think so still more. For in very truth there comes to old age a great tranquillity in such matters and a blessed release. When the fierce tensions[*] of the passions and desires relax, then is the word of Sophocles approved,

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and we are rid of many and mad[*] masters. But indeed in respect of these complaints and in the matter of our relations with kinsmen and friends there is just one cause, Socrates—not old age, but the character of the man. For if men are temperate and cheerful[*] even old age is only moderately burdensome. But if the reverse, old age, Socrates, and youth are hard for such dispositions. And I was filled with admiration[*] for the man by these words, and desirous of hearing more I tried to draw him out and said, I fancy,

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Cephalus, that most people, when they hear you talk in this way, are not convinced but think that you bear old age lightly not because of your character but because of your wealth. For the rich, they say, have many consolations.[*]

You are right, he said. They don't accept my view and there is something in their objection, though not so much as they suppose. But the retort of Themistocles comes in pat here, who, when a man from the little island of Seriphus[*] grew abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to himself

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but to the city from which he came, replied that neither would he himself ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the other if he had been an Athenian. And the same principle applies excellently to those who not being rich take old age hard; for neither would the reasonable man find it altogether easy to endure old age conjoined with poverty, nor would the unreasonable man by the attainment of riches ever attain to self-contentment and a cheerful temper. May I ask, Cephalus, said I, whether you inherited most of your possessions or acquired them yourself? Acquired, eh? he said.

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As a moneymaker, I hold a place somewhere halfway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather and namesake[*] inherited about as much property as I now possess and multiplied it many times, my father Lysanias reduced it below the present amount, and I am content if I shall leave the estate to these boys not less but by some slight measure more than my inheritance. The reason I asked, I said, is that you appear to me not to be overfond of money.

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And that is generally the case with those who have not earned it themselves. [*] But those who have themselves acquired it have a double reason in comparison with other men for loving it. For just as poets feel complacency about their own poems and fathers about their own sons,[*] so men who have made money take this money seriously as their own creation and they also value it for its uses as other people do. So they are hard to talk to since they are unwilling to commend anything except wealth.

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You are right, he replied. I assuredly am, said I. But tell me further this. What do you regard as the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the possession of property? Something, he said, which I might not easily bring many to believe if I told them.[*] For let me tell you, Socrates, he said, that when a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did not occur to him. The tales that are told of the world below and how the men who have done wrong here must pay the penalty there,[*] though he may have laughed them down[*] hitherto,

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then begin to torture his soul with the doubt that there may be some truth in them. And apart from that the man himself[*] either from the weakness of old age or possibly as being now nearer to the things beyond has a somewhat clearer view of them. Be that as it may, he is filled with doubt, surmises, and alarms and begins to reckon up and consider whether he has ever wronged anyone.

Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts up[*] even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is conscious of no wrong

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that he has done a sweet hope[*] ever attends and a goodly to be nurse of his old age, as Pindar[*] too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and piety sweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanies

Hope, who chiefly rules the changeful mind of mortals.

Pindar Frag. 214, Loeb That is a fine saying and an admirable. It is for this, then, that I affirm that the possession of wealth is of most value

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not it may be to every man but to the good man. Not to cheat any man even unintentionally or play him false, not remaining in debt to a god[*] for some sacrifice or to a man for money, so to depart in fear to that other world—to this result the possession of property contributes not a little. It has also many other uses. But, setting one thing against another, I would lay it down, Socrates, that for a man of sense this is the chief service of wealth. An

admirable sentiment, Cephalus,

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said I. But speaking of this very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualification[*] that it is truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I mean, for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly—nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth

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to one who was in that state. You are right, he replied. Then this is not the definition of justice: to tell the truth and return what one has received. Nay, but it is, Socrates, said Polemarchus breaking in, if indeed we are to put any faith in Simonides. Very well, said Cephalus, indeed I make over the whole argument[*] to you. For it is time for me to attend the sacrifices. Well, said I, is not Polemarchus the heir of everything that is yours? Certainly, said he with a laugh, and at the same time went out to the sacred rites.[*]

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Tell me, then, you the inheritor of the argument, what it is that you affirm that Simonides says and rightly says about justice. That it is just, he replied, to render to each his due.[*] In saying this I think he speaks well.

I must admit, said I, that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man.[*] But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit[*] to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited

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is due to him in a sense, is it not? Yes. But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being his right mind. True, said he. It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due. Something else in very deed, he replied, for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil. I see, said I; you mean that[*] he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold

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if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn't that what you say Simonides means? Quite so. But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due? By all means, he said, what is due[*] and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil.

It was a riddling[*] definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the

manner of poets; for while his meaning,

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it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due. What else do you suppose? said he. In heaven's name! said I, suppose[*] someone had questioned him thus: Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine.[*] What do you take it would have been his answer? Obviously, he said, the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks. And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art?

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Seasoning to meats. Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice. If we are to follow the previous examples,[*] Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies. To do good to friends and evil to enemies,[*] then, is justice in his meaning? I think so. Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health? The physician.

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And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea? The pilot. Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies? In making war and as an ally, I should say. Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them. True. And so to those who are not at sea the pilot. Yes. Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?

By no means. There is a use then even in peace for justice?

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Yes, it is useful. But so is agriculture, isn't it? Yes. Namely, for the getting of a harvest? Yes. But likewise the cobbler's art? Yes. Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes. Certainly. Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace? In engagements and dealings, Socrates. And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else? Associations, of course. Is it the just man,

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then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draught-player? The player. And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder? By no means. Then what is the association[*] in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as a harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords? For money-dealings,[*] I think. Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common

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or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn't it so?

Apparently. And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot. It would

seem so. What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner? When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates. You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idle[*]? Quite so. Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it?

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It looks that way. And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vinedresser's art is useful? Apparently. And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made use of, the military art and music. Necessarily. And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful? It looks that way.

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Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worth[*] if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard against[*] a blow? Assuredly. Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection? I think so.

But again

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the very same man is a good guardian of an army who is good at stealing a march[*] upon the enemy in respect of their designs and proceedings generally. Certainly. Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skilful guardian, of that he is also a skilful thief? It seems so. If then the just man is an expert in guarding money he is an expert in stealing it. The argument certainly points that way.[*] A kind of thief then the just man it seems has turned out to be, and it is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer.[*] For he regards with complacency Autolycus,[*]

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the maternal uncle of Odysseus, and says
he was gifted beyond all men in thievery and perjury.

Hom. Od. 19.395 So justice, according to you and Homer and Simonides, seems to be a kind of stealing, with the qualification that it is for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies. Isn't that what you meant? No, by Zeus, he replied. I no longer know what I did mean.[*] Yet this I still believe, that justice benefits friends and harms enemies.

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May I ask whether by friends you mean those who seem[*] to a man to be worthy or those who really are so, even if they do not seem, and similarly of enemies? It is likely, he said, that men will love those whom they suppose to be good and dislike those whom they deem bad. Do not men make mistakes in this matter so that many seem good to them who are not and the reverse?

They do. For those, then, who thus err the good are their enemies and the bad their friends? Certainly. But all the same is then just for them to benefit the bad

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and injure the good? It would seem so. But again the good are just and incapable of injustice. True. On your reasoning then it is just to wrong those who do no injustice. Nay, nay, Socrates, he said, the reasoning can't be right. [*] Then, said I, it is just to harm the unjust and benefit the just. That seems a better conclusion than the other. It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have misjudged men that it is just to harm their friends,

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for they have got bad ones, and to benefit their enemies, for they are good. And so we shall find ourselves saying the very opposite of what we affirmed Simonides to mean. Most certainly, he said, it does work out so. But let us change our ground; for it looks as if we were wrong in the notion we took up about the friend and the enemy. What notion, Polemarchus? That the man who seems to us good is the friend. And to what shall we change it now? said I.

That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that he who seems

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but is not really so seems but is not really the friend. And there will be the same assumption about the enemy. Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy. Yes. So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad?

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By all means, he said, that, I think, would be the right way to put it.

Is it then, said I, the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever?[*]

Certainly it is, he replied; a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies. When horses[*] are harmed does it make them better or worse?

Worse. In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses? Of horses. And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue? Necessarily.

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And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse? Assuredly. And is not justice the specific virtue of man?[*] That too must be granted. Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust. It seems so. Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music? Impossible. Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses? No. By justice then do the just make men unjust,

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or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad? Nay, it is impossible. It is not, I take it, the function[*] of heat to chill but of its opposite. Yes. Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite. Assuredly. Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite. So it appears. But the just man is good? Certainly. It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite. I think you are altogether right,
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Socrates. If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this, that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just man[*] and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone. I concede it, he said. We will take up arms against him, then, said I, you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or Bias[*] or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed said such a thing. I, for my part, he said, am ready to join in the battle with you.

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Do you know, said I, to whom I think the saying belongs—this statement that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies? To whom? he said. I think it was the saying of Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias[*] the Theban or some other rich man who had great power in his own conceit.[*] That is most true, he replied. Very well, said I, since it has been made clear that this too is not justice and the just, what else is there that we might say justice to be?[*]

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Now Thrasymachus,[*] even while we were conversing, had been trying several times to break in and lay hold of the discussion but he was restrained by those who sat by him who wished to hear the argument out. But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn't any longer hold his peace. But gathering himself up like a wild beast he hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces. And Polemarchus and I were frightened and fluttered apart, and he bawled out into our midst,

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What balderdash is this that you have been talking, and why do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? But if you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don't merely ask questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone gives—since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them,[*] but do you yourself answer and tell

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what you say the just is. And don't you be telling me[*] that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won't take from you any such drivel as that! And I, when I heard him, was

dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have lost my voice.[*] But as it is, at the very moment when he began to be exasperated by the course of the argument

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I glanced at him first, so that I became capable of answering him and said with a light tremor: Thrasyarchus, don't be harsh[*] with us. If I and my friend have made mistakes in the consideration of the question, rest assured that it is unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not suppose that while[*] if our quest were for gold[*] we would never willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in the search and so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for justice, a thing more precious than much fine gold, we should then be so foolish as to give way to one another and not rather do our serious best to have it discovered.

You surely must not suppose that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more reasonably receive

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from clever fellows like you than severity.

And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said, Ye gods! here we have the well-known irony[*] of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you. That's because you are wise, Thrasyarchus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve,

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and in putting the question warned him: don't you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won't accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, Thrasyarchus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth,

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or what do you mean? What would have been your answer to him? Humph! said he, how very like the two cases are! There is nothing to prevent, said I; yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don't? Is that, then, said he, what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers? I shouldn't be surprised, I said, if on reflection that would be my view. What then,

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he said, if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve? Why, what else, said I, than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer. I like your simplicity,[*] said he; but in addition to learning you must pay a fine of money. Well, I will when I have got it, I said. It is there, said Glaucon: if money is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates. Oh yes, of course, 337e

said he, so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.

Why, how, I said, my dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn't give any of his suppositions as an answer?

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Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don't be obstinate, but do me the favor to reply and don't be chary[*] of your wisdom, and instruct Glaucon here and the rest of us.

When I had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It was quite plain that Thrasymachus was eager to speak in order that he might do himself credit, since he believed that he had a most excellent answer to our question. But he demurred and pretended to make a point of my being the respondent. Finally he gave way and then said,

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Here you have the wisdom of Socrates, to refuse himself to teach, but go about and learn from others and not even pay thanks[*] therefor. That I learn from others, I said, you said truly, Thrasymachus. But in saying that I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack.[*] But that I praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know forthwith as soon as you have given your answer.

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For I think that you will speak well. Harken and hear then, said he. I affirm that the just is nothing else than[*] the advantage of the stronger.[*] Well, why don't you applaud? Nay, you'll do anything but that. Provided only I first understand your meaning, said I; for I don't yet apprehend it. The advantage of the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do you mean by this? I presume you don't intend to affirm this, that if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and the flesh of beeves[*] is advantageous for him,

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for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker than he both advantageous and just. You're a buffoon,[*] Socrates, and take my statement[*] in the most detrimental sense. Not at all, my dear fellow said I; I only want you to make your meaning plainer.[*] Don't you know then, said he, that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy rules, in others aristocracy?[*] Assuredly. And is not this the thing that is strong and has the mastery[*] in each—the ruling party? Certainly.

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And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the rulers'—advantage and the man who deviates[*] from this law they chastise as a law-breaker and a wrongdoer. This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states

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—the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere,[*] the advantage of the stronger. Now, said I, I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer.

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But you add thereto that of the stronger. A trifling addition[*] perhaps you think it, he said. It is not yet clear[*] whether it is a big one either; but that we must inquire whether what you say is true, is clear.[*] For since I too admit that the just is something that is of advantage[*]—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don't profess to know,[*] we must pursue the inquiry. Inquire away, he said.

I will do so, said I. Tell me, then; you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just?

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I do. May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallible[*] or capable sometimes of error? Surely, he said, they are liable to err. Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not? So I suppose. And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not? That. But whatever they enact[*] must be performed by their subjects and is justice? Of course.

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Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage. What's that you're saying?[*] he replied. What you yourself are saying,[*] I think. Let us

consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that admitted? I think it was, he replied.

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Then you will have to think,[*] I said, that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers unwittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapient[*] Thrasymachus, that it is just to do the very opposite[*] of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior

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are commanded to perform.

Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, said Polemarchus, nothing could be more conclusive. Of course, said Cleitophon, breaking in, if you are his witness.[*] What need is there of a witness? Polemarchus said. Thrasymachus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is evil for themselves and yet says that it is just for the subjects to do this. That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus laid it down that it is just to obey the orders[*] of the rulers. Yes, Cleitophon, but he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just.

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And after these two assumptions he again admitted that the stronger sometimes bid the inferior and their subjects do what is to the disadvantage of the rulers. And from these admissions the just would no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary. O well, said Cleitophon, by the advantage of the superior he meant what the superior supposed to be for his advantage. This was what the inferior had to do, and that this is the just was his position. That isn't what he said,

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replied Polemarchus. Never mind, Polemarchus, said I, but if that is Thrasymachus's present meaning, let us take it from him[*] in that sense. So tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you intended to say, that the just is the advantage of the superior as it appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are we to say this was your meaning? Not in the least, he said.[*] Do you suppose that I call one who is in error a superior when he errs? I certainly did suppose that you meant that, I replied, when you agreed that rulers are not infallible

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but sometimes make mistakes. That is because you argue like a pettifogger, Socrates. Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet

that is what we say literally—we say that the physician[*] erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these
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in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision,[*] no craftsman errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred.

It is in this loose way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you a little while ago. But the most precise statement is that other, that the ruler

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in so far forth as ruler does not err, and not erring he enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, even as I meant from the start, I say the just is to do what is for the advantage of the stronger.

So then, Thrasymachus, said I, my manner of argument seems to you pettifogging? It does, he said. You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question? I don't think it, I know it, he said, and you won't make anything by it, for you won't get the better of me by stealth and

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, failing stealth, you are not of the force[*] to beat me in debate. Bless your soul, said I, I wouldn't even attempt such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you mean the so-called ruler[*] or that ruler in the precise sense of whom you were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior it will be just for the inferior to act? I mean the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word, he said. Now bring on against this your cavils and your slyster's tricks if you are able.

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I ask no quarter. But you'll find yourself unable. Why, do you suppose, I said, that I am so mad to try to try to beard a lion[*] and try the pettifogger on Thrasymachus? You did try it just now, he said, paltry fellow though you be.

[*] Something too much[*] of this sort of thing, said I. But tell me, your physician in the precise sense of whom you were just now speaking, is he a moneymaker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick? And remember to speak of the physician who is really such. A healer of the sick, he replied. And what of the lot—the pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor?

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A ruler of sailors. We don't, I fancy, have to take into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he is called a pilot but in respect of his art and his

ruling of the sailors. True, he said. Then for each of them[*] is there not a something that is for his advantage? Quite so. And is it not also true, said I, that the art naturally exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage? Yes, for this. Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage than to be perfect as possible[*]?

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What do you mean by that question? Just as if, I said, you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, By all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which the art was devised. Do you think that would be a correct answer, or not?

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Correct, he said. But how about this? Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence—as the eyes of vision, the ears of hearing, and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and provide what is advantageous for these very ends—does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on ad infinitum, or will the art look out for its own advantage?

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Or is it a fact that it needs neither itself nor another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that precise way of speaking. Is it so or not? It appears to be so, he said. Then medicine, said I,

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does not consider the advantage of medicine but of the body? Yes. Nor horsemanship of horsemanship but of horses, nor does any other art look out for itself—for it has no need—but for that of which it is the art. So it seems, he replied. But surely,[*] Thrasyarchus, the arts do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts. He conceded this but it went very hard. Then no art considers or enjoins[*] the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker

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which is ruled by it. This too he was finally brought to admit though he tried to contest it. But when he had agreed—Can we deny, then, said I, that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician,

precisely speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a moneymaker. Did we agree on that? He assented. And so the precise pilot is a ruler of sailors,

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not a sailor? That was admitted. Then that sort of a pilot and ruler will not consider and enjoin the advantage of the pilot but that of the sailor whose ruler he is. He assented reluctantly. Then, said I, Thrasymachus, neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does.

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When we had come to this point in the discussion and it was apparent to everybody that his formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus, instead of replying,[*] said, Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse? What do you mean? said I. Why didn't you answer me instead of asking such a question? Because, he said, she lets her little snotty run about drivelling[*] and doesn't wipe your face clean, though you need it badly, if she can't get you to know[*] the difference between the shepherd and the sheep. And what, pray, makes you think that? said I. Because you think that the shepherds

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and the neat-herds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers,[*] differ at all in their thoughts of the governed from a man's attitude towards his sheep[*] or that they think of anything else night and day than

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the sources of their own profit. And you are so far out[*] concerning the just and justice and the unjust and injustice that you don't know that justice and the just are literally[*] the other fellow's good[*]—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves; while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just, and they being thus ruled do what is for his advantage who is the stronger and make him happy

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in serving him, but themselves by no manner of means. And you must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way: that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he always has the worst of it. Then again, in their relations

with the state, if there are direct taxes or contributions to be paid, the just man contributes more from an equal estate and the other less, and when there is a distribution

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the one gains much and the other nothing. And so when each holds office, apart from any other loss the just man must count on his own affairs[*] falling into disorder through neglect, while because of his justice makes no profit from the state, and thereto he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man all the opposite advantages accrue.

I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of,

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the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop.[*]

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For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely; for temple-robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves the appellations of those who commit these partial forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious names they are pronounced happy and blessed[*] not only by their fellow-citizens

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but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice.[*] For it is not the fear of doing[*] but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and a more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits man's self and is for his advantage.

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After this Thrasymachus was minded to depart when like a bathman[*] he had poured his speech in a sudden flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent and said, I am surprised at you, Thrasymachus; after hurling[*] such a doctrine at us, can it be that you

propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it is a small matter[*] that you are attempting to determine

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and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while? Well, do I deny it?[*] said Thrasyarchus. You seem to, said I, or else[*] to care nothing for us and so feel no concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know.

Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also:

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it will be no bad investment[*] for you—any benefit that you bestow on such company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitable[*] than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will.[*] But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence,[*] all the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice.

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Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice. And how am I to persuade you?[*] he said. If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ram[*] it into your head? Heaven forbid! I said, don't do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it,[*] or if you shift your ground change openly and don't try to deceive us.

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But, as it is, you see, Thrasyarchus—let us return to the previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd not with regard to what is best for the sheep but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them

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as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherd[*] surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are entirely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd's art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule[*] in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared

for by it,

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alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulers[*]—willingly hold office and rule? I don't think, he said, I know right well they do.

But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule?

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For tell me this: we ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from others because its power or function is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don't answer counter to your real belief.[*] Well, yes, he said, that is what renders it different. And does not each art also yield us benefit[*] that is peculiar to itself and not general,[*] as for example medicine health, the pilot's art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly? Assuredly. And does not the wage-earner's art yield wage? For that is its function.

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Would you identify medicine and the pilot's art? Or if you please to discriminate precisely as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you? Of course not, he said. Neither, I take it, do you call wage-earning medicine if a man earning wages is in health. Surely not.

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But what of this? Do you call medicine wage-earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages? No, he said. And did we not agree that the benefit derived from each art is peculiar to it? So be it, he said. Any common or general benefit that all craftsmen receive, then, they obviously derive from their common use of some further identical thing. It seems so, he said. And we say that the benefit of earning wages accrues to the craftsmen from their further exercise of the wage-earning art. He assented reluctantly. Then the benefit,

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the receiving of wages does not accrue to each from his own art. But if we are to consider it precisely medicine produces health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft? Apparently not, he said. Does he then bestow no benefit either

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when he works for nothing? I'll say he does. Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage the stronger?

That was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people's troubles[*] in hand to straighten them out, but everybody expects pay for that,

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because he who is to exercise the art rightly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. That is the reason, it seems, why pay[*] must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in form of money or honor or a penalty if they refuse.

What do you mean by that, Socrates? said Glaucon. The two wages I recognize, but the penalty you speak of and described as a form of wage I don't understand.[*] Then, said I, you don't understand the wages of the best men

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for the sake of which the finest spirits hold office and rule when they consent to do so. Don't you know that to be covetous of honor and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach? I do, he said. Well, then, said I, that is why the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honor. They do not wish to collect pay openly for their service of rule and be styled hirelings nor to take it by stealth from their office and be called thieves, nor yet for the sake of honor,

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for they are not covetous of honor. So there must be imposed some compulsion and penalty to constrain them to rule if they are to consent to hold office. That is perhaps why to seek office oneself and not await compulsion is thought disgraceful. But the chief penalty is to be governed by someone worse[*] if a man will not himself hold office and rule. It is from fear of this, as it appears to me, that the better sort hold office when they do, and then they go to it not in the expectation of enjoyment nor as to a good thing,[*] but as to a necessary evil and because they are unable to turn it over to better men than themselves

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or to their like. For we may venture to say that, if there should be a city of good men[*] only, immunity from office-holding would be as eagerly contended for as office is now,[*] and there it would be made plain that in very truth the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled; so that every man of understanding would rather choose to be benefited by another than to be bothered with benefiting him. This point then I

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by no means concede to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the superior. But that we will reserve for another occasion.[*] A far weightier matter seems to me Thrasymachus's present statement, his assertion that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. Which now do you choose, Glaucon? said I, and which seems to you to be the truer statement? That the life of the just man is more profitable, I say, he replied.

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Did you hear, said I, all the goods that Thrasymachus just now enumerated for the life of the unjust man? I heard, he said, but I am not convinced. Do you wish us then to try to persuade him, supposing we can find a way, that what he says is not true? Of course I wish it, he said. If then we oppose[*] him in a set speech enumerating in turn the advantages of being just and he replies and we rejoin, we shall have to count up and measure the goods listed in the respective speeches

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and we shall forthwith be in need of judges to decide between us. But if, as in the preceding discussion, we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry, we shall be ourselves both judges and pleaders. Quite so, he said. Which method do you like best? said I. This one, he said.

Come then, Thrasymachus, I said, go back to the beginning and answer us. You affirm that perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice that is complete.

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I affirm it, he said, and have told you my reasons. Tell me then how you would express yourself on this point about them. You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice? Of course. Justice the virtue and injustice the vice? It is likely,[*] you innocent, when I say that injustice pays and justice doesn't pay. But what then, pray? The opposite, he replied. What! justice vice? No, but a most noble simplicity[*] or goodness of heart. Then do you call injustice badness of heart?

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No, but goodness of judgement. Do you also, Thrasymachus, regard the unjust as intelligent and good? Yes, if they are capable of complete injustice, he said, and are able to subject to themselves cities and tribes of men. But you probably suppose that I mean those who take purses. There is profit to be sure even in that sort of thing, he said, if it goes undetected. But such things are not worth taking into the account,

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but only what I just described. I am not unaware of your meaning in that, I said; but this is what surprised me,[*] that you should range injustice under the head of virtue and wisdom, and justice in the opposite class. Well, I do so class them, he said. That, said I, is a stiffer proposition,[*] my friend, and if

you are going as far as that it is hard to know what to answer.

For if your position were that injustice is profitable yet you conceded it to be vicious and disgraceful as some other[*] disputants do, there would be a chance for an argument on conventional principles. But, as it is, you obviously are going to affirm that it is honorable and strong and you will attach to it all the other qualities

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that we were assigning to the just, since you don't shrink from putting it in the category of virtue and wisdom. You are a most veritable prophet, he replied.

Well, said I, I mustn't flinch from following out the logic of the inquiry, so long as I conceive you to be saying what you think.[*] For now,

Thrasymachus, I absolutely believe that you are not mocking us but telling us your real opinions about the truth.[*] What difference does it make to you, he said, whether I believe it or not? Why don't you test the argument?

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No difference, said I, but here is something I want you to tell me in addition to what you have said. Do you think the just man would want to overreach[*] or exceed another just man? By no means, he said; otherwise he would not be the delightful simpleton that he is. And would he exceed or overreach or go beyond the just action? Not that either, he replied. But how would he treat the unjust man—would he deem it proper and just to outdo, overreach, or go beyond him or would he not? He would, he said, but he wouldn't be able to.

That is not my question, I said,

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but whether it is not the fact that the just man does not claim and wish to outdo the just man but only the unjust? That is the case, he replied. How about the unjust then? Does he claim to overreach and outdo the just man and the just action? Of course, he said, since he claims to overreach and get the better of everything. Then the unjust man will overreach and outdo also both the unjust man and the unjust action, and all his endeavor will be to get the most in everything for himself. That is so.

Let us put it in this way, I said; the just man does not seek to take advantage of his like but of his unlike, but the unjust man

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of both. Admirably put, he said. But the unjust man is intelligent and good and the just man neither. That, too, is right, he said. Is it not also true, I said, that the unjust man is like the intelligent and good and the just man is not? Of course, he said, being such he will be like to such and the other not. Excellent. Then each is such[*] as that to which he is like. What else do you suppose? he said. Very well, Thrasymachus,

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but do you recognize that one man is a musician[*] and another unmusical? I do. Which is the intelligent and which the unintelligent? The musician, I

presume, is the intelligent and the unmusical the unintelligent. And is he not good in the things in which he is intelligent[*] and bad in the things in which he is unintelligent? Yes. And the same of the physician? The same. Do you think then, my friend, that any musician in the tuning of a lyre would want to overreach[*] another musician in the tightening and relaxing of the strings or would claim and think fit to exceed or outdo him? I do not. But would the the unmusical man? Of necessity, he said.

And how about the medical man?

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In prescribing food and drink would he want to outdo the medical man or the medical procedure? Surely not. But he would the unmedical man? Yes. Consider then with regard to all[*] forms of knowledge and ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose to do or say other or more than what another who knows would do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in the same action. Why, perhaps it must be so, he said, in such cases. But what of the ignorant man—of him who does not know? Would he not overreach or outdo equally

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the knower and the ignorant? It may be. But the one who knows is wise? I'll say so. And the wise is good? I'll say so. Then he who is good and wise will not wish to overreach his like but his unlike and opposite. It seems so, he said. But the bad man and the ignoramus will overreach both like and unlike? So it appears. And does not our unjust man, Thrasymachus, overreach both unlike and like? Did you not say that? I did, he replied.

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But the just man will not overreach his like but only his unlike? Yes. Then the just man is like the wise and good, and the unjust is like the bad and the ignoramus. It seems likely. But furthermore we agreed that such is each as that to which he is like. Yes, we did. Then the just man has turned out[*] on our hands to be good and wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant.

Thrasymachus made all these admissions

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not as I now lightly narrate them, but with much baulking and reluctance[*] and prodigious sweating, it being summer, and it was then I beheld what I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing.[*] But when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance, Good, said I, let this be taken as established.[*] But we were also affirming that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don't you remember, Thrasymachus? I remember, he said; but I don't agree with what you are now saying either and I have an answer to it,

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but if I were to attempt to state it, I know very well that you would say that I was delivering a harangue.[*] Either then allow me to speak at such length as

I desire,[*] or, if you prefer to ask questions, go on questioning and I, as we do for old wives[*] telling their tales, will say Very good and will nod assent and dissent. No, no, said I, not counter to your own belief. Yes, to please you, he said, since you don't allow me freedom of speech. And yet what more do you want? Nothing, indeed, said I; but if this is what you propose to do, do it and I will ask the questions. Ask on, then.

This, then, is the question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in sequence.

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What is the nature of injustice as compared with justice? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. But now, I said, if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now fail to recognize that—but what I want is not quite so simple[*] as that. I wish, Thrasymachus, to consider it in some such fashion as this. A city, you would say, may be unjust and

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try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection. Certainly, he said; and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete. I understand, I said, that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this, whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice.

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If,[*] he replied, what you were just now saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice; if it is as I said, with injustice. Admirable, Thrasymachus, I said; you not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers. I am trying to please you, he replied.

Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this: do you think that a city,[*] an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another?

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Certainly not, said he. But if they didn't, wouldn't they be more likely to? Assuredly. For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so? So be it, he replied, not to differ from you. That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable

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of effective action in common? By all means. Suppose, then, it springs up

between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just? They will, he said. And then will you tell me that if injustice arises in one[*] it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it? Have it that it keeps it, he said.

And is it not apparent that its force is such that wherever it is found in city, family, camp, or in anything else

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it first renders the thing incapable of cooperation with itself owing to faction and difference, and secondly an enemy to itself[*] and to its opposite in every case, the just? Isn't that so? By all means. Then in the individual too, I presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature to produce. It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an enemy to himself and to the just. Is it not so? Yes. But, my friend,

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the gods too[*] are just. Have it that they are, he said. So to the gods also, it seems, the unjust man will be hateful, but the just man dear. Revel in your discourse, he said, without fear, for I shall not oppose you, so as not to offend your partisans here. Fill up the measure of my feast, [*] then, and complete it for me, I said, by continuing to answer as you have been doing. Now that the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action and the unjust incapable of any common action,

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and that if we ever say that any men who are unjust have vigorously combined to put something over, our statement is not altogether true, for they would not have kept their hands from one another if they had been thoroughly unjust, but it is obvious that there was in them some justice which prevented them from wronging at the same time one another too as well as those whom they attacked; and by dint of this they accomplished whatever they did and set out to do injustice only half corrupted[*] by injustice, since utter rascals completely unjust

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are completely incapable of effective action—all this I understand to be the truth, and not what you originally laid down. But whether it is also true[*] that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier, which is the question we afterwards proposed for examination, is what we now have to consider. It appears even now that they are, I think, from what has already been said. But all the same we must examine it more carefully. [*] For it is no ordinary[*] matter that we are discussing, but the right conduct of life. Proceed with your inquiry, he said. I proceed, said I. Tell me then—would you say

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that a horse has a specific work[*] or function? I would. Would you be willing to define the work of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do

only with it or best with it? I don't understand, he replied. Well, take it this way: is there anything else with which you can see except the eyes? Certainly not. Again, could you hear with anything but ears? By no means. Would you not rightly say that these are the functions of these (organs)? By all means.

Once more,

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you could use a dirk to trim vine branches and a knife and many other instruments. Certainly. But nothing so well, I take it, as a pruning-knife fashioned for this purpose. That is true. Must we not then assume this to be the work or function of that? We must.

You will now, then, I fancy, better apprehend the meaning of my question when I asked whether that is not the work of a thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform. Well, he said, I do understand, and agree

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that the work of anything is that. Very good, said I. Do you not also think that there is a specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a specific work or function is appointed? Let us return to the same examples. The eyes we say have a function? They have. Is there also a virtue of the eyes? There is. And was there not a function of the ears? Yes. And so also a virtue? Also a virtue. And what of all other things? Is the case not the same? The same. Take note now. Could the eyes possibly fulfil their function well

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if they lacked their own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect? How could they? he said; for I presume you meant blindness instead of vision. Whatever, said I, the excellence may be. For I have not yet come[*] to that question, but am only asking whether whatever operates will not do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its own defect. That much, he said, you may affirm to be true. Then the ears, too, if deprived of their own virtue will do their work ill? Assuredly. And do we then apply

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the same principle to all things? I think so. Then next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you couldn't accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, management, rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work? Nothing else. And again life? Shall we say that too is the function of the soul? Most certainly, he said. And do we not also say that there is an excellence virtue of the soul?

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We do. Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if deprived of its own virtue, or is this impossible? It is impossible. Of necessity, then, a bad soul will govern and manage things badly while the good soul will in all these things do well.[*] Of necessity. And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice? Yes, we did. The just soul and

the just man then will live well and the unjust ill? So it appears, he said, by your reasoning.

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But furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not the contrary. Of course. Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable. So be it, he said. But it surely does not pay to be miserable, but to be happy. Of course not. Never, then, most worshipful Thrasymachus, can injustice be more profitable than justice. Let this complete your entertainment, Socrates, at the festival of Bendis. A feast furnished by you, Thrasymachus, I said, now that you have become gentle with me and are no longer angry.[*] I have not dined well, however—

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by my own fault, not yours. But just as gluttons[*] snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first object of our inquiry—what justice is—let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other topic. So that for me

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the present outcome of the discussion[*] is that I know nothing.[*] For if I don't know what the just is,[*] I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy.

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ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὥμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον. ὁ γὰρ Γλαύκων αἰεὶ τε δὴ ἀνδρειότατος ὢν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλ' ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς

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ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον; ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἶπον, ἔγωγ' ἂν ἐλοίμην, εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἴη.

οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ποιεῖς ὁ βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι· ἄρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι, οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίνεταί ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα; ἔμοιγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον.

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τί δέ; ὃ αὐτὸ τε αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνομένων, οἷον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὀρᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν; τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά που δι' ἀμφοτέρα ἀσπαζόμεθα.

ναί, εἶπον.

τρίτον δὲ ὀρᾷς τι, ἔφη, εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεῦεσθαι καὶ ἰατρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίποννα φαῖμεν ἂν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἐαυτῶν ἔνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν,

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τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίνεταί ἀπ' αὐτῶν.

ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν, ἔφην, καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον. ἀλλὰ τί δῆ;

ἐν ποίῳ, ἔφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην τιθεῖς;

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ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὃ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι.

οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἰδους, ὃ μισθῶν θ' ἔνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ δι' αὐτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὃν χαλεπόν.

οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω καὶ πάλαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὃν φέγεται, ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται· ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής.

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ἴθι δὴ, ἔφη, ἀκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐάν σοι ἔτι ταῦτά δοκῇ. Θρασυμάχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται πρῶταίτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφης κληθηῖναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὕπα κατὰ νοῦν ἢ ἀπόδειξις γέγονεν περὶ ἐκάτερον· ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τί τ' ἔστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐᾶσαι χαίρειν.

οὕτως· οὖν ποιήσω, ἔάν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇ· ἐπανανεώσομαι

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τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναι φασιν καὶ ὅθεν γεγενῆσθαι, δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι· πολὺ γὰρ ἁμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ τι δοκεῖ οὕτως· ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὧτα ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον, ὡς

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ἁμεινον ἀδικίας, οὐδενός πω ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι—βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκοῦσαι—μάλιστα δ’ οἶμαι ἂν σοῦ πυθέσθαι. διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαι σοι ὃν τρόπον αὖ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκοῦειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλ’ ὅρα εἰ σοι βουλομένῳ ἂ λέγω.

πάντων μάλιστα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλακίς τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων;

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κάλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ὁ πρῶτον ἔφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί ὃν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη.

πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασιν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὥστ’ ἐπειδὴν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσι τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύονται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ

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μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν συνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μὴτ’ ἀδικεῖν μὴτ’ ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι καὶ συνθήκας αὐτῶν, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον· καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην γένεσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὕσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἔάν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἔάν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὃν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς

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ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἄρρωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδ’ ἂν ἐνὶ ποτε συνθέσθαι τὸ μῆτε ἀδικεῖν μῆτε ἀδικεῖσθαι· μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἂν. ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε τοιαῦτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος. ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστ’ ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν

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τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἑκατέρῳ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἴτ’ ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι ποῖ ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπ’ αὐτοφῶρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταῦτόν

ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ἰσου τιμὴν. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἦν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἶαν

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ποτέ φασιν δύναμιν τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ γενέσθαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὄμβρου δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγῆναι τι τῆς γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἧ ἔνεμεν. ἰδόντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ ἃ μυθολογοῦσιν θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον χαλκοῦν, κοῦλον, θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ' ὧς ἐγκύψαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόντα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι μείζω ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον, τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ

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τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον ὄντα περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι. συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἴν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ περὶ τὰ ποιμνία, ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον· καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην τοῦ δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἶσω τῆς χειρός, τοῦτου δὲ γενομένου

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ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιψηλαφῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον στρέψαι ἔξω τὴν σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέψαντα φανερόν γενέσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐννοήσαντα ἀποπειρᾶσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω συμβαίνειν, στρέφοντι μὲν εἶσω τὴν σφενδόνην ἀδήλῳ γίγνεσθαι, ἔξω δὲ δῆλῳ· αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθύς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα, ἐλθόντα

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δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαντα, μετ' ἐκείνης ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὕτω κατασχεῖν. εἰ οὖν δύο τοιοῦτω δακτυλίῳ γενοίστην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὅς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, ἐξὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῶς ὅτι βούλοιο λαμβάνειν,

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καὶ εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὅτῳ βούλοιο, καὶ ἀποκτείνουσι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λυεῖν οὕστινας βούλοιο, καὶ τᾶλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰσόθεον ὄντα. οὕτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιοῖ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἴοιεν ἀμφοτέροι. καίτοι μέγα τοῦτο τεκμήριον ἂν φαίη τις ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίᾳ ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅπου γ' ἂν οἴηται ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἔσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν. λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ οἶεται πᾶς ἀνὴρ πολὺ

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μᾶλλον ἰδίᾳ τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος, ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτου λόγου λέγων· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος μηδὲν

ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικῆσαι μηδὲ ἄψαιτο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατος, ἐπαινοῖεν δ' ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτω.

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τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου περὶ ὧν λέγομεν, ἐὰν διαστησώμεθα τὸν τε δικαιοτάτον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, οἳ τοὶ τ' ἐσόμεθα κρίναι ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις; ἦδε· μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁ ἀδικος ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιεῖτω—οἷον κυβερνήτης ἄκρος ἢ ἱατρὸς τὰ τε ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ διαισθάνεται,

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καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐᾷ· ἔτι δὲ ἐὰν ἄρα πη σφαλῇ, ἱκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι—οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀδικος ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἀδικος εἶναι. τὸν ἀλίσκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἡγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα. δοτέον οὖν τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον ἀλλ' ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὐτῷ

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παρεσκευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σφάλλῃται τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῷ εἶναι, λέγειν τε ἱκανῷ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, ἐὰν τι μηνῇται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται, διὰ τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας. τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον αὖ παρ' αὐτὸν ἰστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἀπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα. ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος

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εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι τοιοῦτῳ εἶναι· ἄδηλον οὖν εἶτε τοῦ δικαίου εἶτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη. γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν ἐχέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας, ἵνα ἢ βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῆς γιγνομένων, ἀλλὰ ἴτω ἀμετάστατος μέχρι

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θανάτου, δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι ἀδικος διὰ βίου, ὦν δὲ δίκαιος, ἵνα ἀμφοτέροι εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἐληλυθότες, ὁ μὲν δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας, κρίνονται ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν εὐδαιμονέστερος.

βαβαῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαῦκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἐκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖν ἀνδροῖν.

ὡς μάλιστ', ἔφη, δύναμαι. ὄντοιν δὲ τοιοῦτοιν, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ οἷος ἐκάτερον

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βίος ἐπιμένει· λεκτέον οὖν· καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀγροικοτέρως λέγηται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἶον λέγειν, ὥ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν· ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται,

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ἐκκαυθήσεται τώφθαλμῳ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται καὶ γνώσεται ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν. τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἀδίκον, ἅτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἀδίκον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν, βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον,

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ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλευματα,

Aesch. Seven 592-594 πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι, ἔπειτα γαμεῖν ὀπόθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἂν βούληται, συμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὠφελεῖσθαι κερδαινόντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· εἰς ἀγῶνας τοῖνον ἰόντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλουτεῖν καὶ

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τοὺς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ θεοῖς θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὓς ἂν βούληται, ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τὸν δίκαιον. οὕτω φασίν, ὥ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ.

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ταῦτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἐγὼ μὲν αὖ ἐν νῷ εἶχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, οὗ τί που οἶει, ἔφη, ὥ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου;

ἀλλὰ τί μήν; εἶπον.

αὐτό, ἧ δ' ὅς, οὐκ εἴρηται ὁ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη· ὥστε καὶ σὺ, εἴ τι ὅδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμυνε. καίτοι ἐμέ γε ἱκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθέντα καταπαλαῖσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνῃ.

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καὶ ὅς, οὐδέν, ἔφη, λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε. δεῖ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν, οἱ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ ψέγουσιν, ἵν' ἢ σαφέστερον ὁ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκων. λέγουσι δὲ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέρες τε ὑέσιν, καὶ πάντες οἱ

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τινῶν κηδόμενοι, ὥς χρηὴ δίκαιον εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες
ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ἵνα δοκοῦντι δικάϊω εἶναι γίγνηται ἀπὸ
τῆς δόξης ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι καὶ ὅσαπερ Γλαύκων διῆλθεν ἄρτι, ἀπὸ τοῦ
εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικάϊω. ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὗτοι τὰ τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσιν. τὰς
γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθὰ,
τοῖς ὁσίοις ἅ φασι θεοὺς διδόναι· ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδος τε καὶ Ὀμηρὸς
φασιν, ὁ μὲν τὰς δρυῖς

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τοῖς δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν

ἄκρας μὲν τε φέρειν βαλάνους, μέσσας δὲ μελίσσας· εἰροπόκοι δ' ὄιες, φησίν,
μαλλοῖς καταβρίθασι

Hes. WD 232, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα. παραπλήσια δὲ
καὶ ὁ ἕτερος·

ὥς τέ τευ

γὰρ φησιν

... ἢ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος ὅς τε θεουδῆς
εὐδικίας ἀνέχησι, φέρησι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα

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πυροὺς καὶ κριθάς, βριθῆσι δὲ δένδρεα καρπῷ,
τίκτηι δ' ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχηι ἰχθυῖς.

Hom. Od. 19.109 Μουσαῖος δὲ τούτων νεανικώτερα τάγαθὰ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς
αὐτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδῶσιν τοῖς δικαίοις· εἰς Ἄιδου γὰρ ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ
καὶ κατακλινάντες καὶ συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων κατασκεύασαντες
ἔστεφανωμένους ποιοῦσιν τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον

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ἤδη διάγειν μεθύνοντας, ἠγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν μέθην
αἰώνιον. οἱ δ' ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτεινουσιν μισθοὺς παρὰ θεῶν·
παῖδας γὰρ παιδῶν φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ
εὐόρκου. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐγκωμιάζουσιν δικαιοσύνην· τοὺς δὲ
ἀνοσίους αὖ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ
κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν, ἔτι τε ζῶντας

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εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἄγοντες, ἅπερ Γλαύκων περὶ τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ
ἀδίκων διῆλθε τιμωρήματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων λέγουσιν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ
ἔχουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἔπαινος καὶ ὁ φόγος οὗτος ἑκατέρων.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκέψαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο αὖ εἶδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης
τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον

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καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὕμνοῦσιν ὥς καλὸν μὲν ἢ
σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον, ἀκολασία δὲ

καὶ ἀδικία ἥδ' ὃ μὲν καὶ εὐπετέες κτήσασθαι, δόξη δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ
αἰσχρόν· λυσιτελέστερα δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικοα ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος λέγουσι,
καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας εὐδαιμονίζειν καὶ
τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσιν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζειν καὶ
ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἂν πη ἄσθενεῖς τε

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καὶ πένητες ὧσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἐτέρων. τούτων
δὲ πάντων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται, ὥς
ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας τε καὶ βίον κακὸν ἔνειμαν, τοῖς
δ' ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν μοῖραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας
ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὥς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε
καὶ ἐπωδαῖς, εἴτε τι

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ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκεῖσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ
ἐορτῶν, ἐὰν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλῃ, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ὁμοίως
δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάβει ἐπαγωγᾷς τισιν καὶ καταδέσμοις, τοὺς θεοὺς, ὥς
φασιν, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν. τούτοις δὲ πᾶσιν τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας
ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι, εὐπετείας διδόντες, ὥς
τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι

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ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·
τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροισεν ἔθηκαν

Hes. WD 287-289 καὶ τινα ὁδὸν μακράν τε καὶ τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ
τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὅμηρον μαρτύρονται, ὅτι καὶ
ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν—

λιστοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαισι καὶ εὐχῶλαῖς ἀγαναῖσιν

364e

λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρῶπῳσ' ἀνθρωποὶ
λίσσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῇ καὶ ἀμάρτη.

Hom. Il. 9.497

βίβλων δὲ ὅμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ
Μουσῶν ἐκγόνων, ὥς φασι, καθ' ἃς θηπολοῦσιν, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον
ιδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὥς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ
θυσιῶν καὶ

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365a

παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσι μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς
καλοῦσιν, αἱ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ
περιμένει.

ταῦτα πάντα, ἔφη, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς
πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὥς ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα
ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφρεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ

λεγόμενα ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ποῖός τις ἂν
365b

ὦν καὶ πῇ πορευθεὶς τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι; λέγοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τῶν
εἰκότων πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ Πινδαρον ἐκεῖνο τὸ
πότερον δίκῃ τεῖχος ὕψιον ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβᾷς

Pindar, Fr. καὶ ἔμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα
δικαίῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ ὄφελος οὐδὲν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ
καὶ ζημίας φανεράς· ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρεσκευασμένῳ
θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται.

365c

οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί,
καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται

Simonides, Fr. 76 Bergk, and Eur. Orest. 236. καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ
τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὅλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἔμαυτὸν
σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου
ἀλώπεκα ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ
ῥάδιον αἰεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές,
365d

φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων· ἀλλ' ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτῃ ἰτέον,
ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν συνωμοσίας τε καὶ
ἐταιρίας συναζόμεν, εἰσὶν τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικὴν τε καὶ
δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς
πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὕτε λανθάνειν οὕτε
βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν
ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, τί καὶ ἡμῖν

365e

μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν; εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθὲν τοι
αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν γεγελογησάντων
ποιητῶν, οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν ὡς εἰσὶν οἱοί θυσίαις τε καὶ
εὐχολαῖς ἀγανῆσιν

καὶ ἀναθήμασιν παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι, οἷς ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἢ οὐδέτερα
πειστέον.

εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον

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ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων. δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήμιοι μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν
ἐσόμεθα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπωσόμεθα· ἄδικοι δὲ κερδανοῦμέν τε καὶ
λίσσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες, πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι
ἀπαλλάξομεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἄιδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε
ἀδικήσωμεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παιδῶν. ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόμενος, αἰ
τελεταὶ αὖ μέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοί, ὡς αἰ

366b

μέγιστα πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ προφηταὶ τῶν θεῶν

γενόμενοι, οἱ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν μηνύουσιν.

κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἂν πρὸ μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἰροίμεθ' ἄν, ἣν ἐὰν μετ' εὐσημοσύνης κιβδήλου κτησώμεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμενος λόγος; ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων
366c

τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν ὧς τις δύναιμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα; ὡς δὴ τοι εἰ τις ἔχει ψευδῇ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἃ εἰρήκαμεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἔγνωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη, πολλήν που συγγνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀδικοῖς, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι πλὴν εἰ τις θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν
366d

ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἢ γήρωος ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δέ, διήλον· ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἷός τ' ᾦ. καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἵτιον ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὅθενπερ ἅπας ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὥρμησεν καὶ τῷδε καὶ ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὦ θαυμάσιε, πάντων
366e

ὑμῶν, ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡρώων ἀρξάμενοι, ὅσων λόγοι λελειμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπήνεσεν δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένας· αὐτὸ δ' ἐκάτερον τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει τί δρᾷ, τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνόν, καὶ λανθάνον θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὐτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὐτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπέξηλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχὴ ἐν αὐτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν.
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εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπιθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος ἄριστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ σὺννοικὸς ᾗ. ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείω Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ ἄλλος ποὺ τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἂν, μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν φορτικῶς, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν γὰρ σε
367b

δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τάναντία, ὡς δύναιμι μάλιστα κατατεῖνας λέγω. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιοῦσα ἐκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν ἢ μὲν κακόν, ἢ δὲ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν· τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαιρεί, ὥσπερ Γλαῦκων διεκελεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἐκατέρωθεν τὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι

367c

ψέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι ἄδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, συμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὐτῷ μὲν συμφέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἥττονι ἀσύμφορον. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὠμολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ἄξια κεκτῆσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, οἷον ὁρᾶν,

367d

ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δὴ, καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἀλλ' οὐ δόξῃ ἐστίν, τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσον δικαιοσύνης, ὃ αὐτῇ δι' αὐτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησιν καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει, μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀποδεχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, διότι πάντα τὸν βίον

367e

οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἢ τοῦτο. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρείττον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτῇ δι' αὐτήν, ἔαντε λανθάνῃ ἔαντε μὴ θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἢ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ κακόν ἐστι.

καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, αἰεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαῦκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἡγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε

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ἦσθην καὶ εἶπον· οὐ κακῶς εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαῦκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμήσαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην, εἰπὼν—

παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός·

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὔδοκεῖ ἔχειν· πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἄμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖτε δὴ μοι ὡς

368b

ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεισθαι—τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, ἐπεὶ κατὰ γε αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἠπίστων ἂν ὑμῖν—ὅσω δὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὅτι χρήσωμαι. οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω· δοκῶ γὰρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι—σημεῖον δέ μοι, ὅτι ἃ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ὦμην ἀποφαινέιν ὡς ἄμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου—οὔτ' αὖ ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω· δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἦ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακηγορουμένη

368c

ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν οὕτως ὅπως δύνamai ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῇ.

ὁ τε οὖν Γλαῦκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνεῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ διερευνήσασθαι τί τέ ἐστίν ἑκάτερον καὶ περὶ τῆς

ὠφελίας αὐτοῖν τάληθές ποτέρως ἔχει. εἴπον οὖν ὅπερ ἔμοι ἔδοξεν, ὅτι τὸ
ζήτημα ὧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον ἀλλ' ὅξυ βλέποντος, ὡς ἔμοι
368d

φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκῶ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαύτην
ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἶανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ
πὸρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὅξυ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτὰ τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ
αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι, ἔρμαιον ἂν
ἐφάνη οἷμαι ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ
αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδεΐμαντος· ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον, ὦ
368e

Σώκρατες, ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ζητήσῃ καθορᾷ;
ἐγώ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ. δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἐνός, ἔστι δέ που
καὶ ὅλης πόλεως;
πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐκοῦν μεῖζον πόλις ἐνὸς ἀνδρός;
μεῖζον, ἔφη.

ἴσως τοίνυν πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζονι ἐνεῖη καὶ ῥάων καταμαθεῖν.
εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς

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πόλεσι ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν τι ἐστίν· ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ
ἐκάστω, τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέα
ἐπισκοποῦντες.

ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καλῶς λέγειν.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν
δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν;
τάχ' ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐκοῦν γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἐλπίς εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν ὃ ζητοῦμεν;

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πολύ γε.

δοκεῖ οὖν χρῆναι ἐπιχειρῆσαι περαίνειν; οἷμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον
αὐτὸ εἶναι· σκοπεῖτε οὖν.

ἔσκεπται, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδεΐμαντος· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος
οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ὧν ἐνδεής· ἢ τιν' οἶε ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν
οἰκίζειν;

οὐδεμίαν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

369c

οὕτω δὴ ἄρα παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον, ἐπ' ἄλλου, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου
χρεῖα, πολλῶν δεόμενοι, πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν οἴκησιν ἀγείραντες κοινωνοὺς τε
καὶ βοηθοὺς, ταύτῃ τῇ συνοικίᾳ ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὀνομα· ἦ γάρ;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλῳ, εἴ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ μεταλαμβάνει, οἰόμενος

αὐτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι;

πάνυ γε.

ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν· ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς
ἔοικεν, ἢ ἡμετέρα χρεία.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

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ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν χρειῶν ἡ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ
εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν ἔνεκα.

παντάπασι γε.

δευτέρα δὴ οἰκήσεως, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων.

ἔστι ταῦτα.

φέρει δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶς ἡ πόλις ἀρκέσει ἐπὶ τοσαύτην παρασκευήν; ἄλλο τι
γεωργὸς μὲν εἷς, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δὲ τις ὑφάντης; ἢ καὶ σκυτοτόμον
αὐτόσε προσθήσομεν ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπευτήν;

πάνυ γε.

εἴη δ' ἂν ἢ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν.

369e

φαίνεται.

τί δὴ οὖν; ἓνα ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἅπασι κοινὸν
κατατιθέναι, οἷον τὸν γεωργὸν ἓνα ὄντα παρασκευάζειν σιτία τέτταρσιν καὶ
τετραπλάσιον χρόνον τε καὶ πόνον ἀναλίσκειν ἐπὶ σίτου παρασκευῇ καὶ
ἄλλοις κοινωνεῖν, ἢ ἀμελήσαντα ἑαυτῷ μόνον τέταρτον μέρος ποιεῖν τούτου
τοῦ

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σίτου ἐν τετάρτῳ μέρει τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ τρία, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς οἰκίας
παρασκευῇ διατρίβειν, τὸ δὲ ἱματίου, τὸ δὲ ὑποδημάτων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις
κοινωνοῦντα πράγματα ἔχειν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δι' αὐτὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν;
καὶ ὁ Ἀδεϊμαντος ἔφη· ἄλλ' ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω ῥᾶον ἢ 'κείνως.
οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὰ Δία ἄτοπον. ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ, ὅτι
πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν φύεται ἕκαστος οὐ πάνυ

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ὁμοιος ἐκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου πράξει. ἢ
οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ἔμοιγε.

τί δέ; πότερον κάλλιον πράττοι ἂν τις εἷς ὢν πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος, ἢ
ὅταν μίαν εἷς;

ὅταν, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἷς μίαν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαι καὶ τόδε δῆλον, ὡς, ἐάν τις τινος παρῇ ἔργου καιρόν,
διόλλυται.

δῆλον γάρ.

οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐθέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμένειν,
ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τὸν πράττοντα τῷ πραττομένῳ

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ἐπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρέργου μέρει.

ἀνάγκη.

ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾶον, ὅταν εἷς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττη.

παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν.

πλειόνων δὴ, ὧς Ἀδεΐμαντε, δεῖ πολιτῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἐπὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς ὧν ἐλέγομεν. ὁ γὰρ γεωργός, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι,

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οὐδὲ σμινύην, οὐδὲ τᾶλλα ὄργανα ὅσα περὶ γεωργίαν. οὐδ' αὖ ὁ οἰκοδόμος· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ δεῖ. ὡσαύτως δ' ὁ ὑφάντης τε καὶ ὁ σκυτοτόμος· ἢ οὐ; ἀληθῆ.

τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλκῆς καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες πολλοὶ δημιουργοί, κοινωνοὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ πολιχνίου γιγνόμενοι, συχνὸν αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν πω πάνυ γε μέγα τι εἴη, εἰ αὐτοῖς βουκόλους τε καὶ ποιμένας τοὺς τε ἄλλους νομέας προσθεῖμεν, ἵνα οἱ τε

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γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄροῦν ἔχοιεν βοῦς, οἱ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρῆσθαι ὑποζυγίοις, ὑφάνται δὲ καὶ σκυτοτόμοι δέρμασιν τε καὶ ἐρίοις.

οὐδὲ γε, ἥ δ' ὅς, σμικρὰ πόλεις ἂν εἴη ἔχουσα πάντα ταῦτα.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον οὗ ἐπείσασαυγίμων μὴ δεήσειται, σχεδὸν τι ἀδύνατον.

ἀδύνατον γάρ.

προσδεήσει ἄρα ἔτι καὶ ἄλλων, οἱ ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως αὐτῇ κομιοῦσιν ὧν δεῖται.

δεήσει.

καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἴη ὁ διάκονος, μηδὲν ἄγων ὧν ἐκεῖνοι

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δέονται παρ' ὧν ἂν κομίζονται ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεῖα, κενὸς ἅπεισιν. ἥ γάρ; δοκεῖ μοι.

δεῖ δὴ τὰ οἴκοι μὴ μόνον ἑαυτοῖς ποιεῖν ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷα καὶ ὅσα ἐκείνοις ὧν ἂν δέωνται.

δεῖ γάρ.

πλειόνων δὴ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν δεῖ ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει.

πλειόνων γάρ.

καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων που τῶν τε εἰσαξόντων καὶ ἐξαξόντων ἕκαστα. οὔτοι δὲ εἰσιν ἔμποροι· ἥ γάρ;

ναί.

καὶ ἐμπόρων δὴ δεησόμεθα.

πάνυ γε.

καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε κατὰ θάλατταν ἢ ἐμπορία γίγνηται, συχνῶν

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καὶ ἄλλων προσδεήσεται τῶν ἐπιστημόνων τῆς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐργασίας.
συχνῶν μέντοι.

τί δὲ δὴ; ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς ἀλλήλοις μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι
ἐργάζωνται; ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ κοινωνίαν ποιησάμενοι πόλιν ὠκίσαμεν.
δηλον δὴ, ἥ δ' ὅς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὠνούμενοι.

ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα σύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ
τούτου.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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ἂν οὖν κομίσας ὁ γεωργὸς εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν τι ὧν ποιεῖ, ἢ τις ἄλλος τῶν
δημιουργῶν, μὴ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἤκη τοῖς δεομένοις τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ
ἀλλάξασθαι, ἀργήσῃ τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας καθήμενος ἐν ἀγορᾷ;
οὐδαμῶς, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ εἰσὶν οἱ τοῦτο ὀρώντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν
τάττουσιν ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι σχεδὸν τι οἱ
ἀσθενέστατοι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀχρεῖοι τι ἄλλο ἔργον πράττειν. αὐτοῦ γὰρ δεῖ
μένοντας

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αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ μὲν ἀντ' ἀργυρίου ἀλλάξασθαι τοῖς τι δεομένοις
ἀποδόσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὐτῷ ἀργυρίου διαλλάττειν ὅσοι τι δέονται πρίασθαι.
αὕτη ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ χρεῖα καπήλων ἡμῖν γένεσιν ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἢ οὐ
καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὠνὴν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας
ἰδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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ἔτι δὴ τινες, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διάκονοι, οἳ ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς διανοίας
μὴ πάνυ ἀξιοκοινώνητοι ᾤσιν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἰσχὺν ἱκανὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς
πόνους ἔχωσιν· οἳ δὴ πωλοῦντες τὴν τῆς ἰσχύος χρεῖαν, τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην
μισθὸν καλοῦντες, κέκληνται, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, μισθωτοί· ἥ γάρ;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεως εἰσιν, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ μισθωτοί.

δοκεῖ μοι.

ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἀδεῖμαντε, ἤδη ἡμῖν ἠϋξῆται ἡ πόλις, ὥστ' εἶναι τελέα;
ἴσως.

ποῦ οὖν ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη ἡ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία; καὶ τίني ἅμα
ἐγγενομένη ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα;

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ἐγώ μὲν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ που ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεῖα
τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καλῶς λέγεις· καὶ σκεπτέον γε καὶ οὐκ ἀποκνητέον.
πρῶτον οὖν σκεψώμεθα τίνα τρόπον διαιτῆσονται οἱ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένοι.
ἄλλο τι ἢ σῖτόν τε ποιοῦντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα; καὶ
οἰκοδομησάμενοι οἰκίας, θέρους μὲν τὰ πολλὰ γυμνοὶ τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι

ἐργάσσονται, τοῦ δὲ

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χειμῶνος ἡμφιεσμένοι τε καὶ ὑποδεδεμένοι ἱκανῶς· θρέφονται δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κριθῶν ἄλφιτα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἄλευρα, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάζαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμόν τινα παραβαλλόμενοι ἢ φύλλα καθαρὰ, κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακι τε καὶ μυρρίναις, εὐωχῆσονται αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδιά, ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεοὺς, ἡδέως συνόντες ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιούμενοι

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τοὺς παῖδας, εὐλαβούμενοι πενίαν ἢ πόλεμον.

καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ὑπολαβὼν, Ἄνευ ὄψου, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικας, ποιεῖς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐσπιωμένους.

ἀληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἐπελαθόμην ὅτι καὶ ὄψον ἔξουσιν, ἅλας τε δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ ἐλάας καὶ τυρόν, καὶ βολβοὺς καὶ λάχανά γε, οἷα δὴ ἐν ἀγροῖς ἐσῆματα, ἐσῆσονται. καὶ τραγῆματά που παραθήσομεν αὐτοῖς τῶν τε σύκων καὶ ἐρεβίνθων καὶ κυάμων, καὶ μύρτα καὶ φηγοὺς σποδιοῦσιν

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πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες· καὶ οὕτω διάγοντες τὸν βίον ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ὑγιείας, ὡς εἰκός, γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες ἄλλον τοιοῦτον βίον τοῖς ἐκγόνοις παραδώσουσιν.

καὶ ὅς, εἰ δὲ ὑὼν πόλιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, κατεσκεύαζες, τί ἂν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες;

ἀλλὰ πῶς χρή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων;

ἄπερ νομίζεται, ἔφη· ἐπὶ τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι οἷμαι τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν

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δειπνεῖν, καὶ ὄψα ἄπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι καὶ τραγῆματα.

εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μανθάνω. οὐ πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικε, σκοποῦμεν μόνον ὅπως γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφῶσαν πόλιν. ἴσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἔχει· σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ τοιαύτην τάχ' ἂν κατίδοιμεν τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἢν διεληλύθαμεν, ὥσπερ ὑγίης τις· εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε, καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν· οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει.

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ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τισιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει, οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ δίαίτα, ἀλλὰ κλῖναι τε προσέσονται καὶ τράπεζαι καὶ τᾶλλα σκευή, καὶ ὄψα δὴ καὶ μύρα καὶ θυμιάματα καὶ ἐταῖραι καὶ πέμματα, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν οὐκέτι τἀναγκαῖα θετέον, οἰκίας τε καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τὴν τε ζωγραφίαν κινητέον καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν, καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ ἐλέφαντα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα κτητέον. ἦ γάρ;

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ναί, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν μείζονά τε αὖ τὴν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν· ἐκείνη γὰρ ἢ ὑγιεινὴ οὐκέτι
ἱκανή, ἀλλ’ ἤδη ὄγκου ἐμπληστέα καὶ πλήθους, ἃ οὐκέτι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου
ἐνεκὰ ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἷον οἷ τε θηρευταὶ πάντες οἷ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ
μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικὴν, ποιηταὶ
τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι, σκευῶν
τε παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί, τῶν τε ἄλλων

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καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν γυναικεῖον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλειόνων
δεησόμεθα· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ δεήσειν παιδαγωγῶν, τιθῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτριῶν,
κουρέων, καὶ αὖ ὀψοποιῶν τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν
προσδεησόμεθα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνῆν—ἔδει γὰρ
οὐδέν—ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτου προσδεήσει. δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἴ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται· ἢ γάρ;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

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οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐν χρεῖαις ἐσόμεθα πολὺ μᾶλλον οὕτω διαιτώμενοι ἢ ὡς
τὸ πρότερον;

πολὺ γε.

καὶ ἡ χώρα γέ που, ἢ τότε ἱκανὴ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε, σμικρὰ δὴ ἐξ ἱκανῆς
ἔσται. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

οὕτως, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίων χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἱκανὴν ἔξειν
νέμειν τε καὶ ἀροῦν, καὶ ἐκείνοις αὖ τῆς ἡμετέρας, ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφῶσιν
αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἄπειρον, ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρον;

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πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

πολεμήσομεν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαῦκων; ἢ πῶς ἔσται;

οὕτως, ἔφη.

καὶ μηδέν γέ πω λέγωμεν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, μήτ’ εἴ τι κακὸν μήτ’ εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ
πόλεμος ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι πολέμου αὖ γένεσιν
ἠϋρήκαμεν, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ κακὰ γίνονται,
ὅταν γίγνηται.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἔτι δὴ, ὦ φίλε, μείζονος τῆς πόλεως δεῖ οὗ τι σμικρῷ,

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ἀλλ’ ὄλω στρατοπέδῳ, ὃ ἐξελθὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπάσης καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν
νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν.

τί δέ; ἢ δ’ ὅς· αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί;

οὐκ, εἰ σύ γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ὠμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, ἥνικα
ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν· ὠμολογοῦμεν δέ που, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ἔνα
πολλὰς καλῶς ἐργάζεσθαι τέχνας.

ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.

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τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· ἡ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

ἦ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς;
οὐδαμῶς.

ἀλλ' ἄρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον διεκωλύομεν μήτε γεωργὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι
ἅμα μήτε ὑφάντην μήτε οἰκοδόμον ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν τὸ τῆς
σκυτικῆς ἔργον καλῶς γίγνοιτο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ ὡσαύτως ἐν
ἀπεδιδόμεν, πρὸς ὃ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστος καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε τῶν ἄλλων
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σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παριεῖς τοὺς καιροὺς καλῶς
ἀπεργάσεσθαι· τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πότερον οὐ περὶ πλείστου ἐστὶν
εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα; ἢ οὕτω ῥᾶδιον, ὥστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἅμα πολεμικὸς
ἔσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἠντινοῦν ἐργαζόμενος, πεπτευτικὸς
δὲ ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς
ἐπιτηδεύων, ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χρώμενος;

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καὶ ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν ἣ τι ἄλλο τῶν πολεμικῶν ὄπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων
αὐθημερὸν ὀπλιτικῆς ἢ τινος ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἱκανὸς ἔσται
ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα δημιουργὸν οὐδὲ
ἀθλητὴν ληφθὲν ποιήσῃ, οὐδ' ἔσται χρήσιμον τῷ μὴτε τὴν ἐπιστήμην
ἐκάστου λαβόντι μὴτε τὴν μελέτην ἱκανὴν παρασχομένῳ;

πολλοῦ γὰρ ἂν, ἣ δ' ὅς, τὰ ὄργανα ἦν ἄξια.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅσω μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργον,

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τοσοῦτῳ σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν εἴη καὶ αὗ τέχνης τε καὶ
ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον.

οἴμαι ἔγωγε, ἣ δ' ὅς.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτηδεΐας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον ἂν εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπερ οἴοι τ' ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι τίνες
τε καὶ ποῖαι φύσεις ἐπιτηδεΐαι εἰς πόλεως φυλακὴν.

ἡμέτερον μέντοι.

μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, οὐκ ἄρα φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἡράμεθα· ὅμως δὲ οὐκ
ἀποδεδιλατέον, ὅσον γ' ἂν δύναμις παρείκη.

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οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

οἶει οὖν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν
νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς;

τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;

οἶον ὅζυν τέ που δεῖ αὐτοῖν ἐκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐλαφρὸν
πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκᾶσθαι, καὶ ἰσχυρὸν αὖ, ἐὰν δέῃ ἐλόντα
διαμάχεσθαι.

δεῖ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, πάντων τούτων.

καὶ μὴν ἀνδρεῖόν γε, εἴπερ εὖ μαχεῖται.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἀνδρεῖος δὲ εἶναι ἄρα ἐθελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδῆς εἶτε ἵππος εἶτε κύων ἢ ἄλλο
ὁτιοῦν ζῶον; ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας ὥς

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ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὗ παρόντος ψυχὴ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός
τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος;

ἐννενόηκα.

τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ σώματος οἶον δεῖ τὸν φύλακα εἶναι, δῆλα.

ναί.

καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι γε θυμοειδῆ.

καὶ τοῦτο.

πῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις τε ἔσσονται καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὅντες τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις;

μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ ῥαδίως.

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ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πρᾶγους αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ
τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεπούς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ περιμενοῦσιν ἄλλους σφᾶς διολέσαι,
ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ φθίσονται αὐτὸ δράσαντες.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιήσομεν; πόθεν ἅμα πρᾶγον καὶ μεγάλوثυμον ἦθος
εὐρήσομεν; ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδεῖ πράξει φύσις.

φαίνεται.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι τούτων γε ὁποτέρου ἂν στέρηται, φύλαξ ἀγαθὸς οὐ μὴ γένηται·
ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικεν, καὶ οὕτω

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δὴ συμβαίνει ἀγαθὸν φύλακα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.

καὶ ἐγὼ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἐπισκεψάμενος τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, δικαίως γε, ἦν δ'
ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἀποροῦμεν· ἥς γὰρ προυθέμεθα εἰκόνας ἀπελείφθημεν.

πῶς λέγεις;

οὐκ ἐννενοήκαμεν ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄρα φύσεις οἷας ἡμεῖς οὐκ ᾤήθημεν, ἔχουσαι
τάναντία ταῦτα.

ποῦ δὴ;

ἴδοι μὲν ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ζώοις, οὐ μεντᾶν ἥκιστα

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ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι. οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν,
ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους
ὥς οἶόν τε πρᾶτοτάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας τούναντίον.

οἶδα μέντοι.

τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατόν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον
εἶναι τὸν φύλακα.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ἄρ' οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι τοῦδε προσδεῖσθαι ὁ φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ

θυμοειδεῖ ἔτι προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν;

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πῶς δὴ; ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

καὶ τοῦτο, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς κυσὶν κατόψει, ὃ καὶ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τοῦ θηρίου.

τὸ ποῖον;

ὅτι ὃν μὲν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνῶτα, χαλεπαίνει, οὐδὲ ἐν κακὸν προπεπονθώς· ὃν δ' ἂν γνώριμον, ἀσπάζεται, καὶ μὴδὲν πώποτε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθη. ἢ οὐπω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας;

οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, μέχρι τούτου προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν· ὅτι δέ που δρᾷ ταῦτα, δῆλον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κομψὸν γε φαίνεται τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς

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φύσεως καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον.

πῇ δὴ;

ἦι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅψιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ φίλην καὶ ἐχθρὰν διακρίνει ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν καταμαθεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἀγνοῆσαι. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἂν φιλομαθὲς εἴη συνέσει τε καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ ὀριζόμενον τὸ τε οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον;

οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅπως οὐ.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, τὸ γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταῦτόν;

ταῦτόν γάρ, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν θαρροῦντες τιθῶμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ μέλλει

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πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρῶτός τις ἔσεσθαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῇ αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι;

τιθῶμεν, ἔφη.

φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ θυμοειδὴς καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλλων καλὸς κάγαθός ἔσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως.

παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχοι. θρέφονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα τρόπον; καὶ ἄρα τι προὔργου ἡμῖν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ σκοποῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν οὐπὲρ ἔνεκα

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πάντα σκοποῦμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει γίγνεται; ἵνα μὴ ἐώμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ συχνὸν διεξιῶμεν.

καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαῦκωνος ἀδελφός, πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε προσδοκῶ προὔργου εἶναι εἰς τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν.

μὰ Δία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα ἀφετέον, οὐδ' εἰ μακροτέρα τυγχάνει οὔσα.

οὐ γάρ οὔν.

ἴθι οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές τε καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγῳ παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας.

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ἀλλὰ χρή.

τις οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου
ἡυρημένης; ἔστιν δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ
μουσική.

ἔστιν γάρ.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ μουσικῇ πρότερον ἀρξόμεθα παιδεύοντες ἢ γυμναστικῇ;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

μουσικῆς δ', εἶπον, τιθεῖς λόγους, ἢ οὐ;

ἔγωγε.

λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψευδὸς δ' ἕτερον;

ναί.

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παιδευτέον δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν;

οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη, πῶς λέγεις.

οὐ μανθάνεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ
που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἶπεῖν ψευδὸς, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς
τὰ παιδία ἢ γυμνασίοις χρώμεθα.

ἔστι ταῦτα.

τοῦτο δὴ ἔλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῆς πρότερον ἀπτέον ἢ γυμναστικῆς.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως

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τε δὴ καὶ νέω καὶ ἀπαλῶ ὀτρωοῦν; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται, καὶ
ἐνδύεται τύπος ὃν ἂν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἐκάστω.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ἄρ' οὖν ῥαδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων
μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς
ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις ἅς, ἐπειδὴν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν
οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτοῦς;

οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν παρήσομεν.

πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς,

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καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν μῦθον ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ' ἂν μὴ, ἀποκριτέον.
τοὺς δ' ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφούς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισίν,
καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς
χερσίν· ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον.

ποίους δὴ; ἔφη.

ἐν τοῖς μείζουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ
τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι καὶ ταῦτόν

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δύνασθαι τοὺς τε μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

ἔγωγ', ἔφη· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐννοῶ οὐδὲ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις.

οὐς Ἡσίοδος τε, εἶπον, καὶ Ὀμηρος ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί.

οὗτοι γάρ που μύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγον τε καὶ λέγουσι.

ποίους δῆ, ἧ δ' ὅς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις;

ὅπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρή καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδεται.

τί τοῦτο;

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ὅταν εἰκάξῃ τις κακῶς οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ, περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἳ εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἔοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῇ γράψαι.

καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὰ γε τοιαῦτα μέμφεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα;

πρῶτον μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο ὡς Οὐρανὸς τε ἡργάσατο ἅ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν

Ἡσίοδος, ὃ τε αὖ Κρόνος

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ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν. τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕεος, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθὴ ὥμην δεῖν ῥαδίως οὕτως λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν, δι' ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους, θυσαμένους οὐ χοῖρον ἀλλὰ τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὅτι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι.

καὶ γάρ, ἧ δ' ὅς, οὗτοι γε οἱ λόγοι χαλεποί.

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καὶ οὐ λεκτέοι γ', ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ πόλει. οὐδὲ λεκτέον νέῳ ἀκούοντι ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῖ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρῶν ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοι τε καὶ μέγιστοι.

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἧ δ' ὅς, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιτήδεια εἶναι λέγειν.

οὐδέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ παράπαν ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσι

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τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθὴ—εἰ γε δεῖ ἡμῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας τὴν πόλιν φυλάξιν αἰσχιστον νομίζειν τὸ ῥαδίως ἀλλήλοις ἀπεχθάνεσθαι—πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον, καὶ ἄλλας ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν—ἀλλ' εἰ πως μέλλομεν πείσειν ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἀπήχθετο οὐδ' ἔστιν τοῦτο ὅσιον, τοιαῦτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς

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τὰ παιδιά εὐθύς καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γραυσί, καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν. Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ ὕεος καὶ Ἥφαιστου ῥίψεις ὑπὸ πατρός, μέλλοντος τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένη ἀμυνεῖν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὀμηρος πεποίηκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὗτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεπονημένας οὐτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὁ μὴ, ἀλλ' ἂν ἂν τηλικοῦτος ὦν λάβῃ ἐν

ταῖς δόξαις δυσέκνιπτά

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τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι· ὧν δὴ ἴσως ἔνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον
ἃ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν ὅτι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν.
ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. ἀλλ' εἴ τις αὖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐρωτῶη ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα ἅττα τ'
ἐστὶν καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνας ἂν φαῖμεν;

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Ἀδεΐμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγὼ τε

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καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ' οἰκισταὶ πόλεως· οἰκιστᾶς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους
προσῆκει εἶδέναι ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ' οὓς ἂν ποιῶσιν
οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν;
τοιοῖδε ποὺ τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὧν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον,
ἐάντε τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσιν ποιῇ ἐάντε ἐν μέλεσιν ἐάντε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ.

δεῖ γάρ.

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οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὁ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω;

τί μὴν;

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερόν· ἦ γάρ;

οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ἄρ' οὖν ὁ μὴ βλαβερόν βλάπτει;

οὐδαμῶς.

ὁ δὲ μὴ βλάπτει κακὸν τι ποιεῖ;

οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

ὁ δὲ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ οὐδ' ἂν τινος εἴη κακοῦ αἵτιον;

πῶς γάρ;

τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν;

ναί.

αἵτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας;

ναί.

οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἵτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἵτιον, τῶν
δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον.

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παντελῶς γ', ἔφη.

οὐδ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἵτιος, ὥς οἱ
πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἵτιος, πολλῶν δὲ
ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τάγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν
οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἅττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ'
οὐ τὸν θεόν.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν.

οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε Ὅμηρου οὔτ' ἄλλου

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ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνοήτως ἁμαρτάνοντος καὶ

λέγοντος—

ὥς δοιοί τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὐδὲι
κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν·

Hom. Il. 24.527-8 καὶ ᾧ μὲν ἂν μείξας ὁ Ζεὺς δῶ ἀμφοτέρων,
ἄλλοτε μὲν τε κακῷ ὃ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλῷ·

Hom. Il. 24.530 ᾧ δ' ἂν μὴ, ἀλλ' ἄκρατα τὰ ἕτερα,
τὸν δὲ κακῇ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα διᾶν ἐλαύνει·

Hom. Il. 24.532

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οὐδ' ὥς ταμίας ἡμῖν Ζεὺς—
ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται.

unknown

τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄρκων καὶ σπονδῶν σύγχυσιν, ἣν ὁ Πάνδαρος συνέχεεν, ἐάν τις
φῇ δι' Ἀθηνᾶς τε καὶ Διὸς γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἐπαίνεσόμεθα, οὐδὲ θεῶν ἔριν τε
καὶ κρίσιν

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διὰ Θέμιτός τε καὶ Διός, οὐδ' αὖ, ὥς Αἰσχύλος λέγει, ἐάτεον ἀκούειν τοὺς
νέους, ὅτι—

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ.

Aesch. Fr. ἀλλ' ἐάν τις ποιῇ ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ ἱαμβεῖα ἔνεσιν, τὰ τῆς Νιόβης
πάθη, ἢ τὰ Πελοπιδῶν ἢ τὰ Τρωικὰ ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιοῦτων, ἢ οὐ θεοῦ
ἔργα ἐάτεον αὐτὰ λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρετέον αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν ὅν νῦν ἡμεῖς
λόγον ζητοῦμεν, καὶ

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λεκτέον ὥς ὁ μὲν θεὸς δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἡργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο
κολαζόμενοι· ὥς δὲ ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ἣν δὲ δὴ ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα
θεός, οὐκ ἐάτεον λέγειν τὸν ποιητήν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως
λέγοιεν ὥς ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί, διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὠφελοῦντο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ,
ἐάτεον· κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεὸν τινὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχετέον
παντὶ τρόπῳ μῆτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει
εὐνομήσεσθαι, μῆτε τινὰ ἀκούειν,

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μῆτε νεώτερον μῆτε πρεσβύτερον, μῆτ' ἐν μέτρῳ μῆτε ἄνευ μέτρου
μυθολογοῦντα, ὥς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε σύμφορα ἡμῖν
οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς.

σύμψηφός σοι εἰμι, ἔφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, καὶ μοι ἀρέσκει.

οὗτος μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἷς ἂν εἴη τῶν περὶ θεοῦς νόμων τε καὶ τύπων,
ἐν ᾧ δεήσει τοὺς τε λέγοντας λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων
αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἀπόχρη.

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τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δευτερος ὄδε; ἄρα γόητα τὸν θεὸν οἶει εἶναι καὶ οἶον ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ιδέαις τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν γιγνόμενον, καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἢ ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ιδέας ἐκβαίνειν; οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν γε οὕτως εἰπεῖν.

τί δὲ τόδε; οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τι ἐξίσταται τῆς αὐτοῦ

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ιδέας, ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ μεθίστασθαι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου; ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται τε καὶ κινεῖται; οἶον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ πόνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἰλήσεων τε καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, οὐ τὸ ὑγιέστατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον

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ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἥκιστ' ἂν τι ἔξωθεν πάθος ταραξείεν τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσειεν;

ναί.

καὶ μήν που καὶ τὰ γε σύνθετα πάντα σκεῦη τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὰ εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται.

ἔστι δὴ ταῦτα.

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πᾶν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται.

ἔοικεν.

ἀλλὰ μήν ὁ θεὸς γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντα ἄριστα ἔχει.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ταῦτη μὲν δὴ ἥκιστα ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἴσχοι ὁ θεός.

ἥκιστα δῆτα.

ἀλλ' ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεταβάλλοι ἂν καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ;

δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται.

πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αἰσχιον ἑαυτοῦ;

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ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται· οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεᾶ γε φήσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι.

ὀρθότατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἂν τίς σοι, ὦ Ἀδεΐμαντε, ἐκὼν αὐτὸν χεῖρω ποιεῖν ὀπποῦν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων; ἀδύνατον, ἔφη.

ἀδύνατον ἄρα, ἔφην, καὶ θεῷ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἔοικε,
κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὦν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἀπλῶς
ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ.

ἅπασα, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

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μηδεὶς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡς—
... θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι,
παντοῖοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας.

Hom. Od. 17.485-486 μηδὲ Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος καταψευδέσθω μηδεὶς,
μηδ' ἐν τραγυδίαις μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν εἰσαγέτω Ἥραν
ἡλλοιωμένην, ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν—
Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις.

Aesch.

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καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ μὴ ἡμῖν ψευδέσθων. μηδ' αὖ ὑπὸ τούτων
ἀναπειθόμεναι αἰ μητέρες τὰ παιδία ἐκδειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους
κακῶς, ὡς ἄρα θεοὶ τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις καὶ
παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἅμα μὲν εἰς θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ
τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεργάζωνται δειλοτέρους.

μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.

ἀλλ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοὶ εἰσιν οἷοι μὴ μεταβάλλειν, ἡμῖν δὲ
ποιοῦσιν δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι, ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ
γοητεύοντες;

ἴσως, ἔφη.

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τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψεύδεσθαι θεὸς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα
προτείνων;

οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν,
πάντες θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσιν;

πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ
κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ
κεκτῆσθαι.

οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἦ δ' ὅς, μανθάνω.

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οἷει γάρ τί με, ἔφην, σεμνὸν λέγειν· ἐγώ δὲ λέγω ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα
ψεῦδεσθαι τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ
κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἥκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο, καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ
ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.

πολύ γε, ἔφη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γ' ἂν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος

καλοῖτο, ἢ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἢ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου· ἐπεὶ τὸ γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶν παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἶδωλον,
οὐ πάνυ

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ἄκρατον ψεῦδος. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων
μισεῖται.

δοκεῖ μοι.

τί δὲ δὴ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος; πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον
εἶναι μίσους; ἄρ' οὐ πρὸς τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων,
ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἢ τινα ἄνοιαν κακὸν τι ἐπιχειρῶσιν πράττειν, τότε
ἀποτροπῆς ἔνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται; καὶ ἐν αἷς νυνδὴ

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ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τάληθές ἔχει περὶ τῶν
παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον
ποιοῦμεν;

καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει.

κατὰ τί δὴ οὔν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεῦδος χρήσιμον; πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ
εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἂν ψεύδοιτο;

γελοῖον μεντᾶν εἶη, ἔφη.

ποιητῆς μὲν ἄρα ψευδῆς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι.

οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ἀλλὰ δεδιώς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο;

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πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.

ἀλλὰ δι' οἰκείων ἄνοιαν ἢ μανίαν;

ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων θεοφιλῆς.

οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὗ ἔνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεύδοιτο.

οὐκ ἔστιν.

πάντῃ ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον.

παντάσῃ μὲν οὔν, ἔφη.

κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε
αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ
λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὐθ' ὕπαρ οὐδ' ὄναρ.

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οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέγοντος.

συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἔφην, τοῦτον δεύτερον τύπον εἶναι ἐν ᾧ δεῖ περὶ θεῶν καὶ
λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς
μήτε ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ;

συγχωρῶ.

πολλὰ ἄρα Ὀμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ
ἐνυπνίου πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι· οὐδὲ Αἰσχύλῳ, ὅταν φῇ ἢ

Θέτις τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὐτῇς

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γάμοις ᾄδοντα

ἐνδατεῖσθαι τὰς ἐὰς εὐπαιδίας

Hom. Il. 2.1—

νόσων τ' ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίωνας βίους,

ξυμπαντὰ τ' εἰπὼν θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας

παῖ᾽ ἐπηυφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἐμέ.

κἀγὼ τὸ Φοῖβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα

ἥλπίζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρῶν τέχνη·

ὁ δ', αὐτὸς ὕμνων, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίνῃ παρών,

αὐτὸς τὰδ' εἰπὼν, αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ κτανών

τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν—

Aesch. Frag. 350

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ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν,
οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ
μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον
ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἷόν τε.

παντάπασι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν
χρῶμην.

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English translation

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When I had said this I supposed that I was done with the subject, but it all
turned out to be only a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always an intrepid
enterprising spirit in everything, would not on this occasion acquiesce in
Thrasymachus's abandonment[*] of his case, but said, Socrates, is it your
desire to seem to have persuaded us

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or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be just than
unjust? Really, I said, if the choice rested with me. Well, then, you are not
doing what you wish. For tell me: do you agree that there is a kind of good[*]
which we would choose to possess, not from desire for its after effects, but
welcoming it for its own sake? As, for example, joy and such pleasures are
harmless[*] and nothing results from them afterwards save to have and to hold
the enjoyment.

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I recognise that kind, said I. And again a kind that we love both for its own
sake and for its consequences,[*] such as understanding,[*] sight, and health?
[*] For these presume we welcome for both reasons. Yes, I said. And can you
discern a third form of good under which falls exercise and being healed when

sick and the art of healing and the making of money generally? For of them we would say that they are laborious and painful yet beneficial, and for their own sake

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we would not accept them, but only for the rewards and other benefits that accrue from them. Why yes, I said, I must admit this third class also. But what of it? In which of these classes do you place justice? he said.

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In my opinion, I said, it belongs in the fairest class, that which a man who is to be happy must love both for its own sake and for the results. Yet the multitude, he said, do not think so, but that it belongs to the toilsome class of things that must be practised for the sake of rewards and repute due to opinion but that in itself is to be shunned as an affliction.

I am aware, said I, that that is the general opinion and Thrasymachus has for some time been disparaging it as such and praising injustice. But I, it seems, am somewhat slow to learn. Come now,

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he said, hear what I too have to say and see if you agree with me. For Thrasymachus seems to me to have given up to you too soon, as if he were a serpent[*] that you had charmed, but I am not yet satisfied with the proof that has been offered about justice and injustice. For what I desire is to hear what each of them is and what potency and effect it has in and of itself dwelling in the soul,[*] but to dismiss their rewards and consequences. This, then, is what I propose to do, with your concurrence. I will renew

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the argument of Thrasymachus and will first state what men say is the nature and origin of justice; secondly, that all who practise it do so reluctantly, regarding it as something necessary[*] and not as a good; and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds for thus acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just man—as they say; though I, Socrates, don't believe it. Yet I am disconcerted when my ears are dinned by the arguments of Thrasymachus and innumerable others.[*] But the case for justice,

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to prove that it is better than injustice, I have never yet heard stated by any as I desire to hear it. What I desire is to hear an encomium on justice in and by itself. And I think I am most likely to get that from you. For which reason I will lay myself out in praise of the life of injustice, and in so speaking will give you an example of the manner in which I desire to hear from you in turn the dispraise of injustice and the praise of justice. Consider whether my proposal pleases you. Nothing could please me more, said I;

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for on what subject would a man of sense rather delight to hold and hear

discourse again and again? That is excellent, he said; and now listen to what I said would be the first topic—the nature and origin of justice.

By nature,[*] they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong. So that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the power

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to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and that this is the beginning of legislation and covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential nature of justice—a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to get one's revenge. Justice, they tell us, being mid-way between the two, is accepted and approved,

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not as a real good, but as a thing honored in the lack of vigor to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality a man would never make a compact with anybody either to wrong nor to be wronged; for he would be mad. The nature, then, of justice is this and such as this, Socrates, and such are the conditions in which it originates, according to the theory. But as for the second point, that those who practise it do so unwillingly and from want of power to commit injustice—we shall be most likely to apprehend that if we entertain some such supposition as this in thought:

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if we grant to each, the just and the unjust, licence and power to do whatever he pleases, and then accompany them in imagination and see whither his desire will conduct each. We should then catch the just man in the very act of resorting to the same conduct as the unjust man because of the self-advantage which every creature by its nature pursues as a good, while by the convention of law[*] it is forcibly diverted to paying honor to equality.[*] The licence that I mean would be most nearly such as would result from supposing them to have the power

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which men say once came to the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian.[*] They relate that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler at that time of Lydia, and that after a great deluge of rain and an earthquake the ground opened and a chasm appeared in the place where he was pasturing; and they say that he saw and wondered and went down into the chasm; and the story goes that he beheld other marvels there and a hollow bronze horse with little doors, and that he peeped in and saw a corpse within, as it seemed, of more than mortal stature,

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and that there was nothing else but a gold ring on its hand, which he took off

and went forth. And when the shepherds held their customary assembly to make their monthly report to the king about the flocks, he also attended wearing the ring.

So as he sat there it chanced that he turned the collet of the ring towards himself, towards the inner part of his hand, and when this took place they say that he became invisible[*]

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to those who sat by him and they spoke of him as absent and that he was amazed, and again fumbling with the ring turned the collet outwards and so became visible. On noting this he experimented with the ring to see if it possessed this virtue, and he found the result to be that when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, and when outwards visible; and becoming aware of this, he immediately managed things so that he became one of the messengers

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who went up to the king, and on coming there he seduced the king's wife and with her aid set upon the king and slew him and possessed his kingdom. If now there should be two such rings, and the just man should put on one and the unjust the other, no one could be found, it would seem, of such adamant[*] temper as to persevere in justice and endure to refrain his hands from the possessions of others and not touch them, though he might with impunity take what he wished even from the marketplace,

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and enter into houses and lie with whom he pleased, and slay and loose from bonds whomsoever he would, and in all other things conduct himself among mankind as the equal of a god.[*] And in so acting he would do no differently from the other man, but both would pursue the same course. And yet this is a great proof, one might argue, that no one is just of his own will but only from constraint, in the belief that justice is not his personal good, inasmuch as every man, when he supposes himself to have the power to do wrong, does wrong.

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For that there is far more profit for him personally in injustice than in justice is what every man believes, and believes truly, as the proponent of this theory will maintain. For if anyone who had got such a licence within his grasp should refuse to do any wrong or lay his hands on others' possessions, he would be regarded as most pitiable[*] and a great fool by all who took note of it,[*] though they would praise him[*] before one another's faces, deceiving one another because of their fear of suffering injustice. So much for this point.

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But to come now to the decision[*] between our two kinds of life, if we separate the most completely just and the most completely unjust man, we shall be able to decide rightly, but if not, not. How, then, is this separation to

be made? Thus: we must subtract nothing of his injustice from the unjust man or of his justice from the just, but assume the perfection of each in his own mode of conduct.

In the first place, the unjust man must act as clever craftsmen do: a first-rate pilot or physician, for example, feels the difference between impossibilities[*] and possibilities in his art

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and attempts the one and lets the others go; and then, too, if he does happen to trip, he is equal to correcting his error. Similarly, the unjust man who attempts injustice rightly must be supposed to escape detection if he is to be altogether unjust, and we must regard the man who is caught as a bungler.[*] For the height of injustice[*] is to seem just without being so. To the perfectly unjust man, then, we must assign perfect injustice and withhold nothing of it, but we must allow him, while committing the greatest wrongs, to have secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice;

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and if he does happen to trip,[*] we must concede to him the power to correct his mistakes by his ability to speak persuasively if any of his misdeeds come to light, and when force is needed, to employ force by reason of his manly spirit and vigor and his provision of friends and money; and when we have set up an unjust man of this character, our theory must set the just man at his side—a simple and noble man, who, in the phrase of Aeschylus, does not wish to seem but be good. Then we must deprive him of the seeming.[*] For if he is going to be thought just

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he will have honors and gifts because of that esteem. We cannot be sure in that case whether he is just for justice's sake or for the sake of the gifts and the honors. So we must strip him bare of everything but justice and make his state the opposite of his imagined counterpart.[*] Though doing no wrong he must have the repute of the greatest injustice, so that he may be put to the test as regards justice through not softening because of ill repute and the consequences thereof. But let him hold on his course unchangeable even unto death,

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seeming all his life to be unjust though being just, that so, both men attaining to the limit, the one of injustice, the other of justice, we may pass judgement which of the two is the happier.

Bless me, my dear Glaucon, said I, how strenuously you polish off each of your two men for the competition for the prize as if it were a statue.[*] To the best of my ability, he replied, and if such is the nature of the two, it becomes an easy matter, I fancy, to unfold the tale of the sort of life that awaits each.

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We must tell it, then; and even if my language is somewhat rude and brutal,[*]

you must not suppose, Socrates, that it is I who speak thus, but those who commend injustice above justice.

What they will say is this: that such being his disposition the just man will have to endure the lash, the rack, chains,

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the branding-iron in his eyes, and finally, after every extremity of suffering, he will be crucified,[*] and so will learn his lesson that not to be but to seem just is what we ought to desire. And the saying of Aeschylus[*] was, it seems, far more correctly applicable to the unjust man. For it is literally true, they will say, that the unjust man, as pursuing what clings closely to reality, to truth, and not regulating his life by opinion, desires not to seem but to be unjust, Exploiting the deep furrows of his wit

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From which there grows the fruit of counsels shrewd,

Aesch. Seven 592-594 first office and rule in the state because of his reputation for justice, then a wife from any family he chooses, and the giving of his children in marriage to whomsoever he pleases, dealings and partnerships with whom he will, and in all these transactions advantage and profit for himself because he has no squeamishness about committing injustice; and so they say that if he enters into lawsuits, public or private, he wins and gets the better of his opponents, and, getting the better,[*] is rich and benefits his friends

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and harms his enemies[*]; and he performs sacrifices and dedicates votive offerings to the gods adequately and magnificently,[*] and he serves and pays court[*] to men whom he favors and to the gods far better than the just man, so that he may reasonably expect the favor of heaven[*] also to fall rather to him than to the just. So much better they say, Socrates, is the life that is prepared for the unjust man from gods and men than that which awaits the just.

When Glaucon had thus spoken, I had a mind

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to make some reply thereto, but his brother Adeimantus said, You surely don't suppose, Socrates, that the statement of the case is complete? Why, what else? I said. The very most essential point, said he, has not been mentioned. Then, said I, as the proverb has it, Let a brother help a man[*]—and so, if Glaucon omits any word or deed, do you come to his aid. Though for my part what he has already said is quite enough to overthrow me and

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incapacitate me for coming to the rescue of justice. Nonsense, he said, but listen to this further point. We must set forth the reasoning and the language of the opposite party, of those who commend justice and dispraise injustice, if

what I conceive to be Glaucon's meaning is to be made more clear.
Fathers, when they address exhortations to their sons, and all those who have others in their charge,[*]

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urge the necessity of being just, not by praising justice itself, but the good repute with mankind that accrues from it, the object that they hold before us being that by seeming to be just the man may get from the reputation office and alliances and all the good things that Glaucon just now enumerated as coming to the unjust man from his good name. But those people draw out still further this topic of reputation. For, throwing in good standing with the gods, they have no lack of blessings to describe, which they affirm the gods give to pious men, even as the worthy Hesiod and Homer declare,

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the one that the gods make the oaks bear for the just:

Acorns on topmost branches and swarms of bees on their mid-trunks,

and he tells how the

Flocks of the fleece-bearing sheep are laden and weighted with soft wool,

Hes. WD 232ff. and of many other blessings akin to these; and similarly the other poet:

Even as when a good king, who rules in the fear of the high gods,

Upholds justice and right, and the black earth yields him her foison,

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Barley and wheat, and his trees are laden and weighted with fair fruits,

Increase comes to his flocks and the ocean is teeming with fishes.

Hom. Od. 19.109

And Musaeus and his son[*] have[*] a more excellent song[*] than these of the blessings that the gods bestow on the righteous. For they conduct them to the house of Hades in their tale and arrange a symposium of the saints,[*] where, reclined on couches crowned with wreaths,

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they entertain the time henceforth with wine, as if the fairest meed of virtue were an everlasting drunk. And others extend still further the rewards of virtue from the gods. For they say that the children's children[*] of the pious and oath-keeping man and his race thereafter never fail. Such and such-like are their praises of justice. But the impious and the unjust they bury in mud[*] in the house of Hades and compel them to fetch water in a sieve,[*] and, while they still live,

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they bring them into evil repute, and all the sufferings that Glaucon enumerated as befalling just men who are thought to be unjust, these they recite about the unjust, but they have nothing else to say.[*] Such is the praise and the censure of the just and of the unjust.

Consider further, Socrates, another kind of language about justice and injustice

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employed by both laymen and poets. All with one accord reiterate that soberness and righteousness are fair and honorable, to be sure, but unpleasant and laborious, while licentiousness and injustice are pleasant and easy to win and are only in opinion and by convention disgraceful. They say that injustice pays better than justice, for the most part, and they do not scruple to felicitate bad men who are rich or have other kinds of power to do them honor in public and private, and to dishonor

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and disregard those who are in any way weak or poor, even while admitting that they are better men than the others. But the strangest of all these speeches are the things they say about the gods[*] and virtue, how so it is that the gods themselves assign to many good men misfortunes and an evil life but to their opposites a contrary lot; and begging priests[*] and soothsayers go to rich men's doors and make them believe that they by means of sacrifices and incantations have accumulated a treasure of power from the gods[*] that can expiate and cure with pleasurable festivals

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any misdeed of a man or his ancestors, and that if a man wishes to harm an enemy, at slight cost he will be enabled to injure just and unjust alike, since they are masters of spells and enchantments[*] that constrain the gods to serve their end. And for all these sayings they cite the poets as witnesses, with regard to the ease and plentifulness of vice, quoting:

Evil-doing in plenty a man shall find for the seeking;

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Smooth is the way and it lies near at hand and is easy to enter;
But on the pathway of virtue the gods put sweat from the first step,

Hes. WD 287-289 and a certain long and uphill road. And others cite Homer as a witness to the beguiling of gods by men, since he too said:

The gods themselves are moved by prayers,
And men by sacrifice and soothing vows,

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And incense and libation turn their wills
Praying, whenever they have sinned and made transgression.

Hom. Il. 9.497

And they produce a bushel[*] of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sport[*] for the living,

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and that there are also special rites for the defunct, which they call functions, that deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice.

What, Socrates, do we suppose is the effect of all such sayings about the esteem in which men and gods hold virtue and vice upon the souls that hear them, the souls of young men who are quick-witted and capable of flitting, as it were, from one expression of opinion to another and inferring from them

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all the character and the path whereby a man would lead the best life? Such a youth[*] would most likely put to himself the question Pindar asks,

Is it by justice or by crooked deceit that I the higher tower shall scale and so live my life out in fenced and guarded security?

Pindar, Fr. The consequences of my being just are, unless I likewise seem so, not assets,[*] they say, but liabilities, labor and total loss; but if I am unjust and have procured myself a reputation for justice a godlike life is promised.

Then

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since it is

the seeming

Simonides, Fr. 76 Bergk, and Eur. *Orest.* 236 as the wise men show me, that masters the reality

and is lord of happiness, to this I must devote myself without reserve. For a front and a show[*] I must draw about myself a shadow-line of virtue, but trail behind me the fox of most sage Archilochus,[*] shifty and bent on gain. Nay, 'tis objected, it is not easy for a wrong-doer always to lie hid.[*] Neither is any other big thing facile,

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we shall reply. But all the same if we expect to be happy, we must pursue the path to which the footprints of our arguments point. For with a view to lying hid we will organize societies and political clubs,[*] and there are teachers of cajolery[*] who impart the arts of the popular assembly and the court-room. So that, partly by persuasion, partly by force, we shall contrive to overreach with impunity. But against the gods, it may be said, neither secrecy nor force can avail. Well, if there are no gods, or they do not concern themselves with the doings of men,

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neither need we concern ourselves with eluding their observation.[*] If they do exist and pay heed, we know and hear of them only from such discourses and from the poets who have described their pedigrees. But these same authorities tell us that the gods are capable of being persuaded and swerved from their course by sacrifice and soothing vows and dedications. We must

believe them in both or neither.

And if we are to believe them, the thing to do is to commit injustice and offer sacrifice

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from fruits of our wrongdoing.[*] For if we are just, we shall, it is true, be unscathed by the gods, but we shall be putting away from us the profits of injustice; but if we are unjust, we shall win those profits, and, by the importunity of our prayers, when we transgress and sin, we shall persuade them and escape scot-free. Yes, it will be objected, but we shall be brought to judgement in the world below for our unjust deeds here, we or our children's children. Nay, my dear sir, our calculating friend[*] will say, here again the rites for the dead[*] have much efficacy, and the absolving divinities,

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as the greatest cities declare, and the sons of gods, who became the poets and prophets[*] of the gods, and who reveal that this is the truth.

On what further ground, then, could we prefer justice to supreme injustice? If we combine this with a counterfeit decorum, we shall prosper to our heart's desire, with gods and men in life and death, as the words of the multitude and of men of the highest authority declare. In consequence, then, of all that has been said, what possibility is there, Socrates, that any man

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who has the power of any resources of mind, money, body, or family should consent to honor justice and not rather laugh[*] when he hears her praised? In sooth, if anyone is able to show the falsity of these arguments, and has come to know with sufficient assurance that justice is best, he feels much indulgence for the unjust, and is not angry with them, but is aware that except a man by inborn divinity of his nature disdains injustice, or, having won to knowledge, refrains from it,

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no one else is willingly just, but that it is from lack of manly spirit or from old age or some other weakness[*] that men dispraise injustice, lacking the power to practise it. The fact is patent. For no sooner does such one come into the power than he works injustice to the extent of his ability. And the sole cause of all this is the fact that was the starting-point of this entire plea of my friend here and of myself to you, Socrates, pointing out how strange it is that of all you

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self-styled advocates of justice, from the heroes of old whose discourses survive to the men of the present day, not one has ever censured injustice or commended justice otherwise than in respect of the repute, the honors, and the gifts that accrue from each. But what each one of them is in itself, by its own inherent force, when it is within the soul of the possessor and escapes the eyes of both gods and men, no one has ever adequately set forth in poetry or prose

—the proof that the one is the greatest of all evils that the soul contains within itself, while justice is the greatest good.

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For if you had all spoken in this way from the beginning and from our youth up had sought to convince us, we should not now be guarding against one another's injustice, but each would be his own best guardian, for fear lest by working injustice he should dwell in communion with the greatest of evils.[*] This, Socrates, and perhaps even more than this, Thrasymachus and haply another might say in pleas for and against justice and injustice, inverting their true potencies, as I believe, grossly. But I—

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for I have no reason to hide anything from you—am laying myself out to the utmost on the theory, because I wish to hear its refutation from you. Do not merely show us by argument that justice is superior to injustice, but make clear to us what each in and of itself does to its possessor, whereby the one is evil and the other good. But do away with the repute of both, as Glaucon urged. For, unless you take away from either the true repute and attach to each the false, we shall say that it is not justice that you are praising but the semblance,

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nor injustice that you censure, but the seeming, and that you really are exhorting us to be unjust but conceal it, and that you are at one with Thrasymachus in the opinion that justice is other man's good,[*] the advantage of the other, and that injustice is advantageous and profitable to oneself but disadvantageous to the inferior. Since, then, you have admitted that justice belongs to the class of those highest goods which are desirable both for their consequences and still more for their own sake, as sight, hearing, intelligence, yes and health too,

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and all other goods that are productive[*] by their very nature and not by opinion, this is what I would have you praise about justice—the benefit which it and the harm which injustice inherently works upon its possessor. But the rewards and the honors that depend on opinion, leave to others to praise. For while I would listen to others who thus commended justice and disparaged injustice, bestowing their praise and their blame on the reputation and the rewards of either, I could not accept that sort of thing from you unless you say I must, because you have passed

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your entire life[*] in the consideration of this very matter. Do not then, I repeat, merely prove to us in argument the superiority of justice to injustice, but show us what it is that each inherently does to its possessor—whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and men—whereby the one is good and the other evil.

While I had always admired the natural parts of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I was especially

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pleased by their words on this occasion, and said:

It was excellently spoken of you, sons of the man we know,

[*] in the beginning of the elegy which the admirer[*] of Glaucon wrote when you distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara [*]—

Sons of Ariston,[*] whose race from a glorious sire is god-like.

This, my friends, I think, was well said. For there must indeed be a touch of the god-like in your disposition if you are not convinced that injustice is preferable to justice though you can plead its case in such fashion.

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And I believe that you are really not convinced. I infer this from your general character since from your words alone I should have distrusted you. But the more I trust you the more I am at a loss what to make of the matter. I do not know how I can come to the rescue. For I doubt my ability by reason that you have not accepted the arguments whereby I thought I proved against Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice. Nor yet again do I know how I can refuse to come to the rescue. For I fear lest

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it be actually impious to stand idly by when justice is reviled and be faint-hearted and not defend her so long as one has breath and can utter his voice. The best thing, then, is to aid her as best I can. Glaucon, then, and the rest besought me by all means to come to the rescue and not to drop the argument but to pursue to the end the investigation as to the nature of each and the truth about their respective advantages. I said then as I thought: The inquiry we are undertaking is no easy one but

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calls for keen vision, as it seems to me. So, since we are not clever persons, I think we should employ the method of search that we should use if we, with not very keen vision, were bidden to read small letters from a distance, and then someone had observed that these same letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface. We should have accounted it a godsend, I fancy, to be allowed to read those letters first, and examine the smaller, if they are the same. Quite so, said Adeimantus;

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but what analogy to do you detect in the inquiry about justice? I will tell you, I said: there is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also of an entire city. Assuredly, said he. Is not the city larger[*] than the man? It is larger, he said.

Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend. If it please you, then,

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let us first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less. I think that is a good suggestion, he said. If, then, said I, our argument should observe the origin[*] of a state, we should see also the origin of justice and injustice in it. It may be, said he. And if this is done, we may expect to find more easily what we are seeking?

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Much more. Shall we try it, then, and go through with it? I fancy it is no slight task. Reflect, then. We have reflected,[*] said Adeimantus; proceed and don't refuse.

The origin of the city, then, said I, in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our own needs,[*] but each of us lacks many things. Do you think any other principle establishes the state? No other, said he. As a result of this,

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then, one man calling in another for one service and another for another, we, being in need of many things, gather many into one place of abode as associates and helpers, and to this dwelling together we give the name city or state, do we not? By all means. And between one man and another there is an interchange of giving, if it so happens, and taking, because each supposes this to be better for himself. Certainly. Come, then, let us create a city from the beginning, in our theory. Its real creator, as it appears, will be our needs. Obviously.

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Now the first and chief of our needs is the provision of food for existence and life.[*] Assuredly. The second is housing and the third is raiment and that sort of thing. That is so. Tell me, then, said I, how our city will suffice for the provision of all these things. Will there not be a farmer for one, and a builder, and then again a weaver? And shall we add thereto a cobbler and some other purveyor for the needs of body? Certainly. The indispensable minimum of a city, then, would consist of four or

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five men. Apparently.

What of this, then? Shall each of these contribute his work for the common use of all? I mean shall the farmer, who is one, provide food for four and spend fourfold time and toil on the production of food and share it with the others, or shall he take no thought for them and provide a fourth portion

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of the food for himself alone in a quarter of the time and employ the other three-quarters, the one in the provision of a house, the other of a garment, the other of shoes, and not have the bother of associating with other people, but,

himself for himself, mind his own affairs?[*] And Adeimantus said, But, perhaps, Socrates, the former way is easier. It would not, by Zeus, be at all strange, said I; for now that you have mentioned it, it occurs to me myself that, to begin with, our several natures are not

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all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for another. Don't you think so? I do. Again, would one man do better working at many tasks or one at one? One at one, he said. And, furthermore, this, I fancy, is obvious—that if one lets slip the right season, the favorable moment in any task, the work is spoiled. Obvious. That, I take it, is because the business will not wait upon the leisure of the workman, but the workman must

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attend to it as his main affair, and not as a by-work. He must indeed. The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the right moment, and at leisure from other occupations. By all means. Then, Adeimantus, we need more than four citizens for the provision of the things we have mentioned. For the farmer, it appears, will not make his own plough if it is to be a good one,

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nor his hoe, nor his other agricultural implements, nor will the builder, who also needs many; and similarly the weaver and cobbler. True. Carpenters, then, and smiths and many similar craftsmen, associating themselves with our hamlet, will enlarge it considerably. Certainly. Yet it still wouldn't be very large even if we should add to them neat-herds and shepherds and other herders,

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so that the farmers might have cattle for ploughing,[*] and the builders oxen to use with the farmers for transportation, and the weavers and cobblers hides and fleeces for their use. It wouldn't be a small city, either, if it had all these. But further, said I, it is practically impossible to establish the city in a region where it will not need imports. It is. There will be a further need, then, of those who will bring in from some other city what it requires. There will. And again, if our servitor goes forth empty-handed, not taking with him any of the things needed by those

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from whom they procure what they themselves require, he will come back with empty hands, will he not? I think so. Then their home production must not merely suffice for themselves but in quality and quantity meet the needs of those of whom they have need. It must. So our city will require more farmers and other craftsmen. Yes, more. And also of other ministrants who are to export and import the merchandise. These are traders, are they not? Yes. We shall also need traders, then. Assuredly. And if the trading is carried on by sea,

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we shall need quite a number of others who are expert in maritime business. Quite a number.

But again, within the city itself how will they share with one another the products of their labor? This was the very purpose of our association and establishment of a state. Obviously, he said, by buying and selling. A market-place, then, and money as a token[*] for the purpose of exchange will be the result of this.

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By all means. If, then, the farmer or any other craftsman taking his products to the market-place does not arrive at the same time with those who desire to exchange with him, is he to sit idle in the market-place and lose time from his own work? By no means, he said, but there are men who see this need and appoint themselves for this service—in well-conducted cities they are generally those who are weakest[*] in body and those who are useless for any other task. They must wait there in the agora

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and exchange money for goods with those who wish to sell, and goods for money with as many as desire to buy. This need, then, said I, creates the class of shopkeepers in our city. Or is not shopkeepers the name we give to those who, planted in the agora, serve us in buying and selling, while we call those who roam from city to city merchants? Certainly. And there are, furthermore, I believe, other servitors who in the things of the mind

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are not altogether worthy of our fellowship, but whose strength of body is sufficient for toil; so they, selling the use of this strength and calling the price wages, are designated, I believe, wage-earners, are they not? Certainly. Wage-earners, then, it seems, are the complement that helps to fill up the state.[*] I think so. Has our city, then, Adeimantus, reached its full growth and is it complete? Perhaps. Where, then, can justice and injustice be found in it? And along with which of the constituents that we have considered does it come into the state?

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I cannot conceive, Socrates, he said, unless it be in some need that those very constituents have of one another. Perhaps that is a good suggestion, said I; we must examine it and not hold back. First of all, then, let us consider what will be the manner of life of men thus provided. Will they not make bread and wine and garments and shoes? And they will build themselves houses and carry on their work in summer for the most part unclad and unshod and in winter clothed and

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shod sufficiently? And for their nourishment they will provide meal from their barley and flour from their wheat, and kneading and cooking these they will serve noble cakes and loaves on some arrangement of reeds or clean leaves,

and, reclined on rustic beds strewn with bryony and myrtle, they will feast with their children, drinking of their wine thereto, garlanded and singing hymns to the gods in pleasant fellowship, not begetting offspring beyond their means

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lest they fall into poverty or war?

Here Glaucon broke in: No relishes[*] apparently, he said, for the men you describe as feasting. True said I; I forgot that they will also have relishes—salt, of course, and olives and cheese and onions and greens, the sort of things they boil in the country, they will boil up together. But for dessert we will serve them figs and chickpeas and beans,

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and they will toast myrtle-berries and acorns before the fire, washing them down with moderate potations and so, living in peace and health, they will probably die in old age and hand on a like life to their offspring. And he said, If you were founding a city of pigs,[*] Socrates, what other fodder than this would you provide? Why, what would you have, Glaucon? said I. What is customary, he replied; They must recline on couches, I presume, if they are not to be uncomfortable,

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and dine from tables and have made dishes and sweetmeats such as are now in use. Good, said I, I understand. It is not merely the origin of a city, it seems, that we are considering but the origin of a luxurious city. Perhaps that isn't such a bad suggestion, either. For by observation of such a city it may be we could discern the origin of justice and injustice in states. The true state I believe to be the one we have described—the healthy state, as it were. But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a fevered state, there is nothing to hinder.

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For there are some, it appears, who will not be contented with this sort of fare or with this way of life; but couches will have to be added thereto and tables and other furniture, yes, and relishes and myrrh and incense and girls[*] and cakes—all sorts of all of them. And the requirements we first mentioned, houses and garments and shoes, will no longer be confined to necessities,[*] but we must set painting to work and embroidery, and procure gold and ivory and similar adornments, must we not?

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Yes, he said. Then we shall have to enlarge the city again. For that healthy state is no longer sufficient, but we must proceed to swell out its bulk and fill it up with a multitude of things that exceed the requirements of necessity in states, as, for example, the entire class of huntsmen, and the imitators,[*] many of them occupied with figures and colors and many with music—the poets and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, chorus-dancers, contractors[*]

—and

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the manufacturers of all kinds of articles, especially those that have to do with women's adornment. And so we shall also want more servitors. Don't you think that we shall need tutors, nurses wet[*] and dry, beauty-shop ladies, barbers[*] and yet again cooks and chefs? And we shall have need, further, of swineherds; there were none of these creatures[*] in our former city, for we had no need of them, but in this city there will be this further need; and we shall also require other cattle in great numbers if they are to be eaten,

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shall we not? Yes. Doctors, too, are something whose services[*] we shall be much more likely to require if we live thus than as before? Much.

And the territory, I presume, that was then sufficient to feed the then population, from being adequate will become too small. Is that so or not? It is. Then we shall have to cut out a cantle[*] of our neighbor's land if we are to have enough for pasture and ploughing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon themselves to the unlimited[*] acquisition of wealth,

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disregarding the limit set by our necessary wants. Inevitably, Socrates. We shall go to war[*] as the next step, Glaucon—or what will happen? What you say, he said. And we are not yet to speak, said I, of any evil or good effect of war, but only to affirm that we have further[*] discovered the origin of war, namely, from those things from which[*] the greatest disasters, public and private, come to states when they come. Certainly.

Then, my friend, we must still further enlarge our city

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by no small increment, but by a whole army, that will march forth and fight it out with assailants in defence of all our wealth and the luxuries we have just described. How so? he said; are the citizens themselves[*] not sufficient for it? Not if you, said I, and we all were right in the admission we made when we were molding our city. We surely agreed, if you remember, that it is impossible for one man to do the work of many arts well. True, he said. Well, then, said I,

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don't you think that the business of fighting is an art and a profession? It is indeed, he said. Should our concern be greater, then, for the cobbler's art than for the art of war? By no means. Can we suppose, [*] then, that while we were at pains to prevent the cobbler from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end that [*] we might have the cobbler's business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every one man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted and at which he was to work all his days,

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at leisure[*] from other pursuits and not letting slip the right moments for doing the work well, and that yet we are in doubt whether the right accomplishment of the business of war is not of supreme moment? Is it so easy[*] that a man who is cultivating the soil will be at the same time a soldier and one who is practising cobbling or any other trade, though no man in the world could make himself a competent expert at draughts or the dice who did not practise that and nothing else from childhood[*] but treated it as an occasional business? And are we to believe that a man who

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takes in hand a shield or any other instrument of war springs up on that very day a competent combatant in heavy armor or in any other form of warfare—though no other tool will make a man be an artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor will it be of any service to those who have neither acquired the science[*] of it nor sufficiently practised themselves in its use? Great indeed, he said, would be the value of tools in that case.[*]

Then, said I, in the same degree that the task of our guardians[*] is the greatest of all,

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it would require more leisure than any other business and the greatest science and training. I think so, said he. Does it not also require a nature adapted to that very pursuit? Of course. It becomes our task, then, it seems, if we are able, to select which and what kind of natures are suited for the guardianship of a state. Yes, ours. Upon my word, said I, it is no light task that we have taken upon ourselves. But we must not faint

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so far as our strength allows.

No, we mustn't. Do you think, said I, that there is any difference between the nature of a well-bred hound for this watch-dog's work and of a well-born lad? What point have you in mind? I mean that each of them must be keen of perception, quick in pursuit of what it has apprehended,[*] and strong too if it has to fight it out with its captive. Why, yes, said he, there is need of all these qualities. And it must, further, be brave[*] if it is to fight well. Of course. And will a creature be ready to be brave that is not high-spirited, whether horse or dog or

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anything else? Have you never observed what an irresistible and invincible thing is spirit,[*] the presence of which makes every soul in the face of everything fearless and unconquerable? I have. The physical qualities of the guardian, then, are obvious. Yes. And also those of his soul, namely that he must be of high spirit. Yes, this too. How then, Glaucon, said I, will they escape being savage to one another[*] and to the other citizens if this is to be their nature? Not easily, by Zeus, said he. And yet

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we must have them gentle to their friends and harsh to their enemies; otherwise they will not await their destruction at the hands of others, but will be first themselves in bringing it about. True, he said. What, then, are we to do? said I. Where shall we discover a disposition that is at once gentle and great-spirited? For there appears to be an opposition[*] between the spirited type and the gentle nature. There does. But yet if one lacks either of these qualities, a good guardian he never can be. But these requirements resemble impossibilities, and so

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the result is that a good guardian is impossible. It seems likely, he said. And I was at a standstill, and after reconsidering what we had been saying, I said, We deserve to be at a loss, my friend, for we have lost sight of the comparison that we set before ourselves.[*] What do you mean? We failed to note that there are after all such natures as we thought impossible, endowed with these opposite qualities. Where? It may be observed in other animals, but especially in that which we

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likened to the guardian. You surely have observed in well-bred hounds that their natural disposition is to be most gentle to their familiars and those whom they recognize, but the contrary to those whom they do not know. I am aware of that. The thing is possible, then, said I, and it is not an unnatural requirement that we are looking for in our guardian. It seems not. And does it seem to you that our guardian-to-be will also need, in addition to the being high-spirited, the further quality of having the love of wisdom in his nature?

How so? he said; I don't apprehend your meaning.

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This too, said I, is something that you will discover in dogs and which is worth our wonder in the creature. What? That the sight of an unknown person angers him before he has suffered any injury, but an acquaintance he will fawn upon though he has never received any kindness from him. Have you never marvelled at that? I never paid any attention to the matter before now, but that he acts in some such way is obvious. But surely that is an exquisite

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trait of his nature and one that shows a true love of wisdom.[*] In what respect, pray? In respect, said I, that he distinguishes a friendly from a hostile aspect by nothing save his apprehension of the one and his failure to recognize the other. How, I ask you,[*] can the love of learning be denied to a creature whose criterion of the friendly and the alien is intelligence and ignorance? It certainly cannot, he said. But you will admit, said I, that the love of learning and the love of wisdom are the same? The same, he said. Then may we not confidently lay it down in the case of man too, that if he is to be

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in some sort gentle to friends and familiars he must be by nature a lover of wisdom and of learning? Let us so assume, he replied. The love of wisdom, then, and high spirit and quickness and strength will be combined for us in the nature of him who is to be a good and true guardian of the state. By all means, he said. Such, then, I said, would be the basis[*] of his character. But the rearing of these men and their education, how shall we manage that? And will the consideration of this topic advance us

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in any way towards discerning what is the object of our entire inquiry—the origin of justice and injustice in a state—our aim must be to omit nothing of a sufficient discussion, and yet not to draw it out to tiresome length? And Glaucon's brother replied, Certainly, I expect that this inquiry will bring us nearer to that end. Certainly, then, my dear Adeimantus, said I, we must not abandon it even if it prove to be rather long. No, we must not. Come, then, just as if we were telling stories or fables[*] and

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had ample leisure,[*] let us educate these men in our discourse. So we must. What, then, is our education?[*] Or is it hard to find a better than that which long time has discovered?[*] Which is, I suppose, gymnastics for the body[*] and for the soul music. It is. And shall we not begin education in music earlier than in gymnastics? Of course. And under music you include tales, do you not? I do. And tales are of two species, the one true and the other false[*]? Yes.

And education must make use

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of both, but first of the false? I don't understand your meaning. Don't you understand, I said, that we begin by telling children fables, and the fable is, taken as a whole, false, but there is truth in it also? And we make use of fable with children before gymnastics. That is so. That, then, is what I meant by saying that we must take up music before gymnastics. You were right, he said. Do you not know, then, that the beginning in every task is the chief thing,[*] especially for any creature that is young and tender[*]?

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For it is then that it is best molded and takes the impression[*] that one wishes to stamp upon it. Quite so. Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer[*] our children to listen to any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up? By no manner of means will we allow it. We must begin, then, it seems, by a censorship

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over our storymakers, and what they do well we must pass and what not, reject. And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories far rather than

their bodies by their hands. But most of the stories they now tell we must reject. What sort of stories? he said. The example of the greater stories, I said, will show us the lesser also. For surely the pattern must be the same and the greater and the less

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must have a like tendency. Don't you think so? I do, he said; but I don't apprehend which you mean by the greater, either. Those, I said, that Hesiod[*] and Homer and the other poets related. These, methinks, composed false stories which they told and still tell to mankind. Of what sort? he said; and what in them do you find fault? With that, I said, which one ought first and chiefly to blame, especially if the lie is not a pretty one.

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What is that? When anyone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, like a painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models. It is certainly right to condemn things like that, he said; but just what do we mean and what particular things?

There is, first of all, I said, the greatest lie about the things of greatest concernment, which was no pretty invention of him who told how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did to Cronos, and how Cronos in turn took his revenge;

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and then there are the doings and sufferings of Cronos at the hands of his son. Even if they were true I should not think that they ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless young persons. But the best way would be to bury them in silence, and if there were some necessity[*] for relating them, that only a very small audience should be admitted under pledge of secrecy and after sacrificing, not a pig,[*] but some huge and unprocurable victim, to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales. Why, yes, said he, such stories are hard sayings. Yes, and they are not to be told,

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Adeimantus, in our city, nor is it to be said in the hearing of a young man, that in doing the utmost wrong he would do nothing to surprise anybody, nor again in punishing his father's[*] wrong-doings to the limit, but would only be following the example of the first and greatest of the gods.[*] No, by heaven, said he, I do not myself think that they are fit to be told. Neither must we admit at all, said I, that gods war with gods[*] and plot against one another and contend—for it is not true either—

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if we wish our future guardians to deem nothing more shameful than lightly to fall out with one another; still less must we make battles of gods and giants the subject for them of stories and embroideries,[*] and other enmities many and manifold of gods and heroes toward their kith and kin. But if there is any likelihood of our persuading them that no citizen ever quarrelled with his fellow-citizen and that the very idea of it is an impiety,

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that is the sort of thing that ought rather to be said by their elders, men and women, to children from the beginning and as they grow older, and we must compel the poets to keep close to this in their compositions. But Hera's fetherings[*] by her son and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus by his father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and the battles of the gods[*] in Homer's verse are things that we must not admit into our city either wrought in allegory[*] or without allegory. For the young are not able to distinguish what is and what is not allegory, but whatever opinions are taken into the mind at that age are wont to prove

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indelible and unalterable. For which reason, maybe, we should do our utmost that the first stories that they hear should be so composed as to bring the fairest lessons of virtue to their ears.

Yes, that is reasonable, he said; but if again someone should ask us to be specific and say what these compositions may be and what are the tales, what could we name?

And I replied, Adeimantus, we are not poets,[*] you and I at present,

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but founders of a state. And to founders it pertains to know the patterns on which poets must compose their fables and from which their poems must not be allowed to deviate; but the founders are not required themselves to compose fables. Right, he said; but this very thing—the patterns or norms of right speech about the gods, what would they be? Something like this, I said. The true quality of God we must always surely attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse. We must. And is not God of course[*] good in reality

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and always to be spoken of[*] as such? Certainly. But further, no good thing is harmful, is it? I think not. Can what is not harmful harm? By no means. Can that which does not harm do any evil? Not that either. But that which does no evil would not be cause of any evil either? How could it? Once more, is the good beneficent? Yes. It is the cause, then, of welfare? Yes. Then the good is not the cause of all things, but of things that are well it the cause—of things that are ill it is blameless. Entirely so,

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he said. Neither, then, could God, said I, since he is good, be, as the multitude say, the cause of all things, but for mankind he is the cause of few things, but of many things not the cause.[*] For good things are far fewer[*] with us than evil, and for the good we must assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other things and not in God. What you say seems to me most true, he replied. Then, said I, we must not accept

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from Homer or any other poet the folly of such error as this about the gods when he says

Two urns stand on the floor of the palace of Zeus and are filled with Dooms he allots, one of blessings, the other of gifts that are evil,

Hom. Il. 24.527-8 and to whomsoever Zeus gives of both commingled—
Now upon evil he chances and now again good is his portion,

Hom. Il. 24.530 but the man for whom he does not blend the lots, but to whom he gives unmixed evil—

Hunger devouring drives him, a wanderer over the wide world,

Hom. Il. 24.532

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nor will we tolerate the saying that

Zeus is dispenser alike of good and of evil to mortals.

[*]

But as to the violation of the oaths[*] and the truce by Pandarus, if anyone affirms it to have been brought about by the action of Athena and Zeus, we will not approve, nor that the strife and contention[*] of the gods

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was the doing of Themis and Zeus; nor again must we permit our youth to hear what Aeschylus says—

A god implants the guilty cause in men

When he would utterly destroy a house,

Aesch. []* but if any poets compose a Sorrows of Niobe, the poem that contains these iambics, or a tale of the Pelopidae or of Troy, or anything else of the kind, we must either forbid them to say that these woes are the work of God, or they must devise some such interpretation as we now require, and must declare that what God

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did was righteous and good, and they were benefited[*] by their chastisement. But that they were miserable who paid the penalty, and that the doer of this was God, is a thing that the poet must not be suffered to say; if on the other hand he should say that for needing chastisement the wicked were miserable and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by God, that we must allow. But as to saying that God, who is good, becomes the cause of evil to anyone, we must contend in every way that neither should anyone assert this in his own city if it is to be well governed, nor anyone hear it,

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neither younger nor older, neither telling a story in meter or without meter; for neither would the saying of such things, if they are said, be holy, nor would they be profitable to us or concordant with themselves. I cast my vote with yours for this law, he said, and am well pleased with it. This, then, said I, will

be one of the laws and patterns concerning the gods[*] to which speakers and poets will be required to conform, that God is not the cause of all things, but only of the good. And an entirely satisfactory one, he said.

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And what of this, the second. Do you think that God is a wizard and capable of manifesting himself by design, now in one aspect, now in another, at one time[*] himself changing and altering his shape in many transformations and at another deceiving us and causing us to believe such things about him; or that he is simple and less likely than anything else to depart from his own form? I cannot say offhand, he replied. But what of this: If anything went out from[*] its own form, would it not be displaced and changed, either by itself 380e

or by something else? Necessarily. Is it not true that to be altered and moved[*] by something else happens least to things that are in the best condition,

as, for example, a body by food and drink and toil, and plants[*] by the heat of the sun and winds and similar influences—is it not true that the healthiest and strongest is least altered?

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Certainly. And is it not the soul that is bravest and most intelligent, that would be least disturbed[*] and altered by any external affection? Yes. And, again, it is surely true of all composite implements, edifices, and habiliments, by parity of reasoning, that those which are well made and in good condition are least liable to be changed by time and other influences. That is so. It is universally[*] true, then, that that which is in the best state by nature or

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art or both admits least alteration by something else. So it seems. But God, surely, and everything that belongs to God is in every way in the best possible state. Of course. From this point of view, then, it would be least of all likely that there would be many forms in God. Least indeed.

But would he transform and alter himself? Obviously, he said, if he is altered. Then does he change himself for the better and to something fairer, or for the worse[*] and to something uglier than himself?

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It must necessarily, said he, be for the worse if he is changed. For we surely will not say that God is deficient in either beauty or excellence. Most rightly spoken, said I. And if that were his condition, do you think, Adeimantus, that any one god or man would of his own will worsen himself in any way?

Impossible, he replied. It is impossible then, said I, even for a god to wish to alter himself, but, as it appears, each of them being the fairest and best possible abides[*] for ever simply in his own form. An absolutely necessary conclusion to my thinking. No poet then,

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I said, my good friend, must be allowed to tell us that
The gods, in the likeness of strangers,
Many disguises assume as they visit the cities of mortals.

Hom. Od. 17.485-486 [*] Nor must anyone tell falsehoods about Proteus[*]
and Thetis, nor in any tragedy or in other poems bring in Hera disguised as a
priestess collecting alms
for the life-giving sons of Inachus, the Argive stream.

Aesch. [*]

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And many similar falsehoods they must not tell. Nor again must mothers
under the influence of such poets terrify their children[*] with harmful tales,
how that there are certain gods whose apparitions haunt the night in the
likeness of many strangers from all manner of lands, lest while they speak evil
of the gods they at the same time make cowards of children. They must not,
he said. But, said I, may we suppose that while the gods themselves are
incapable of change they cause us to fancy that they appear in many shapes
deceiving and practising magic upon us? Perhaps, said he.

Consider,

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said I; would a god wish to deceive, or lie, by presenting in either word or
action what is only appearance? I don't know, said he. Don't you know, said
I, that the veritable lie, if the expression is permissible, is a thing that all gods
and men abhor? What do you mean? he said. This, said I, that falsehood in the
most vital part of themselves, and about their most vital concerns, is
something that no one willingly accepts, but it is there above all that everyone
fears it. I don't understand yet either. That is because you suspect me of some
grand meaning,

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I said; but what I mean is, that deception in the soul about realities, to have
been deceived and to be blindly ignorant and to have and hold the falsehood
there, is what all men would least of all accept, and it is in that case that they
loathe it most of all. Quite so, he said. But surely it would be most wholly
right, as I was just now saying, to describe this as in very truth falsehood—
ignorance namely in the soul of the man deceived. For the falsehood in words
is a copy[*] of the affection in the soul,

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an after-rising image of it and not an altogether unmixed falsehood. Is not that
so? By all means.

Essential falsehood, then, is hated not only by gods but by men. I agree. But
what of the falsehood in words, when and for whom is it serviceable so as not
to merit abhorrence? Will it not be against enemies? And when any of those
whom we call friends owing to madness or folly attempts to do some wrong,

does it not then become useful

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to avert the evil—as a medicine? And also in the fables of which we were just now speaking owing to our ignorance of the truth about antiquity, we liken the false to the true as far as we may and so make it edifying.[*] We most certainly do, he said. Tell me, then, on which of these grounds falsehood would be serviceable to God. Would he because of his ignorance of antiquity make false likenesses of it? An absurd supposition, that, he said. Then there is no lying poet in God. I think not.

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Well then, would it be through fear of his enemies that he would lie? Far from it. Would it be because of the folly or madness of his friends? Nay, no fool or madman is a friend of God. Then there is no motive for God to deceive. None. From every point of view[*] the divine and the divinity are free from falsehood. By all means.

Then God is altogether simple and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by visions or words or the sending of signs

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in waking or in dreams. I myself think so, he said, when I hear you say it. You concur then, I said, this as our second norm or canon for speech and poetry about the gods,—that they are neither wizards in shape-shifting nor do they mislead us by falsehoods in words or deed? I concur. Then, though there are many other things that we praise in Homer, this we will not applaud, the sending of the dream by Zeus[*] to Agamemnon, nor shall we approve of Aeschylus when his Thetis[*] avers that

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Apollo singing at her wedding,
foretold the happy fortunes of her issue

Hom. Il. 2.1 —

Their days prolonged, from pain and sickness free,
And rounding out the tale of heaven's blessings,
Raised the proud paeon, making glad my heart.
And I believed that Phoebus' mouth divine,
Filled with the breath of prophecy, could not lie.
But he himself, the singer, himself who sat
At meat with us, himself who promised all,
Is now himself the slayer of my son.

Aesch. Frag. 350

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When anyone says that sort of thing about the gods, we shall be wroth with him, we will refuse him a chorus, neither will we allow teachers to use him for the education of the young if our guardians are to be god-fearing men and

god-like in so far as that is possible for humanity. By all means, he said, I accept these norms and would use them as canons and laws.

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τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἀκουστέον τε καὶ οὐκ ἀκουστέον εὐθύς ἐκ παίδων τοῖς θεοῦς τε τιμήσουσιν καὶ γονέας τήν τε ἀλλήλων φιλίαν μὴ περὶ σμικροῦ ποιησομένοις.

καὶ οἶμαι γ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν φαίνεσθαι.

τί δὲ δὴ εἰ μέλλουσιν εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι; ἄρα οὐ ταῦτά τε λεκτέον καὶ οἷα αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι ἥκιστα τὸν θάνατον δεδιέναι;

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ἦ ἡγῆ τινά ποτ' ἂν γενέσθαι ἀνδρεῖον ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτο τὸ δεῖμα; μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἔγωγε.

τί δέ; τᾶν Ἄιδου ἡγούμενον εἶναι τε καὶ δεινὰ εἶναι οἷε τινὰ θανάτου ἀδεῇ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις αἰρήσεσθαι πρὸ ἥττης τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον; οὐδαμῶς.

δεῖ δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἡμᾶς ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν λέγειν, καὶ δεῖσθαι μὴ λιοιδορεῖν ἀπλῶς οὕτως τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν, ὥς οὔτε ἀληθῆ

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ἂν λέγοντας οὔτε ὠφέλιμα τοῖς μέλλουσιν μαχίμοις ἔσεσθαι.

δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη.

ἐξαλείψομεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους ἀρξάμενοι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα—

βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλω

ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοςτος πολὺς εἴη

ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν

Aesch. Frag. 350 καὶ τὸ—

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οἰκία δὲ θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι φανείη

σμερδαλέ', εὐρώεντα, τὰ τε στυγέουσι θεοὶ περ

Hom. Il. 20.64 καὶ—

ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις ἔστι καὶ εἰν Αἴδαο δόμοισιν

ψυχὴ καὶ εἶδωλον, ἅτᾳρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν

Hom. Od. 10.495 καὶ τὸ—

οἷῳ πεπνῦσθαι, ταῖ δὲ σκιαὶ αἴισσουσι

Hom. Il. 23.103 καὶ—

ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ῥεθέων παμμένη Αἰδόσδε βεβήκει,

ὄν πότμον γοώωσα, λιποῦσ' ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην

Hom. Il. 16.856

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καὶ τὸ—
... ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονός, ἥ ὕτε καπνός,
ῥχετο τετριγυῖα ...

Hom. Il. 23.100 καὶ—

ὥς δ' ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῶ ἄντρου θεσπεσίοιο
τριζουσai ποτέονται, ἐπεὶ κέ τις ἀποπέσῃσιν
ὄρμαθοῦ ἐκ πέτρης, ἀνά τ' ἀλλήλησιν ἔχονται,
ὥς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ' ἦσαν.

Hom. Od. 24.6-10

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ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα παραιτησόμεθα Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
ποιητὰς μὴ χαλεπαίνειν ἂν διαγράφωμεν, οὐχ ὥς οὐ ποιητικὰ καὶ ἡδέα τοῖς
πολλοῖς ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' ὅσῳ ποιητικώτερα, τοσούτῳ ἥττον ἀκουστέον παισὶ
καὶ ἀνδράσιν οὓς δεῖ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, δουλείαν θανάτου μᾶλλον
πεφοβημένους.

παντάσῃσι μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν ἔτι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὀνόματα πάντα τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ φοβερὰ
ἀποβλητέα, Κωκυτοὺς τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ

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νέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τοῦτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα
φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὡς οἶεται πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἴσως εὖ ἔχει πρὸς
ἄλλο τι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλάκων φοβούμεθα μὴ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης
θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος γένωνται ἡμῖν.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, φοβούμεθα.

ἀφαιρετέα ἄρα;

ναί.

τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον τύπον τούτοις λεκτέον τε καὶ ποιητέον;

δῆλα δῆ.

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καὶ τοὺς ὀδυρμούς ἄρα ἐξαίρησομεν καὶ τοὺς οἴκτους τοὺς τῶν ἐλλογίμων
ἀνδρῶν;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, εὔτερ καὶ τὰ πρότερα.

σκοπεῖ δῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ὀρθῶς ἐξαίρησομεν ἢ οὐ. φαμέν δὲ δῆ ὅτι ὁ
ἐπικῆς ἀνὴρ τῷ ἐπικεῖ, οὐπὲρ καὶ ἐταῖρός ἐστιν, τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινὸν
ἡγήσεται.

φαμέν γάρ.

οὐκ ἄρα ὑπὲρ γ' ἐκείνου ὡς δεινόν τι πεπονθότος ὀδύροιτ' ἂν.

οὐ δῆτα.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε λέγομεν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐτάρκης
πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν

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ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἐτέρου προσδεῖται.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

ἦκιστα ἄρ' αὐτῷ δεινὸν στερηθῆναι ὕεος ἢ ἀδελφοῦ ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου
του τῶν τοιούτων.

ἦκιστα μέντοι.

ἦκιστ' ἄρα καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι, φέρειν δὲ ὡς πρᾶτότατα, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν τοιαύτη
συμφορὰ καταλάβῃ.

πολύ γε.

ὀρθῶς ἄρ' ἂν ἐξαιροῖμεν τοὺς θρήνους τῶν ὀνομαστῶν ἀνδρῶν, γυναιξὶ δὲ
ἀποδιδόμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις,

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καὶ ὅσοι κακοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἴνα ἡμῖν δυσχεραίνωσιν ὅμοια τούτοις ποιεῖν
οὐς δὴ φάμεν ἐπὶ φυλακῇ τῆς χώρας τρέφειν.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

πάλιν δὴ Ὀμήρου τε δεησόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν μὴ ποιεῖν Ἀχιλλεῖα
θεᾶς παῖδα—

ἄλλοτ' ἐπὶ πλευρᾷς κατακείμενον, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε

ὑπτιον, ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνῇ, ...

Hom. Il. 24.10-12

τοτὲ δ' ὀρθὸν ἀναστάντα πλωῖζοντ' ἀλύοντ' ἐπὶ

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θῖν' ἀλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο,

Hom. Il. 24.12 μηδὲ

ἀμφοτέραισιν χερσὶν ἐλόντα κόνιν αἰθαλόεσσαν χευάμενον κᾶκ κεφαλῆς

Hom. Il. 18.23-24, μηδὲ ἄλλα κλαιοντά τε καὶ ὀδυρόμενον ὅσα καὶ οἷα
ἐκεῖνος ἐποίησε, μηδὲ Πρίαμον ἐγγὺς θεῶν γεγονότα λιτανεύοντά τε καὶ—

... κυλινδόμενον κατὰ κόπρον,

ἐξονομακλήδην ὀνομάζοντ' ἀνδρα ἕκαστον.

Hom. Il. 22.414-415 πολὺ δ' ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον δεησόμεθα μήτοι θεοὺς γε
ποιεῖν ὀδυρομένους καὶ λέγοντας—

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ὦμοι ἐγὼ δειλῇ, ὦμοι δυσαριστοτόκεια·

Hom. Il. 18.54 εἰ δ' οὖν θεοὺς, μήτοι τὸν γε μέγιστον τῶν θεῶν τολμῆσαι
οὕτως ἀνομοίως μιμήσασθαι, ὥστε

ὦ πόποι, φάναι, ἦ φίλον ἄνδρα διωκόμενον περὶ ἄστυ

ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὀρώμαι, ἐμὸν δ' ὀλοφύρεται ἦτορ·

Hom. Il. 22.168 καὶ—

αἶ αἶ ἐγών, ὅ τέ μοι Σαρπηδόνα φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν

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μοῖρ' ὑπὸ Πατρόκλαιο Μενoitιάδαο δαμῆναι.

Hom. Il. 16.433-434 εἰ γάρ, ὦ φίλε Ἀδεΐμαντε, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμῖν οἱ νέοι
σπουδῇ ἀκούοιεν καὶ μὴ καταγελῶεν ὡς ἀναξίως λεγομένων, σχολῇ ἂν

ἐαυτὸν γὰρ τις ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἀνάξιον ἠγῆσαιτο τούτων καὶ ἐπιπλήξειεν, εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι αὐτῷ τι τοιοῦτον ἢ λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσχυνόμενος οὐδὲ καρτερῶν πολλοὺς ἐπὶ σμικροῖσιν παθήμασιν θρήνους ἂν ᾄδοι καὶ ὀδυρμούς.

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ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

δεῖ δέ γε οὐχ, ὥς ἄρτι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἐσήμαινεν· ὧ πειστέον, ἕως ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἄλλω καλλίονι πείσῃ.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν δεῖ.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ φιλογέλωτάς γε δεῖ εἶναι. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὅταν τις ἐπιῇ ἰσχυρῷ γέλωπι, ἰσχυρὰν καὶ μεταβολὴν ζητεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον.

δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

οὐτε ἄρα ἀνθρώπους ἀξίους λόγου κρατουμένους ὑπὸ

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γέλωτος ἄν τις ποιῇ, ἀποδεκτέον, πολὺ δὲ ἦττον, ἐὰν θεοὺς.

πολὺ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐκοῦν Ὀμήρου οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν—

ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνῶρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν,

ὥς ἴδον Ἥφαιστον διὰ δώματα πομπύοντα·

Hom. Il. 1.599-600 οὐκ ἀποδεκτέον κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

εἰ σύ, ἔφη, βούλει ἐμὸν τιθέναι· οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ

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ἀποδεκτέον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειάν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον. εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεοῖσι μὲν ἄχρηστον ψεῦδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρησίμον ὥς ἐν φαρμάκου εἶδει, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ γε τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἁπτέον.

δῆλον, ἔφη.

τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δὴ τῆς πόλεως, εἴτερ τιςὶν ἄλλοις, προσήκει ψεῦδεσθαι ἢ πολέμιων ἢ πολιτῶν ἕνεκα ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῆς πόλεως, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πᾶσιν οὐχ ἁπτέον τοῦ τοιούτου·

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ἀλλὰ πρὸς γε δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄρχοντας ἰδιώτῃ ψεύσασθαι ταῦτόν καὶ μεῖζον ἀμάρτημα φήσομεν ἢ κάμνοντι πρὸς ἰατρὸν ἢ ἀσκοῦντι πρὸς παιδοτρίβην περὶ τῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ σώματος παθημάτων μὴ τάληθῇ λέγειν, ἢ πρὸς κυβερνήτην περὶ τῆς νεῶς τε καὶ τῶν ναυτῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντι ὅπως ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τις τῶν συνναυτῶν πράξεως ἔχει.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

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ἂν ἄρ' ἄλλον τινὰ λαμβάνῃ ψευδόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει—

... τῶν οἱ δημιοεργοὶ ἔασι,

μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,

Hom. Od. 17.383-384 κολάσει ὥς ἐπιτήδευμα εἰσάγοντα πόλεως ὥσπερ νεὼς ἀνατρεπτικόν τε καὶ ὀλέθριον.

ἐάνπερ, ἧ δ' ὅς, ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελῆται.

τί δέ; σωφροσύνης ἄρα οὐ δεήσει ἡμῖν τοῖς νεανίαις;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

σωφροσύνης δὲ ὥς πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιάδε μέγιστα, ἀρχόντων
389e

μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

τὰ δὴ τοιάδε φήσομεν οἶμαι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷα καὶ Ὀμήρῳ Διομήδης λέγει

—
τέττα, σιωπῇ ἦσο, ἐμῷ δ' ἐπιπείθεο μύθῳ,

Hom. Il. 4.412 καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα, τὰ—

... ἴσαν μένεα πνεῖοντες Ἀχαιοί,

σιγῇ δειδιότες σημάντορας, ...

Hom. Il. 3.8 καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

καλῶς.

τί δέ; τὰ τοιάδε—

οἶνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο

Hom. Il. 1.225

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καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐξῆς ἄρα καλῶς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τις ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ποιήσει εἴρηκε νεανιεύματα ἰδιωτῶν εἰς ἄρχοντας;

οὐ καλῶς.

οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι εἷς γε σωφροσύνην νέοις ἐπιτήδεια ἀκούειν· εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν παρέχεται, θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν. ἢ πῶς σοι φαίνεται;

οὕτως, ἔφη.

τί δέ; ποιεῖν ἄνδρα τὸν σοφώτατον λέγοντα ὥς δοκεῖ αὐτῷ κάλλιστον εἶναι πάντων, ὅταν—

... παρὰ πλεῖται ὥσι τράπεζαι

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σίτου καὶ κρειῶν, μέθυ δ' ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσω

οἶνοχόος φορέῃσι καὶ ἐγχείῃ δεπάεσσι,

Hom. Od. 9.8-10 δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν ἑαυτοῦ ἀκούειν νέω; ἢ τὸ—

λιμῷ δ' οἴκτιστον θανέειν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν;

Hom. Od. 12.342 ἡ Δία, καθευδόντων τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὥς, μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς ἃ ἐβουλεύσατο, τούτων πάντων ῥαδίως

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ἐπλανθανόμενον διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὕτως ἐκπλαγέντα

ιδόντα τὴν Ἥραν, ὥστε μὴδ' εἰς τὸ δωμάτιον ἐθέλειν ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ
βουλόμενον χαμαὶ συγγίγνεσθαι, λέγοντα ὡς οὕτως ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχεται,
ὡς οὐδ' ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐφοίτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους
φίλους λήθοντε τοκῆας

Hom. Il. 14.296. οὐδὲ Ἄρεώς τε καὶ ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Ἥφαιστου δεσμὸν δι'
ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ μοι φαίνεται ἐπιτήδειον.

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ἀλλ' εἴ ποὺ τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καρτερίαι πρὸς ἅπαντα καὶ λέγονται καὶ
πράττονται ὑπὸ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν, θεατέον τε καὶ ἀκουστέον, οἷον καὶ τὸ

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·

τέτλαθι δῆ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

Hom. Od. 20.17-18

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

οὐ μὲν δὴ δωροδόκους γε ἑάτεον εἶναι τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐδὲ φιλοχρημάτους.

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οὐδαμῶς.

οὐδ' ἄστέον αὐτοῖς ὅτι—

δῶρα θεοὺς πείθει, δῶρ' αἰδοίους βασιλῆας·

unknown οὐδὲ τὸν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως παιδαγωγὸν Φοῖνικα ἐπαινετέον ὡς
μετρίως ἔλεγε συμβουλευὼν αὐτῷ δῶρα μὲν λαβόντι ἐπαμύνειν τοῖς
Ἀχαιοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ δώρων μὴ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τῆς μήνιος.

οὐδ' αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἀξιώσομεν οὐδ' ὁμολογήσομεν οὕτω φιλοχρήματον
εἶναι, ὥστε παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος δῶρα λαβεῖν, καὶ τιμὴν αὖ λαβόντα
νεκροῦ

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ἀπολύειν, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ 'θέλειν.

οὐκουν δίκαιόν γε, ἔφη, ἐπαινεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ὀκνῶ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δι' Ὀμηρον λέγειν ὅτι οὐδ' ὅσιον ταῦτά γε κατὰ
Ἀχιλλέως φάναι καὶ ἄλλων λεγόντων πείθεσθαι, καὶ αὖ ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ἀπόλλω
εἶπεν—

ἔβλαψάς μ' ἐκάεργε, θεῶν ὀλοώτατε πάντων·

ἦ σ' ἂν τισαίμην, εἴ μοι δύναμις γε παρείη·

Hom. Il. 22.15

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καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ποταμόν, θεὸν ὄντα, ἀπειθῶς εἶχεν καὶ μάχεσθαι ἔτοιμος
ἦν, καὶ αὖ τὰς τοῦ ἑτέρου ποταμοῦ Σπερχειοῦ ἱερὰς τρίχας

Πατρόκλῳ ἥρωϊ

, ἔφη,

κόμην ὀπάσαιμι φέρεσθαι

Hom. Il. 23.151, νεκρῷ ὄντι, καὶ ὡς ἔδρασεν τοῦτο, οὐ πειστέον· τὰς τε αὖ Ἑκτορος ἔλξεις περὶ τὸ σῆμα τὸ Πατρόκλου καὶ τὰς τῶν ζωγρηθέντων σφαγὰς εἰς τὴν πυράν, σύμπαντα ταῦτα οὐ φήσομεν ἀληθῆ εἰρησθαι, οὐδ' ἐάσομεν

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πειθεσθαι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ὡς Ἀχιλλεὺς, θεᾶς ὦν παῖς καὶ Πηλέως, σωφρονεστάτου τε καὶ τρίτου ἀπὸ Διός, καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ σοφωτάτῳ Χείρωνι τεθραμμένος, τοσαύτης ἦν ταραχῆς πλέως, ὥστ' ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσήματε δύο ἐναντίῳ ἀλλήλοιν, ἀνελευθερίαν μετὰ φιλοχρηματίας καὶ αὖ ὑπερηφανίαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

ὁρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μηδὲ τάδε πειθώμεθα μηδ' ἐῷμεν λέγειν, ὡς Θησεὺς Ποσειδῶνος ὕδς Πειρίθους τε Διὸς

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ῶρμησαν οὕτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγὰς, μηδὲ τιν' ἄλλον θεοῦ παῖδά τε καὶ ἥρω τολμῆσαι ἂν δεινὰ καὶ ἀσεβῆ ἔργασασθαι, οἷα νῦν καταψεύδονται αὐτῶν· ἀλλὰ προσαναγκάζωμεν τοὺς ποιητὰς ἢ μὴ τούτων αὐτὰ ἔργα φάναι ἢ τούτους μὴ εἶναι θεῶν παῖδας, ἀμφοτέρα δὲ μὴ λέγειν, μηδὲ ἡμῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν τοὺς νέους ὡς οἱ θεοὶ κακὰ γεννῶσιν, καὶ ἥρωες ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν βελτίους· ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν,

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οὐθ' ὅσια ταῦτα οὔτε ἀληθῆ· ἐπεδείξαμεν γάρ που ὅτι ἐκ θεῶν κακὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσιν βλαβερά· πᾶς γὰρ ἐαυτῷ συγγνώμην ἔξει κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσιν τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ—

... οἱ θεῶν ἀγχισποροι,

οἱ Ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ὦν κατ' Ἰδαῖον πάγον

Διὸς πατρώου βωμός ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι,

Aesch. Niobe Fr. καὶ—

οὐ πῶ σφιν ἐξίτηλον αἶμα δαιμόνων.

Aesch. Niobe

ὦν ἔνεκα παυστέον τοὺς τοιοῦτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν πολλήν

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εὐχέριαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις πονηρίας.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡμῖν ἔτι λοιπὸν εἶδος λόγων περὶ ὀριζομένοις οἶους τε λεκτέον καὶ μὴ; περὶ γὰρ θεῶν ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἴη ἄν;

δῆλα δῆ.

ἀδύνατον δὴ, ὦ φίλε, ἡμῖν τοῦτο γε ἐν τῷ παρόντι τάξει.

πῶς;

ὅτι οἶμαι ἡμᾶς ἐρεῖν ὡς ἄρα καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογοποιοὶ

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κακῶς λέγουσιν περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ μέγιστα, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄδικοι μὲν εὐδαίμονες πολλοί, δίκαιοι δὲ ἄθλιοι, καὶ ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἐὰν λανθάνῃ, ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν, οἰκεία δὲ ζημία· καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἄπερεῖν λέγειν, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων προστάξειν ἄδειν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

εὖ μὲν οὔν, ἔφη, οἶδα.

οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ὁμολογῇς ὀρθῶς με λέγειν, φήσω σε ὠμολογηκέναι ἅ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν;

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ὑπέλαβες.

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οὐκοῦν περὶ γε ἀνθρώπων ὅτι τοιούτους δεῖ λόγους λέγεσθαι, τότε διομολογησόμεθα, ὅταν εὐρωμεν οἷόν ἐστιν δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὡς φύσει λυσιτελοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι, ἐάντε δοκῇ ἐάντε μὴ τοιοῦτος εἶναι; ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων περὶ ἐχέτω τέλος· τὸ δὲ λέξεως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅ τε λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον παντελῶς ἐσκέψεται.

καὶ ὁ Ἀδεΐμαντος, τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ μανθάνω ὅτι λέγεις.

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ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεῖ γε· ἴσως οὔν τῇδε μᾶλλον εἴσῃ. ἄρ' οὐ πάντα ὅσα ὑπὸ μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν λέγεται διήγησις οὔσα τυγχάνει ἢ γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ μελλόντων;

τί γάρ, ἔφη, ἄλλο;

ἄρ' οὔν οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἀπλῇ διηγῇσιν ἢ διὰ μιμήσεως γιγνομένη ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν;

καὶ τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι δέομαι σαφέστερον μαθεῖν.

γελοῖος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικα διδάσκαλος εἶναι καὶ ἀσαφής· ὥσπερ οὔν οἱ ἀδύνατοι λέγειν, οὐ κατὰ ὅλον ἀλλ' ἀπολαβῶν

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μέρος τι πειράσομαι σοι ἐν τούτῳ δηλῶσαι ὃ βούλομαι.

καὶ μοι εἰπέ· ἐπίστασαι τῆς Ἰλιάδος τὰ πρῶτα, ἐν οἷς ὁ ποιητὴς φησι τὸν μὲν Χρῦσην δεῖσθαι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἀπολῦσαι τὴν θυγατέρα, τὸν δὲ χαλεπαίνειν, τὸν δέ, ἐπειδὴ

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οὐκ ἐτύγχανεν, κατεῦχεσθαι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πρὸς τὸν θεόν; ἔγωγε.

οἶσθ' οὔν ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν—

... καὶ ἐλίσσετο πάντα Ἀχαιοὺς,

Ἄτρεϊδα δὲ μάλιστα δῶν, κοσμήτορε λαῶν

Hom. Il. 1.15 λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν τὴν

διάνοιαν ἄλλοσε τρέπειν ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτός· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὣν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει καὶ πειρᾶται

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ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα ποιῆσαι μὴ Ὅμηρον δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα, πρεσβύτην ὄντα. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὴ πᾶσαν σχεδὸν τι οὕτω πεποιήται διήγησιν περὶ τε τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλῃ Ὀδυσσεΐα παθημάτων.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν διήγησις μὲν ἔστιν καὶ ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις ἐκάστοτε λέγῃ καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων;

πῶς γάρ οὔ;

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ἀλλ' ὅταν γέ τινα λέγῃ ῥῆσιν ὡς τις ἄλλος ὢν, ἄρ' οὐ τότε ὁμοιοῦν αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ λέξιν ἐκάστῳ ὃν ἂν προείπῃ ὡς ἐροῦντα; φήσομεν· τί γάρ;

οὐκοῦν τὸ γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ἐκεῖνον ὃ ἂν τις ὁμοιοῖ;

τί μὴν;

ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

εἰ δέ γε μηδαμοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτοιο ὁ ποιητής, πᾶσα

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ἂν αὐτῷ ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἢ ποιήσις τε καὶ διήγησις γεγонуῖα εἴη. ἵνα δὲ μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι οὐκ αὖ μανθάνεις, ὅπως ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο ἐγὼ φράσω. εἰ γὰρ Ὅμηρος εἰπὼν ὅτι ἦλθεν ὁ Χρύσης τῆς τε θυγατρὸς λύτρα φέρων καὶ ἰκέτης τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν βασιλέων, μετὰ τοῦτο μὴ ὡς Χρύσης γενόμενος ἔλεγεν ἀλλ' ἔτι ὡς Ὅμηρος, οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν μίμησις ἦν ἀλλὰ ἀπλὴ διήγησις. εἶχε δ' ἂν ὥδε πως—φράσω δὲ ἄνευ μέτρου· οὐ γὰρ εἰμι ποιητικός—ἐλθὼν

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ὁ ἱερεὺς ηὔχετο ἐκείνοις μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς δοῦναι ἐλόντας τὴν Τροίαν αὐτοῦς σωθῆναι, τὴν δὲ θυγατέρα οἱ λῦσαι δεξαμένους ἄποινα καὶ τὸν θεὸν αἰδεσθέντας.

ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐσέβοντο καὶ συνήγουν, ὁ δὲ Ἀγαμέμνων ἡγρίαινεν ἐντελλόμενος νῦν τε ἀπέναι καὶ αὐθις μὴ ἐλθεῖν, μὴ αὐτῷ τὸ τε σκῆπτρον καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ στέμματα οὐκ ἐπαρκέσοι· πρὶν δὲ λυθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν θυγατέρα, ἐν Ἀργεὶ ἔφη γηράσειν μετὰ οὗ· ἀπέναι δ' ἐκέλευεν καὶ μὴ ἐρεθίζειν,

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ἵνα σῶς οἴκαδε ἔλθοι. ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτης ἀκούσας ἔδεισέν τε καὶ ἀπήει σιγῇ, ἀποχωρήσας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πολλὰ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι ηὔχετο, τὰς τε ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνακαλῶν καὶ ὑπομιμνήσκων καὶ ἀπαιτῶν, εἴ τι

πώποτε ἢ ἐν ναῶν οἰκοδομήσεσιν ἢ ἐν ἱερῶν θυσίαις κεχαρισμένον
δωρήσαιτο· ὦν δὴ χάριν κατηύχετο τεῖσαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὰ ἅ δάκρυα τοῖς
ἐκείνου βέλεσιν. οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἄνευ

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μιμήσεως ἀπλῇ διήγησις γίνεται.

μανθάνω, ἔφη.

μάνθανε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ταύτης αὖ ἐναντία γίνεται, ὅταν τις τὰ τοῦ
ποιητοῦ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων ἐξαιρῶν τὰ ἀμοιβαῖα καταλείπη.

καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, μανθάνω, ὅτι ἔστιν τὸ περὶ τὰς τραγωδίας τοιοῦτον.

ὀρθότατα, ἔφην, ὑπέλαβες, καὶ οἶμαί σοι ἤδη δηλοῦν ὃ ἔμπροσθεν οὐχ οἷός
τ' ἦ, ὅτι τῆς ποιήσεώς τε καὶ μυθολογίας

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ἢ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγωδία τε καὶ κωμωδία,
ἢ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—εὖροις δ' ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν
διθυράμβοις—ἢ δ' αὖ δι' ἀμφοτέρων ἐν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ
δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι, εἴ μοι μανθάνεις.

ἀλλὰ συνίημι, ἔφη, ὃ τότε ἐβούλου λέγειν.

καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου δὴ ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι ἔφαμεν ἃ μὲν λεκτέον ἤδη εἰρήσθαι,
ὥς δὲ λεκτέον ἔτι σκεπτέον εἶναι.

ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι.

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τοῦτο τοίνυν αὐτὸ ἦν ὃ ἔλεγον, ὅτι χρεῖη διομολογήσασθαι πότερον
ἐάσομεν τοὺς ποιητὰς μιμουμένους ἡμῖν τὰς διηγήσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ μὲν
μιμουμένους, τὰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ ὅποια ἐκάτερα, ἢ οὐδὲ μιμεῖσθαι.

μαντεύομαι, ἔφη, σκοπεῖσθαι σε εἴτε παραδεξόμεθα τραγωδίαν τε καὶ
κωμωδίαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ οὐ.

ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγέ πω οἶδα,
ἀλλ' ὅπη ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ, ταύτη ἰτέον.

καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις.

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τόδε τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀδεΐμαντε, ἄθρει, πότερον μιμητικοὺς ἡμῖν δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς
φύλακας ἢ οὐ· ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔπεται, ὅτι εἷς ἕκαστος ἐν μὲν
ἂν ἐπιτηδεύμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι, πολλὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἐπιχειροῖ,
πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἂν, ὥστ' εἶναι που ἐλλόγιμος;
τί δ' οὐ μέλλει;

οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μιμήσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ αὐτὸς μιμεῖσθαι εὖ
ὥσπερ ἐν οὐ δυνατός;

οὐ γὰρ οὕν.

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σχολῇ ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει γέ τι ἅμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ
πολλὰ μιμῆσεται καὶ ἔσται μιμητικός, ἐπεὶ που οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς
ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμεῖσθαι, οἷον
κωμωδίαν καὶ τραγωδίαν ποιοῦντες. ἢ οὐ μιμήματε ἄρτι τούτῳ ἐκάλεις;

ἔγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγεις, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται οἱ αὐτοί.

οὐδὲ μὴν ῥαψῳδοὶ γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα.

ἀληθῆ.

ἀλλ' οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ κωμωδοῖς τε καὶ τραγωδοῖς οἱ

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αὐτοί· πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μιμήματα. ἢ οὐ;

μιμήματα.

καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὧν Ἀδεΐμαντε, φαίνεται μοι εἰς μικρότερα
κατακεκερματισθαι ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ὥστε ἀδύνατος εἶναι πολλὰ
καλῶς μιμεῖσθαι ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν ὧν δὴ καὶ τὰ μιμήματά ἐστιν
ἀφομοιώματα.

ἀληθέστατα, ἢ δ' ὅς.

εἰ ἄρα τὸν πρῶτον λόγον διασώσομεν, τοὺς φύλακας ἡμῖν τῶν ἄλλων
πασῶν δημιουργιῶν ἀφειμένους δεῖν εἶναι

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δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως πάνυ ἀκριβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο
ἐπιτηδεύειν ὅτι μὴ εἰς τοῦτο φέρει, οὐδὲν δὴ δέοι ἂν αὐτοὺς ἄλλο πράττειν
οὐδὲ μιμεῖσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ μιμῶνται, μιμεῖσθαι τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα εὐθὺς
ἐκ παιδων, ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὀσίους, ἐλευθέρους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα,
τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινοὺς εἶναι μιμήσασθαι, μηδὲ ἄλλο
μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχροῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι

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ἀπολαύσωσιν. ἢ οὐκ ἦσθησαι ὅτι αἱ μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρρω
διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς
καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν;

καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὅς.

οὐ δὴ ἐπιτρέψομεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧν φαμὲν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας
ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, γυναῖκα μιμεῖσθαι ἄνδρας ὄντας, ἢ νέαν ἢ πρεσβυτέραν,
ἢ ἀνδρὶ λοιδορουμένην ἢ πρὸς θεοὺς ἐρίζουσάν τε καὶ μεγαλαυχουμένην,
οἰομένην

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εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἢ ἐν συμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθεσιν καὶ θρήνοις ἔχομένην·
κάμνουσαν δὲ ἢ ἐρῶσαν ἢ ὠδίνουσαν, πολλοῦ καὶ δεήσομεν.

παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς.

οὐδέ γε δούλας τε καὶ δούλους πράττοντας ὅσα δούλων.

οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

οὐδέ γε ἄνδρας κακοὺς, ὡς ἔοικεν, δειλοὺς τε καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πράττοντας ὧν
νυνδὴ εἵπομεν, κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμωδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ
αἰσχρολογοῦντας, μεθύοντας ἢ

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καὶ νήφοντας, ἢ καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις
ἀμαρτάνουσιν εἰς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλους, οἷμαι δὲ οὐδὲ μαινομένοις
ἐθιστέον ἀφομοιοῦν αὐτοὺς ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲ ἐν ἔργοις· γνωστέον μὲν γὰρ

καὶ μαινομένους καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας, ποιητέον δὲ οὐδὲν
τούτων οὐδὲ μιμητέον.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· χαλκεύοντας ἢ τι ἄλλο δημιουργοῦντας,

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ἢ ἐλαύνοντας τριήρεις ἢ κελεύοντας τούτοις, ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν περὶ ταῦτα
μιμητέον;

καὶ πῶς; ἔφη, οἷς γε οὐδὲ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτων οὐδενὶ ἐξέσται;

τί δέ; ἵππους χρεμετίζοντας καὶ ταύρους μυκωμένους καὶ ποταμοὺς
φοφοῦντας καὶ θάλαπταν κτυποῦσαν καὶ βροντὰς καὶ πάντα αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα ἢ
μιμήσονται;

ἀλλ' ἀπειρήται αὐτοῖς, ἔφη, μήτε μαίνεσθαι μήτε μαινομένοις
ἀφομοιοῦσθαι.

εἰ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω ἃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔστιν τι εἶδος λέξεώς τε καὶ
διηγήσεως ἐν ᾧ ἂν διηγοῖτο ὁ τῷ ὄντι καλὸς

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κάγαθός, ὁπότε τι δέοι αὐτὸν λέγειν, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ ἀνόμοιον τούτῳ εἶδος,
οὗ ἂν ἔχοιτο ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ διηγοῖτο ὁ ἐναντίως ἐκείνῳ φύς τε καὶ τραφεῖς.
ποῖα δὴ, ἔφη, ταῦτα;

ὁ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτριος ἀνὴρ, ἐπειδὴν ἀφίκηται ἐν τῇ διηγῇ
ἐπὶ λέξιν τινα ἢ πρᾶξιν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ἐθελήσιν ὥς αὐτὸς ὦν ἐκεῖνος
ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ μιμήσει, μάλιστα μὲν
μιμούμενος

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τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἥττον ἢ
ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ ὑπὸ ἐρώτων ἐσφαλμένον ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἢ πινος ἄλλης
συμφορᾶς· ὅταν δὲ γίγνηται κατὰ τινα ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον, οὐκ ἐθελήσιν
σπουδῇ ἀπεικάζειν ἑαυτὸν τῷ χεῖρονι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα κατὰ βραχὺ, ὅταν τι
χρηστὸν ποιῇ, ἀλλ' αἰσχυνεῖσθαι, ἅμα μὲν ἀγύμναστος ὦν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι
τούς τοιοῦτους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δυσχεραίνων αὐτὸν ἐκμάπτειν τε καὶ

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ἐνιστάναι εἰς τοὺς τῶν κακίωνων τύπους, ἀτιμάζων τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὅτι μὴ
παιδιᾶς χάριν.

εἰκός, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν διηγῇσιν χρήσεται οἷα ἡμεῖς ὀλίγον πρότερον διήλθομεν περὶ τὰ τοῦ
Ὀμήρου ἔπη, καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἡ λέξις μετέχουσα μὲν ἀμφοτέρων, μιμήσεώς
τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης διηγήσεως, σμικρὸν δὲ τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς
μιμήσεως; ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οἷόν γε ἀνάγκη τὸν τύπον εἶναι τοῦ τοιοῦτου ῥήτορος.

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οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος αὖ, ὅσω ἂν φαυλότερος ἦ, πάντα τε
μᾶλλον διηγῇσεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον οἰήσεται εἶναι, ὥστε πάντα
ἐπιχειρήσει μιμεῖσθαι σπουδῇ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ

ἐλέγομεν, βροντάς τε καὶ ψόφους ἀνέμων τε καὶ χαλαζῶν καὶ ἀξόνων τε καὶ τροχιλιῶν, καὶ σαλπίγγων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ συριγγων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων φωνάς, καὶ ἔτι κυνῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὀρνέων φθόγγους.

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καὶ ἔσται δὴ ἡ τοῦτου λέξις ἅπανα διὰ μιμήσεως φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν, ἢ σμικρόν τι διηγήσεως ἔχουσα;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο.

ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔλεγον τὰ δύο εἶδη τῆς λέξεως.

καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν αὐτοῖν τὸ μὲν σμικρὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς ἔχει, καὶ ἐὰν τις ἀποδιδῷ πρέπουσαν ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν τῇ λέξει, ὀλίγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν γίνεται λέγειν τῷ ὁρθῶς λέγοντι καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἁρμονίᾳ—σμικραὶ γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαί—καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν

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ῥυθμῷ ὡσαύτως παραπλησίῳ τινί;

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει.

τί δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου εἶδος; οὐ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖται, πασῶν μὲν ἁρμονιῶν, πάντων δὲ ῥυθμῶν, εἰ μέλλει αὖ οἰκείως λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ παντοδαπὰς μορφὰς τῶν μεταβολῶν ἔχειν;

καὶ σφόδρα γε οὕτως ἔχει.

ἄρ' οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ τι λέγοντες ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτων ἐπιτυχάνουσιν τύπῳ τῆς λέξεως ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τινὲς συγκεραννύντες;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

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τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· πότερον εἰς τὴν πόλιν πάντας τούτους

παραδεξόμεθα ἢ τῶν ἀκράτων τὸν ἕτερον ἢ τὸν κεκραμένον;

ἐὰν ἡ ἐμή, ἔφη, νικᾷ, τὸν τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς μιμητὴν ἄκρατον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Ἀδεΐμαντε, ἡδύς γε καὶ ὁ κεκραμένος, πολὺ δὲ ἡδιστος παισὶ τε καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς ὁ ἐναντίος οὗ σὺ αἰρήῃ καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ.

ἡδιστος γάρ.

ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρμόττειν φαίης τῇ

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ἡμετέρα πολιτεία, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστος ἐν πράττει.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἀρμόττει.

οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει τὸν τε σκυτοτόμον σκυτοτόμον εὐρήσομεν καὶ οὐ κυβερνήτην πρὸς τῇ σκυτοτομίᾳ, καὶ τὸν γεωργὸν γεωργὸν καὶ οὐ δικαστὴν πρὸς τῇ γεωργίᾳ, καὶ τὸν πολεμικὸν πολεμικὸν καὶ οὐ χρηματιστὴν πρὸς τῇ πολεμικῇ, καὶ πάντας οὕτω;

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

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ἄνδρα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνάμενον ὑπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γίγνεσθαι καὶ

μιμῆσθαι πάντα χρήματα, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀφίκοιτο εἰς τὴν πόλιν αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξασθαι, προσκυνοῖμεν ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἡδὺν, εἴποιμεν δ' ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ἐν τῇ πόλει παρ' ἡμῖν οὔτε θέμις ἐγγενέσθαι, ἀποπέμποιμὲν τε εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν μῦρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχέαντες καὶ ἐρίῳ στέφαντες, αὐτοὶ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ

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χρῶμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ὠφελίας ἔνεκα, ὃς ἡμῖν τὴν τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς λέξιν μιμοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγει ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τύποις οἷς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐνομοθετησάμεθα, ὅτε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπεχειροῦμεν παιδεύειν.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν ποιοῖμεν, εἰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἴη.

νῦν δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους παντελῶς διαπεπεράνθαι· ἃ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἴρηται.

καὶ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

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οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ περὶ ὠδῆς τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν; δῆλα δὴ.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πᾶς ἤδη ἂν εὖροι ἃ ἡμῖν λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν οἷα δεῖ εἶναι, εἴπερ μέλλομεν τοῖς προειρημένοις συμφωνήσιν;

καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ἐπιγελάσας, ἐγώ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύω ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἶναι· οὐκουν ἱκανῶς γε ἔχω ἐν τῷ παρόντι συμβαλέσθαι ποῖα ἅττα δεῖ ἡμᾶς λέγειν· ὑποπτεύω μέντοι.

πάντως δῆπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε ἱκανῶς ἔχεις

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λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἔστιν συγκείμενον, λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ.

ναί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

οὐκοῦν ὅσον γε αὐτοῦ λόγος ἔστιν, οὐδὲν δῆπου διαφέρει τοῦ μὴ ἀδομένου λόγου πρὸς τὸ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δεῖν τύποις λέγεσθαι οἷς ἄρτι προείπομεν καὶ ὡσαύτως;

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

καὶ μὴν τὴν γε ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἀλλὰ μέντοι θρήνων γε καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ἔφαμεν ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

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τίνες οὖν θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι; λέγε μοι· σὺ γὰρ μουσικός.

μειξολυδιστί, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστί καὶ τοιαῦται τινες.

οὐκοῦν αὖται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι; ἀχρηστοὶ γὰρ καὶ γυναιξὶν ἅς δεῖ ἐπικεκῆς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσι.

πάνυ γε.

ἀλλὰ μὴν μέθῃ γε φύλαξιν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ μαλακία καὶ ἀργία.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

τινες οὖν μαλακαὶ τε καὶ συμποτικάι τῶν ἁρμονιῶν;
ἰαστί, ἧ δ' ὅς, καὶ λυδιστί αὖτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται.

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ταύταις οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπὶ πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔσθ' ὅτι χρήσῃ;
οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει σοι δωριστί λείπεσθαι καὶ φρυγιστί.
οὐκ οἶδα, ἔφην ἐγὼ, τὰς ἁρμονίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰλειπε ἐκείνην τὴν ἁρμονίαν, ἧ
ἐν τε πολεμικῇ πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρείου καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ
πρεπόντως ἂν μιμῆσαιτο φθόγγους τε καὶ προσωδίας, καὶ ἀποτυχόντος ἢ εἰς
τραύματα ἢ εἰς

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θανάτους ἰόντος ἢ εἰς τινὰ ἄλλην συμφορὰν πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις
παρὰτεταγμένως καὶ καρτεροῦντως ἀμυνομένου τὴν τύχην· καὶ ἄλλην αὖ ἐν
εἰρηνικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαίῳ ἄλλ' ἐν ἐκουσίᾳ πράξει ὄντος, ἢ τινὰ τι πείθοντός
τε καὶ δεομένου, ἢ εὐχῇ θεὸν ἢ διδαχῇ καὶ νουθετήσῃ ἀνθρώπων, ἢ
τοῦναντίον ἄλλῳ δεομένῳ ἢ διδάσκοντι ἢ μεταπειθοντι ἑαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα,
καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπερηφάνως ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ
σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις

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πράττοντά τε καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. ταύτας δύο ἁρμονίας, βίαιον,
ἐκούσιον, δυστυχοῦντων, εὐτυχοῦντων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων ἁρμονίας
αἵτινες φθόγγους μιμῆσονται κάλλιστα, ταύτας λείπει.
ἀλλ', ἧ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλας αἰτεῖς λείπειν ἢ ἅς νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον.
οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, πολυχорδίας γε οὐδὲ παναρμονίου ἡμῖν δεήσει ἐν ταῖς
ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ μέλεσιν.

οὐ μοι, ἔφη, φαίνεται.

τριγώνων ἄρα καὶ πεντάγωνων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων ὅσα

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πολύχορδα καὶ πολυαρμόνια, δημιουργοὺς οὐ θρέψομεν.

οὐ φαινόμεθα.

τί δέ; αὐλοποιοὺς ἢ αὐλητάς παραδέξῃ εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο
πολυχορδότατον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μίμημα;
δῆλα δὴ, ἧ δ' ὅς.

λύρα δὴ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ κιθάρα λείπεται καὶ κατὰ πόλιν χρήσιμα· καὶ αὖ
κατ' ἀγροὺς τοῖς νομεῦσι σῦριγξ ἂν τις εἴῃ.

ὥς γοῦν, ἔφη, ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει.

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οὐδὲν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καινὸν ποιοῦμεν, ὦ φίλε, κρίνοντες τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὰ
τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄργανα πρὸ Μαρσίου τε καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου ὀργάνων.

μὰ Δία, ἧ δ' ὅς, οὐ μοι φαινόμεθα.

καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, εἶπον, λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἦν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν
ἔφαμεν πόλιν.

σωφρονοῦντές γε ἡμεῖς, ἧ δ' ὅς.

ἴθι δὴ, ἔφην, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθαίρωμεν.

ἐπόμενον γάρ δὴ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη τὸ περὶ ῥυθμούς, μὴ ποικίλους αὐτοὺς διώκειν μηδὲ παντοδαπὰς βάσεις, ἀλλὰ βίου ῥυθμούς ἰδεῖν κοσμοῦ τε καὶ ἀνδρείου τίνες εἰσίν· οὕς ἰδόντα τὸν

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πόδα τῷ τοῦ τοιοῦτου λόγῳ ἀναγκάζειν ἔπεσθαι καὶ τὸ μέλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγον ποδὶ τε καὶ μέλει. οἴτινες δ' ἂν εἶεν οὗτοι οἱ ῥυθμοί, σὸν ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰς ἀρμονίας, φράσαι.

ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρί' ἄττα ἐστὶν εἶδη ἐξ ὧν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέτταρα, ὅθεν αἱ πᾶσαι ἀρμονίαι, τεθεαμένος ἂν εἴποιμι· ποῖα δὲ ὁποίου βίου μιμήματα, λέγειν οὐκ ἔχω.

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ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος βουλευσόμεθα, τίνες τε ἀνελευθερίας καὶ ὕβρεως ἢ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι βάσεις, καὶ τίνες τοῖς ἐναντίοις λειπτέον ῥυθμούς· οἶμαι δὲ με ἀκηκοέναι οὐ σαφῶς ἐνόπλιόν τέ τινα ὀνομάζοντος αὐτοῦ σύνθετον καὶ δάκτυλον καὶ ἡρῶν γε, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως διακοσμοῦντος καὶ ἴσον ἄνω καὶ κάτω τιθέντος, εἰς βραχὺ τε καὶ μακρὸν γιγνόμενον, καί, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἱαμβον καὶ τιν' ἄλλον τροχαῖον ὠνόμαζε, μήκη δὲ καὶ

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βραχυτήτας προσῆπτε. καὶ τούτων πισὶν οἶμαι τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ ποδὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ἥττον φέγειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ τοὺς ῥυθμούς αὐτούς—ἦτοι συναμφοτέρον τι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω λέγειν—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ὥσπερ εἶπον, εἰς Δάμωνα ἀναβεβλήσθω· διελέσθαι γὰρ οὐ σμικροῦ λόγου. ἦ σὺ οἶει; μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ἀλλὰ τόδε γε, ὅτι τὸ τῆς εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης τῷ εὐρύθμῳ τε καὶ ἀρρυθμῷ ἀκολουθεῖ, δύνασαι διελέσθαι;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

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ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ εὐρυθμόν γε καὶ τὸ ἀρρυθμον τὸ μὲν τῇ καλῇ λέξει ἔπεται ὁμοιούμενον, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἐναντίᾳ, καὶ τὸ εὐάρμοστον καὶ ἀνάρμοστον ὡσαύτως, εἴπερ ῥυθμός γε καὶ ἀρμονία λόγῳ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος τούτοις.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον.

τί δ' ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ λόγος; οὐ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθει ἔπεται;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

τῇ δὲ λέξει τὰ ἄλλα;

ναί.

εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία

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εὐθελεία ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἦν ἄνοιαν οὔσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὥς εὐθήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὥς ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν.

παντάσασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ ταῦτα διωκτέα τοῖς νέοις, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ αὐτῶν πράττειν;

διωκτέα μὲν οὖν.

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ἔστιν δέ γε που πλήρης μὲν γραφικὴ αὐτῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη δημιουργία, πλήρης δὲ ὑφαντικὴ καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομία καὶ πᾶσα αὖ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων σκευῶν ἐργασία, ἔτι δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων φυτῶν· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῦτοις ἔνεστιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἀρρυθμία καὶ ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοθείας ἀδελφά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου, σώφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἦθους, ἀδελφά τε καὶ μιμήματα.

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

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ἄρ' οὖν τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἡμῖν μόνον ἐπιστατητέον καὶ προσαναγκαστέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἦθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἢ μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς ἐπιστατητέον καὶ διακωλυτέον τὸ κακὸς τοῦτο καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ ἄσχημον μῆτε ἐν εἰκόσι ζῶων μῆτε ἐν οἰκοδομήμασι μῆτε ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ δημιουργουμένῳ ἐμποιεῖν, ἢ ὁ μὴ οἶός τε ὦν οὐκ ἐατέος παρ' ἡμῖν δημιουργεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐν κακίας εἰκόσι τρεφόμενοι ἡμῖν οἱ

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φύλακες ὥσπερ ἐν κακῇ βοτάνῃ, πολλὰ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀπὸ πολλῶν δρεπόμενοι τε καὶ νεμόμενοι, ἔν τι συνιστάντες λανθάνωσιν κακὸν μέγα ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν ψυχῇ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους ζητητέον τοὺς δημιουργοὺς τοὺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους ἰχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐν ὑγιεινῷ τόπῳ οἰκοῦντες οἱ νέοι ἀπὸ παντὸς ὠφελῶνται, ὁπόθεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἢ πρὸς ὄψιν ἢ πρὸς ἀκοήν τι προσβάλῃ, ὥσπερ αὖρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ

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χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδων λανθάνῃ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα;

πολὺ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, κάλλιστα οὕτω τραφεῖεν.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτῃ ἐν μουσικῇ τροφῇ, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἀρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα,

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ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοῦναντίον;

καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλείπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ

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γίγνεται καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός, τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι
νέος ὢν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ'
ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφεῖς;
ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα ἐν μουσικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφή.
ὥσπερ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γραμμάτων περὶ τότε ἱκανῶς εἶχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα
μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμῶς ὀλίγα ὄντα ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστιν περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὐτ' ἐν
σμικρῷ οὐτ' ἐν

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μεγάλῳ ἡτιμάζομεν αὐτὰ, ὥς οὐ δέοι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ
προυθυμούμεθα διαγιγνώσκειν, ὥς οὐ πρότερον ἐσόμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν
οὕτως ἔχοιμεν—

ἀληθῆ.

οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εἴ που ἢ ἐν ὕδασι ἢ ἐν κατόπτροις
ἐμφαίνοντο, οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὰ γνῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν τῆς
αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτης;

παντάπασι μὲν οὔν.

ἄρ' οὔν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον

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ἐσόμεθα, οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὕς φαμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας,
πρὶν ἂν τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ
μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ἐναντία
πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα
καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις
ἀτιμάζωμεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰώμεθα τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελέτης;
πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

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οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτου ἂν συμπίπτῃ ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἦθη ἐνόντα καὶ
ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα
τύπου, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι;

πολὺ γε.

καὶ μὴν τὸ γε κάλλιστον ἐρασμιώτατον;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

τῶν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ὃ γε μουσικὸς ἐρώη ἂν· εἰ δὲ
ἀσύμφωνος εἴη, οὐκ ἂν ἐρώη.

οὐκ ἂν, εἰ γέ τι, ἔφη, κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλλείποι· εἰ μέντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα,
ὑπομείνειεν ἂν ὥστε ἐθέλειν

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ἀσπάζεσθαι.

μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅτι ἔστιν σοὶ ἢ γέγονεν παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ συγχωρῶ.
ἀλλὰ τότε μοι εἶπέ· σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡδονὴ ὑπερβαλλούση ἔστι τις κοινωνία;
καὶ πῶς; ἔφη, ἢ γε ἔκφρονα ποιεῖ οὐχ ἥττον ἢ λύπη;
ἀλλὰ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ;

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οὐδαμῶς.

τί δέ; ὕβρει τε καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ;

πάντων μάλιστα.

μειζω δέ τινα καὶ ὀξυτέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια;

οὐκ ἔχω, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδὲ γε μανικωτέραν.

ὁ δὲ ὀρθὸς ἔρωσ πέφυκε κοσμίῳ τε καὶ καλοῦ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μουσικῶς ἔρᾳ;

καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐδὲν ἄρα προσοιστέον μανικὸν οὐδὲ συγγενὲς ἀκολασίας τῷ ὀρθῷ ἔρωτι; οὐ προσοιστέον.

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οὐ προσοιστέον ἄρα αὕτη ἢ ἡδονή, οὐδὲ κοινωνητέον αὐτῆς ἐραστῇ τε καὶ παιδικοῖς ὀρθῶς ἐρῶσί τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις;

οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσοιστέον.

οὕτω δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, νομοθετήσεις ἐν τῇ οἰκίζομένη πόλει φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ἄπτεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑέος παιδικῶν ἐραστήν, τῶν καλῶν χάριν, ἐὰν πείθῃ, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὕτως ὁμιλεῖν πρὸς ὃν τις σπουδάζοι, ὅπως μηδέποτε δόξει μακρότερα

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τούτων συγγίγνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, φόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέξοντα. οὕτως, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται τέλος ἡμῖν ἔχειν ὁ περὶ μουσικῆς λόγος; οἷ γοῦν δεῖ τελευτᾶν, τετελεύτηκεν· δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά.

σύμφημι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

μετὰ δὴ μουσικὴν γυμναστικὴν θρεπτέοι οἱ νεανία.

τί μήν;

δεῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ ταύτη ἀκριβῶς τρέφεσθαι ἐκ παίδων διὰ

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βίου. ἔχει δέ πως, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, ὧδε· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται, ὃ ἂν χρηστὸν ἦ σῶμα, τοῦτο τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετῇ ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ τῇ αὐτῆς ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρέχειν ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστον· σοὶ δὲ πῶς φαίνεται;

καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, οὕτως.

οὐκοῦν εἰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἱκανῶς θεραπεύσαντες παραδοῖμεν αὐτῇ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον τοὺς

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τύπους ὑφηγησαίμεθα, ἵνα μὴ μακρολογῶμεν, ὀρθῶς ἂν ποιοῖμεν;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

μέθης μὲν δὴ εἵπομεν ὅτι ἀφεκτέον αὐτοῖς· παντὶ γάρ που μᾶλλον ἐγχωρεῖ ἢ φύλακι μεθυσθέντι μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπου γῆς ἔστιν.

γελοῖον γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸν γε φύλακα φύλακος δεῖσθαι.

τί δὲ δὴ σίτων πέρι; ἀθληταὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος. ἦ οὐχί;

ναί.

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ἄρ' οὖν ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ἀσκητῶν ἕξις προσήκουσ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτοις; ἴσως.

ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπνώδης αὐτὴ γέ τις καὶ σφαλερὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν. ἦ οὐχ ὀρθῶς ὅτι καθευδουσί τε τὸν βίον καί, ἐὰν σμικρὰ ἐκβῶσιν τῆς τεταγμένης διαίτης, μεγάλα καὶ σφόδρα νοσοῦσιν οὗτοι οἱ ἀσκηταί;

ὁρῶ.
κομποτέρα δὴ πινος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀσκήσεως δεῖ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀθληταῖς, οὐς γε ὥσπερ κύνας ἀγρύπνους τε ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ὅξ' ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις μεταβάλλοντας ὑδάτων

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τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σίτων καὶ εἰλήσεων καὶ χειμῶνων μὴ ἀκροσφαλεῖς εἶναι πρὸς ὑγίειαν.

φαίνεται μοι.

ἄρ' οὖν ἢ βελτίστη γυμναστικὴ ἀδελφὴ τις ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀπλῆς μουσικῆς ἣν ὀλίγον πρότερον διῆμεν;

πῶς λέγεις;

ἀπλῇ που καὶ ἐπεικῆς γυμναστικῇ, καὶ μάλιστα ἢ τῶν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον.

πῇ δὴ;

καὶ παρ' Ὀμήρου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά γε τοιαῦτα μάθοι ἂν τις. οἶσθα γὰρ ὅτι ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἡρώων ἐστιάσεσιν οὕτε ἰχθύσιν αὐτοὺς ἐστιᾷ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπὶ

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θαλάττῃ ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ ὄντας, οὕτε ἐφθοῖς κρέασιν ἀλλὰ μόνον ὀπτοῖς, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη στρατιώταις εὐπόρα· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν αὐτῷ τῷ πυρὶ χρῆσθαι εὐπορώτερον ἢ ἀγγεῖα συμπεριφέρειν.

καὶ μάλα.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἡδυσμάτων, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, Ὅμηρος πώποτε ἐμνήσθη. ἦ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσκηταὶ ἴσασιν, ὅτι τῷ μέλλοντι σώματι εὖ ἔξειν ἀφεκτέον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπάντων;

καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη, ἴσασι τε καὶ ἀπέχονται.

404d

Συρακοσίαν δέ, ὦ φίλε, τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὄψου, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐκ αἰνεῖς, εἴπερ σοι ταῦτα δοκεῖ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.

οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

ψέγεις ἄρα καὶ Κορινθίαν κόρην φίλην εἶναι ἀνδράσιν μέλλουσιν εὖ σώματος ἔξειν.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν καὶ Ἀττικῶν πεμμάτων τὰς δοκούσας εἶναι εὐπαθείας;

ἀνάγκη.

ὅλην γὰρ οἶμαι τὴν τοιαύτην σίτησιν καὶ δίαιταν τῇ μελοποιίᾳ τε καὶ ὥδῃ τῇ ἐν τῷ παναρμονίῳ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι

404e

ῥυθμοῖς πεποιημένην ἀπεικάζοντες ὁρθῶς ἂν ἀπεικάζοιμεν.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀκολασίαν ἢ ποικιλίᾳ ἐνέτικτεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ νόσον, ἣ δὲ ἀπλότης κατὰ μὲν μουσικὴν ἐν ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην, κατὰ δὲ γυμναστικὴν ἐν σώμασιν ὑγίειαν;

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

405

405a

ἀκολασίας δὲ καὶ νόσων πληθυνουσῶν ἐν πόλει ἄρ' οὐ δικαστήριά τε καὶ ἰατρεῖα πολλὰ ἀνοίγεται, καὶ δικανικὴ τε καὶ ἰατρικὴ σεμνύνονται, ὅταν δὴ καὶ ἐλεύθεροι πολλοὶ καὶ σφόδρα περὶ αὐτὰ σπουδάζωσιν;

τί γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;

τῆς δὲ κακῆς τε καὶ αἰσχροῦς παιδείας ἐν πόλει ἄρα μὴ τι μεῖζον ἔξεις λαβεῖν τεκμήριον ἢ τὸ δεῖσθαι ἰατρῶν καὶ δικαστῶν ἄκρων μὴ μόνον τοὺς φαύλους τε καὶ χειροτέχνας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἐλευθέρῳ σχήματι προσποιουμένους τεθράφθαι;

405b

ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας μέγα τεκμήριον τὸ ἐπακτῷ παρ' ἄλλων, ὡς δεσποτῶν τε καὶ κριτῶν, τῷ δικαίῳ ἀναγκάζεσθαι χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἀπορίᾳ οἰκείων;

πάντων μὲν οὔν, ἔφη, αἰσχιστον.

ἢ δοκεῖ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτου αἰσχίον εἶναι τοῦτο, ὅταν δὴ τις μὴ μόνον τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βίου ἐν δικαστηρίοις φεύγων τε καὶ διώκων κατατρίβηται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ ἀπειροκαλίας ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ τούτῳ πεισθῇ καλλωπίζεσθαι, ὡς δεινὸς

405c

ὦν περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἱκανὸς πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι, πάσας δὲ διεξόδους διεξελθὼν ἀποστραφῆναι λυγιζόμενος, ὥστε μὴ παρασχεῖν δίκην, καὶ ταῦτα σμικρῶν τε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἔνεκα, ἀγνοῶν ὅσῳ κάλλιον καὶ ἄμεινον τὸ παρασκευάζειν τὸν βίον αὐτῷ μηδὲν δεῖσθαι νυστάζοντος δικαστοῦ;

οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἐκείνου ἔτι αἰσχίον.

τὸ δὲ ἰατρικῆς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεῖσθαι ὅτι μὴ τραυμάτων ἔνεκα ἢ τινων ἐπετείων νοσημάτων ἐπιπεσόντων, ἀλλὰ δι'

405d

ἀργίαν τε καὶ δίαιταν οἷαν διήλθομεν, ῥευμάτων τε καὶ πνευμάτων ὥσπερ λίμνας ἐμπιπλαμένους φύσας τε καὶ κατάρρους νοσήμασιν ὀνόματα τίθεσθαι ἀναγκάζειν τοὺς κομποὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ; καὶ μάλ', ἔφη· ὡς ἀληθῶς καινὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἄτοπα νοσημάτων ὀνόματα. οἷα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς οἶμαι, οὐκ ἦν ἐπ' Ἀσκληπιοῦ.

405e

τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι αὐτοῦ οἱ υἱεῖς ἐν Τροίᾳ Εὐρυπύλῳ τετρωμένῳ ἐπ' οἶνον
Πράμνειον ἄλφιστα πολλὰ ἐπιπασθέντα

406

406a

καὶ τυρὸν ἐπιξυσθέντα, ἃ δὴ δοκεῖ φλεγματώδη εἶναι, οὐκ ἐμέμφαντο τῇ
δούσῃ πιεῖν, οὐδὲ Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἰωμένῳ ἐπετίμησαν.

καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ἄτοπὸν γε τὸ πῶμα οὕτως ἔχοντι.

οὐκ, εἰ γ' ἐννοεῖς, εἶπον, ὅτι τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ τῶν νοσημάτων ταύτῃ τῇ νῦν
ἱατρικῇ πρὸ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιάδα οὐκ ἐχρῶντο, ὥς φασι, πρὶν Ἡρόδικον
γενέσθαι· Ἡρόδικος δὲ παιδοτρίβης ὢν καὶ νοσώδης γενόμενος, μείζας
γυμναστικὴν

406b

ἱατρικῇ, ἀπέκναισε πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτὸν, ἔπειτ' ἄλλους ὕστερον
πολλούς.

πῇ δὴ; ἔφη.

μακρόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν θάνατον αὐτῷ ποιήσας. παρακολουθῶν γὰρ τῷ
νοσήματι θανασίμῳ ὄντι οὔτε ἰάσασθαι οἴμαι οἶός τ' ἦν ἑαυτὸν, ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ
τε πάντων ἱατρευόμενος διὰ βίου ἔζη, ἀποκναιόμενος εἰ τι τῆς εἰωθυίας
διαίτης ἐκβαίῃ, δυσθανατῶν δὲ ὑπὸ σοφίας εἰς γῆρας ἀφίκετο.

καλὸν ἄρα τὸ γέρας, ἔφη, τῆς τέχνης ἠνέγκατο.

406c

οἶον εἰκός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν μὴ εἰδότα ὅτι Ἀσκληπιὸς οὐκ ἀγνοίᾳ οὐδὲ
ἀπειρίᾳ τούτου τοῦ εἶδους τῆς ἱατρικῆς τοῖς ἐκγόνοις οὐ κατέδειξεν αὐτό,
ἀλλ' εἰδὼς ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς εὐνομουμένοις ἔργον τι ἐκάστω ἐν τῇ πόλει
προστέτακται, ὃ ἀναγκαῖον ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐδενὶ σχολή διὰ βίου κάμνειν
ἱατρευόμενῳ. ὃ ἡμεῖς γελοιῶς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν δημιουργῶν αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ
τῶν πλουσιῶν τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνων δοκούντων εἶναι οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα.

πῶς; ἔφη.

406d

τέκτων μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κάμνων ἀξιοῖ παρὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ φάρμακον πῶν
ἐξεμέσαι τὸ νόσημα, ἢ κάτω καθαρθεῖς ἢ καύσει ἢ τομῇ χρησάμενος
ἀπηλλάχθαι· ἐὰν δὲ τις αὐτῷ μακρὰν διαίταν προστάτῃ, πλίδιά τε περὶ τὴν
κεφαλὴν περιπιθεῖς καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐπόμενα, ταχὺ εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ σχολή
κάμνειν οὐδὲ λυσιτελεῖ οὕτω ζῆν, νοσήματι τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα, τῆς δὲ
προκειμένης ἐργασίας ἀμελοῦντα. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα χαίρειν

406e

εἰπὼν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἱατρῷ, εἰς τὴν εἰωθυῖαν διαίταν ἐμβάς, ὑγιῆς γενόμενος
ζῆ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττων· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἱκανὸν ᾖ τὸ σῶμα ὑπενεγκεῖν,
τελευτήσας πραγμάτων ἀπηλλάγη.

καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ μὲν γ', ἔφη, δοκεῖ πρέπειν οὕτω ἱατρικῇ χρῆσθαι.

407

407a

ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον, ὃ εἰ μὴ πράττοι, οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει ζῆν;
δῆλον, ἔφη.

ὁ δὲ δὴ πλούσιος, ὥς φαμεν, οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκειμένον, οὐ
ἀναγκαζομένῳ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀβίωτον.

οὕκουν δὴ λέγεται γε.

Φωκυλίδου γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀκούεις πῶς φησι δεῖν, ὅταν τῷ ἤδη βίος ᾗ,
ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν.

οἶμαι δέ γε, ἔφη, καὶ πρότερον.

μηδέν, εἶπον, περὶ τούτου αὐτῷ μαχόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διδάξωμεν
πότερον μελετητέον τοῦτο τῷ πλουσίῳ

407b

καὶ ἀβίωτον τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι, ἢ νοσοτροφία τεκτονικῇ μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις
τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ, τὸ δὲ Φωκυλίδου παρακείμεμα
οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει.

ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς. σχεδόν γε τι πάντων μάλιστα ἢ γε περαιτέρῳ
γυμναστικῇς ἢ περιττῇ αὐτῇ ἐπιμέλεια τοῦ σώματος· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς
οἰκονομίας καὶ πρὸς στρατείας καὶ πρὸς ἐδραίους ἐν πόλει ἀρχὰς δύσκολος.
τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς μαθήσεις ἀστινασοῦν καὶ

407c

ἐννοήσεις τε καὶ μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτὸν χαλεπῇ, κεφαλῇς τινας ἀεὶ διατάσεις
καὶ ἰλίγγους ὑποπεύουσα καὶ αἰτιωμένη ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὥστε,
ὅπῃ ταύτῃ ἀρετὴ ἀσκεῖται καὶ δοκιμάζεται, πάντῃ ἐμπόδιος· κάμνειν γὰρ
οἷεσθαι ποιεῖ ἀεὶ καὶ ὠδινόντα μήποτε λήγειν περὶ τοῦ σώματος.

εἰκός γε, ἔφη.

οὕκοῦν ταῦτα γινώσκοντα φῶμεν καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸν τοὺς μὲν φύσει τε καὶ
διαίτῃ ὑγιεινῶς ἔχοντας τὰ σώματα,

407d

νόσημα δέ τι ἀποκεκριμένον ἴσχοντας ἐν αὐτοῖς, τούτοις μὲν καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ
ἔξει καταδείξαι ἱατρικὴν, φαρμάκοις τε καὶ τομαῖς τὰ νοσήματα ἐκβάλλοντα
αὐτῶν τὴν εἰωθυῖαν προστάττειν διαίταν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ πολιτικά βλάβτοι, τὰ δ'
εἴσω διὰ παντὸς νενοσηκότα σώματα οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν διαίταις κατὰ σμικρὸν
ἀπαντλοῦντα καὶ ἐπιχέοντα μακρὸν καὶ κακὸν βίον ἀνθρώπῳ ποιεῖν, καὶ
ἐκγονα αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα φυτεύειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὴ
δυνάμενον ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ

407e

περιόδῳ ζῆν μὴ οἷεσθαι δεῖν θεραπεύειν, ὡς οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε πόλει
λυσιστελεῖ;

πολιτικόν, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιόν.

δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν,

408

408a

οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς καὶ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐφάνησαν, καὶ τῇ
ἱατρικῇ, ὡς ἐγώ λέγω, ἐχρῶντο; ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι ὅτι καὶ τῷ Μενέλεῳ ἐκ τοῦ
τραύματος οὗ ὁ Πάνδαρος ἔβαλεν—

αἶμ' ἐκμυζήσαντες ἐπ' ἥπια φάρμακ' ἔπασσον,

Hom. Il. 4.218 ὅτι δ' ἐχρῆν μετὰ τοῦτο ἢ πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ

Εὐρυπύλῳ προσέταπτον, ὥς ἱκανῶν ὄντων τῶν φαρμάκων ἰάσασθαι ἄνδρας
πρὸ τῶν τραυμάτων ὑγιεινοὺς τε καὶ

408b

κοσμίους ἐν διαίτῃ, κἂν εἰ τύχοιεν ἐν τῷ παραχρηῖμα κυκεῶνα πίνοντες,
νοσώδη δὲ φύσει τε καὶ ἀκόλαστον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ὦοντο
λυσιστελεῖν ζῆν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν τέχνην δεῖν εἶναι, οὐδὲ θεραπευτέον
αὐτούς, οὐδ' εἰ Μίδου πλουσιώτεροι εἶεν.

πάνυ κομπούς, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιοῦ παῖδας.

πρέπει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καίτοι ἀπειθοῦντές γε ἡμῖν οἱ τραγωδοποιοὶ τε καὶ
Πίνδαρος Ἀπόλλωνος μὲν φασιν Ἀσκληπιὸν εἶναι, ὑπὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πεισθῆναι
πλούσιον ἄνδρα θανάσιμον

408c

ἤδη ὄντα ἰάσασθαι, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κεραυνωθῆναι αὐτόν. ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὰ
προειρημένα οὐ πεισόμεθα αὐτοῖς ἀμφοτέρα, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ἦν, οὐκ ἦν,
φήσομεν, αἰσχροκερδής· εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδής, οὐκ ἦν θεοῦ.

ὀρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά γε. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦδε τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἄρ' οὐκ
ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκτῆσθαι ἰατροὺς; εἶεν δ' ἂν που μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι
ὅσοι

408d

πλείστους μὲν ὑγιεινοὺς, πλείστους δὲ νοσώδεις μετεχειρίσαντο, καὶ
δικασταὶ αὖ ὡσαύτως οἱ παντοδαπαῖς φύσεσιν ὠμιληκότες.

καὶ μάλα, εἶπον, ἀγαθοὺς λέγω. ἀλλ' οἴσθα οὕς ἡγοῦμαι τοιούτους;
ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔφη.

ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· σὺ μέντοι οὐχ ὅμοιον πρᾶγμα τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ
ἦρου.

πῶς; ἔφη.

ἰατροὶ μὲν, εἶπον, δεινότατοι ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ἐκ παίδων ἀρξάμενοι πρὸς τῷ
μανθάνειν τὴν τέχνην ὥς πλείστοις τε καὶ πονηροτάτοις σώμασιν ὁμιλήσειαν
καὶ αὐτοὶ πάσας

408e

νόσους κάμοιεν καὶ εἶεν μὴ πάνυ ὑγιεινοὶ φύσει. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι σώματι σῶμα
θεραπεύουσιν—οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὰ ἐνεχώρει κακὰ εἶναι ποτε καὶ γενέσθαι—
ἀλλὰ ψυχῇ σῶμα, ἧ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ κακὴν γενομένην τε καὶ οὔσαν εὔ τι
θεραπεύειν.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

409

409a

δικαστῆς δὲ γε, ὦ φίλε, ψυχῇ ψυχῆς ἄρχει, ἧ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ ἐκ νέας ἐν
πονηραῖς ψυχαῖς τεθράφθαι τε καὶ ὠμιληκέναι καὶ πάντα ἀδικήματα αὐτὴν
ἡδίκηκυῖαν διεξεληλυθέναι, ὥστε ὀξέως ἂφ' αὐτῆς τεκμαίρεσθαι τὰ τῶν
ἄλλων ἀδικήματα οἷον κατὰ σῶμα νόσους· ἀλλ' ἄπειρον αὐτὴν καὶ
ἀκέραιον δεῖ κακῶν ἡθῶν νέαν οὔσαν γεγονέναι, εἰ μέλλει καλὴ κάγαθὴ
οὔσα κρινεῖν ὑγιῶς τὰ δίκαια. διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις νέοι ὄντες οἱ ἐπεικεῖς
φαίνονται καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοι

409b

ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδίκων, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς παραδείγματα ὁμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς.

καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε αὐτὸ πάσχουσι.

τῷ τοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ νέον ἀλλὰ γέροντα δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν δικαστὴν εἶναι, ὅψιμαθ' ἡγενοῦντά τῆς ἀδικίας οἷόν ἐστιν, οὐκ οἰκείαν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἐνοῦσαν ἡσθημένον, ἀλλ' ἀλλοτρίαν ἐν ἀλλοτρίαις μεμελετηκότα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διαισθάνεσθαι οἷον πέφυκε κακόν, ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ

409c

ἐμπειρίᾳ οἰκείᾳ κεχρημένον.

γενναιότατος γοῦν, ἔφη, ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ τοιοῦτος δικαστής.

καὶ ἀγαθὸς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ σὺ ἡρώτας· ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν ἀγαθός. ὁ δὲ δεινὸς ἐκεῖνος καὶ καχύποπτος, ὁ πολλὰ αὐτὸς ἡδίκηκώς καὶ πανοῦργός τε καὶ σοφὸς οἰόμενος εἶναι, ὅταν μὲν ὁμοίοις ὁμιλῇ, δεινὸς φαίνεται ἐξευλαβούμενος, πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ παραδείγματα ἀποσκοπῶν· ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτέροις ἤδη πλησιάσῃ, ἀβέλτερος

409d

αὖ φαίνεται, ἀπιστῶν παρὰ καιρὸν καὶ ἀγνοῶν ὑγιεὺς ἦθος, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχων παράδειγμα τοῦ τοιοῦτου. πλεονάκις δὲ πονηροῖς ἢ χρηστοῖς ἐντυγχάνων σοφώτερος ἢ ἀμαθέστερος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ.

οὐ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιοῦτον χρὴ τὸν δικαστὴν ζητεῖν τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ σοφόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν πρότερον· πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τε καὶ αὐτὴν οὐ ποτ' ἂν γνοίῃ, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἅμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην

409e

λήψεται. σοφὸς οὖν οὗτος, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται.

καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, συνδοκεῖ.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἱατρικὴν, οἷαν εἵπομεν, μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης δικαστικῆς κατὰ πόλιν νομοθετήσεις, αἱ τῶν πολιτῶν σοι

410

410a

τοὺς μὲν εὐφυεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύουσιν, τοὺς δὲ μή, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιοῦτοι, ἀποθνήσκουσιν ἐάσουσιν, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν;

τὸ γοῦν ἄριστον, ἔφη, αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς πάσχουσιν καὶ τῇ πόλει οὕτω πέφανται. οἱ δὲ δὴ νέοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διήλον ὅτι εὐλαβήσονται σοι δικαστικῆς εἰς χρεῖαν ἵεναι, τῇ ἀπλῇ ἐκείνῃ μουσικῇ χρώμενοι ἣν δὴ ἔφαμεν σωφροσύνην ἐντίκτειν.

τί μήν; ἔφη.

410b

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ ταῦτά ἴχνη ταῦτα ὁ μουσικὸς γυμναστικὴν διώκων, ἐὰν ἐθέλῃ, αἰρήσει, ὥστε μηδὲν ἱατρικῆς δεῖσθαι ὅτι μὴ ἀνάγκη; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

αὐτὰ γε μὴν τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τοὺς πόνους πρὸς τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῆς φύσεως
βλέπων κάκεῖνο ἐγείρων πονήσκει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύν, οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι
ἀθλῆται ῥώμης ἕνεκα σιτία καὶ πόνους μεταχειριεῖται.

ὀρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ καθιστάντες

410c

μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκά τινες οἴονται καθιστᾶσιν,
ἵνα τῇ μὲν τὸ σῶμα θεραπεύοιντο, τῇ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν;

ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; ἔφη.

κινδυνεύουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρα τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον
καθιστάναι.

πῶς δὴ;

οὐκ ἔννοεῖς, εἶπον, ὥς διατίθενται αὐτὴν τὴν διάνοιαν οἱ ἂν γυμναστικῇ μὲν
διὰ βίου ὁμιλήσωσιν, μουσικῆς δὲ μὴ ἄψωνται; ἢ αὖ ὅσοι ἂν τοῦναντίον
διατεθῶσιν;

τινος δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πέρι λέγεις;

410d

ἀγριότητός τε καὶ σκληρότητος, καὶ αὖ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερότητος, ἦν δ'
ἐγώ—

ἔγωγε, ἔφη· ὅτι οἱ μὲν γυμναστικῇ ἀκράτῳ χρησάμενοι ἀγριώτεροι τοῦ
δέοντος ἀποβαίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ μουσικῇ μαλακώτεροι αὖ γίνονται ἢ ὥς
κάλλιον αὐτοῖς.

καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ γε ἄγριον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἂν τῆς φύσεως παρέχοιτο, καὶ
ὀρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρεῖον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντος
σκληρόν τε καὶ χαλεπὸν γίγνοιτ' ἂν, ὥς τὸ εἶκός.

δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

410e

τί δέ; τὸ ἡμερον οὐχ ἡ φιλόσοφος ἂν ἔχοι φύσις, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀνεθέντος
αὐτοῦ μαλακώτερον εἴη τοῦ δέοντος, καλῶς δὲ τραφέντος ἡμερόν τε καὶ
κόσμιον;

ἔστι ταῦτα.

δεῖν δέ γε φαμεν τοὺς φύλακας ἀμφοτέρα ἔχειν τοῦτω τῷ φύσει.

δεῖ γάρ.

οὐκοῦν ἡρμόσθαι δεῖ αὐτὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡρμοσμένου σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία ἢ

411

411a

ψυχὴ;

πάνυ γε.

τοῦ δὲ ἀναρμόστου δειλὴ καὶ ἄγροικος;

καὶ μάλα.

οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὲν τις μουσικῇ παρέχῃ καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ
τῶν ὧτων ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης ἅς νυνδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ

μαλακάς καὶ θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίας, καὶ μινυρίζων τε καὶ γεγανωμένος ὑπὸ
τῆς ὥδῃς διατελῇ τὸν βίον ὅλον, οὗτος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, εἴ τι θυμοειδὲς
εἶχεν, ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξεν καὶ χρήσιμον

411b

ἐξ ἀχρήστου καὶ σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν· ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνιῇ ἀλλὰ κηλῇ, τὸ
δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἦδη τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἕως ἂν ἐκτῆξῃ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμῃ
ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσει ἄθυμον λάβῃ, ταχὺ τοῦτο
διεπράξατο· ἐὰν δὲ θυμοειδῇ, ἀσθενῇ ποιήσας τὸν θυμὸν ὀξύρροπον
ἀπηργάσατο, ἀπὸ σμικρῶν ταχὺ ἐρεθιζόμενόν

411c

τε καὶ κατασβεννύμενον. ἀκράχοιοι οὖν καὶ ὀργίλοι ἀντὶ θυμοειδοῦς
γεγέννηται, δυσκολίας ἔμπλεω.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

τί δὲ ἂν αὐτὸ γυμναστικῇ πολλὰ πονῇ καὶ εὐωχῆται εὖ μάλα, μουσικῆς δὲ καὶ
φιλοσοφίας μὴ ἄπτηται; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν εὖ ἴσχων τὸ σῶμα φρονήματός τε
καὶ θυμοῦ ἐμπίμπλαται καὶ ἀνδρειότερος γίγνεται αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ;

καὶ μάλα γε.

τί δὲ ἐπειδὴν ἄλλο μηδὲν πράττει μηδὲ κοινωνῇ Μούσης

411d

μηδαμῇ; οὐκ εἴ τι καὶ ἐνῆν αὐτοῦ φιλομαθὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἅτε οὔτε
μαθήματος γευόμενον οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζητήματος, οὔτε λόγου μετίσχον οὔτε
τῆς ἄλλης μουσικῆς, ἀσθενὲς τε καὶ κωφὸν καὶ τυφλὸν γίγνεται, ἅτε οὐκ
ἐγειρόμενον οὐδὲ τρεφόμενον οὐδὲ διακαθαίρομένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων
αὐτοῦ;

οὕτως, ἔφη.

μισόλογος δὴ οἷμαι ὁ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται καὶ ἄμουσος, καὶ πειθοῖ μὲν διὰ
λόγων οὐδὲν ἔτι χρῆται, βία δὲ καὶ

411e

ἀγριότητι ὥσπερ θηρίον πρὸς πάντα διαπράττεται, καὶ ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ καὶ
σκαιότητι μετὰ ἀρρυθμίας τε καὶ ἀχαριστίας ζῇ.

παντάπασι, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει.

ἐπὶ δὴ δὴ ὄντε τοῦτω, ὡς ἔοικε, δύο τέχνα θεὸν ἔγωγ' ἂν τινα φαίην
δεδωκέναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μουσικὴν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐπὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς
καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον, οὐκ ἐπὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ἐπ'
ἐκείνω, ὅπως

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412a

ἂν ἀλλήλοιν συναρμοσθῆτον ἐπιτεινομένω καὶ ἀνιεμένω μέχρι τοῦ
προσῆκοντος.

καὶ γὰρ ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

τὸν κάλλιστ' ἄρα μουσικῇ γυμναστικὴν κεραννύντα καὶ μετριώτατα τῇ ψυχῇ
προσφέροντα, τοῦτον ὀρθότατ' ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι τελέως μουσικώτατον καὶ

εὐαρμοστότατον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν τὰς χορδὰς ἀλλήλαις συνιστάντα.
εἰκότως γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡμῖν, ὦ Γλαύκων, δεήσει τοῦ τοιοῦτου τινὸς αἰεὶ
ἐπιστάτου, εἰ μέλλει ἡ πολιτεία σώζεσθαι;

412b

δεήσει μέντοι ὡς οἷόν τε γε μάλιστα.

οἱ μὲν δὴ τύποι τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι ἂν εἶεν. χορείας γὰρ τι ἂν
τις διεξιοι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ θήρας τε καὶ κυνηγέσια καὶ γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας
καὶ ἵππικους; σχεδὸν γάρ τι διῆλα δὴ ὅτι τούτοις ἐπόμενα δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι, καὶ
οὐκέτι χαλεπὰ εὐρεῖν.

ἴσως, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ χαλεπὰ.

εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο τι ἂν ἡμῖν διαιρετέον εἴη; ἄρ' οὐκ αὐτῶν
τούτων οἵτινες ἄρξουσὶ τε καὶ ἄρξονται;

412c

τί μήν;

οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους τοὺς ἄρχοντας δεῖ εἶναι, νεωτέρους δὲ τοὺς
ἀρχομένους, δῆλον;

δῆλον.

καὶ ὅτι γε τοὺς ἀρίστους αὐτῶν;

καὶ τοῦτο.

οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἄριστοι ἄρ' οὐ γεωργικώτατοι γίνονται;

ναί.

νῦν δ', ἐπειδὴ φυλάκων αὐτοὺς ἀρίστους δεῖ εἶναι, ἄρ' οὐ φυλακικωτάτους
πόλεως;

ναί.

οὐκοῦν φρονίμους τε εἰς τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν καὶ δυνατοὺς καὶ ἔτι
κηδεμόνας τῆς πόλεως;

412d

ἔστι ταῦτα.

κῆδοιτο δέ γ' ἂν τις μάλιστα τούτου ὃ τυγχάνοι φιλῶν.

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ' ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ᾧ συμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ
καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος οἶοιτο συμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ
εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δέ, τοῦναντίον.

οὕτως, ἔφη.

ἐκλεκτέον ἄρ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων φυλάκων τοιούτους ἄνδρας, οἳ ἂν σκοποῦσιν
ἡμῖν μάλιστα φαίνονται παρὰ πάντα τὸν

412e

βίον, ὃ μὲν ἂν τῇ πόλει ἡγήσωνται συμφέρειν, πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ποιεῖν, ὃ δ'
ἂν μή, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ πρᾶξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν.

ἐπιτήδριοι γάρ, ἔφη.

δοκεῖ δὴ μοι τηρητέον αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἡλικίαις, εἰ φυλακικοὶ
εἴσι τούτου τοῦ δόγματος καὶ μήτε γοητευόμενοι μήτε βιαζόμενοι
ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐπιλανθανόμενοι δόξαν τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν δεῖν ἃ τῇ πόλει

βέλπιστα.

τίνα, ἔφη, λέγεις τὴν ἐκβολήν;

ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ. φαίνεται μοι δόξα ἐξιέναι ἐκ διανοίας ἢ ἐκουσίως ἢ ἀκουσίως, ἐκουσίως μὲν ἢ ψευδῆς

413

413a

τοῦ μεταμανθάνοντος, ἀκουσίως δὲ πᾶσα ἡ ἀληθής.

τὸ μὲν τῆς ἐκουσίου, ἔφη, μανθάνω, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀκουσίου δέομαι μαθεῖν.

τί δέ; οὐ καὶ σὺ ἡγῇ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀκουσίως στέρεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἐκουσίως; ἢ οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐψεῦσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθεύειν ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὐ τὸ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀληθεύειν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;

ἀλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, ὀρθῶς λέγεις, καὶ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄκοντες ἀληθοῦς δόξης στερίσκεσθαι.

413b

οὐκοῦν κλαπέντες ἢ γοητευθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες τοῦτο πάσχουσιν;

οὐδὲ νῦν, ἔφη, μανθάνω.

τραγικῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κινδυνεύω λέγειν. κλαπέντας μὲν γὰρ τοὺς μεταπεισθέντας λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλανθανομένους, ὅτι τῶν μὲν χρόνος, τῶν δὲ λόγος ἐξαίρουμενος λανθάνει· νῦν γάρ που μανθάνεις;

ναί.

τοὺς τοίνυν βιασθέντας λέγω οὕς ἂν ὀδύνη τις ἢ ἀλγηδὼν μεταδοξάσαι ποιήσῃ.

καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἔμαθον, καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

413c

τοὺς μὴν γοητευθέντας, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, κἄν σὺ φαίης εἶναι οἱ ἂν μεταδοξάσωσιν ἢ ὑφ' ἡδονῆς κηληθέντες ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου τι δείσαντες. ἔοικε γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, γοητεῦειν πάντα ὅσα ἀπατᾷ.

ὁ τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ζητητέον τίνες ἄριστοι φύλακες τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς δόγματος, τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέον ὃ ἂν τῇ πόλει ἀεὶ δοκῶσι βέλτιστον εἶναι αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν. τηρητέον δὴ εὐθύς ἐκ παιδῶν προθεμένοις ἔργα ἐν οἷς ἂν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον μάλιστα ἐπιλανθάνοιτο καὶ ἐξαπατῶτο, καὶ τὸν μὲν μνήμονα

413d

καὶ δυσεξαπάτητον ἐγκριτέον, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀποκριτέον. ἢ γάρ;

ναί.

καὶ πόνους γε αὖ καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ἀγῶνας αὐτοῖς θετέον, ἐν οἷς ταῦτα ταῦτα τηρητέον.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τρίτου εἰδους τούτοις γοητείας ἄμιλλαν ποιητέον, καὶ θεατέον—ὥσπερ τοὺς πῶλους ἐπὶ τοὺς φόφους τε καὶ θορύβους ἄγοντες σκοποῦσιν εἰ φοβεροί, οὕτω νέους ὄντας εἰς δειματ' ἅττα κομιστέον καὶ εἰς ἡδονὰς

413e

αὖ μεταβλητέον, βασανίζοντας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρί—εἰ

δυσγοήτευτος καὶ εὐσχήμων ἐν πᾶσι φαίνεται, φύλαξ αὐτοῦ ὢν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μουσικῆς ἥς ἐμάνθανεν, εὐρυθμόν τε καὶ εὐάρμοστον ἑαυτὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρέχων, οἷος δὴ ἂν ὢν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ πόλει χρησιμώτατος εἴη. καὶ τὸν αἰεὶ ἐν τε παισὶ καὶ νεανίσκοις καὶ ἐν ἀνδράσι βασανιζόμενον

414

414a

καὶ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ φύλακα, καὶ τιμὰς δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, τάφων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μνημείων μέγιστα γέρα λαγχάνοντα· τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποκριτέον. τοιαύτη τις, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ἡ ἐκλογή εἶναι καὶ κατὰστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρήσθαι. καὶ ἐμοί, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὕτως πη φαίνεται.

414b

ἄρ' οὖν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀρθότατον καλεῖν τούτους μὲν φύλακας παντελεῖς τῶν τε ἔξωθεν πολεμίων τῶν τε ἐντὸς φιλίων, ὅπως οἱ μὲν μὴ βουλήσονται, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνήσονται κακουργεῖν, τοὺς δὲ νέους, οὓς δὴ νῦν φύλακας ἐκαλοῦμεν, ἐπικούρους τε καὶ βοηθοὺς τοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων δόγμασιν;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μηχανὴ γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δέοντι γιγνομένων, ὧν δὴ νῦν ἐλέγομεν, γενναῖόν

414c

τι ἐν ψευδομένους πεῖσαι μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν;

ποῖόν τι; ἔφη.

μηδὲν καινόν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ Φοινικικόν τι, πρότερον μὲν ἤδη πολλαχοῦ γεγονός, ὡς φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πεπείκασιν, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ οὐ γεγονός οὐδ' οἶδα εἰ γενόμενον ἂν, πεῖσαι δὲ συχνῆς πειθοῦς.

ὡς ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὀκνοῦντι λέγειν.

δόξω δὲ σοι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μάλ' εἰκότως ὀκνεῖν, ἐπειδὰν εἴπω.

λέγ', ἔφη, καὶ μὴ φοβοῦ.

414d

λέγω δὴ—καίτοι οὐκ οἶδα ὅποια τὸλμη ἢ ποίοις λόγοις χρώμενος ἐρῶ—καὶ ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας πείθειν καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ὡς ἄρ' ἃ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὺς ἐτρέφομεν τε καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν, ὥσπερ ὄνειράτα ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάντα πάσχειν τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτούς, ἦσαν δὲ τότε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐντὸς πλαττόμενοι καὶ τρεφόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ

414e

ὄπλα αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σκευὴ δημιουργουμένη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἐξειργασμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτοὺς μήτηρ οὔσα ἀνῆκεν, καὶ νῦν δεῖ ὡς περὶ μητρὸς καὶ τροφοῦ τῆς χώρας ἐν ἣ εἰσι βουλευέσθαι τε καὶ ἀμύνειν αὐτούς, ἐὰν τις ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴη, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν ὄντων καὶ γηγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι.

οὐκ ἐτός, ἔφη, πάλαι ἡσχύνου τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν.

415

415a

πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰκότως· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἄκουε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ μύθου. ἔστ' ἐμὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἄδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν, χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει συνέμειξεν αὐτοῖς, διὸ τιμιώτατοί εἰσιν· ὅσοι δ' ἐπικούροι, ἄργυρον· σιδηρον δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν τοῖς τε γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς. ἅτε οὖν συγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίους ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς γεννῶτε,

415b

ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ γεννηθεῖη ἂν ἀργυροῦν καὶ ἐξ ἀργύρου χρυσοῦν ἔκγονον καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτως ἐξ ἀλλήλων. τοῖς οὖν ἄρχουσι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα παραγγέλλει ὁ θεός, ὅπως μηδενὸς οὕτω φύλακες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται μὴδ' οὕτω σφόδρα φυλάξουσιν μὴδὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐκγόνους, ὅτι αὐτοῖς τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμεικται, καὶ ἕαν τε σφέτερος ἔκγονος ὑπόχαλκος ἢ ὑποσιδηρος γένηται, μὴδενὶ

415c

τρόπῳ κατελεήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ φύσει προσήκουσαν τιμὴν ἀποδόντες ὥσουσιν εἰς δημιουργοὺς ἢ εἰς γεωρούς, καὶ ἂν αὖ ἐκ τούτων τις ὑπόχρυσος ἢ ὑπάργυρος φυῇ, τιμήσαντες ἀνάξουσιν τοὺς μὲν εἰς φυλακὴν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς ἐπικουρίαν, ὡς χρημοῦ ὄντος τότε τὴν πόλιν διαφθαρήναι, ὅταν αὐτὴν ὁ σιδηροῦς φύλαξ ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς φυλάξῃ. τοῦτον οὖν τὸν μῦθον ὅπως ἂν πεισθεῖεν, ἔχεις τινὰ μηχανήν;

415d

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὅπως γ' ἂν αὐτοὶ οὗτοι· ὅπως μεντὰν οἱ τούτων ὑεῖς καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὕστερον.

ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ ἀλλήλων κήδεσθαι· σχεδὸν γὰρ τι μανθάνω ὃ λέγεις.

καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἔξει ὅπῃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἡ φήμη ἀγάγῃ· ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτους τοὺς γηγενεῖς ὀπλίσαντες προάγωμεν ἡγουμένων τῶν ἀρχόντων. ἐλθόντες δὲ θεασάσθων τῆς πόλεως ὅπου κάλλιστον στρατοπεδεύσασθαι, ὅθεν τοὺς τε

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ἔνδον μάλιστ' ἂν κατέχοιεν, εἴ τις μὴ ἐθέλοι τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἔξωθεν ἀπαμύνοιεν, εἰ πολέμιος ὥσπερ λύκος ἐπὶ ποίμνην τις ἴοι· στρατοπεδευσάμενοι δέ, θύσαντες οἷς χρή, εὐνὰς ποιησάσθων. ἢ πῶς; οὕτως, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τοιαύτας, οἷας χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ἱκανὰς εἶναι; πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; οἰκήσεις γάρ, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν.

ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, στρατιωτικὰς γε, ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστικὰς.

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πῶς, ἔφη, αὖ τοῦτο λέγεις διαφέρειν ἐκείνου;

ἐγὼ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, πειράσομαι εἰπεῖν. δεινότατον γάρ που πάντων καὶ αἷσχιστον ποιμέσι τοιούτους γε καὶ οὕτω τρέφειν κύνας ἐπικούρους

ποιμνίων, ὥστε ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἢ λιμοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλου κακοῦ ἔθους αὐτοὺς τοὺς κύνας ἐπιχειρήσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν καὶ ἀντὶ κυνῶν λύκοις ὁμοιωθῆναι.

δαινόν, ἦ δ' ὅς· πῶς δ' οὐ;

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οὐκοῦν φυλακτέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἡμῖν οἱ ἐπίκουροι ποιήσωσι πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῶν κρείττους εἰσίν, ἀντὶ συμμαχῶν εὐμενῶν δεσπόταις ἀγρίοις ἀφομοιωθῶσιν;

φυλακτέον, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμένοι ἂν εἶεν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι καλῶς πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν;

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσίν γ', ἔφη.

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄξιον διισχυρίζεσθαι, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων· ὁ μέντοι ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ἄξιον, ὅτι δεῖ

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αὐτοὺς τῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν παιδείας, ἣτις ποτέ ἐστιν, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ μέγιστον ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ἡμεροὶ εἶναι αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς φυλαττομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

πρὸς τοίνυν τῇ παιδεῖα ταύτῃ φαῖν ἂν τις νοῦν ἔχων δεῖν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν τοιαύτην αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθαι, ἣτις μήτε τοῦ φύλακας ὡς ἀρίστους εἶναι παύσει

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αὐτοὺς, κακουργεῖν τε μὴ ἐπαρεῖ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

καὶ ἀληθῶς γε φήσει.

Ὅρα δὴ, εἶπον ἐγὼ, εἰ τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον δεῖ αὐτοὺς ζῆν τε καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ μέλλουσι τοιοῦτοι ἔσεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένον μηδεμίαν μηδένα ἰδίαν, ἂν μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη· ἔπειτα οἴκησιν καὶ ταμιεῖον μηδενὶ εἶναι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, εἰς δ' οὐ πᾶς ὁ βουλόμενος εἴσεισι· τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια, ὅσων δέονται ἄνδρες ἀθληταὶ πολέμου σῶφρονές τε καὶ

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ἀνδρεῖοι, ταξαμένους παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δέχεσθαι μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς τοσοῦτον ὅσον μήτε περιεῖναι αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν μήτε ἐνδεεῖν· φοιτῶντας δὲ εἰς συσσίτια ὥσπερ ἐστρατοπεδευμένους κοινῇ ζῆν· χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον εἰπεῖν αὐτοῖς ὅτι θεῖον παρὰ θεῶν ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχουσι καὶ οὐδὲν προσδέονται τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου, οὐδὲ ὅσια τὴν ἐκείνου κτήσιν τῇ τοῦ θνητοῦ χρυσοῦ κτήσει συμμειγνύντας μιαίνειν, διότι πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόσια περὶ τὸ τῶν

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πολλῶν νόμισμα γέγονεν, τὸ παρ' ἐκείνοις δὲ ἀκήρατον· ἀλλὰ μόνοις αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ ἅπτεσθαι χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου οὐ θέμις, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄροφον ἰέναι οὐδὲ περιάφασθαι οὐδὲ πίνειν ἐξ ἀργύρου ἢ χρυσοῦ. καὶ οὕτω μὲν σῶζονται τ' ἂν καὶ σῶζοιεν τὴν πόλιν· ὁπότε δ' αὐτοὶ γῆν τε ἰδίαν καὶ οἰκίαν καὶ νομίσματα κτήσονται, οἰκονόμοι

μὲν καὶ γεωργοὶ ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἔσονται,
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δεσπότα δ' ἐχθροὶ ἀντὶ συμμάχων τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γενήσονται,
μισοῦντες δὲ δὴ καὶ μισούμενοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπιβουλεύόμενοι
διάξουσι πάντα τὸν βίον, πολὺ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον δεδιότες τοὺς ἑνδον ἢ τοὺς
ἔξωθεν πολεμίους, θέοντες ἤδη τότε ἐγγύτατα ὀλέθρου αὐτοὶ τε καὶ ἡ ἄλλη
πόλις. τούτων οὖν πάντων ἕνεκα, ἧν δ' ἐγώ, φῶμεν οὕτω δεῖν
κατεσκευάσθαι τοὺς φύλακας οἰκήσεώς τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταῦτα
νομοθετήσωμεν, ἢ μή;
πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων.

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English translation

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Concerning the gods then, said I, this is the sort of thing that we must allow or not allow them to hear from childhood up, if they are to honor the gods[*] and their fathers and mothers, and not to hold their friendship with one another in light esteem. That was our view and I believe it right. What then of this? If they are to be brave, must we not extend our prescription to include also the sayings that will make them least likely

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to fear death? Or do you suppose that anyone could ever become brave who had that dread in his heart? No indeed, I do not, he replied. And again if he believes in the reality of the underworld and its terrors,[*] do you think that any man will be fearless of death and in battle will prefer death to defeat and slavery? By no means. Then it seems we must exercise supervision[*] also, in the matter of such tales as these, over those who undertake to supply them and request them not to dispraise in this indiscriminating fashion the life in Hades but rather praise it,

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since what they now tell us is neither true nor edifying to men who are destined to be warriors. Yes, we must, he said. Then, said I, beginning with this verse we will expunge everything of the same kind:

Liefer were I in the fields up above to be serf to another
Tiller of some poor plot which yields him a scanty subsistence,
Than to be ruler and king over all the dead who have perished,

Aesch. Frag. 350 [*] and this:

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Lest unto men and immortals the homes of the dead be uncovered
Horrible, noisome, dank, that the gods too hold in abhorrence,

Hom. Il. 20.64 [*] and:

Ah me! so it is true that e'en in the dwellings of Hades
Spirit there is and wraith, but within there is no understanding,

Hom. Il. 10.495 [*] and this:

Sole to have wisdom and wit, but the others are shadowy phantoms,

Hom. Il. 23.103 [*] and:

Forth from his limbs unwilling his spirit flitted to Hades,

Wailing its doom and its lustihood lost and the May of its manhood,

Hom. Il. 16.856 [*]

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and:

Under the earth like a vapor vanished the gibbering soul,

Hom. Il. 23.100 and:

Even as bats in the hollow of some mysterious grotto

Fly with a flittermouse shriek when one of them falls from the cluster

Whereby they hold to the rock and are clinging the one to the other,

Flitted their gibbering ghosts.

Hom. Od. 24.6-10 [*]

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We will beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we cancel those and all similar passages, not that they are not poetic and pleasing[*] to most hearers, but because the more poetic they are the less are they suited to the ears of boys and men who are destined to be free and to be more afraid of slavery than of death. By all means.

Then we must further taboo in these matters the entire vocabulary of terror and fear, Cocytus[*]

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named of lamentation loud, abhorred Styx, the flood of deadly hate, the people of the infernal pit and of the charnel-house, and all other terms of this type, whose very names send a shudder[*] through all the hearers every year. And they may be excellent for other purposes,[*] but we are in fear for our guardians lest the habit of such thrills make them more sensitive[*] and soft than we would have them. And we are right in so fearing. We must remove those things then? Yes. And the opposite type to them is what we must require in speech and in verse? Obviously. And shall we also do away with the

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wailings and lamentations of men of repute? That necessarily follows, he said, from the other. Consider, said I, whether we shall be right in thus getting rid of them or not. What we affirm is that a good man[*] will not think that for a good man, whose friend he also is, death is a terrible thing. Yes, we say that. Then it would not be for his friend's[*] sake as if he had suffered something dreadful that he would make lament. Certainly not. But we also say this, that such a one is most of all men sufficient unto himself[*]

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for a good life and is distinguished from other men in having least need of

anybody else. True, he replied. Least of all then to him is it a terrible thing to lose son[*] or brother or his wealth or anything of the sort. Least of all. Then he makes the least lament and bears it most moderately when any such misfortune overtakes him. Certainly.

Then we should be right in doing away with the lamentations of men of note and in attributing them to women,[*]

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and not to the most worthy of them either, and to inferior men, in that those whom we say we are breeding for the guardianship of the land may disdain to act like these. We should be right, said he. Again then we shall request Homer and the other poets not to portray Achilles, the son of a goddess, as, Lying now on his side, and then again on his back, And again on his face,

Hom. Il. 24.10-12 [*] and then rising up and

Drifting distraught on the shore of the waste unharvested ocean,

Hom. Il. 24.10-12 [*]

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nor

clutching with both hands the sooty dust and strewing it over his head,

[*] nor as weeping and lamenting in the measure and manner attributed to him by the poet; nor yet Priam,[*] near kinsman of the gods, making supplication and rolling in the dung,

Calling aloud unto each, by name to each man appealing.

Hom. Il. 22.414-415 And yet more than this shall we beg of them at least not to describe the gods as lamenting and crying,

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Ah, woe is me, woeful mother who bore to my sorrow the bravest,

Hom. Il. 18.54 [*] and if they will so picture the gods at least not to have the effrontery to present so unlikely a likeness[*] of the supreme god as to make him say:

Out on it, dear to my heart is the man whose pursuit around Troy-town I must behold with my eyes while my spirit is grieving within me,

Hom. Il. 22.168 [*] and:

Ah, woe is me! of all men to me is Sarpedon the dearest,

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Fated to fall by the hands of Patroclus, Menoitius' offspring.

Hom. Il. 16.433-434 [*]

For if, dear Adeimantus, our young men should seriously incline to listen to such tales and not laugh at them as unworthy utterances, still less surely would any man be to think such conduct unworthy of himself and to rebuke

himself if it occurred to him to do or say anything of that kind, but without shame or restraint full many a dirge for trifles would he chant [*] and many a lament.

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You say most truly, he replied. But that must not be, as our reasoning but now showed us, in which we must put our trust until someone convinces with a better reason. No, it must not be. Again, they must not be prone to laughter.[*] For ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughter his condition provokes a violent reaction.[*] I think so, he said.

Then if anyone represents men of worth as overpowered

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by laughter we must accept it, much less if gods. Much indeed, he replied. Then we must not accept from Homer such sayings as these either about the gods:

Quenchless then was the laughter[*] that rose from the blessed immortals
When they beheld Hephaestus officiously puffing and panting.

Hom. Il. 1.599-600 — we must not accept it on your view. If it pleases you
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to call it mine,[*] he said; at any rate we must not accept it. But further we must surely prize truth most highly. For if we were right in what we were just saying and falsehood is in very deed useless to gods, but to men useful as a remedy or form of medicine,[*] it is obvious that such a thing must be assigned to physicians and laymen should have nothing to do with it.

Obviously, he replied. The rulers then of the city may, if anybody, fitly lie on account of enemies or citizens for the benefit[*] of the state; no others may have anything to do with it,

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but for a layman to lie to rulers of that kind we shall affirm to be as great a sin, nay a greater, than it is for a patient not to tell physician or an athlete his trainer the truth about his bodily condition, or for a man to deceive the pilot about the ship and the sailors as to the real condition of himself or a fellow-sailor, and how they fare. Most true, he replied. If then

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the ruler catches anybody else in the city lying, any of the craftsmen
Whether a prophet or healer of sickness or joiner of timbers,

Hom. Od. 17.383-384 he will chastise him for introducing a practice as subversive[*] and destructive of a state as it is of a ship. He will, he said, if deed follows upon word.[*] Again, will our lads not need the virtue of self-control? Of course. And for the multitude[*] are not the main points of self-control these—to be obedient to their rulers and themselves to be rulers[*]

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over the bodily appetites and pleasures of food, drink, and the rest? I think so.

Then, I take it, we will think well said such sayings as that of Homer's Diomedes:

Friend, sit down and be silent and hark to the word of my bidding,

Hom. Il. 4.412 [*] and what follows:

Breathing high spirit the Greeks marched silently fearing their captains,

Hom. Il. 3.8 [*] and all similar passages.

Yes, well said. But what of this sort of thing?

Heavy with wine with the eyes of a dog and the heart of a fleet deer,

Hom. Il. 1.225 [*]

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and the lines that follow, [*] are these well—and other impertinences [*] in prose or verse of private citizens to their rulers? They are not well. They certainly are not suitable for youth to hear for the inculcation of self-control. But if from another point of view they yield some pleasure we must not be surprised, or what is your view of it? This, he said.

Again, to represent the wisest man as saying that this seems to him the fairest thing in the world,

When the bounteous tables are standing

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Laden with bread and with meat and the cupbearer ladles the sweet wine Out of the mixer and bears it and empties it into the beakers.

Hom. Od. 9.8-10 [*]—do you think the hearing of that sort of thing will conduce to a young man's temperance or self-control? or this:

Hunger is the most piteous death that a mortal may suffer.

Hom. Od. 12.342 [*] Or to hear how Zeus [*] lightly forgot all the designs which he devised,

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watching while the other gods slept, because of the excitement of his passions, and was so overcome by the sight of Hera that he is not even willing to go to their chamber, but wants to lie with her there on the ground and says that he is possessed by a fiercer desire than when they first consorted with one another, Deceiving their dear parents.

Hom. Il. 14.296 Nor will it profit them to hear of Hephaestus's fettering Ares and Aphrodite [*] for a like motive. No, by Zeus, he said,

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I don't think it will. But any words or deeds of endurance in the face of all odds [*] attributed to famous men are suitable for our youth to see represented and to hear, such as:

He smote his breast and chided thus his heart,

Endure, my heart, for worse hast thou endured.

Hom. Od. 20.17-18 [*] By all means, he said. It is certain that we cannot

allow our men to be acceptors of bribes or greedy for gain.

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By no means. Then they must not chant:

Gifts move the gods and gifts persuade dread kings.

unknown [*] Nor should we approve Achilles' attendant Phoenix[*] as speaking fairly when he counselled him if he received gifts for it to defend the Achaeans, but without gifts not to lay aside his wrath; nor shall we think it proper nor admit that Achilles[*] himself was so greedy as to accept gifts from Agamemnon and again to give up a dead body after receiving payment[*]

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but otherwise to refuse. It is not right, he said, to commend such conduct. But, for Homer's sake, said I, I hesitate to say that it is positively impious[*] to affirm such things of Achilles and to believe them when told by others; or again to believe that he said to Apollo

Me thou hast balked, Far-darter, the most pernicious of all gods, Mightily would I requite thee if only my hands had the power.

Hom. Il. 22.15 [*]

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And how he was disobedient to the river,[*] who was a god and was ready to fight with him, and again that he said of the locks of his hair, consecrated to her river Spercheius:

This let me give to take with him my hair to the hero, Patroclus,

Hom. Il. 23.151 [*] who was a dead body, and that he did so we must believe. And again the trailings[*] of Hector's body round the grave of Patroclus and the slaughter[*] of the living captives upon his pyre, all these we will affirm to be lies,

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nor will we suffer our youth to believe that Achilles, the son of a goddess and of Peleus the most chaste[*] of men, grandson[*] of Zeus, and himself bred under the care of the most sage Cheiron, was of so perturbed a spirit as to be affected with two contradictory maladies, the greed that becomes no free man and at the same time overweening arrogance towards gods and men. You are right, he said.

Neither, then, said I, must we believe this or suffer it to be said, that Theseus, the son of Poseidon,

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and Peirithous, the son of Zeus, attempted such dreadful rapes,[*] nor that any other child of a god and hero would have brought himself to accomplish the terrible and impious deeds that they now falsely relate of him. But we must constrain the poets either to deny that these are their deeds or that they are the children of gods, but not to make both statements or attempt to persuade our

youth that the gods are the begetters of evil, and that heroes are no better than men.

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For, as we were saying, such utterances are both impious and false. For we proved, I take it, that for evil to arise from gods is an impossibility. Certainly. And they are furthermore harmful to those that hear them. For every man will be very lenient with his own misdeeds if he is convinced that such are and were the actions of

The near-sown seed of gods,

Close kin to Zeus, for whom on Ida's top

Ancestral altars flame to highest heaven,

Nor in their life-blood fails[*] the fire divine.

Aesch. Niobe Fr.

For which cause we must put down such fables, lest they breed

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in our youth great laxity[*] in turpitude. Most assuredly. What type of discourse remains for our definition of our prescriptions and proscriptions? We have declared the right way of speaking about gods and daemons and heroes and that other world. We have. Speech, then, about men would be the remainder. Obviously. It is impossible for us, my friend, to place this here.

[*] Why? Because I presume we are going to say that so it is that both poets

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and writers of prose speak wrongly about men in matters of greatest moment, saying that there are many examples of men who, though unjust, are happy, and of just men who are wretched, and that there is profit in injustice if it be concealed, and that justice is the other man's good and your own loss; and I presume that we shall forbid them to say this sort of thing and command them to sing and fable the opposite. Don't you think so? Nay, I well know it, he said. Then, if you admit that I am right, I will say that you have conceded the original point of our inquiry?

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Rightly apprehended, he said. Then, as regards men that speech must be of this kind, that is a point that we will agree upon when we have discovered the nature of justice and the proof that it is profitable to its possessor whether he does or does not appear to be just. Most true, he replied.

So this concludes the topic of tales.[*] That of diction, I take it, is to be considered next. So we shall have completely examined both the matter and the manner of speech. And Adeimantus said, I don't understand what

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you mean by this. Well, said I, we must have you understand. Perhaps you will be more likely to apprehend it thus. Is not everything that is said by fabulists or poets a narration of past, present, or future things? What else could it be? he said. Do not they proceed[*] either by pure narration or by a

narrative that is effected through imitation,[*] or by both? This too, he said, I still need to have made plainer. I seem to be a ridiculous and obscure teacher, [*] I said; so like men who are unable to express themselves

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I won't try to speak in wholes[*] and universals but will separate off a particular part and by the example of that try to show you my meaning. Tell me. Do you know the first lines if the *Iliad* in which the poet says that Chryses implored Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that the king was angry and that Chryses,

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failing of his request, imprecated curses on the Achaeans in his prayers to the god? I do. You know then that as far as these verses,

And prayed unto all the Achaeans,

Chiefly to Atreus' sons, twin leaders who marshalled the people,

Hom. Il. 1.15 the poet himself is the speaker and does not even attempt to suggest to us that anyone but himself is speaking.

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But what follows he delivers as if he were himself Chryses and tries as far as may be to make us feel that not Homer is the speaker, but the priest, an old man. And in this manner he has carried in nearly all the rest of his narration about affairs in Ilion, all that happened in Ithaca, and the entire *Odyssey*. Quite so, he said. Now, it is narration, is it not, both when he presents the several speeches and the matter between the speeches? Of course. But when he delivers a speech

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as if he were someone else, shall we not say that he then assimilates thereby his own diction is far as possible to that of the person whom he announces as about to speak? We shall obviously. And is not likening one's self to another speech or bodily bearing an imitation of him to whom one likens one's self? Surely. In such case then it appears he and the other poets effect their narration through imitation. Certainly. But if the poet should conceal himself nowhere, then his entire poetizing and narration would have been accomplished without imitation.[*]

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And lest you may say again that you don't understand, I will explain to you how this would be done. If Homer, after telling us that Chryses came with the ransom of his daughter and as a suppliant of the Achaeans but chiefly of the kings, had gone on speaking not as if made or being Chryses[*] but still as Homer, you are aware that it would not be imitation but narration, pure and simple. It would have been somewhat in this wise. I will state it without meter for I am not a poet:[*]

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the priest came and prayed that to them the gods should grant to take Troy and

come safely home, but that they should accept the ransom and release his daughter, out of reverence for the god;
and when he had thus spoken the others were of reverent mind and approved, but Agamemnon was angry and bade him depart and not come again lest the scepter and the fillets of the god should not avail him. And ere his daughter should be released, he said, she would grow old in Argos with himself, and he ordered him to be off and not vex him if he wished to get home safe.

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And the old man on hearing this was frightened and departed in silence, and having gone apart from the camp he prayed at length to Apollo, invoking the appellations of the god, and reminding him of and asking requital for any of his gifts that had found favor whether in the building of temples or the sacrifice of victims. In return for these things he prayed that the Achaeans should suffer for his tears by the god's shafts. It is in this way, my dear fellow, I said, that

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without imitation simple narration results. I understand, he said.

Understand then, said I, that the opposite of this arises when one removes the words of the poet between and leaves the alternation of speeches. This too I understand, he said, —it is what happens in tragedy. You have conceived me most rightly, I said, and now I think I can make plain to you what I was unable to before, that there is one kind of poetry and tale-telling which works wholly through imitation,

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as you remarked, tragedy and comedy; and another which employs the recital of the poet himself, best exemplified, I presume, in the dithyramb[*]; and there is again that which employs both, in epic poetry and in many other places, if you apprehend me. I understand now, he said, what you then meant. Recall then also the preceding statement that we were done with the what of speech and still had to consider the 'how.' I remember.

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What I meant then was just this, that we must reach a decision whether we are to suffer our poets to narrate as imitators or in part as imitators and in part not, and what sort of things in each case, or not allow them to imitate[*] at all. I divine, he said, that you are considering whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy into our city or not. Perhaps, said I, and perhaps even more than that. [*] For I certainly do not yet know myself, but whithersoever the wind, as it were, of the argument blows,[*] there lies our course.

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Well said, he replied. This then, Adeimantus, is the point we must keep in view, do we wish our guardians to be good mimics or not? Or is this also a consequence of what we said before, that each one could practise well only one pursuit and not many, but if he attempted the latter, dabbling in many

things, he would fail of distinction in all? Of course it is. And does not the same rule hold for imitation, that the same man is not able to imitate many things well as he can one? No, he is not.

Still less, then, will he be able to combine

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the practice of any worthy pursuit with the imitation of many things and the quality of a mimic; since, unless I mistake, the same men cannot practise well at once even the two forms of imitation that appear most nearly akin, as the writing of tragedy and comedy[*]? Did you not just now call these two imitations? I did, and you are right in saying that the same men are not able to succeed in both, nor yet to be at once good rhapsodists[*] and actors. True. But

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neither can the same men be actors for tragedies and comedies[*]—and all these are imitations, are they not? Yes, imitations. And to still smaller coinage[*] than this, in my opinion, Adeimantus, proceeds the fractioning of human faculty, so as to be incapable of imitating many things or of doing the things themselves of which the imitations are likenesses. Most true, he replied. If, then, we are to maintain our original principle, that our guardians, released from all other crafts,

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are to be expert craftsmen of civic liberty, [*] and pursue nothing else that does not conduce to this, it would not be fitting for these to do nor yet to imitate anything else. But if they imitate they should from childhood up[*] imitate what is appropriate to them[*]—men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things of that kind; but things unbecoming the free man they should neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from the imitation

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they imbibe the reality.[*] Or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into habits and (second) nature[*] in the body, the speech, and the thought? Yes, indeed, said he. We will not then allow our charges, whom we expect to prove good men, being men, to play the parts of women and imitate a woman young or old wrangling with her husband, defying heaven, loudly boasting, fortunate in her own conceit, or involved in misfortune

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and possessed by grief and lamentation—still less a woman that is sick, in love, or in labor. Most certainly not, he replied. Nor may they imitate slaves, female and male, doing the offices of slaves. No, not that either.

Nor yet, as it seems, bad men who are cowards and who do the opposite of the things we just now spoke of, reviling and lampooning one another, speaking foul words in their cups or when sober

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and in other ways sinning against themselves and others in word and deed after the fashion of such men. And I take it they must not form the habit of likening themselves to madmen either in words nor yet in deeds. For while knowledge they must have[*] both of mad and bad men and women, they must do and imitate nothing of this kind. Most true, he said. What of this? I said, —are they to imitate smiths and other craftsmen or the rowers of triremes and those who call the time to them or other things

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connected therewith? How could they, he said, since it will be forbidden them even to pay any attention to such things? Well, then, neighing horses[*] and lowing bulls, and the noise of rivers and the roar of the sea and the thunder and everything of that kind—will they imitate these? Nay, they have been forbidden, he said, to be mad or liken themselves to madmen. If, then, I understand your meaning, said I, there is a form of diction and narrative in which

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the really good and true man would narrate anything that he had to say, and another form unlike this to which the man of the opposite birth and breeding would cleave and which he would tell his story. What are these forms? he said. A man of the right sort, I think, when he comes in the course of his narrative to some word or act of a good man will be willing to impersonate the other in reporting it, and will feel no shame at that kind of mimicry, by preference imitating the good man

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when he acts steadfastly and sensibly, and less and more reluctantly when he is upset by sickness or love or drunkenness or any other mishap. But when he comes to someone unworthy of himself, he will not wish to liken himself in earnest to one who is inferior,[*] except in the few cases where he is doing something good, but will be embarrassed both because he is unpractised in the mimicry of such characters, and also because he shrinks in distaste from molding and fitting himself the types of baser things.

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His mind disdains them, unless it be for jest.[*] Naturally, he said. Then the narrative that he will employ will be the kind that we just now illustrated by the verses of Homer, and his diction will be one that partakes of both, of imitation and simple narration, but there will be a small portion of imitation in a long discourse—or is there nothing in what I say? Yes, indeed, [*] he said, that is the type and pattern of such a speaker.

Then, said I,

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the other kind speaker, the more debased he is the less will he shrink from imitating anything and everything. He will think nothing unworthy of himself,

so that he will attempt, seriously and in the presence of many,[*] to imitate all things, including those we just now mentioned—claps of thunder, and the noise of wind and hail and axles and pulleys, and the notes of trumpets and flutes and pan-pipes, and the sounds of all instruments, and the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds; and so his style will depend wholly on imitation
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in voice and gesture, or will contain but a little of pure narration. That too follows of necessity, he said. These, then, said I, were the two types of diction of which I was asking. There are those two, he replied. Now does not one of the two involve slight variations,[*] and if we assign a suitable pitch and rhythm to the diction, is not the result that the right speaker speaks almost on the same note and in one cadence—for the changes are slight—
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and similarly in a rhythm of nearly the same kind? Quite so. But what of the other type? Does it not require the opposite, every kind of pitch and all rhythms, if it too is to have appropriate expression, since it involves manifold forms of variation? Emphatically so. And do all poets and speakers hit upon one type or the other of diction or some blend which they combine of both?
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They must, he said. What, then, said I, are we to do? Shall we admit all of these into the city, or one of the unmixed types, or the mixed type? If my vote prevails, he said, the unmixed imitator of the good. Nay, but the mixed type also is pleasing, Adeimantus, and far most pleasing to boys and their tutors and the great mob is the opposite of your choice. Most pleasing it is. But perhaps, said I, you would affirm it to be ill-suited
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to our polity, because there is no twofold or manifold man[*] among us, since every man does one thing. It is not suited. And is this not the reason why such a city is the only one in which we shall find the cobbler a cobbler and not a pilot in addition to his cobbling, and the farmer a farmer and not a judge added to his farming, and the soldier a soldier and not a money-maker in addition to his soldiery, and so of all the rest? True, he said.[*]

If a man, then, it seems,

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who was capable by his cunning of assuming every kind of shape and imitating all things should arrive in our city, bringing with himself[*] the poems which he wished to exhibit, we should fall down and worship him as a holy and wondrous and delightful creature, but should say to him that there is no man of that kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for such a man to arise among us, and we should send him away to another city, after pouring myrrh down over his head and crowning him with fillets of wool, but we ourselves, for our souls' good, should continue to employ

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the more austere[*] and less delightful poet and tale-teller, who would imitate the diction of the good man and would tell his tale in the patterns which we prescribed in the beginning,[*] when we set out to educate our soldiers. We certainly should do that if it rested with us. And now, my friend, said I, we may say that we have completely finished the part of music that concerns speeches and tales. For we have set forth what is to be said and how it is to be said. I think so too, he replied.

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After this, then, said I, comes the manner of song and tunes? Obviously. And having gone thus far, could not everybody discover what we must say of their character in order to conform to what has already been said? I am afraid that everybody does not include me, laughed Glaucon[*]; I cannot sufficiently divine off-hand what we ought to say, though I have a suspicion. You certainly, I presume, said I,

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have sufficient a understanding of this—that the song[*] is composed of three things, the words, the tune, and the rhythm? Yes, said he, that much. And so far as it is words, it surely in no manner differs from words not sung in the requirement of conformity to the patterns and manner that we have prescribed? True, he said. And again, the music and the rhythm must follow the speech.[*] Of course. But we said we did not require dirges and lamentations in words. We do not. What, then,

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are the dirge-like modes of music? Tell me, for you are a musician. The mixed Lydian,[*] he said, and the tense or higher Lydian, and similar modes. These, then, said I, we must do away with. For they are useless even to women[*] who are to make the best of themselves, let alone to men. Assuredly. But again, drunkenness is a thing most unbefitting guardians, and so is softness and sloth. Yes. What, then, are the soft and convivial modes? There are certain Ionian and also Lydian modes

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that are called lax.

Will you make any use of them for warriors? None at all, he said; but it would seem that you have left the Dorian and the Phrygian. I don't know[*] the musical modes, I said, but leave us that mode[*] that would fittingly imitate the utterances and the accents of a brave man who is engaged in warfare or in any enforced business, and who, when he has failed, either meeting wounds or death or having fallen into some other mishap,

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in all these conditions confronts fortune with steadfast endurance and repels her strokes. And another for such a man engaged in works of peace, not enforced but voluntary,[*] either trying to persuade somebody of something and imploring him—whether it be a god, through prayer, or a man, by

teaching and admonition—or contrariwise yielding himself to another who petitioning or teaching him or trying to change his opinions, and in consequence faring according to his wish, and not bearing himself arrogantly, but in all this acting modestly and moderately

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and acquiescing in the outcome. Leave us these two modes—the forced and the voluntary—that will best imitate the utterances of men failing or succeeding, the temperate, the brave—leave us these. Well, said he, you are asking me to leave none other than those I just spoke of. Then, said I, we shall not need in our songs and airs instruments of many strings or whose compass includes all the harmonies. Not in my opinion, said he. Then we shall not maintain makers of triangles and harps and all other

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many stringed and poly-harmonic[*] instruments. Apparently not. Well, will you admit to the city flute-makers and flute-players? Or is not the flute the most many-stringed of instruments and do not the pan-harmonics[*] themselves imitate it? Clearly, he said. You have left, said I, the lyre and the cither. These are useful[*] in the city, and in the fields the shepherds would have a little piccolo to pipe on.[*] So our argument indicates, he said.

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We are not innovating, my friend, in preferring Apollo and the instruments of Apollo to Marsyas and his instruments. No, by heaven! he said, I think not. And by the dog,[*] said I, we have all unawares purged the city which a little while ago we said was wanton.[*] In that we show our good sense, he said. Come then, let us complete the purification.

For upon harmonies would follow the consideration of rhythms: we must not pursue complexity nor great variety in the basic movements,[*] but must observe what are the rhythms of a life that is orderly and brave, and after observing them

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require the foot and the air to conform to that kind of man's speech and not the speech to the foot and the tune. What those rhythms would be, it is for you to tell us as you did the musical modes. Nay, in faith, he said, I cannot tell. For that there are some three forms[*] from which the feet are combined, just as there are four[*] in the notes of the voice whence come all harmonies, is a thing that I have observed and could tell. But which are imitations of which sort of life, I am unable to say.[*]

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Well, said I, on this point we will take counsel with Damon,[*] too, as to which are the feet appropriate to illiberality, and insolence or madness or other evils, and what rhythms we must leave for their opposites; and I believe I have heard him obscurely speaking[*] of a foot that he called the enoplios, a composite foot, and a dactyl and an heroic[*] foot, which he arranged, I know

not how, to be equal up and down[*] in the interchange of long and short,[*]
and unless I am mistaken he used the term iambic, and there was another foot
that he called the trochaic,

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and he added the quantities long and short. And in some of these, I believe, he
censured and commended the tempo of the foot no less than the rhythm itself,
or else some combination of the two; I can't say. But, as I said, let this matter
be postponed for Damon's consideration. For to determine the truth of these
would require no little discourse. Do you think otherwise? No, by heaven, I do
not. But this you are able to determine—that seemliness and unseemliness are
attendant upon the good rhythm and the bad. Of course. And, further,[*] that
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good rhythm and bad rhythm accompany, the one fair diction, assimilating
itself thereto, and the other the opposite, and so of the apt and the unapt, if, as
we were just now saying, the rhythm and harmony follow the words and not
the words these. They certainly must follow the speech, he said. And what of
the manner of the diction, and the speech? said I. Do they not follow and
conform to the disposition of the soul? Of course. And all the rest to the
diction? Yes. Good speech, then, good accord, and good grace,

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and good rhythm wait upon good disposition, not that weakness of head
which we euphemistically style goodness of heart, but the truly good and fair
disposition of the character and the mind.[*] By all means, he said. And must
not our youth pursue these everywhere[*] if they are to do what it is truly
theirs to do[*]? They must indeed.

And there is surely much of these qualities in painting

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and in all similar craftsmanship[*]—weaving is full of them and embroidery
and architecture and likewise the manufacture of household furnishings and
thereto the natural bodies of animals and plants as well. For in all these there
is grace or gracelessness. And gracelessness and evil rhythm and disharmony
are akin to evil speaking and the evil temper but the opposites are the symbols
and the kin of the opposites, the sober and good disposition. Entirely so, he
said.

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Is it, then, only the poets that we must supervise and compel to embody in
their poems the semblance of the good character or else not write poetry
among us, or must we keep watch over the other craftsmen, and forbid them
to represent the evil disposition, the licentious, the illiberal, the graceless,
either in the likeness of living creatures or in buildings or in any other product
of their art, on penalty, if unable to obey, of being forbidden to practise their
art among us, that our guardians may not be bred among symbols of evil, as it
were

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in a pasturage of poisonous herbs, lest grazing freely and cropping from many such day by day they little by little and all unawares accumulate and build up a huge mass of evil in their own souls. But we must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature are capable of following the trail of true beauty and grace, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from all things about them, whence the influence that emanates from works of beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings from wholesome places health,

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and so from earliest childhood insensibly guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason. Yes, he said, that would be far the best education for them. And is it not for this reason, Glaucon, said I, that education in music is most sovereign, [*] because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained,

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and otherwise the contrary?

And further, because omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and so, feeling distaste [*] rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good.

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The ugly he would rightly disapprove of and hate while still young and yet unable to apprehend the reason, but when reason came [*] the man thus nurtured would be the first to give her welcome, for by this affinity he would know her. I certainly think, he said, that such is the cause of education in music. It is, then, said I, as it was when we learned our letters and felt that we knew them sufficiently only when the separate letters did not elude us, appearing as few elements in all the combinations that convey them, and when we did not disregard them

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in small things or great [*] and think it unnecessary to recognize them, but were eager to distinguish them everywhere, in the belief that we should never be literate and letter-perfect till we could do this. True. And is it not also true that if there are any likenesses [*] of letters reflected in water or mirrors, we shall never know them until we know the originals, but such knowledge belongs to the same art and discipline [*]? By all means. Then, by heaven, am I not right in saying that by the same token we shall never be true musicians, either—

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neither we nor the guardians that we have undertaken to educate—until we are

able to recognize the forms of soberness, courage, liberality,[*] and high-mindedness and all their kindred and their opposites, too, in all the combinations that contain and convey them, and to apprehend them and their images wherever found, disregarding them neither in trifles nor in great things, but believing the knowledge of them to belong to the same art and discipline? The conclusion is inevitable, he said.

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Then, said I, when there is a coincidence[*] of a beautiful disposition in the soul and corresponding and harmonious beauties of the same type in the bodily form—is not this the fairest spectacle for one who is capable of its contemplation[*]? Far the fairest. And surely the fairest is the most lovable. Of course. The true musician, then, would love by preference persons of this sort; but if there were disharmony he would not love this. No, he said, not if there was a defect in the soul; but if it were in the body he would bear with it and still be willing to bestow his love.

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I understand, I said, that you have or have had favorites of this sort and I grant your distinction. But tell me this—can there be any communion between soberness and extravagant pleasure[*]? How could there be, he said, since such pleasure puts a man beside himself

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no less than pain? Or between it and virtue generally?

By no means. But is there between pleasure and insolence and licence? Most assuredly. Do you know of greater or keener pleasure than that associated with Aphrodite? I don't, he said, nor yet of any more insane. But is not the right love a sober and harmonious love of the orderly and the beautiful? It is indeed, said he. Then nothing of madness, nothing akin to licence, must be allowed to come nigh the right love? No. Then this kind of pleasure

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may not come nigh, nor may lover and beloved who rightly love and are loved have anything to do with it? No, by heaven, Socrates, he said, it must not come nigh them. Thus, then, as it seems, you will lay down the law in the city that we are founding, that the lover may kiss[*] and pass the time with and touch the beloved as a father would a son, for honorable ends, if he persuade him. But otherwise he must so associate with the objects of his care that there should never be any suspicion of anything further,

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on penalty of being stigmatized for want of taste and true musical culture. Even so, he said. Do you not agree, then, that our discourse on music has come to an end? It has certainly made a fitting end, for surely the end and consummation of culture be love of the beautiful. I concur, he said.

After music our youth are to be educated by gymnastics? Certainly. In this too they must be carefully trained

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from boyhood through life, and the way of it is this, I believe; but consider it yourself too. For I, for my part, do not believe that a sound body by its excellence makes the soul good, but on the contrary that a good soul by its virtue renders the body the best that is possible.[*] What is your opinion? I think so too. Then if we should sufficiently train the mind and turn over to it the minutiae of the care of the body,

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and content ourselves with merely indicating the norms or patterns, not to make a long story of it, we should acting rightly? By all means. From intoxication[*] we said that they must abstain. For a guardian is surely the last person in the world to whom it is allowable to get drunk and not know where on earth he is. Yes, he said, it would absurd that a guardian[*] should need a guard. What next about their food? These men are athletes in the greatest of contests,[*] are they not? Yes.

Is, then, the bodily habit of the athletes we see about us suitable for such?

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Perhaps. Nay, said I, that is a drowsy habit and precarious for health. Don't you observe that they sleep away their lives,[*] and that if they depart ever so little from their prescribed regimen these athletes are liable to great and violent diseases? I do. Then, said I, we need some more ingenious form of training for our athletes of war, since these must be as it were sleepless hounds, and have the keenest possible perceptions of sight and hearing, and in their campaigns undergo many changes[*]

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in their drinking water, their food, and in exposure to the heat of the sun and to storms,[*] without disturbance of their health. I think so. Would not, then, the best gymnastics be akin to the music that we were just now describing? What do you mean? It would be a simple and flexible[*] gymnastic, and especially so in the training for war. In what way? One could learn that, said I, even from Homer.[*] For you are aware that in the banqueting of the heroes on campaign he does not

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feast them on fish,[*] nor on boiled meat, but only on roast, which is what soldiers could most easily procure. For everywhere, one may say, it is of easier provision to use the bare fire than to convey pots and pans[*] along. Indeed it is. Neither, as I believe, does Homer ever make mention of sweet meats. Is not that something which all men in training understand—that if one is to keep his body in good condition he must abstain from such things altogether? They are right,

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he said, in that they know it and do abstain. Then, my friend, if you think this is the right way, you apparently do not approve of a Syracusan table[*] and

Sicilian variety of made dishes. I think not. You would frown, then, on a little Corinthian maid as the *chère amie* of men who were to keep themselves fit? Most certainly. And also on the seeming delights of Attic pastry? Inevitably. In general, I take it, if we likened that kind of food and regimen to music and song expressed in the pan-harmonic mode and

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in every variety of rhythm it would be a fair comparison. Quite so. And here variety engendered licentiousness, did it not, but here disease? While simplicity in music begets sobriety in the souls, and in gymnastic training it begets health in bodies. Most true, he said.

And when licentiousness

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and disease multiply in a city, are not many courts of law and dispensaries opened, and the arts of chicane[*] and medicine give themselves airs when even free men in great numbers take them very seriously? How can they help it? he said.

Will you be able to find a surer proof of an evil and shameful state of education in a city than the necessity of first-rate physicians and judges, not only for the base and mechanical, but for those who claim to have been bred in the fashion of free men? Do you not think

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it disgraceful and a notable mark of bad breeding to have to make use of a justice imported from others, who thus become your masters and judges, from lack of such qualities in yourself[*]? The most shameful thing in the world. Is it? said I, or is this still more shameful[*]—when a man only wears out the better part of his days in the courts of law as defendant or accuser, but from the lack of all true sense of values[*] is led to plume himself on this very thing, as being a smart fellow to put over an unjust act

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and cunningly to try every dodge and practice,[*] every evasion, and wriggle[*] out of every hold in defeating justice, and that too for trifles and worthless things, because he does not know how much nobler and better it is to arrange his life so as to have no need[*] of a nodding juryman? That is, said he, still more shameful than the other. And to require medicine, said I, not merely for wounds or the incidence of some seasonal maladies,

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but, because of sloth and such a regimen as we described, to fill one's body up with winds and humors like a marsh and compel the ingenious sons of Aesculapius to invent for diseases such names as fluxes and flatulences—don't you think that disgraceful?[*] Those surely are, he said, new-fangled and monstrous strange names of diseases. There was nothing of the kind, I fancy, said I, in the days of Aesculapius. I infer this from the fact that at Troy his sons

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did not find fault with the damsel who gave to the wounded Eurypylus[*] to drink a posset of Pramnian wine plentifully sprinkled with barley and gratings of cheese,

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inflammatory ingredients of a surety, nor did they censure Patroclus, who was in charge of the case.

It was indeed, said he, a strange potion for a man in that condition. Not strange, said I, if you reflect that the former Asclepiads made no use of our modern coddling[*] medication of diseases before the time of Herodicus. But Herodicus[*] was a trainer and became a valetudinarian, and blended

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gymnastics and medicine, for the torment first and chiefly of himself and then of many successors. How so? he said. By lingering out his death, said I; for living in perpetual observance of his malady, which was incurable, he was not able to effect a cure, but lived through his days unfit for the business of life, suffering the tortures of the damned if he departed a whit from his fixed regimen, and struggling against death by reason of his science he won the prize of a doting old age.[*] A noble prize[*] indeed for his science, he said.

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The appropriate one, said I, for a man who did not know that it was not from ignorance or inacquaintance with this type of medicine that Aesculapius did not discover it to his descendants, but because he knew that for all well-governed peoples there is a work assigned to each man in the city which he must perform, and no one has leisure to be sick[*] and doctor himself all his days. And this we absurdly enough perceive in the case of a craftsman, but don't see in the case of the rich and so-called fortunate. How so? he said.

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A carpenter, said I, when he is sick expects his physician to give him a drug which will operate as an emetic on the disease, or to get rid of it by purging[*] or the use of cautery or the knife. But if anyone prescribes for him a long course of treatment with swathings[*] about the head and their accompaniments, he hastily says that he has no leisure to be sick and that such a life of preoccupation with his illness and neglect of the work that lies before him isn't worth living. And thereupon he bids farewell to that kind of physician,

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enters upon his customary way of life, regains his health, and lives attending to his affairs—or, if his body is not equal to strain, he dies and is freed from all his troubles.[*] For such a man, he said, that appears to be the right use of medicine.

And is not the reason, I said,

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that he had a task and that life wasn't worth acceptance on condition of not doing his work? Obviously, he said. But the rich man, we say, has no such appointed task, the necessity of abstaining from which renders life intolerable. I haven't heard of any. Why, haven't you heard that saying of Phocylides,[*] that after a man has made his pile he ought to practice virtue? Before, too, I fancy, he said. Let us not quarrel with him on that point, I said, but inform ourselves whether this virtue is something for the rich man to practise,

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and life is intolerable if he does not, or whether we are to suppose that while valetudinarianism is a hindrance to single-minded attention to carpentry and the other arts, it is no obstacle to the fulfilment of Phocylides' exhortation. Yes, indeed, he said, this excessive care for the body that goes beyond simple gymnastics[*] is the greatest of all obstacles. For it is troublesome in household affairs and military service and sedentary offices in the city. And, chief of all, it puts difficulties in the way of any kind of instruction, thinking, or private meditation,

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forever imagining headaches[*] and dizziness and attributing their origin to philosophy. So that wherever this kind of virtue is practiced[*] and tested it is in every way a hindrance.[*] For it makes the man always fancy himself sick and never cease from anguishing about his body. Naturally, he said. Then, shall we not say that it was because Asclepius knew this—that for those who were by nature and course of life sound of body

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but had some localized disease, that for such, I say, and for this habit he revealed the art of medicine, and, driving out their disease by drugs and surgery, prescribed for them their customary regimen in order not to interfere with their civic duties, but that, when bodies were diseased inwardly and throughout, he did not attempt by diet and by gradual evacuations and infusions to prolong a wretched existence for the man and have him beget in all likelihood similar wretched offspring?

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But if a man was incapable of living in the established round[*] and order of life, he did not think it worth while to treat him, since such a fellow is of no use either to himself or to the state. A most politic Asclepius you're telling us of,[*] he said.

Obviously, said I, that was his character. And his sons too, don't you in see that at Troy they approved

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themselves good fighting-men and practised medicine as I described it? Don't you remember[*] that in the case of Menelaus too from the wound that Pandarus inflicted

They sucked the blood, and soothing simples sprinkled?

Hom. Il. 4.218 [*] But what he was to eat or drink thereafter they no more prescribed than for Eurypylos, taking it for granted that the remedies sufficed to heal men who before their wounds were healthy and temperate in diet
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even if they did happen for the nonce to drink a posset; but they thought that the life of a man constitutionally sickly and intemperate was of no use to himself or others, and that the art of medicine should not be for such nor should they be given treatment even if they were richer than Midas.[*] Very ingenious fellows, he said, you make out these sons of Asclepius to be.

'Tis fitting, said I; and yet in disregard of our principles the tragedians and Pindar[*] affirm that Asclepius, though he was the son of Apollo, was bribed by gold

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to heal a man already at the point of death, and that for this cause he was struck by the lightning. But we in accordance with the aforesaid principles[*] refuse to believe both statements, but if he was the son of a god he was not avaricious, we will insist, and if he was greedy of gain he was not the son of a god. That much, said he, is most certainly true. But what have you to say to this, Socrates, must we not have good physicians in our city? And they would be the most likely to be good who had treated the greatest number of healthy and diseased men,

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and so good judges would be those who had associated with all sorts and conditions of men. Most assuredly I want them good, I said; but do you know whom I regard as such? I'll know if you tell,[*] he said. Well, I will try, said I. You, however, have put unlike cases in one question. How so? said he.

Physicians, it is true, I said, would prove most skilled if, from childhood up, in addition to learning the principles of the art they had familiarized themselves with the greatest possible number of the most sickly bodies,

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and if they themselves had suffered all diseases and were not of very healthy constitution. For you see they do not treat the body by the body.[*] If they did, it would not be allowable for their bodies to be or to have been in evil condition. But they treat the body with the mind—and it is not competent for a mind that is or has been evil to treat anything well. Right, he said.

But a judge, mark you, my friend,

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rules soul with soul and it is not allowable for a soul to have been bred from youth up among evil souls and to have grown familiar with them, and itself to have run the gauntlet of every kind of wrong-doing and injustice so as quickly to infer from itself the misdeeds of others as it might diseases in the body, but it must have been inexperienced in evil natures and uncontaminated by them

while young, if it is to be truly fair and good and judge soundly of justice. For which cause the better sort seem to be simple-minded in youth and are easily deceived by the wicked,

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since they do not have within themselves patterns answering to the affections of the bad. That is indeed their experience, he said. Therefore it is, said I, that the good judge must not be a youth but an old man, a late learner[*] of the nature of injustice, one who has not become aware of it as a property in his own soul, but one who has through the long years trained himself to understand it as an alien thing in alien souls, and to discern how great an evil it is

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by the instrument of mere knowledge and not by experience of his own. That at any rate, he said, appears to be the noblest kind of judge. And what is more, a good one, I said, which was the gist of your question. For he who has a good soul is good. But that cunning fellow quick to suspect evil,[*] and who has himself done many unjust acts and who thinks himself a smart trickster, when he associates with his like does appear to be clever, being on his guard and fixing his eyes on the patterns within himself. But when the time comes for him to mingle with the good and his elders,

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then on the contrary he appears stupid. He is unseasonably distrustful and he cannot recognize a sound character because he has no such pattern in himself. But since he more often meets with the bad than the good, he seems to himself and to others to be rather wise than foolish. That is quite true, he said.

Well then, said I, such a one must not be our ideal of the good and wise judge but the former. For while badness could never come to know both virtue and itself, native virtue through education

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will at last acquire the science both of itself and badness.[*] This one, then, as I think, is the man who proves to be wise and not the bad man.[*] And I concur, he said.

Then will you not establish by law in your city such an art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with this kind of justice? And these arts will care for the bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly well born,

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but of those who are not, such as are defective in body they will suffer to die and those who are evil-natured and incurable[*] in soul they will themselves[*] put to death. This certainly, he said, has been shown to be the best thing for the sufferers themselves and for the state. And so your youths, said I, employing that simple music which we said engendered sobriety will, it is clear, guard themselves against falling into the need of the justice of the court-room. Yes, he said. And will not our musician, pursuing the same trail

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in his use of gymnastics, if he please, get to have no need of medicine save when indispensable[*]? I think so. And even the exercises and toils of gymnastics he will undertake with a view to the spirited part of his nature[*] to arouse that rather than for mere strength, unlike ordinary athletes, who treat[*] diet and exercise only as a means to muscle. Nothing could be truer, he said. Then may we not say, Glaucon, said I, that those who established[*] an education in music and gymnastics

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had not the purpose in view that some attribute to them in so instituting, namely to treat the body by one and the soul by the other? But what? he said. It seems likely, I said, that they ordained both chiefly for the soul's sake. How so? Have you not observed, said I, the effect on the disposition of the mind itself[*] of lifelong devotion to gymnastics with total neglect of music? Or the disposition of those of the opposite habit? In what respect do you mean? he said.

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In respect of savagery and hardness or, on the other hand, of softness and gentleness? I have observed, he said, that the devotees of unmitigated gymnastics turn out more brutal than they should be and those of music softer than is good for them. And surely, said I, this savagery is a quality derived from the high-spirited element in our nature, which, if rightly trained, becomes brave, but if overstrained, would naturally become hard and harsh. I think so, he said. And again, is not the gentleness

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a quality which the philosophic nature would yield? This if relaxed too far would be softer than is desirable but if rightly trained gentle and orderly? That is so. But our requirement, we say,[*] is that the guardians should possess both natures. It is. And must they not be harmoniously adjusted to one another? Of course.

And the soul of the man thus attuned is sober and brave?

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Certainly. And that of the ill adjusted is cowardly and rude? It surely is. Now when a man abandons himself to music to play[*] upon him and pour[*] into his soul as it were through the funnel of his ears those sweet, soft, and dirge-like airs of which we were just now[*] speaking, and gives his entire time to the warblings and blandishments of song, the first result is that the principle of high spirit, if he had it,

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is softened like iron[*] and is made useful instead of useless and brittle. But when he continues[*] the practice without remission and is spellbound, the effect begins to be that he melts and liquefies[*] till he completely dissolves away his spirit, cuts out as it were the very sinews of his soul and makes of

himself a feeble warrior.[*]Assuredly, he said. And if, said I, he has to begin with a spiritless[*] nature he reaches this result quickly, but if high-spirited, by weakening the spirit he makes it unstable,

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quickly irritated by slight stimuli, and as quickly quelled. The outcome is that such men are choleric and irascible instead of high-spirited, and are peevish and discontented. Precisely so. On the other hand, if a man toils hard at gymnastics and eats right lustily and holds no truck with music and philosophy, does he not at first get very fit and full of pride and high spirit and become more brave and bold than he was? He does indeed. But what if he does nothing but this and has no contact with the Muse in any way,

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is not the result that even if there was some principle of the love of knowledge in his soul, since it tastes of no instruction nor of any inquiry and does not participate in any discussion or any other form of culture, it becomes feeble, deaf, and blind, because it is not aroused or fed nor are its perceptions purified and quickened? That is so, he said. And so such a man, I take it, becomes a misologist[*] and stranger to the Muses. He no longer makes any use of persuasion by speech but achieves all his ends

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like a beast by violence and savagery, and in his brute ignorance and ineptitude lives a life of disharmony and gracelessness. That is entirely true, he said.

For these two, then, it seems there are two arts which I would say some god gave to mankind, music and gymnastics for the service of the high-spirited principle and the love of knowledge in them—not for the soul and the body except incidentally, but for the harmonious adjustment of these two principles

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by the proper degree of tension and relaxation of each. Yes, so it appears, he said. Then he who best blends gymnastics with music and applies them most suitably to the soul is the man whom we should most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and harmonious musician, far rather than the one who brings the strings into unison with one another.[*] That seems likely, Socrates, he said. And shall we not also need in our city, Glaucon, a permanent overseer[*] of this kind if its constitution is to be preserved?

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We most certainly shall.

Such would be the outlines of their education and breeding. For why[*] should one recite the list of the dances of such citizens, their hunts and chases with hounds, their athletic contests and races? It is pretty plain that they must conform to these principles and there is no longer any difficulty in discovering them. There is, it may be, no difficulty, he said. Very well, said I; what, then, have we next to determine? Is it not which ones among them[*] shall be

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the rulers and the ruled? Certainly. That the rulers must be the elder and the ruled the younger is obvious. It is. And that the rulers must be their best? This too. And do not the best of the farmers prove the best farmers? Yes. And in this case, since we want them to be the best of the guardians, must they not be the best guardians, the most regardful of the state? Yes. They must then to begin with be intelligent in such matters and capable,

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and furthermore careful[*] of the interests of the state? That is so. But one would be most likely to be careful of that which he loved. Necessarily. And again, one would be most likely to love that whose interests he supposed to coincide with his own, and thought that when it prospered, he too would prosper and if not, the contrary. So it is, he said. Then we must pick out from the other guardians such men as to our observation appear most inclined through the entire course of their lives to be zealous to do what they think

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for the interest of the state, and who would be least likely to consent to do the opposite. That would be a suitable choice, he said. I think, then, we shall have to observe them at every period of life, to see if they are conservators and guardians of this conviction in their minds and never by sorcery nor by force can be brought to expel[*] from their souls unawares this conviction that they must do what is best for the state. What do you mean by the expelling? he said.

I will tell you, said I; it seems to me that the exit of a belief from the mind is either voluntary or involuntary.

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Voluntary is the departure of the false belief from one who learns better, involuntary that of every true belief. The voluntary, he said, I understand, but I need instruction about the involuntary. How now, said I, don't you agree with me in thinking that men are unwillingly deprived of good things but willingly of evil? Or is it not an evil to be deceived in respect of the truth and a good to possess truth? And don't you think that to opine the things that are is to possess the truth? Why, yes, said he, you are right, and I agree that men are unwillingly deprived of true opinions.[*] And doesn't this happen to them by theft, by the spells of sorcery or by force? I don't understand now either, he said. I must be talking in high tragic style,[*] I said;

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by those who have their opinions stolen from them I mean those who are over-persuaded and those who forget, because in the one case time, in the other argument strips them unawares of their beliefs. Now I presume you understand, do you not? Yes. Well, then, by those who are constrained or forced I mean those whom some pain or suffering compels[*] to change their minds. That too I understand and you are right. And the victims of sorcery[*]

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I am sure you too would say are they who alter their opinions under the spell of pleasure or terrified by some fear. Yes, he said: everything that deceives appears to cast a spell upon the mind.

Well then, as I was just saying, we must look for those who are the best guardians of the indwelling conviction that what they have to do is what they at any time believe to be best for the state. Then we must observe them from childhood up and propose them tasks in which one would be most likely to forget this principle or be deceived, and he whose memory is sure

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and who cannot be beguiled we must accept and the other kind we must cross off from our list. Is not that so? Yes. And again we must subject them to toils and pains and competitions in which we have to watch for the same traits. Right, he said. Then, said I, must we not institute a third kind of competitive test with regard to sorcery and observe them in that? Just as men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if they are liable to take fright, so we must bring these lads while young into fears

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and again pass them into pleasures, testing them much more carefully than men do gold in the fire, to see if the man remains immune to such witchcraft and preserves his composure throughout, a good guardian of himself and the culture which he has received, maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all those conditions, and the character that would make him most useful to himself and to the state.

And he who as boy, lad, and man endures the test

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and issues from it unspoiled we must establish as ruler over our city and its guardian, and bestow rewards upon him in life, and in death the allotment of the supreme honors of burial-rites and other memorials. But the man of the other type we must reject. Such, said I, appears to me, Glaucon, the general notion of our selection and appointment of rulers and guardians as sketched in outline, but not drawn out in detail. I too, he said, think much the same. Then would it not truly

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be most proper to designate these as guardians in the full sense of the word, watchers against foemen without and friends within, so that the latter shall not wish and the former shall not be able to work harm, but to name those youths whom we were calling guardians just now, helpers and aids for the decrees of the rulers? I think so, he replied.

How, then, said I, might we contrive[*] one of those opportune falsehoods[*] of which we were just now[*] speaking,

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so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible the rulers themselves, but failing

that the rest of the city? What kind of a fiction do you mean? said he. Nothing unprecedented, said I, but a sort of Phoenician tale,[*] something that has happened ere now in many parts of the world, as the poets aver and have induced men to believe, but that has not happened and perhaps would not be likely to happen in our day[*] and demanding no little persuasion to make it believable. You act like one who shrinks from telling his thought, he said. You will think that I have right good reason[*] for shrinking when I have told, I said.

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Say on, said he, and don't be afraid. Very well, I will. And yet I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the city, that in good sooth[*] all our training and educating of them were things that they imagined and that happened to them as it were in a dream; but that in reality at that time they were down within the earth being molded and fostered themselves while

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their weapons and the rest of their equipment were being fashioned. And when they were quite finished the earth as being their mother[*] delivered them, and now as if their land were their mother and their nurse they ought to take thought for her and defend her against any attack and regard the other citizens as their brothers and children of the self-same earth. It is not for nothing,[*] he said, that you were so bashful about coming out with your lie. It was quite natural that I should be,

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I said; but all the same hear the rest of the story. While all of you in the city are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet God in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold in their generation,[*] for which reason they are the most precious—but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen. And as you are all akin, though for the most part you will breed after your kinds,[*]

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it may sometimes happen that a golden father would beget a silver son and that a golden offspring would come from a silver sire and that the rest would in like manner be born of one another. So that the first and chief injunction that the god lays upon the rulers is that of nothing else[*] are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of these metals in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron

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they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out[*] among the artisans or the farmers. And again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his composition they shall honor such and bid

them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to the assistanceship, alleging that there is an oracle[*] that the state shall then be overthrown when the man of iron or brass is its guardian. Do you see any way of getting them to believe this tale?

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No, not these themselves, he said, but I do, their sons and successors and the rest of mankind who come after.[*] Well, said I, even that would have a good effect making them more inclined to care for the state and one another. For I think I apprehend your meaning. XXII. And this shall fall out as tradition[*] guides.

But let us arm these sons of earth and conduct them under the leadership of their rulers. And when they have arrived they must look out for the fairest site in the city for their encampment,[*]

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a position from which they could best hold down rebellion against the laws from within and repel aggression from without as of a wolf against the fold. And after they have encamped and sacrificed to the proper gods[*] they must make their lairs, must they not? Yes, he said. And these must be of a character keep out the cold in winter and be sufficient in summer? Of course. For I presume you are speaking of their houses. Yes, said I, the houses of soldiers[*] not of money-makers.

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What distinction do you intend by that? he said. I will try to tell you, I said. It is surely the most monstrous and shameful thing in the world for shepherds to breed the dogs who are to help them with their flocks in such wise and of such a nature that from indiscipline or hunger or some other evil condition the dogs themselves shall attack the sheep and injure them and be likened to wolves[*] instead of dogs. A terrible thing, indeed, he said.

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Must we not then guard by every means in our power against our helpers treating the citizens in any such way and, because they are the stronger, converting themselves from benign assistants into savage masters? We must, he said. And would they not have been provided with the chief safeguard if their education has really been a good one? But it surely has, he said. That, said I, dear Glaucon, we may not properly affirm,[*] but what we were just now saying we may,

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that they must have the right education, whatever it is, if they are to have what will do most to make them gentle to one another and to their charges. That is right, he said. In addition, moreover, to such an education a thoughtful man would affirm that their houses and the possessions provided for them ought to be such as not to interfere with the best performance of their own work as guardians and not to incite them to wrong the other citizens.

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He will rightly affirm that. Consider then, said I, whether, if that is to be their character, their habitations and ways of life must not be something after this fashion. In the first place, none must possess any private property[*] save the indispensable. Secondly, none must have any habitation or treasure-house which is not open for all to enter at will. Their food, in such quantities as are needful for athletes of war[*] sober and brave,

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they must receive as an agreed[*] stipend[*] from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship, so measured that there shall be neither superfluity at the end of the year nor any lack.[*] And resorting to a common mess[*] like soldiers on campaign they will live together.

Gold and silver, we will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold, since many impious deeds have been done about

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the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied. But for these only of all the dwellers in the city it is not lawful to handle gold and silver and to touch them nor yet to come under the same roof[*] with them, nor to hang them as ornaments on their limbs nor to drink from silver and gold. So living they would save themselves and save their city.[*] But whenever they shall acquire for themselves land of their own and houses and coin, they will be house-holders and farmers instead of guardians, and will be transformed

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from the helpers of their fellow citizens to their enemies and masters,[*] and so in hating and being hated,[*] plotting and being plotted against they will pass their days fearing far more and rather[*] the townsmen within than the foemen without—and then even then laying the course[*] of near shipwreck for themselves and the state. For all these reasons, said I, let us declare that such must be the provision for our guardians in lodging and other respects and so legislate. Shall we not? By all means, said Glaucon.

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καὶ ὁ Ἀδεϊμαντος ὑπολαβὼν, τί οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπολογήσῃ, ἐάν τις σε φῇ μὴ πᾶν τι εὐδαιμόνας ποιεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑαυτοὺς, ὧν ἔστι μὲν ἡ πόλις τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οἱ δὲ μηδὲν ἀπολαύουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῆς πόλεως, οἷον ἄλλοι ἀγροὺς τε κεκτημένοι καὶ οἰκίας οἰκοδομοῦμενοι καλὰς καὶ μεγάλας, καὶ ταύταις πρέπουσιν κατασκευὴν κτῶμενοι, καὶ θυσίας θεοῖς ἰδίας θύοντες, καὶ ξενοδοκοῦντες, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, χρυσὸν τε καὶ ἄργυρον κεκτημένοι καὶ πάντα ὅσα νομίζεται τοῖς μέλλουσιν μακαρίοις εἶναι;

ἀλλ' ἄτεχνῶς, φαίη ἄν, ὥσπερ ἐπικούροι μισθωτοὶ ἐν

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τῇ πόλει φαίνονται καθῆσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φρουροῦντες. ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτα γε ἐπισίτιοι καὶ οὐδὲ μισθὸν πρὸς τοῖς σιτίοις λαμβάνοντες ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν ἀποδημῆσαι βούλονται ἰδίᾳ, ἐξέσται αὐτοῖς, οὐδ' ἑταίραις διδόναι, οὐδ' ἀναλίσκειν ἂν ποι βούλονται ἄλλοσε, οἷα δὴ οἱ εὐδαιμόνες δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἀναλίσκουσι. ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ τῆς κατηγορίας ἀπολείπεις.

ἀλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔστω καὶ ταῦτα κατηγορημένα.

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τί οὖν δὴ ἀπολογησόμεθα, φήεις;

ναί.

τὸν αὐτὸν οἶμον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πορευόμενοι εὐρήσομεν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἃ λεκτέα. ἐροῦμεν γὰρ ὅτι θαυμαστὸν μὲν ἂν οὐδὲν εἴη εἰ καὶ οὔτοι οὕτως εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἔν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὐδαιμον, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις. ὥηθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἂν εὐρεῖν δικαιοσύνην καὶ αὖ ἐν τῇ κάκιστα οἰκουμένῃ

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ἀδικίαν, κατιδόντες δὲ κρῖναι ἂν ὁ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν. νῦν μὲν οὖν, ὡς οἴομεθα, τὴν εὐδαιμόνα πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες ὀλίγους ἐν αὐτῇ τοιοῦτους πινὰς τιθέντες, ἀλλ' ὅλην· αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεψόμεθα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντα γράφοντας προσελθὼν τις ἔψεγε λέγων ὅτι οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις τοῦ ζώου τὰ κάλλιστα φάρμακα προστίθεμεν—οἱ γὰρ ὀφθαλμοὶ κάλλιστον ὄν οὐκ ὁστρεῖω ἐναληθιμμένοι εἶεν ἀλλὰ μέλανι—μετρίως ἂν ἐδοκοῦμεν

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πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπολογεῖσθαι λέγοντες· ὦ θαυμάσιε, μὴ οἶου δεῖν ἡμᾶς οὔτω καλοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς γράφειν, ὥστε μηδὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς φαίνεσθαι, μηδ' αὖ τᾶλλα μέρη, ἀλλ' ἄθρει εἰ τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις ἀποδιδόντες τὸ ὅλον καλὸν ποιοῦμεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν μὴ ἀνάγκαζε ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν

τοῖς φύλαξι προσάπτειν, ἢ ἐκείνους πᾶν μᾶλλον

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ἀπεργάσεται ἢ φύλακας. ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ καὶ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ξυστίδας ἀμφιέσαντες καὶ χρυσὸν περιθέντες πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐργάζεσθαι κελεύειν τὴν γῆν, καὶ τοὺς κεραμέας κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐώχουμένους, τὸν τροχὸν παραθεμένους, ὅσον ἂν ἐπιθυμῶσι κεραμεύειν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας τοιοῦτῳ τρόπῳ μακαρίους ποιεῖν, ἵνα δὴ ὅλη ἡ πόλις εὐδαιμονῇ.

ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς μὴ οὕτω νουθέτει· ὥς, ἂν σοι πειθώμεθα, οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς

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ἔσται οὔτε ὁ κεραμεὺς κεραμεὺς οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἔχων σχῆμα ἐξ ὧν πόλις γίγνεται. ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐλάττων λόγος· νευρορράφοι γὰρ φαῦλοι γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες καὶ προσποιησάμενοι εἶναι μὴ ὄντες πόλει οὐδὲν δεινόν, φύλακες δὲ νόμων τε καὶ πόλεως μὴ ὄντες ἀλλὰ δοκοῦντες ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι πᾶσαν ἄρδην πόλιν ἀπολλύουσιν, καὶ αὖ τοῦ εὖ οἰκεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μόνοι τὸν καιρὸν ἔχουσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν φύλακας ὥς ἀληθῶς

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ποιοῦμεν ἥκιστα κακούργους τῆς πόλεως, ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο λέγων γεωργοὺς τινὰς καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πανηγύρει ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν πόλει ἐστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας, ἄλλο ἂν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι. σκεπτέον οὖν πότερον πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τοὺς φύλακας καθιστῶμεν, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστη αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονία ἐγγενήσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὅλην βλέποντας θεατέον εἰ ἐκείνη ἐγγίγνεται, τοὺς δ' ἐπικούρους τούτους καὶ τοὺς

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φύλακας ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκαστέον ποιεῖν καὶ πειστέον, ὅπως ὅτι ἄριστοι δημιουργοὶ τοῦ ἐαυτῶν ἔργου ἔσονται, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας ὡσαύτως, καὶ οὕτω συμπάσης τῆς πόλεως αὐξανομένης καὶ καλῶς οἰκίζομένης ἐατέον ὅπως ἐκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἢ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.

ἀλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, καλῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ τούτου ἀδελφὸν δόξω σοι μετρίως λέγειν;

τί μάλιστα;

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τοὺς ἄλλους αὖ δημιουργοὺς σκόπει εἰ τάδε διαφθείρει, ὥστε καὶ κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι.

τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα;

πλοῦτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πενία.

πῶς δὴ;

ᾧδε. πλουτήσας χυτρεὺς δοκεῖ σοι ἔτ' ἐθελήσειν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς τέχνης; οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.

Ἀργὸς δὲ καὶ ἀμελὴς γενήσεται μᾶλλον αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ;

πολύ γε.

οὐκοῦν κακίων χυτρεὺς γίγνεται;

καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, πολὺ.

καὶ μὴν καὶ ὄργανά γε μὴ ἔχων παρέχεσθαι ὑπὸ πενίας ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν εἰς τὴν τέχνην τὰ τε ἔργα πονηρότερα

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ἐργάσεται καὶ τοὺς ὑεῖς ἢ ἄλλους οὓς ἂν διδάσκη χεῖρους δημιουργοὺς διδάξεται.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ὕπ' ἀμφοτέρων δὴ, πενίας τε καὶ πλούτου, χεῖρω μὲν τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔργα, χεῖρους δὲ αὐτοί.

φαίνεται.

ἔτερα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῖς φύλαξιν ηὔρηκαμεν, ἃ παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλακτέον ὅπως μήποτε αὐτοὺς λήσει εἰς τὴν πόλιν παραδύνατα.

τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

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πλοῦτός τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πενία· ὡς τοῦ μὲν τρυφήν καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν ἐμποιοῦντος, τῆς δὲ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ κακοεργίαν πρὸς τῷ νεωτερισμῷ.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τόδε μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκόπει, πῶς ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις οἷα τ' ἔσται πολεμεῖν, ἐπειδὰν χρήματα μὴ κεκτημένη ᾖ, ἄλλως τε κἂν πρὸς μεγάλην τε καὶ πλουσίαν ἀναγκασθῇ πολεμεῖν.

δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρὸς μὲν μίαν χαλεπώτερον,

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πρὸς δὲ δύο τοιαύτας ῥᾶον.

πῶς εἴπεις; ἦ δ' ὅς.

πρῶτον μὲν πού, εἴπον, ἐὰν δέῃ μάχεσθαι, ἄρα οὐ πλουσίοις ἀνδράσι μαχοῦνται αὐτοὶ ὄντες πολέμου ἀθληταί;

ναὶ τοῦτό γε, ἔφη.

τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδεΐμαντε; εἷς πύκτης ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἐπὶ τοῦτο παρεσκευασμένος δυοῖν μὴ πύκταιν, πλουσίοις δὲ καὶ πίονοις, οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι ῥαδίως μάχεσθαι;

οὐκ ἂν ἴσως, ἔφη, ἅμα γε.

οὐδ' εἰ ἐξείη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑποφeyγοντι τὸν πρότερον αἰεῖ

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προσφερόμενον ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῖ πολλάκις ἐν ἡλίῳ τε καὶ πνίγει; ἄρα γε οὐ καὶ πλείους χειρώσαιτ' ἂν τοιούτους ὁ τοιοῦτος;

ἀμέλει, ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστόν.

ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶει πυκτικῆς πλέον μετέχειν τοὺς πλουσίους ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἢ πολεμικῆς;

ἐγωγ', ἔφη.

ῥαδίως ἄρα ἡμῖν οἱ ἀθληταὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων διπλασίοις τε καὶ τριπλασίοις αὐτῶν μαχοῦνται.

συγχωρήσομαι σοι, ἔφη· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

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τί δ' ἂν πρεσβείαν πέμψαντες εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν πόλιν τάληθῇ εἴπωσιν, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν οὐδὲν χρυσίῳ οὐδ' ἄργυρίῳ χρῶμεθα, οὐδ' ἡμῖν θέμις, ὑμῖν δέ· συμπολεμήσαντες οὖν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἔχετε τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων; οἷε τινὰς ἀκούσαντας ταῦτα αἰρήσεσθαι κυσὶ πολεμῆιν στερεοῖς τε καὶ ἰσχυροῖς;

οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν εἰς μίαν, ἔφη, πόλιν συναθροισθῇ

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τὰ τῶν ἄλλων χρήματα, ὅρα μὴ κίνδυνον φέρῃ τῇ μὴ πλουτούσῃ.

εὐδαίμων εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἷε ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλην τινὰ προσειπεῖν πόλιν ἢ τὴν τοιαύτην οἷαν ἡμεῖς κατεσκευάζομεν.

ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη.

μειζόνως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρή προσαγορεύειν τὰς ἄλλας· ἐκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάμπολλαι ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων.

δύο μὲν, κἂν ὅτιοῦν ἦ, πολεμία ἀλλήλαις,

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ἢ μὲν πενήτων, ἢ δὲ πλουσίων· τοῦτων δ' ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ πάνυ πολλαί, αἷς ἐὰν μὲν ὡς μιᾷ προσφέρῃ, παντὸς ἂν ἀμάρτοις, ἐὰν δὲ ὡς πολλαῖς, διδοὺς τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις χρήματά τε καὶ δυνάμεις ἢ καὶ αὐτούς, συμμαχοῖς μὲν ἀεὶ πολλοῖς χρήσῃ, πολεμίῳις δ' ὀλίγοις. καὶ ἔως ἂν ἡ πόλις σοι οἰκῇ σωφρόνως ὡς ἄρτι ἐτάχθη, μεγίστη ἔσται, οὐ τῷ εὐδοκίμειν λέγω, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη, καὶ ἐὰν μόνον ἦ χιλίων τῶν προπολεμούντων· οὕτω γὰρ μεγάλην πόλιν μίαν οὐ ῥαδίως οὔτε ἐν Ἑλλήσιν οὔτε ἐν βαρβάροις

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εὐρήσεις, δοκούσας δὲ πολλὰς καὶ πολλαπλασίας τῆς τηλικαύτης. ἢ ἄλλως οἷε;

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλιστος ὅρος τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἄρχουσιν, ὅσῃν δεῖ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἡλικὴ οὔσῃ ὅσῃ χώραν ἀφορισαμένους τὴν ἄλλην χαίρειν ἐᾶν.

τις, ἔφη, ὅρος;

οἴμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐξομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὖξιν, πέρα δὲ μή.

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καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο αὖ ἄλλο πρόσταγμα τοῖς φύλαξι προστάξομεν, φυλάττειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ὅπως μήτε σμικρὰ ἢ πόλις ἔσται μήτε μεγάλη δοκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ τις ἱκανὴ καὶ μία.

καὶ φαῦλόν γ', ἔφη, ἴσως αὐτοῖς προστάξομεν.

καὶ τούτου γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι φαυλότερον τόδε, οὗ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπεμνήσθημεν λέγοντες ὡς δέοι, ἐάντε τῶν φυλάκων τις φαῦλος ἔκγονος γένηται, εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους

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αὐτὸν ἀποπέμπεσθαι, ἐάντ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων σπουδαῖος, εἰς τοὺς φύλακας.
τοῦτο δ' ἐβούλετο δηλοῦν ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, πρὸς ὃ τις πέφυκεν,
πρὸς τοῦτο ἓνα πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον ἔργον δεῖ κομίζειν, ὅπως ἂν ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ
ἐπιτηδεύων ἕκαστος μὴ πολλοὶ ἀλλ' εἷς γίγνηται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ σύμπασα ἡ
πόλις μία φύηται ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλαί.

ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐκείνου σμικρότερον.

οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἀγαθὲ Ἀδεΐμαντε, ὡς δόξειεν ἂν τις, ταῦτα πολλὰ καὶ
μεγάλα αὐτοῖς προστάττομεν ἀλλὰ

423e

πάντα φαῦλα, ἐὰν τὸ λεγόμενον ἓν μέγα φυλάττωσι, μᾶλλον δ' ἀντὶ μεγάλου
ἱκανόν.

τί τοῦτο; ἔφη.

τὴν παιδείαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τροφήν· ἐὰν γὰρ εὖ παιδευόμενοι μέτριοι
ἄνδρες γίγνωνται, πάντα ταῦτα ῥαδίως διόψονται, καὶ ἄλλα γε ὅσα νῦν
ἡμεῖς παραλείπομεν, τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτῆσιν καὶ γάμων καὶ
παιδοποιίας, ὅτι

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δεῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ποιεῖσθαι.
ὀρθότατα γάρ, ἔφη, γίγνεται ἂν.

καὶ μὴν, εἶπον, πολιτεία ἐάνπερ ἅπαξ ὁρμήσῃ εὖ, ἔρχεται ὥσπερ κύκλος
αὐξανομένη· τροφή γὰρ καὶ παιδευσις χρηστὴ σωζομένη φύσεις ἀγαθὰς
ἐμποιεῖ, καὶ αὖ φύσεις χρησταὶ τοιαύτης παιδείας ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι ἔτι
βελτίους τῶν προτέρων φύονται, εἷς τε τᾶλλα καὶ εἰς τὸ

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γεννᾶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις.

εἰκὸς γ', ἔφη.

ὥς τοίνυν διὰ βραχέων εἰπεῖν, τούτου ἀνθεκτέον τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς τῆς
πόλεως, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὺς μὴ λάθῃ διαφθαρέν ἀλλὰ παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ
φυλάττωσι, τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν περὶ γυμναστικὴν τε καὶ μουσικὴν παρὰ τὴν
τάξιν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα φυλάττειν, φοβουμένους ὅταν τις λέγῃ ὡς
τὴν

... ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπιφρονέουσ' ἄνθρωποι,

ἥτις ἀειδόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται,

Hom. Od. 1.351

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μὴ πολλάκις τὸν ποιητὴν τις οἶηται λέγειν οὐκ ἄσματα νέα ἀλλὰ τρόπον
ῥᾶδις νέον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπαινῇ. δεῖ δ' οὕτ' ἐπαινεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον οὔτε
ὑπολαμβάνειν. εἶδος γὰρ καινὸν μουσικῆς μεταβάλλειν εὐλαβητέον ὡς ἐν
ὄλῳ κινδυνεύοντα· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινεῦνται μουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν
νόμων τῶν μεγίστων, ὡς φησὶ τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι.

καὶ ἐμὲ τοίνυν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδεΐμαντος, θές τῶν πεπεισμένων.

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τὸ δὴ φυλακτήριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνταῦθα που οἰκοδομητέον τοῖς
φύλαξιν, ἐν μουσικῇ.

ἡ γοῦν παρανομία, ἔφη, ῥαδίως αὕτη λανθάνει παραδουμένη.

ναί, ἔφην, ὡς ἐν παιδιᾷ γε μέρει καὶ ὡς κακὸν οὐδὲν ἐργαζομένη.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, ἔφη, ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ σμικρὸν εἰσοικισαμένη ἡρέμα
ὑπορρεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἡθῆ τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς
ἀλλήλους συμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει, ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν συμβολαίων ἔρχεται ἐπὶ
424e

τοὺς νόμους καὶ πολιτείας σὺν πολλῇ, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀσελγεία, ἕως ἂν
τελευτῶσα πάντα ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἀνατρέψῃ.

εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει;

δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, τοῖς ἡμετέροις παισὶν ἐννομωτέρου εὐθὺς
παιδιᾷ μεθεκτέον, ὡς παρανόμου γιγνομένης αὐτῆς καὶ παιδῶν τοιούτων
ἐννόμους τε καὶ σπουδαίους

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ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας αὐξάνεσθαι ἀδύνατον ὄν;

πῶς δ' οὐχί; ἔφη.

ὅταν δὴ ἄρα καλῶς ἀρξάμενοι παῖδες παίζειιν εὐνομίαν διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς
εἰσδεξώνται, πάλιν τοῦναντίον ἢ 'κείνοις εἰς πάντα συνέπεται τε καὶ αὕξει,
ἐπανορθοῦσα εἴ τι καὶ πρότερον τῆς πόλεως ἔκειτο.

ἀληθῆ μέντοι, ἔφη.

καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ ἄρα, εἶπον, δοκοῦντα εἶναι νόμιμα ἐξευρίσκουσιν οὕτοι, ἃ οἱ
πρότερον ἀπώλλυσαν πάντα.

τὰ ποῖα;

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τὰ τοιάδε· σιγὰς τε τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις ἅς πρέπει, καὶ
κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις καὶ γονέων θεραπείας, καὶ κουράς γε καὶ
ἀμπεχόνας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ ὅλον τὸν τοῦ σώματος σχηματισμὸν καὶ τᾶλλα
ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

ἔγωγε.

νομοθετεῖν δ' αὐτὰ οἷμαι εὐήθες· οὔτε γάρ που γίγνεται οὔτ' ἂν μείνειεν
λόγῳ τε καὶ γράμμασιν νομοθετηθέντα.

πῶς γάρ;

κινδυνεύει γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐκ τῆς παιδείας

425c

ὅποι ἂν τις ὀρμήσῃ, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐπόμενα εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄν
ὅμοιον παρακαλεῖ;

τί μὴν;

καὶ τελευτῶν δὴ οἷμαι φαῖμεν ἂν εἰς ἓν τι τέλος καὶ νεανικὸν ἀποβαίνειν
αὐτὸ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ τοῦναντίον.

τί γὰρ οὐκ; ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, διὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρήσαιμι

νομοθετεῖν.

εἰκότως γ', ἔφη.

τί δέ, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην, τάδε τὰ ἀγοραῖα, συμβολαίων τε πέρι κατ' ἀγορὰν ἕκαστοι ἅ πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμβάλλουσιν,

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εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ χειροτεχνικῶν περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ λοιδοριῶν καὶ αἰκίας καὶ δικῶν λήξεως καὶ δικαστῶν καταστάσεως, καὶ εἴ που τελῶν τινες ἢ πράξεις ἢ θέσεις ἀναγκαῖοι εἰσιν ἢ κατ' ἀγορὰς ἢ λιμένας, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀγορανομικὰ ἅττα ἢ ἀστυνομικὰ ἢ ἐλλιμενικὰ ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τούτων τολμήσομέν τι νομοθετεῖν;

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄξιον, ἔφη, ἀνδράσι καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς ἐπιτάττειν·

425e

τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτῶν, ὅσα δεῖ νομοθετήσασθαι, ῥαδίως που εὐρήσουσιν. ναί, ὦ φίλε, εἶπον, ἐάν γε θεὸς αὐτοῖς διδῷ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων ὧν ἔμπροσθεν διήλθομεν.

εἰ δὲ μή γε, ἡ δ' ὅς, πολλὰ τοιαῦτα τιθέμενοι αἰεὶ καὶ ἐπανορθούμενοι τὸν βίον διατελοῦσιν, οἴομενοι ἐπιλήψεσθαι τοῦ βελτίστου.

λέγεις, ἔφην ἐγώ, βιώσεσθαι τοὺς τοιοῦτους ὥσπερ τοὺς κάμνοντάς τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἐκβῆναι πονηρᾶς διαίτης.

πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

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καὶ μὴν οὔτοι γε χαριέντως διατελοῦσιν· ἱατρευόμενοι γὰρ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν, πλὴν γε ποικιλώτερα καὶ μείζω ποιοῦσι τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐλπίζοντες, ἐάν τις φάρμακον συμβουλευέσῃ, ὑπὸ τούτου ἔσεσθαι ὑγιεῖς. πάνυ γάρ, ἔφη, τῶν οὕτω καμνόντων τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη.

τί δέ; ἡν δ' ἐγώ· τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίεν, τὸ πάντων ἔχθιστον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν τάληθ' ἔχοντα, ὅτι πρὶν ἂν μεθύων καὶ ἐμπιμπλάμενος καὶ ἀφροδισιάζων καὶ ἀργῶν παύσῃται,

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οὔτε φάρμακα οὔτε καύσεις οὔτε τομαὶ οὐδ' αὖ ἐπωδαὶ αὐτὸν οὐδὲ περιπάττα οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ὀνήσει;

οὐ πάνυ χαρίεν, ἔφη· τὸ γὰρ τῷ εὖ λέγοντι χαλεπαίνειν οὐκ ἔχει χάριν.

οὐκ ἐπαινέτης εἶ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικας, τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν.

οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.

οὐδ' ἂν ἡ πόλις ἄρα, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὅλη τοιοῦτον ποιῇ, οὐκ ἐπαινέσῃ. ἡ οὐ φαίνονται σοὶ ταῦτ' ἐργάζεσθαι τούτοις τῶν πόλεων ὅσαι κακῶς πολιτευόμεναι προαγορεύουσι

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τοῖς πολίταις τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως ὅλην μὴ κινεῖν, ὡς ἀποθανομένους, ὅς ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ· ὅς δ' ἂν σφᾶς οὕτω πολιτευομένους ἡδιστα θεραπεύῃ καὶ χαρίζηται ὑποτρέχων καὶ προγιγνώσκων τὰς σφετέρας βουλήσεις καὶ ταύτας δεινὸς ἢ ἀποπληροῦν, οὗτος ἄρα ἀγαθός τε ἔσται ἀνὴρ καὶ σοφός τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τιμήσεται ὑπὸ σφῶν;

ταύτὸν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι δρᾶν, καὶ οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν ἐπαινῶ.
426d

τί δ' αὖ τοὺς ἐθέλοντας θεραπεύειν τὰς τοιαύτας πόλεις καὶ
προθυμουμένους; οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς ἀνδρείας τε καὶ εὐχερείας;
ἐγὼ γ', ἔφη, πλὴν γ' ὅσοι ἐξηπάτηνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἴονται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
πολιτικοὶ εἶναι, ὅτι ἐπαινοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν.
πῶς λέγεις; οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς ἀνδράσιν; ἢ οἷοι οἷόν τ' εἶναι
ἀνδρὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ μετρεῖν, ἐτέρων
426e

τοιούτων πολλῶν λεγόντων ὅτι τετράπηχὺς ἐστίν, αὐτὸν ταῦτα μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι
περὶ αὐτοῦ;

οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

μὴ τοίνυν χαλέπαινε· καὶ γὰρ ποῦ εἰσι πάντων χαριέστατοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι,
νομοθετοῦντές τε οἷα ἄρτι διήλθομεν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦντες, αἰεὶ οἰόμενοι τι
πέρας εὐρήσειν περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις κακουργήματα καὶ περὶ ἃ νυνδὴ
ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ὥσπερ Ὑδραν τέμνουσιν.

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καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἄλλο γέ τι ποιοῦσιν.

ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας οὕτ'
ἐν κακῶς οὕτ' ἐν εὖ πολιτευομένῃ πόλει ὥμην ἂν δεῖν τὸν ἀληθινὸν
νομοθέτην πραγματεύεσθαι, ἐν τῇ μὲν ὅτι ἀνωφελῇ καὶ πλέον οὐδέν, ἐν δὲ
τῇ ὅτι τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κἂν ὀφισοῦν εὖροι, τὰ δὲ ὅτι αὐτόματα ἔπεισιν ἐκ
τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

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τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἔτι ἂν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῆς νομοθεσίας εἴη;

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν οὐδέν, τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς τὰ γε
μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ πρῶτα τῶν νομοθετημάτων.

τὰ ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἱερῶν τε ἰδρύσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλαι θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων
θεραπεῖαι· τελευτησάντων τε αὖ θῆκαι καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἐκεῖ δεῖ ὑπηρετοῦντας
ἵλεως αὐτοὺς ἔχειν. τὰ γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα οὕτ' ἐπιστάμεθα ἡμεῖς οἰκίζοντές τε
πόλιν

427c

οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεισόμεθα, ἐὰν νοῦν ἔχωμεν, οὐδὲ χρησόμεθα ἐξηγητῇ ἄλλ' ἢ
τῷ πατρίῳ· οὗτος γὰρ δήπου ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις
πάτριος ἐξηγητῆς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγεῖται.
καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ποιητέον οὕτω.

ὠκισμένη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη ἂν σοι εἴη, ὦ παῖ

427d

Ἀρίστωνος, ἡ πόλις· τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει ἐν αὐτῇ, φῶς ποθὲν
πορισάμενος ἱκανόν, αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει καὶ Πολέμαρχον
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐὰν πως ἴδωμεν ποῦ ποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ποῦ ἢ
ἀδικία, καὶ τί ἀλλήλοιν διαφέρετον, καὶ πότερον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα

εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἔαντε λανθάνῃ ἔαντε μὴ πάντας θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους.
οὐδὲν λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· σὺ γὰρ ὑπέσχου ζητήσιν,
427e

ὥς οὐχ ὅσιόν σοι ὄν μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνῃ εἰς δύναμιν παντὶ τρόπῳ.
ἀληθεῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὑπομιμνήσκεις, καὶ ποιητέον μέν γε οὕτως, χρὴ δὲ καὶ
ὑμᾶς συλλαμβάνειν.

ἀλλ', ἔφη, ποιήσομεν οὕτω.

ἐλπίζω τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐρήσιν αὐτὸ ὧδε. οἷμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ
ὀρθῶς γε ὥκισται, τελέως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι.

ἀνάγκη γ', ἔφη.

δῆλον δὴ ὅτι σοφὴ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαία.

δῆλον.

οὐκοῦν ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν εὖρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ
ἠύρημένον;

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τί μὴν;

ὥσπερ τοίνυν ἄλλων τινῶν τεττάρων, εἰ ἐν τι ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτῶν ἐν ὁτῶοῦν,
ὅποτε πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο ἔγνωμεν, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν ἡμῖν, εἰ δὲ τὰ τρία πρότερον
ἐγνωρίσαμεν, αὐτῷ ἂν τούτῳ ἐγνώριστο τὸ ζητούμενον· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ
ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν ἢ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἐπειδὴ τέτταρα ὄντα τυγχάνει, ὡσαύτως ζητητέον;

δῆλα δὴ.

καὶ μὲν δὴ πρῶτόν γε μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ κατάδηλον εἶναι

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ἡ σοφία· καὶ τι ἄτοπον περὶ αὐτὴν φαίνεται.

τί; ἦ δ' ὅς.

σοφὴ μὲν τῷ ὄντι δοκεῖ μοι ἡ πόλις εἶναι ἣν διήλθομεν· εὐβουλος γάρ, οὐχί;
ναί.

καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε αὐτό, ἡ εὐβουλία, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ
που ἀμαθία γε ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμη εὖ βουλευόνται.

δῆλον.

πολλὰ δέ γε καὶ παντοδαπαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσίν.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἄρ' οὐν διὰ τὴν τῶν τεκτόνων ἐπιστήμην σοφὴ καὶ εὐβουλος ἡ πόλις
προσρητέα;

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οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, διὰ γε ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική.

οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην, βουλευομένη ὥς ἂν
ἔχοι βέλτιστα, σοφὴ κλητέα πόλις.

οὐ μέντοι.

τί δέ; τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἢ τινα ἄλλην τῶν τοιούτων;

οὐδ' ἠντινοῦν, ἔφη.

οὐδὲ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καρποῦ τῆς γενέσεως ἐκ τῆς γῆς, ἀλλὰ γεωργική.
δοκεῖ μοι.

τί δ'; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῇ ἄρτι ὑφ' ἡμῶν οἰκισθείσῃ παρὰ τισι
τῶν πολιτῶν, ἣ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν

428d

ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλευέται, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ὅλης, ὄντινα τρόπον αὐτὴ τε
πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ;

ἔστι μέντοι.

τίς, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἐν τίσιν;

αὕτη, ἣ δ' ὅς, ἡ φυλακική, καὶ ἐν τοῦτοις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὕς νυνδὴ τελέους
φύλακας ὠνομάζομεν.

διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις;

εὐβουλον, ἔφη, καὶ τῷ ὄντι σοφὴν.

πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῇ πόλει οἶει ἡμῖν χαλκέας

428e

πλείους ἐνέσεσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας τούτους;

πολύ, ἔφη, χαλκέας.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντες ὀνομάζονται τινες
εἶναι, πάντων τούτων οὗτοι ἂν εἶεν ὀλίγιστοι;

πολύ γε.

τῷ σμικροτάτῳ ἄρα ἔθνει καὶ μέρει ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῇ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπιστήμῃ, τῷ
προεστῶτι καὶ ἄρχοντι, ὅλη σοφὴ ἂν εἴη κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα πόλις· καὶ
τοῦτο, ὥς ἔοικε, φύσει

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ὀλίγιστον γίγνεται γένος, ᾧ προσήκει ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης μεταλαγχάνειν
ἢν μόνην δεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν σοφίαν καλεῖσθαι.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἐν τῶν τεττάρων οὐκ οἶδα ὄντινα τρόπον ηὔρηκαμεν, αὐτὸ τε
καὶ ὅπου τῆς πόλεως ἵδρυται.

ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ἀποχρώντως ηὔρησθαι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνδρεία γε αὐτὴ τε καὶ ἐν ᾧ κεῖται τῆς πόλεως, δι' ὃ τοιαύτη
κλητέα ἢ πόλις, οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.

πῶς δὴ;

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τίς ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψας ἢ δειλὴν ἢ ἀνδρείαν πόλιν εἴποι
ἀλλ' ἢ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ὃ προπολεμεῖ τε καὶ στρατεύεται ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς;
οὐδ' ἂν εἷς, ἔφη, εἰς ἄλλο τι.

οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι, εἶπον, οἳ γε ἄλλοι ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ δειλοὶ ἢ ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες κύριοι
ἂν εἶεν ἢ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἢ τοίαν.

οὐ γάρ.

καὶ ἀνδρεία ἄρα πόλις μέρει τινὶ ἑαυτῆς ἔστι, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἔχειν
δύναμιν τοιαύτην ἣ διὰ παντὸς σώσει τὴν περὶ

429c

τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, ταῦτά τε αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ τοιαῦτα, ἃ τε καὶ οἷα ὁ νομοθέτης παρήγγελλεν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ. ἢ οὐ τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; οὐ πάννυ, ἔφη, ἔμαθον ὃ εἶπες, ἀλλ' αὐθις εἶπε.

σωτηρίαν ἔγωγ', εἶπον, λέγω τινὰ εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

ποῖαν δὴ σωτηρίαν;

τὴν τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμου διὰ τῆς παιδείας γεγονυίας περὶ τῶν δεινῶν ἃ τέ ἐστι καὶ οἷα· διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν τὸ ἔν τε λύπαις ὄντα διασώζεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν

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ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις καὶ μὴ ἐκβάλλειν. ὧ δέ μοι δοκεῖ ὁμοιον εἶναι ἐθέλω ἀπεικάζειν, εἰ βούλει.

ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἱ βαφῆς, ἐπειδὴν βουληθῶσι βάψαι ἔρια ὥστ' εἶναι ἀλουργά, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκλέγονται ἐκ τοσοῦτων χρωμάτων μίαν φύσιν τὴν τῶν λευκῶν, ἔπειτα προπαρασκευάζουσιν, οὐκ ὀλίγη παρασκευὴ θεραπεύσαντες ὅπως δέξεται ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ ἄνθος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ βάπτουσι.

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καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν τοῦτ' αὖ τῷ τρόπῳ βαφῆ, δευσοποιὸν γίγνεται τὸ βαφέν, καὶ ἡ πλύσις οὗτ' ἄνευ ῥυμμάτων οὔτε μετὰ ῥυμμάτων δύναται αὐτῶν τὸ ἄνθος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ, οἶσθα οἷα δὴ γίγνεται, ἐάντε τις ἄλλα χρώματα βάπτῃ ἐάντε καὶ ταῦτα μὴ προθεραπεύσας.

οἶδα, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ ἔκπλυτα καὶ γελοῖα.

τοιοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπόλαβε κατὰ δύναμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὅτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ

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ἐπαιδεύομεν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ· μὴδὲν οἷον ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι ἢ ὅπως ἡμῖν ὅτι κάλλιστα τοὺς νόμους πεισθέντες δέξοιντο ὥσπερ βαφὴν, ἵνα δευσοποιὸς αὐτῶν ἡ δόξα γίγνοιτο καὶ περὶ δεινῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ τὴν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιτηδεῖαν ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἐκπλύναι τὴν βαφὴν τὰ ῥύμματα ταῦτα, δεινὰ ὄντα ἐκκλύζειν, ἢ τε ἡδονή, παντὸς χαλεστραίου δεινότερα οὕσα τοῦτο δρᾶν

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καὶ κονίας, λύπη τε καὶ φόβος καὶ ἐπιθυμία, παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος. τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν τε πέρι καὶ μὴ ἀνδρείαν ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, λέγω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγονυῖαν, τὴν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάννυ νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν.

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ἀληθέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις.

ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξῃ· αὐθις δὲ

περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἔαν βούλῃ, ἔτι κάλλιον δίδμεν. νῦν γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο ἐζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην· πρὸς οὗν τὴν ἐκείνου ζήτησιν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἱκανῶς ἔχει. ἀλλὰ καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

δύο μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι λοιπὰ ἃ δεῖ καταδεῖν ἐν τῇ
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πόλει, ἣ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ οὗ δὴ ἔνεκα πάντα ζητοῦμεν, δικαιοσύνη.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

πῶς οὖν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὖροιμεν, ἵνα μηκέτιπραγματευώμεθα περὶ
σωφροσύνης;

ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, οὔτε οἶδα οὔτ' ἂν βουλοίμην αὐτὸ πρότερον φανῆναι,
εἴπερ μηκέτι ἐπίσκεψόμεθα σωφροσύνην· ἀλλ' εἰ ἔμοιγε βούλει χαρίζεσθαι,
σκόπει πρότερον τοῦτο ἐκείνου.

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ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βούλομαι γε, εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ.

σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη.

σκεπτέον, εἶπον· καὶ ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν, συμφωνίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ
προσέοικεν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρότερον.

πῶς;

κόσμος ποὺ τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ
ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὡς φασὶ κρείττω δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀποφαίνοντες οὐκ οἶδ'
ὄντινα τρόπον, καὶ ἄλλα ἅττα τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἴχνη αὐτῆς λέγεται. ἡ γὰρ;
πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν

κρείττω αὐτοῦ

γελοῖον; ὁ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ κρείττων καὶ ἥττων δῆπου ἂν αὐτοῦ εἴη καὶ ὁ ἥττων
κρείττων·

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ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν τούτοις προσαγορεύεται.

τί δ' οὐ;

ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φαίνεται μοι βούλεσθαι λέγειν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὡς τι ἐν αὐτῷ
τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ἔνι, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, καὶ ὅταν μὲν
τὸ βέλτιον φύσει τοῦ χειρόνος ἐγκρατὲς ᾖ, τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ
κρείττω αὐτοῦ

—ἐπαινεῖ γοῦν—ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ τροφῆς κακῆς ἢ τινος ὁμιλίας κρατηθῇ ὑπὸ
πλήθους τοῦ χειρόνος σμικρότερον τὸ βέλτιον

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ὅν, τοῦτο δὲ ὡς ἐν ὄνειδι ψέγειν τε καὶ καλεῖν ἥττω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀκόλαστον
τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον.

καὶ γὰρ ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

ἀπόβλεπε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὴν νέαν ἡμῖν πόλιν, καὶ εὐρήσεις ἐν αὐτῇ
τὸ ἕτερον τούτων ἐνόν· κρείττω γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτῆς δικαίως φήσεις
προσαγορεύεσθαι, εἴπερ οὐ τὸ ἄμεινον τοῦ χειρόνος ἄρχει σῶφρον κλητέον

καὶ κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ.

ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπω, ἔφη, καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ

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ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας ἐν παισὶ μάλιστα ἂν τις εὖροι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ οἰκέταις
καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

τὰς δὲ γε ἀπλᾶς τε καὶ μετρίας, αἱ δὴ μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῷ
ἄγονται, ἐν ὀλίγοις τε ἐπιτεύξῃ καὶ τοῖς βέλτιστα μὲν φύσιν, βέλτιστα δὲ
παιδευθεῖσιν.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἐνόντα σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ κρατούμενας αὐτόθι τὰς
ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε

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καὶ φαύλοις ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσι
τε καὶ ἐπεικεστέροις;

ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα πόλιν προσαγορεύειν κρεῖττω ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ
αὐτὴν αὐτῆς, καὶ ταύτην προσρητέον.

παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ σὺ φρονα κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

καὶ μὴν εἴπερ αὖ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ἢ αὐτῇ δόξα ἔνεστι τοῖς

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τε ἄρχουσι καὶ ἀρχομένοις περὶ τοῦ οὕστινας δεῖ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἂν
εἴη τοῦτο ἐνόν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα.

ἐν ποτέροις οὖν φήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἐνεῖναι ὅταν οὕτως
ἔχωσιν; ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις;

ἐν ἀμφοτέροις που, ἔφη.

ὀρθῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπεικῶς ἐμαντευόμεθα ἄρτι ὡς ἀρμονία τινὶ ἢ
σωφροσύνῃ ὡμοίωται;

τί δῆ;

ὅτι οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ σοφία ἐν μέρει τινὶ

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ἐκατέρα ἐνοῦσα ἢ μὲν σοφὴν, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρείαν τὴν πόλιν παρείχετο, οὐχ οὕτω
ποιεῖ αὕτη, ἀλλὰ δι' ὅλης ἀτεχνῶς τέταται διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένη
συνάδοντας τοὺς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταῦτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς
μέσους, εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύϊ, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει ἢ
χρήμασιν ἢ ἄλλῳ ὅτιοι τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε ὀρθότατ' ἂν φαῖμεν ταύτην
τὴν ὁμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χειρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνωνος κατὰ φύσιν
συμφωνίαν ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ.

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πάνυ μοι, ἔφη, συνδοκεῖ.
εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὰ μὲν τρία ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει κατῴπται, ὥς γε οὕτωςι δόξαι·
τὸ δὲ δὴ λοιπὸν εἶδος, δι' ὃ ἂν ἔτι ἀρετῆς μετέχοι πόλις, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη;
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη.
δῆλον.

οὐκοῦν, ὦ Γλαῦκων, νῦν δὴ ἡμᾶς δεῖ ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας τινὰς θάμνον
κύκλω περιστάσθαι προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν, μὴ πη διαφύγῃ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ
ἀφανισθεῖσα ἄδηλος γένηται.

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φανερὸν γὰρ δὴ ὅτι ταύτη πη ἔστιν· ὅρα οὖν καὶ προθυμοῦ κατιδεῖν, ἐάν
πως πρότερος ἔμοῦ ἴδης καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσῃς.
εἰ γὰρ ὦφελον, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ἐάν μοι ἐπομένῳ χρῆ καὶ τὰ δεικνύμενα
δυναμένῳ καθορᾶν, πάνυ μοι μετρίως χρήσῃ.
ἔπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐξάμενος μετ' ἐμοῦ.
ποιήσω ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ μόνον, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἡγοῦ.
καὶ μὴν, εἶπον ἐγώ, δύσβατός γέ τις ὁ τόπος φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσκιος· ἔστι γοῦν
σκοτεινὸς καὶ δυσδιερευνήτος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁμῶς ἰτέον.

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ἰτέον γάρ, ἔφη.
καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδὼν, ἰοὺ ἰοὺ, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαῦκων· κινδυνεύομέν τι ἔχειν ἵχνος,
καὶ μοι δοκεῖ οὐ πάνυ τι ἐκφευξέισθαι ἡμᾶς.
εὖ ἀγγέλλεις, ἦ δ' ὅς.
ἦ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βλακικὸν γε ἡμῶν τὸ πάθος.
τὸ ποῖον;

πάλαι, ὦ μακάριε, φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐχ
ἑωρῶμεν ἄρ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἦμεν καταγελαστότατοι· ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν
ἔχοντες ζητοῦσιν

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ἐνίοτε ὃ ἔχουσιν, καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀπεβλέπομεν, πόρρω δὲ ποι
ἀπεσκοποῦμεν, ἦ δὴ καὶ ἐλάνθανεν ἴσως ἡμᾶς.
πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;
οὕτως, εἶπον, ὥς δοκοῦμέν μοι καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκούοντες πάλαι οὐ
μανθάνειν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἐλέγομεν τρόπον τινὰ αὐτό.
μακρόν, ἔφη, τὸ προοίμιον τῷ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἀκοῦσαι.

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ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄκουε εἰ τι ἄρα λέγω. ὃ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐθέμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖν
διὰ παντός, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατωκίζομεν, τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἥτοι
τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη. ἐθέμεθα δὲ δήπου καὶ πολλάκις ἐλέγομεν, εἰ
μέμνησαι, ὅτι ἓνα ἕκαστον ἐν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν, εἰς ὃ
αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφυκυῖα εἴη.

ἐλέγομεν γάρ.

καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη
ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν

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ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν.

εἰρήκαμεν γάρ.

τοῦτο τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον ἢ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν. οἷσθα ὅθεν τεκμαίρομαι; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ λέγ', ἔφη.

δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε σωτηρίαν παρέχειν, ἔωσπερ ἂν

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ἐνῆ. καίτοι ἔφαμεν δικαιοσύνην ἔσεσθαι τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν ἐκείνων, εἰ τὰ τρία εὐροιμεν.

καὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δέοι γε κρῖναι τί τὴν πόλιν ἡμῖν τούτων μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν ἀπεργάσεται ἐγγενόμενον, δύσκριτον ἂν εἴη πότερον ἢ ὁμοδοξία τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ ἀρχομένων, ἢ ἡ περὶ δεινῶν τε καὶ μὴ, ἅττα ἐστί, δόξης ἐννόμου σωτηρία ἐν τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐγγενομένη, ἢ ἡ ἐν

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τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρόνησις τε καὶ φυλακὴ ἐνοῦσα, ἢ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ ἐνὸν καὶ ἐν παιδὶ καὶ ἐν γυναικὶ καὶ δούλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ καὶ δημιουργῷ καὶ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, ὅτι τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος εἷς ὧν ἔπραττε καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει.

δύσκριτον, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὔ;

ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα, ὡς εἰοικε, πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν δικαιοσύνην τὸ γε τούτοις ἐνάμιλλον ἂν εἰς ἀρετὴν

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πόλεως θείης;

παντάπασι μὲν οὔν.

σκοπεῖ δὴ καὶ τῇδε εἰ οὕτω δόξει· ἄρα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰς δίκας προστάξεις δικάζειν;

τί μὴν;

ἢ ἄλλου οὐτινοσοῦν μᾶλλον ἐφιεμένοι δικάσουσιν ἢ τούτου, ὅπως ἂν ἕκαστοι μὴτ' ἔχῳσι τὰλλότρια μῆτε τῶν αὐτῶν στέρωνται;

οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τούτου.

ὡς δικαίου ὄντος;

ναί.

καὶ ταύτῃ ἄρα πῃ ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἐαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ

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πρᾶξις δικαιοσύνη ἂν ὁμολογοῖτο.

ἔστι ταῦτα.

ιδεῖ δὴ ἔάν σοι ὅπερ ἐμοὶ συνδοκῇ. τέκτων σκυτοτόμου ἐπιχειρῶν ἔργα ἐργάζεσθαι ἢ σκυτοτόμος τέκτονος, ἢ τὰ ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνοντες τάλλήλων ἢ τιμάς, ἢ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπιχειρῶν ἀμφοτέρα πράττειν, πάντα τᾶλλα μεταλλαττόμενα, ἄρα σοι ἂν τι δοκεῖ μέγα βλάψαι πόλιν; οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη.

ἀλλ' ὅταν γε οἷμαι δημιουργὸς ὦν ἢ τις ἄλλος χρηματιστὴς
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φύσει, ἔπειτα ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ πλῆθει ἢ ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ εἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ εἶδος ἐπιχειρῇ ἰέναι, ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν τις εἰς τὸ τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ καὶ φύλακος ἀνάξιος ὦν, καὶ τὰ ἀλλήλων οὔτοι ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνωσι καὶ τὰς τιμάς, ἢ ὅταν ὁ αὐτὸς πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα ἐπιχειρῇ πράττειν, τότε οἷμαι καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖν ταύτην τὴν τούτων μεταβολὴν καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην ὀλεθρον εἶναι τῇ πόλει.

παντάσας μὲν οὖν.

ἢ τριῶν ἄρα ὄντων γενῶν πολυπραγμοσύνη καὶ μεταβολή
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εἰς ἄλληλα μεγίστη τε βλάβη τῇ πόλει καὶ ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο μάλιστα κακουργία.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

κακουργίαν δὲ τὴν μεγίστην τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πόλεως οὐκ ἀδικίαν φήσεις εἶναι; πῶς δ' οὐ;

τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἀδικία. πάλιν δὲ ὥδε λέγωμεν· χρηματιστικοῦ, ἐπικουρικοῦ, φυλακικοῦ γένους οἰκιοπραγία, ἐκάστου τούτων τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττοντος ἐν πόλει, τοῦναντίον ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνη τ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὴν πόλιν δικαίαν παρέχοι;

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οὐκ ἄλλη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἔχειν ἢ ταύτην.

μηδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶ πάνυ παγίως αὐτὸ λέγωμεν, ἀλλ' ἔάν μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ εἰς ἕνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰδὼν τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ὁμολογῇται καὶ ἐκεῖ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, συγχωρησόμεθα ἥδη—τί γὰρ καὶ ἐροῦμεν; —εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἄλλο τι σκεψόμεθα. νῦν δ' ἐκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν ἣν ᾤθημεν, εἰ ἐν μείζονι τινι τῶν ἐχόντων δικαιοσύνην πρότερον ἢ ἐκεῖ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν θεάσασθαι, ῥᾶον ἂν ἐν ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καταδεῖν οἷόν ἐστιν. καὶ

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ἔδοξε δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο εἶναι πόλις, καὶ οὕτω ᾠκίζομεν ὥς ἐδυνάμεθα ἀρίστην, εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι ἔν γε τῇ ἀγαθῇ ἂν εἴη. ὁ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐκεῖ ἐφάνη, ἐπαναφέρωμεν εἰς τὸν ἕνα, καὶ μὲν ὁμολογῇται, καλῶς ἔξει· ἔάν δέ τι ἄλλο ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἐμφαίνεται, πάλιν ἐπανιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν βασανιοῦμεν, καὶ

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τάχ' ἂν παρ' ἄλληλα σκοποῦντες καὶ τρίβοντες, ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων ἐκλάμψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην· καὶ φανεράν γενομένην βεβαιωσόμεθα αὐτὴν

παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

ἀλλ', ἔφη, καθ' ὁδὸν τε λέγεις καὶ ποιεῖν χρή οὕτως.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ γε ταῦτ' ἂν τις προσείποι μεῖζόν τε καὶ ἔλαττον, ἀνόμοιον τυγχάνει ὃν ταύτῃ ἢ ταῦτ' ὅν προσαγορεύεται, ἢ ὅμοιον; ὅμοιον, ἔφη.

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καὶ δίκαιος ἄρα ἀνὴρ δικαίας πόλεως κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶδος οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἀλλ' ὅμοιος ἔσται.

ὅμοιος, ἔφη.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι πόλις γε ἔδοξεν εἶναι δίκαια ὅτε ἐν αὐτῇ τριττὰ γένη φύσεων ἐνόντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἔπραττεν, σώφρων δὲ αὐτὴ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφὴ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν ἄλλ' ἅττα πάθη τε καὶ ἔξεις.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

καὶ τὸν ἕνα ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, οὕτως ἀξιῶσομεν, τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα

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εἶδη ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἔχοντα, διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη ἐκείνοις τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦσθαι τῇ πόλει.

πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

εἰς φαῦλόν γε αὖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ θανμάσιε, σκέμμα ἐμπεπτώκαμεν περὶ ψυχῆς, εἴτε ἔχει τὰ τρία εἶδη ταῦτα ἐν αὐτῇ εἴτε μή.

οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, εἰς φαῦλον· ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθές, ὅτι χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ.

φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ εὖ γ' ἴσθι, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ὥς ἡ

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ἐμὴ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων, οἷαις νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μὴ ποτε λάβωμεν— ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδὸς ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα— ἴσως μέντοι τῶν γε προειρημένων τε καὶ προεσκεμμένων ἀξίως.

οὐκοῦν ἀγαπητόν; ἔφη· ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι ἱκανῶς ἂν ἔχοι.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἴπον, ἔμοιγε καὶ πάνυ ἐξαρκέσει.

μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκάμης, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ σκόπει.

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ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι γε τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστιν ἡμῶν εἶδη τε καὶ ἦθη ἅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὐ γάρ που ἄλλοθεν ἐκέῖσε ἀφίεται.

γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ τις οἰηθεῖ τὸ θυμοειδὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγγεγονέναι, οἳ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θράκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδόν τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν

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μάλιστα ἂν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον τὸ περὶ τοὺς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἰγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν οὐχ ἥκιστα.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν γνῶναι.

οὐ διῆτα.

τόδε δὲ ἤδη χαλεπὸν, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἕκαστα πράττομεν ἢ τρισὶν οὖσιν ἄλλο ἄλλω· μανθάνομεν μὲν ἑτέρῳ, θυμούμεθα δὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐπιθυμοῦμεν δ' αὖ τρίτῳ τινὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν τε καὶ γέννησιν ἡδονῶν καὶ ὅσα τούτων

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ἀδελφά, ἢ ὅλη τῇ ψυχῇ καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πράττομεν, ὅταν ὀρμήσωμεν.

ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ χαλεπὰ διορίσασθαι ἀξίως λόγου.

καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

ὥδε τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν αὐτὰ ὀρίζεσθαι, εἴτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις εἴτε ἑτέρα ἔστι.

πῶς;

δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτόν τάναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταῦτόν γε καὶ πρὸς ταῦτόν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα, ὥστε ἂν που εὐρίσκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν

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ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω.

εἶπεν.

σκόπει δὴ ὁ λέγω.

λέγε, ἔφη.

ἐστάναι, εἶπον, καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυνατόν; οὐδαμῶς.

ἔτι τοίνυν ἀκριβέστερον ὁμολογησώμεθα, μὴ πη προϊόντες

ἀμφισβητήσωμεν. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ἄνθρωπον ἐστηκότα, κινουῦντα δὲ τὰς χεῖράς τε καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἔστηκε τε καὶ κινεῖται ἅμα, οὐκ ἂν οἴμαι ἀξιοῖμεν οὕτω

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λέγειν δεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ ἔστηκε, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται. οὐχ οὕτω; οὕτω.

οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ ἔτι μᾶλλον χαριεντίζοιτο ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, κομψευόμενος ὡς οἱ γε στρόβιλοι ὅλοι ἐστᾶσι τε ἅμα καὶ κινουῦνται, ὅταν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πῆξαντες τὸ κέντρον περιφέρωνται, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι κύκλῳ περιὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἔδρᾳ τοῦτο δρᾷ, οὐκ ἂν ἀποδεχοίμεθα, ὡς οὐ κατὰ ταῦτ' αὐτῶν

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τὰ τοιαῦτα τότε μενόντων τε καὶ φερομένων, ἀλλὰ φαῖμεν ἂν ἔχειν αὐτὰ εὐθὺ τε καὶ περιφερὲς ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ εὐθὺ ἐστάναι—οὐδαμῇ γὰρ ἀποκλίνειν—κατὰ δὲ τὸ περιφερὲς κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅταν δὲ τὴν εὐθυωρίαν ἢ εἰς δεξιὰν ἢ εἰς ἀριστεράν ἢ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἢ εἰς τὸ ὀπισθεν ἐγκλίνη ἅμα περιφερόμενον, τότε οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν ἐστάναι.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη.

οὐδὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τῶν τοιούτων λεγόμενον ἐκπλήξει, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον τι πείσει ὥς ποτέ τι ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὃν ἅμα κατὰ

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τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τάναντία πάθοι ἢ καὶ εἶη ἢ καὶ ποιήσειεν.
οὕκουν ἐμέ γε, ἔφη.

ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ ἀναγκαζώμεθα πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας
ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐπεξιόντες καὶ βεβαιούμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς οὕσας
μηκύνειν, ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προῖωμεν,
ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐάν ποτε ἄλλη φανῇ ταῦτα ἢ ταύτη, πάντα ἡμῖν τὰ ἀπὸ
τούτου συμβαίνοντα λελυμένα ἔσεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.

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ἄρ' ἂν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ἀνανεύειν καὶ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι τινος
λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι, πάντα τὰ
τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις θείης εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων;
οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτη διοίσει.

ἀλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, τῶν ἐναντίων.

τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αὖ τὸ
ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὐ πάντα ταῦτα

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εἰς ἐκεῖνά ποι' ἂν θείης τὰ εἶδη τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα; οἷον ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ
ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἥτοι ἐφίεσθαι φήσεις ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ, ἢ
προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν βούληται οἱ γενέσθαι, ἢ αὖ, καθ' ὅσον ἐθέλει τί οἱ
πορισθῆναι, ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο πρὸς αὐτὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος,
ἐπορεγομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσεως;

ἔγωγε.

τί δέ; τὸ ἀβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μὴδ' ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν καὶ
ἀπελαύνειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντα τάναντία ἐκείνοις θήσομεν;

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πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἐπιθυμιῶν τι φήσομεν εἶναι εἶδος, καὶ
ἐναργεστάτας αὐτῶν τούτων ἦν τε δίψαν καλοῦμεν καὶ ἦν πείναν;
φήσομεν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὕκοῦν τὴν μὲν ποτοῦ, τὴν δ' ἐδωδῆς;

ναί.

ἄρ' οὖν, καθ' ὅσον δίψα ἐστί, πλέονος ἂν τινος ἢ οὗ λέγομεν ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ εἶη, οἷον δίψα ἐστί δίψα ἅρά γε θερμοῦ ποτοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, ἢ πολλοῦ ἢ
ὀλίγου, ἢ καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινος πώματος; ἢ ἐὰν μὲν τις θερμότης τῷ

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δίψει προσῇ, τὴν τοῦ ψυχροῦ ἐπιθυμίαν προσπαρέχοιτ' ἂν, ἐὰν δὲ ψυχρότης,
τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ; ἐὰν δὲ διὰ πλήθους παρουσίαν πολλῇ ἢ δίψα ᾗ, τὴν τοῦ
πολλοῦ παρέξεται, ἐὰν δὲ ὀλίγη, τὴν τοῦ ὀλίγου; αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ διψῆν οὐ μὴ
ποτε ἄλλου γένηται ἐπιθυμία ἢ οὐπὲρ πέφυκεν, αὐτοῦ πώματος, καὶ αὖ τὸ
πεινῆν βρώματος;

οὕτως, ἔφη, αὐτὴ γε ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐκάστη αὐτοῦ μόνον ἐκάστου οὗ πέφυκεν,
τοῦ δὲ τοιοῦ ἢ τοιοῦ τὰ προσγιγνόμενα.

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μήτοι τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀσκέπτους ἡμᾶς ὄντας θορυβήσῃ, ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ, καὶ οὐ σίτου ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ σίτου. πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· εἰ οὖν ἡ διψα ἐπιθυμία ἐστὶ, χρηστοῦ ἂν εἴῃ εἴτε πώματος εἴτε ἄλλου ὅτου ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω. ἴσως γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, δοκοῖ τι λέγειν ὁ ταῦτα λέγων.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι

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του, τὰ μὲν ποιά ἅττα ποιοῦ τινός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου μόνον.

οὐκ ἔμαθον, ἔφη.

οὐκ ἔμαθες, ἔφην, ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον τινός εἶναι μεῖζον;

πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν τοῦ ἐλάττονος;

ναί.

τὸ δέ γε πολὺ μεῖζον πολὺ ἐλάττονος. ἦ γάρ;

ναί.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ ποτὲ μεῖζον ποτὲ ἐλάττονος, καὶ τὸ ἐσόμενον μεῖζον ἐσομένου ἐλάττονος;

ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἦ δ' ὅς.

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καὶ τὰ πλείω δὴ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ τὰ διπλάσια πρὸς τὰ ἡμίσεια καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ αὖ βαρύτερα πρὸς κουφότερα καὶ θάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα, καὶ ἔτι γε τὰ θερμὰ πρὸς τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

τί δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτου δὴ δεῖ θεῖναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη δὲ τις καὶ ποιά τις

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ποιοῦ πινος καὶ τινός. λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· οὐκ ἐπειδὴ οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη ἐγένετο, διηνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ὥστε οἰκοδομικὴ κληθῆναι;

τί μήν;

ἄρ' οὐ τῷ ποιά τις εἶναι, οἷα ἐτέρα οὐδεμία τῶν ἄλλων;

ναί.

οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ποιοῦ πινος, καὶ αὐτὴ ποιά τις ἐγένετο; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω τέχνηαι τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαι;

ἔστιν οὕτω.

τοῦτο τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάθι με τότε βούλεσθαι λέγειν, εἰ ἄρα νῦν ἔμαθες, ὅτι ὅσα ἐστὶν οἷα εἶναι του, αὐτὰ μὲν μόνα αὐτῶν μόνων ἐστὶν, τῶν δὲ ποιῶν τινων ποιά ἅττα.

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καὶ οὐ τι λέγω, ὥς, οἶων ἂν ᾗ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔστιν, ὥς ἄρα καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσῶδων ἢ ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινὴ καὶ νοσώδης καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακὴ καὶ ἀγαθὴ· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν ἐγένετο ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ ποιοῦ τινος, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὑγιεινὸν καὶ νοσῶδες, ποιά δὴ τις συνέβη καὶ αὐτὴ γενέσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὴν ἐποίησεν μηκέτι ἐπιστήμην ἀπλῶς καλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινος προσγενομένου ἱατρικὴν. ἔμαθον, ἔφη, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν.

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τὸ δὲ δὴ δίψος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τούτων θήσεις τῶν τινὸς εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστιν; ἔστι δὲ δήπου δίψος—

ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς· πώματός γε.

οὐκοῦν ποιοῦ μέν τινος πώματος ποιόν τι καὶ δίψος, δίψος δ' οὖν αὐτὸ οὔτε πολλοῦ οὔτε ὀλίγου, οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ, οὐδ' ἐνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινος, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ πώματος μόνον αὐτὸ δίψος πέφυκεν;

παντάπασι μὲν οὔν.

τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ, καθ' ὅσον διψῇ, οὐκ ἄλλο

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τι βούλεται ἢ πιεῖν, καὶ τούτου ὀρέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὀρμᾷ.

δῆλον δὴ.

οὐκοῦν εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτὴν ἀνθέλκει διψῶσαν, ἕτερον ἂν τι ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ, φαμέν, τὸ γε αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμ' ἂν τάναντία πράττοι.

οὐ γὰρ οὔν.

ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνται τε καὶ προσέλκονται, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἢ ἀπωθοῦσα χεὶρ, ἑτέρα δὲ ἢ προσαγομένη.

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παντάπασι μὲν οὔν, ἔφη.

πότερον δὴ φῶμέν τινος ἔστιν ὅτε διψῶντας οὐκ ἐθέλειν πιεῖν;

καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλὰκις.

τί οὔν, ἔφην ἐγώ, φαίη τις ἂν τούτων πέρι; οὐκ ἐνεῖναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελεῦον, ἐνεῖναι δὲ τὸ κωλῦον πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὃν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύοντος;

ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

ἄρ' οὔν οὐ τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, ὅταν

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ἐγγένηται, ἐκ λογισμοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄγοντα καὶ ἔλκοντα διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων παραγίγνεται;

φαίνεται.

οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀξιόσομεν αὐτὰ διττὰ τε καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἐταῖρον.

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οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰκότως, ἔφη, ἡγοίμεθ' ἂν οὕτως.

ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύο ἡμῖν ὠρίσθω εἶδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα· τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμούμεθα πότερον τρίτον, ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ ἂν εἴη ὁμοφυές;

ἴσως, ἔφη, τῷ ἐτέρῳ, τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ.

ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ· ὥς ἄρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαῖωνος ἀνιῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους, ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δὲ αὖ δυσχεραῖνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτὸν, καὶ τέως μὲν μάχοιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοιτο,

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κρατούμενος δ' οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διελκύσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς, προσδραμὼν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς, ἰδοὺ ὑμῖν, ἔφη, ᾧ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος.

ἤκουσα, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός.

οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφην, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὥς ἄλλο ὄν ἄλλῳ.

σημαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἔφην, πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν

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βιάζωνται τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμίαι, λοιδοροῦντά τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντοιιν σύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου; ταῖς δ' ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινωνήσαντα, αἰροῦντος λόγου μὴ δεῖν ἀντιπράττειν, οἷμαι σε οὐκ ἂν φάναι γενομένου ποτὲ ἐν σαντῷ τοῦ τοιούτου αἰσθέσθαι, οἷμαι δ' οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ.

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη.

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τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅταν τις οἷηται ἀδικεῖν; οὐχ ὅσω ἂν γενναιότερος ᾗ, τοσοῦτ' ἤττον δύναται ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ πεινῶν καὶ ῥιγῶν καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων πάσχων ὑπ' ἐκείνου ὃν ἂν οἷηται δικαίως ταῦτα δρᾶν, καί, ὃ λέγω, οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός;

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

τί δέ ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαι τις ἡγῆται; οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ συμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ καί, διὰ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν,

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ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἡ διαπράξηται ἡ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς πραῦνθῃ;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔοικε τούτῳ ᾧ λέγεις· καίτοι γ' ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει τοὺς ἐπικούρους ὥσπερ κύνας ἐθέμεθα ὑπηκόους τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ

ποιμένων πόλεως.

καλῶς γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νοεῖς ὁ βούλομαι λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἦ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τόδε ἐνθυμῆ;

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τὸ ποῖον;

ὅτι τούναντίον ἢ ἀρτίως ἡμῖν φαίνεται περὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικόν τι αὐτὸ ὥόμεθα εἶναι, νῦν δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖν φαμεν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν. παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν ἕτερον ὂν καὶ τούτου, ἢ λογιστικοῦ τι εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ τρία ἀλλὰ δύο εἶδη εἶναι ἐν ψυχῇ, λογιστικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν; ἢ καθάπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει συνεῖχεν αὐτὴν τρία

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ὄντα γένη, χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρητικόν, βουλευτικόν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπικουρον ὂν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρή;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τρίτον.

ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄν γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἄλλο τι φανῇ, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἐφάνη ἕτερον ὂν.

ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη, φανῆναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτο γ' ἂν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθύς γενόμενα μεστὰ ἐστὶ, λογισμοῦ δ' ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν,

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οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὅπῃ ποτε.

ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλῶς γε εἴπεις. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἂν τις ἴδοι ὁ λέγεις, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὁ ἄνω που ἐκεῖ εἵπομεν, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου μαρτυρήσει, τὸ—

στῆθος δὲ πλῆξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·

Hom. Od. 20.17 ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ σαφῶς ὥς ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ ἐπιπλήττον πεποίηκεν

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Ὅμηρος τὸ ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ τοῦ βελτιονός τε καὶ χειρονος τῷ ἀλογιστῶς θυμουμένῳ.

κομιδῇ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ταῦτα μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μόγις διανενοῦκαμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπεικῶς ὡμολόγηται τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν ἐν πόλει, τὰ αὐτὰ δ' ἐν ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ γένη ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμόν.

ἔστι ταῦτα.

οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνό γε ἥδη ἀναγκαῖον, ὥς πόλις ἦν σοφὴ καὶ ᾧ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τούτῳ σοφὸν εἶναι;

τί μήν;

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καὶ ᾧ δὴ ἀνδρεῖος ἰδιώτης καὶ ὥς, τούτῳ καὶ πόλιν ἀνδρείαν καὶ οὕτως, καὶ

τᾶλλα πάντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὠσανύτως ἀμφοτέρω ἔχειν;

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ δίκαιον δὴ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οἶμαι φήσομεν ἄνδρα εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ὥπερ καὶ πόλις ἦν δίκαια.

καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.

ἀλλ' οὐ πη μὴν τοῦτο γε ἐπιλελήσμεθα, ὅτι ἐκείνη γε τῷ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττειν τριῶν ὄντων γενῶν δίκαια ἦν.

οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, ἐπιλελησθαι.

μνημονευτέον ἄρα ἡμῖν ὅτι καὶ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος, ὅτου ἂν

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τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττη, οὗτος δίκαιός τε ἔσται καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων.

καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μνημονευτέον.

οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόω εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου;

πάνυ γε.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κρᾶσις σύμφωνα αὐτὰ ποιήσει, τὸ μὲν ἐπιτείνουσα καὶ

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τρέφουσα λόγοις τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθήμασιν, τὸ δὲ ἀνιείσα παραμυθουμένη, ἡμεροῦσα ἁρμονίᾳ τε καὶ ῥυθμῷ;

κομιδῇ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

καὶ τούτῳ δὴ οὕτῳ τραφέντε καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὐτῶν μαθόντε καὶ παιδευθέντε προστήσεσθον τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ—ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον—ὃ τηρήσετον μὴ τῷ πίμπλασθαι τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλουμένων ἡδονῶν πολὺ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν γενόμενον

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οὐκ αὖ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττη, ἀλλὰ καταδουλώσασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσήκον αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ σύμπαντα τὸν βίον πάντων ἀνατρέψῃ.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πολεμίους τούτῳ ἂν κάλλιστα φυλαττοίτην ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον, τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν, ἐπόμενον δὲ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιτελοῦν τὰ βουλευθέντα;

ἔστι ταῦτα.

καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ οἶμαι τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα

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ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασώζῃ διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων παραγγελθὲν δεινὸν τε καὶ μῆ.

ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

σοφὸν δὲ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ μικρῷ μέρει, τῷ ὃ ἦρχεν τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα

παρήγγελλεν, ἔχον αὖ κἀκεῖνο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος
ἐκάστω τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

τί δέ; σῶφρονα οὐ τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν τὸ τε
ἄρχον καὶ τὴν ἀρχομένω τὸ λογιστικὸν

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ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζωσιν αὐτῷ;

σωφροσύνη γοῦν, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦτο, πόλεώς τε καὶ ἰδιώτου.

ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ δίκαιός γε, ὃ πολλὰκις λέγομεν, τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως ἔσται.

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

τί οὖν; εἶπον ἐγώ· μὴ πῃ ἡμῖν ἀπαμβλύνεται ἄλλο τι δικαιοσύνη δοκεῖν εἶναι
ἢ ὅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐφάνη;

οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

ὥδε γάρ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, παντάπασιν ἂν βεβαιωσαίμεθα

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εἴ τι ἡμῶν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμφισβητεῖ, τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες.

ποῖα δὴ;

οἷον εἰ δέοι ἡμᾶς ἀνομολογεῖσθαι περὶ τε ἐκείνης τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ

ἐκείνῃ ὁμοίως πεφυκότος τε καὶ τεθραμμένου ἀνδρός, εἰ δοκεῖ ἂν

παρακαταθήκην χρυσοῦ ἢ ἀργυρίου δεξάμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀποστερῆσαι,

τίν' ἂν οἶει οἰηθῆναι

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τοῦτον αὐτὸ δρᾶσαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὅσοι μὴ τοιοῦτοι;

οὐδέν' ἂν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἱεροσυλιῶν καὶ κλοπῶν καὶ προδοσιῶν, ἣ ἰδίᾳ ἐταίρων ἢ

δημοσίᾳ πόλεων, ἐκτός ἂν οὗτος εἴη;

ἐκτός.

καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὅπως οὖν γ' ἂν ἄπιστος ἢ κατὰ ὅρκους ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας
ὁμολογίας.

πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

μοιχεῖαι γε μὴν καὶ γονέων ἀμέλεια καὶ θεῶν ἀθεραπευσία παντὶ ἄλλῳ
μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ προσήκουσι.

παντὶ μέντοι, ἔφη.

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οὐκοῦν τούτων πάντων αἴτιον ὅτι αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτοῦ
πράττει ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι;

τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, καὶ οὐδέν ἄλλο.

ἔτι τι οὖν ἕτερον ζητεῖς δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἢ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ἢ τοὺς

τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ πόλεις;

μὰ Δία, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἔγωγε.

τέλεον ἄρα ἡμῖν τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἀποτετέλεσται, ὃ ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεῦσαι ὥς

εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν κατὰ

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θεόν τινα εἰς ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κινδυνεύομεν ἐμβεβηκέναι.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

τὸ δὲ γε ἦν ἄρα, ὦ Γλαύκων—δι’ ὃ καὶ ὠφελεῖ—εἰδωλὸν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης, τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτομικὸν φύσει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν σκυτοτομεῖν καὶ ἄλλο μηδὲν πράττειν, τὸν δὲ τεκτονικὸν τεκταίνεσθαι, καὶ τὰλλα δὴ οὕτως φαίνεται.

τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτόν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ’ οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν

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ἐντός, ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐάσαντα τὰλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὄρους τρεῖς ἀρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἅττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, πάντα ταῦτα

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συνδῆσαντα καὶ παντάπασι ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, οὕτω δὲ πράττειν ἤδη, ἐάν τι πράττῃ ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἢ περὶ σώματος θεραπείαν ἢ καὶ πολιτικόν τι ἢ περὶ τὰ ἴδια συμβόλαια, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν πρᾶξιν ἢ ἂν ταύτην τὴν ἔξιν σῶζῃ τε καὶ συναπεργάζεται, σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην, ἄδικον δὲ

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πρᾶξιν ἢ ἂν αἰεὶ ταύτην λύῃ, ἀμαθίαν δὲ τὴν ταύτῃ αὖ ἐπιστατοῦσαν δόξαν. παντάπασι, ἥ δ’ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

εἶεν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· τὸν μὲν δίκαιον καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ὃ τυγχάνει ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄν, εἰ φαίμεν ἡύρηκέναι, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τι οἴμαι δόξαιμεν ψεύδεσθαι.

μὰ Δία οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη.

φῶμεν ἄρα;

φῶμεν.

ἔστω δὲ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο σκεπτέον οἴμαι ἀδικίαν.

δῆλον.

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οὐκοῦν στάσιν τινὰ αὖ τριῶν ὄντων τούτων δεῖ αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἀλλοτριπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐπανάστασιν μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢν’ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐ προσῆκον, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτου ὄντος φύσει οἷου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεῦειν, τῷ δ’ οὐ δουλεῦειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι; τοιαῦτ’ ἅττα οἴμαι φήσομεν καὶ τὴν τούτων ταραχὴν καὶ πλάνην εἶναι τὴν τε ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶσαν κακίαν.

αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, ἔφη.

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οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἄδικοα πράττειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ αὖ τὸ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ταῦτα πάντα τυγχάνει ὄντα κατάδηλα ἥδη σαφῶς, εἴπερ καὶ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη;

πῶς δῆ;

ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυγχάνει οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῶν ὑγιεινῶν τε καὶ νοσωδῶν, ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἐν σώματι, ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῇ.

πῆ; ἔφη.

τὰ μὲν που ὑγιεινὰ ὑγίειαν ἐμποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ νοσώδη νόσον.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαια πράττειν δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖ,

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τὸ δ' ἄδικοα ἀδικίαν;

ἀνάγκη.

ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου.

ἔστι γάρ.

οὐκοῦν αὖ, ἔφην, τὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ ἀδικίαν παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου;

κομιδῇ, ἔφη.

ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ

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κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἰσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια.

ἔστιν οὕτω.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα εἰς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν φέρει, τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ εἰς κακίας;

ἀνάγκη.

τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἥδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι

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πότερον αὖ λυσιτελεῖ δίκαιά τε πράττειν καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἔαντε λανθάνῃ ἔαντε μὴ τοιοῦτος ὢν, ἢ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι, ἔανπερ μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενος.

ἀλλ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γελοῖον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ σκέμμα γίγνεσθαι ἥδη, εἰ τοῦ μὲν σώματος τῆς φύσεως διαφθειρομένης δοκεῖ οὐ βιωτὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ μετὰ πάντων σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ παντὸς πλούτου καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς, τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦτου ᾧ ζῶμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ

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διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται, ἔανπερ τις ποιῇ ὃ ἂν βουλευθῇ ἄλλο πλὴν τοῦτο ὁπόθεν κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγῇσεται, δικαιοσύνην δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν κτήσεται, ἐπειδήπερ ἐφάνη γε ὄντα ἐκάτερα οἷα ἡμεῖς διεληλυθάμεν. γελοῖον γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπείπερ ἐνταῦθα ἐληλύθαμεν, ὅσον οἶόν

τε σαφέστατα καταδεῖν ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει οὐ χρὴ ἀποκάμνειν.

ἥκιστα, νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, πάντων ἀποκμητέον.

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δεῦρό νυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς ὅσα καὶ εἶδη ἔχει ἡ κακία, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἃ γε δὴ καὶ ἄξια θέας.

ἔπομαι, ἔφη· μόνον λέγε.

καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς μοι φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἅπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας, τέτταρα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄττα ὧν καὶ ἄξιον ἐπιμνησθῆναι.

πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

ὅσοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτειῶν τρόποι εἰσὶν εἶδη ἔχοντες, τοσοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι.

πόσοι δὴ;

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πέντε μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτειῶν, πέντε δὲ ψυχῆς.

λέγε, ἔφη, τίνες.

λέγω, εἶπον, ὅτι εἷς μὲν οὗτος ὃν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν πολιτείας εἷη ἂν τρόπος, ἐπονομασθεῖη δ' ἂν καὶ διχῇ· ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἐνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος βασιλεία ἂν κληθεῖη, πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν εἶδος λέγω· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν

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πλείους οὔτε εἷς ἐγγεγόμενοι κινήσειεν ἂν τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως, τροφῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ χρησάμενος ἧ διήλθομεν.

οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ἔφη.

Republic

English translation

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And Adeimantus broke in and said, What will be your defence, Socrates, if anyone objects that you are not making these men very happy,[*] and that through their own fault? For the city really belongs to them and yet they get no enjoyment out of it as ordinary men do by owning lands and building fine big houses and providing them with suitable furniture and winning the favor of the gods by private sacrifices[*] and entertaining guests and enjoying too those possessions which you just now spoke of, gold and silver and all that is customary for those who are expecting to be happy?

But they seem, one might say, to be established in idleness in the city,

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exactly like hired mercenaries, with nothing to do but keep guard. Yes, said I, and what is more, they serve for board-wages and do not even receive pay in addition to their food as others do,[*] so that they will not even be able to take a journey[*] on their own account, if they wish to, or make presents to their

mistresses, or spend money in other directions according to their desires like the men who are thought to be happy. These and many similar counts of the indictment you are omitting. Well, said he, assume these counts too.[*]

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What then will be our apology you ask? Yes. By following the same path I think we shall find what to reply. For we shall say that while it would not surprise us if these men thus living prove to be the most happy, yet the object on which we fixed our eyes in the establishment of our state was not the exceptional happiness of any one class but the greatest possible happiness of the city as a whole. For we thought[*] that in a state so constituted we should be most likely to discover justice as we should injustice

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in the worst governed state, and that when we had made these out we could pass judgement on the issue of our long inquiry. Our first task then, we take it, is to mold the model of a happy state—we are not isolating[*] a small class in it and postulating their happiness, but that of the city as a whole. But the opposite type of state we will consider presently.[*] It is as if we were coloring a statue and someone approached and censured us, saying that we did not apply the most beautiful pigments to the most beautiful parts of the image, since the eyes,[*] which are the most beautiful part, have not been painted with purple but with black—

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we should think it a reasonable justification to reply, Don't expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine that they will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts. But observe whether by assigning what is proper to each we render the whole beautiful.[*] And so in the present case you must not require us to attach to the guardians a happiness that will make them anything but guardians.

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For in like manner we could[*] clothe the farmers in robes of state and deck them with gold and bid them cultivate the soil at their pleasure, and we could make the potters recline on couches from left to right[*] before the fire drinking toasts and feasting with their wheel alongside to potter with when they are so disposed, and we can make all the others happy in the same fashion, so that thus the entire city may be happy.

But urge us not to this,

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since, if we yield, the farmer will not be a farmer nor the potter a potter, nor will any other of the types that constitute state keep its form. However, for the others it matters less. For cobblers[*] who deteriorate and are spoiled and pretend to be the workmen that they are not are no great danger to a state. But guardians of laws and of the city who are not what they pretend to be, but only seem, destroy utterly, I would have you note, the entire state, and on the

other hand, they alone are decisive of its good government and happiness. If then we are forming true guardians

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and keepers of our liberties, men least likely to harm the commonwealth, but the proponent of the other ideal is thinking of farmers and happy feasters as it were in a festival and not in a civic community, he would have something else in mind[*] than a state. Consider, then, whether our aim in establishing the guardians is the greatest possible happiness among them or whether that is something we must look to see develop in the city as a whole, but these helpers and guardians

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are to be constrained and persuaded to do what will make them the best craftsmen in their own work, and similarly all the rest. And so, as the entire city develops and is ordered well, each class is to be left, to the share of happiness that its nature comports.

Well, he said, I think you are right. And will you then, I said, also think me reasonable in another point akin to this? What pray? Consider whether

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these are the causes that corrupt other[*] craftsmen too so as positively to spoil them.[*] What causes? Wealth and poverty.[*] said I. How so? Thus! do you think a potter who grew rich would any longer be willing to give his mind to his craft? By no means, said he. But will he become more idle and negligent than he was? Far more. Then he becomes a worse potter? Far worse too. And yet again, if from poverty he is unable to provide himself with tools and other requirements of his art,

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the work that he turns out will be worse, and he will also make inferior workmen of his sons or any others whom he teaches. Of course. From both causes, then, poverty and wealth, the products of the arts deteriorate, and so do the artisans? So it appears. Here, then, is a second group of things it seems that our guardians must guard against and do all in their power to keep from slipping into the city without their knowledge. What are they?

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Wealth and poverty, said I, since the one brings luxury, idleness and innovation, and the other illiberality and the evil of bad workmanship in addition to innovation. Assuredly, he said; yet here is a point for your consideration, Socrates, how our city, possessing no wealth, will be able to wage war, especially if compelled to fight a large and wealthy state.

Obviously, said I, it would be rather difficult to fight one such,

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but easier to fight two.[*] What did you mean by that? he said. Tell me first, I said, whether, if they have to fight, they will not be fighting as athletes of war[*] against men of wealth? Yes, that is true, he said. Answer me then,

Adeimantus. Do you not think that one boxer perfectly trained in the art could easily fight two fat rich men who knew nothing of it? Not at the same time perhaps, said he. Not even, said I, if he were allowed to retreat[*]

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and then turn and strike the one who came up first, and if he repeated the procedure many times under a burning and stifling sun? Would not such a fighter down even a number of such opponents? Doubtless, he said; it wouldn't be surprising if he did. Well, don't you think that the rich have more of the skill and practice[*] of boxing than of the art of war? I do, he said. It will be easy, then, for our athletes in all probability to fight with double and triple their number. I shall have to concede the point,

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he said, for I believe you are right. Well then, if they send an embassy to the other city and say what is in fact true[*]: We make no use of gold and silver nor is it lawful for us but it is for you: do you then join us in the war and keep the spoils of the enemy,[*]—do you suppose any who heard such a proposal would choose to fight against hard and wiry hounds rather than with the aid of the hounds against fat and tender sheep? I think not. Yet consider whether the accumulation

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of all the wealth of other cities in one does not involve danger for the state that has no wealth. What happy innocence, said I, to suppose that you can properly use the name city of any other than the one we are constructing. Why, what should we say? he said. A greater predication, said I, must be applied to the others. For they are each one of them many cities, not a city, as it goes in the game.[*]

There are two at the least at enmity with one another, the city of the rich

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and the city of the poor,[*] and in each of these there are many. If you deal with them as one you will altogether miss the mark, but if you treat them as a multiplicity by offering to the one faction the property, the power, the very persons of the other, you will continue always to have few enemies and many allies. And so long as your city is governed soberly in the order just laid down, it will be the greatest of cities. I do not mean greatest in repute, but in reality, even though it have only a thousand[*] defenders. For a city of this size

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that is really one[*] you will not easily discover either among Greeks or barbarians—but of those that seem so you will find many and many times the size of this. Or do you think otherwise? No, indeed I don't, said he.

Would not this, then, be the best rule and measure for our governors of the proper size of the city and of the territory that they should mark off for a city of that size and seek no more? What is the measure? I think, said I, that they

should let it grow so long as in its growth it consents[*] to remain a unity,
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but no further. Excellent, he said. Then is not this still another injunction that we should lay upon our guardians, to keep guard in every way that the city shall not be too small, nor great only in seeming, but that it shall be a sufficient city and one? That behest will perhaps be an easy[*] one for them, he said. And still easier,[*] haply, I said, is this that we mentioned before[*] when we said that if a degenerate offspring was born to the guardians he must be sent away to the other classes,

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and likewise if a superior to the others he must be enrolled among the guardians; and the purport of all this was[*] that the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity.[*] Why yes, he said, this is even more trifling than that. These are not, my good Adeimantus, as one might suppose, numerous and difficult injunctions that
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we are imposing upon them, but they are all easy, provided they guard, as the saying is, the one great thing[*]—or instead of great let us call it sufficient.[*] What is that? he said.

Their education and nurture, I replied. For if a right education[*] makes of them reasonable men they will easily discover everything of this kind—and other principles that we now pass over, as that the possession of wives and marriage,

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and the procreation of children and all that sort of thing should be made as far as possible the proverbial goods of friends that are common.[*] Yes, that would be the best way, he said. And, moreover, said I, the state, if it once starts[*] well, proceeds as it were in a cycle[*] of growth. I mean that a sound nurture and education if kept up creates good natures in the state, and sound natures in turn receiving an education of this sort develop into better men than their predecessors

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both for other purposes and for the production of offspring as among animals also.[*] It is probable, he said. To put it briefly, then, said I, it is to this that the overseers of our state must cleave and be watchful against its insensible corruption. They must throughout be watchful against innovations in music and gymnastics counter to the established order, and to the best of their power guard against them, fearing when anyone says that

That song is most regarded among men

Which hovers newest on the singer's lips,

Hom. Od. I.351 [*]

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lest haply[*] it be supposed that the poet means not new songs but a new way of song[*] and is commending this. But we must not praise that sort of thing nor conceive it to be the poet's meaning. For a change to a new type of music is something to beware of as a hazard of all our fortunes. For the modes of music[*] are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental political and social conventions, as Damon affirms and as I am convinced.[*] Set me too down in the number of the convinced, said Adeimantus.

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It is here, then, I said, in music, as it seems, that our guardians must build their guard-house[*] and post of watch. It is certain, he said, that this is the kind of lawlessness[*] that easily insinuates[*] itself unobserved. Yes, said I, because it is supposed to be only a form of play[*] and to work no harm. Nor does it work any, he said, except that by gradual infiltration it softly overflows[*] upon the characters and pursuits of men and from these issues forth grown greater to attack their business dealings, and from these relations

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it proceeds against the laws and the constitution with wanton licence, Socrates, till finally it overthrows[*] all things public and private. Well, said I, are these things so? I think so, he said.

Then, as we were saying[*] in the beginning, our youth must join in a more law-abiding play, since, if play grows lawless and the children likewise,

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it is impossible that they should grow up to be men of serious temper and lawful spirit. Of course, he said. And so we may reason that when children in their earliest play are imbued with the spirit of law and order through their music, the opposite of the former supposition happens—this spirit waits upon them in all things and fosters their growth, and restores and sets up again whatever was overthrown in the other[*] type of state. True, indeed, he said. Then such men rediscover for themselves those seemingly trifling conventions which their predecessors abolished altogether. Of what sort? Such things as

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the becoming silence[*] of the young in the presence of their elders; the giving place to them and rising up before them, and dutiful service of parents, and the cut of the hair[*] and the garments and the fashion of the foot-gear, and in general the deportment of the body and everything of the kind. Don't you think so? I do. Yet to enact them into laws would, I think, be silly.[*] For such laws are not obeyed nor would they last, being enacted only in words and on paper. How could they? At any rate, Adeimantus, I said, the direction of the education from whence one starts is likely to determine

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the quality of what follows. Does not like ever summon like? Surely. And the final[*] outcome, I presume, we would say is one complete and vigorous

product of good or the reverse. Of course, said he. For my part, then, I said, for these reasons I would not go on to try to legislate on such matters.[*] With good reason, said he. But what, in heaven's name, said I, about business matters, the deals[*] that men make with one another in the agora—

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and, if you please, contracts with workmen[*] and actions for foul language[*] and assault, the filing of declarations,[*] the impanelling of juries, the payment and exaction of any dues that may be needful in markets or harbors and in general market, police or harbor regulations and the like, can we bring[*] ourselves to legislate about these? Nay, 'twould not be fitting, he said, to dictate to good and honorable men.[*] For most of the enactments that are needed about these things

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they will easily, I presume, discover. Yes, my friend, provided God grants them the preservation of the principles of law that we have already discussed. Failing that, said he, they will pass their lives multiplying such petty laws and amending them in the expectation of attaining what is best. You mean, said I, that the life of such citizens will resemble that of men who are sick, yet from intemperance are unwilling to abandon[*] their unwholesome regimen.

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By all means. And truly, said I, these latter go on in a most charming[*] fashion. For with all their doctoring they accomplish nothing except to complicate and augment their maladies. And[*] they are always hoping that some one will recommend a panacea that will restore their health. A perfect description, he said, of the state of such invalids. And isn't this a charming trait in them, that they hate most in all the world him who tells them the truth that until a man stops drinking and gorging and wenching

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and idling, neither drugs[*] nor cautery nor the knife, no, nor spells nor periapts[*] will be of any avail? Not altogether charming, he said, for there is no grace or charm in being angry[*] with him who speaks well. You do not seem to be an admirer[*] of such people, said I. No, by heaven, I am not. Neither then, if an entire city,[*] as we were just now saying, acts in this way, will it have your approval, or don't you think that the way of such invalids is precisely that of those cities

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which being badly governed forewarn their citizens not to meddle[*] with the general constitution of the state, denouncing death to whosoever attempts that—while whoever most agreeably serves[*] them governed as they are and who curries favor with them by fawning upon them and anticipating their desires and by his cleverness in gratifying them, him they will account the good man, the man wise in worthwhile things,[*] the man they will delight to honor? Yes, he said, I think their conduct is identical, and I don't approve it in

the very least.

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And what again of those who are willing and eager to serve[*] such states? Don't you admire their valiance and light-hearted irresponsibility[*]? I do, he said, except those who are actually deluded and suppose themselves to be in truth statesmen[*] because they are praised by the many. What do you mean? Can't you make allowances[*] for the men? Do you think it possible for a man who does not know how to measure when a multitude of others equally ignorant assure him that he is four cubits tall

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not to suppose this to be the fact about himself? Why no,[*] he said, I don't think that. Then don't be harsh with them. For surely such fellows are the most charming spectacle in the world when they enact and amend such laws as we just now described and are perpetually expecting to find a way of putting an end to frauds in business and in the other matters of which I was speaking because they can't see that they are in very truth[*] trying to cut off a Hydra's head.

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Indeed, he said, that is exactly what they are doing. I, then, said I, should not have supposed[*] that the true lawgiver ought to work out matters of that kind[*] in the laws and the constitution either of an ill-governed or a well-governed state—in the one because they are useless and accomplish nothing, in the other because some of them anybody could discover and others will result spontaneously from the pursuits already described.

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What part of legislation, then, he said, is still left for us? And I replied, For us nothing, but for the Apollo of Delphi, the chief, the fairest and the first of enactments. What are they? he said. The founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond[*] to keep them gracious. For of such matters

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we neither know anything nor in the founding of our city if we are wise shall we entrust them to any other or make use of any other interpreter[*] than the God of our fathers.[*] For this God surely is in such matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of their fathers who from his seat in the middle and at the very navel[*] of the earth delivers his interpretation. Excellently said, he replied; and that is what we must do.

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At last, then, son of Ariston, said I, your city[*] may be considered as established. The next thing is to procure a sufficient light somewhere and to look yourself,[*] and call in the aid of your brother and of Polemarchus and the rest, if we may in any wise discover where justice and injustice[*] should

be in it, wherein they differ from one another and which of the two he must have who is to be happy, alike[*] whether his condition is known or not known to all gods and men. Nonsense, said Glaucon, you[*] promised that you would carry on the search yourself,

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admitting that it would be impious[*] for you not to come to the aid of justice by every means in your power. A true reminder, I said, and I must do so, but you also must lend a hand. Well, he said, we will. I expect then, said I, that we shall find it in this way. I think our city, if it has been rightly founded is good in the full sense of the word.[*] Necessarily, he said. Clearly, then, it will be wise, brave, sober, and just. Clearly. Then if we find any of these qualities in it, the remainder[*] will be that which we have not found?

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Surely. Take the case of any four other things. If we were looking for any one of them in anything and recognized the object of our search first, that would have been enough for us, but if we had recognized the other three first, that in itself would have made known to us the thing we were seeking. For plainly there was nothing left for it to be but the remainder. Right, he said. And so, since these are four, we must conduct the search in the same way. Clearly.

And, moreover,

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the first thing that I think I clearly see therein is the wisdom,[*] and there is something odd about that, it appears. What? said he. Wise in very deed I think the city that we have described is, for it is well counselled, is it not? Yes. And surely this very thing, good counsel,[*] is a form of wisdom. For it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men counsel well. Obviously. But there are many and manifold knowledges or sciences in the city. Of course. Is it then owing to the science of her carpenters that

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a city is to be called wise and well advised? By no means for that, but rather mistress of the arts of building. Then a city is not to be styled wise because of the deliberations[*] of the science of wooden utensils for their best production? No, I grant you. Is it, then, because of that of brass implements or any other of that kind? None whatsoever, he said. Nor yet because of the science of the production of crops from the soil, but the name it takes from that is agricultural. I think so. Then, said I, is there any science in the city just founded by us residing in any of its citizens which does not take counsel about some particular thing

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in the city but about the city as a whole and the betterment of its relations with itself[*] and other states? Why, there is. What is it, said I, and in whom is it found? It is the science of guardianship or government and it is to be found in those rulers to whom we just now gave the name of guardians in the full sense

of the word. And what term then do you apply to the city because of this knowledge? Well advised, he said, and truly wise. Which class, then, said I, 428e

do you suppose will be the more numerous in our city, the smiths or these true guardians? The smiths, by far, he said. And would not these rulers be the smallest of all the groups of those who possess special knowledge and receive distinctive appellations[*]? By far.

Then it is by virtue of its smallest class and minutest part of itself, and the wisdom that resides therein, in the part which takes the lead and rules, that a city established on principles of nature would be wise as a whole. And as it appears

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these are by nature the fewest, the class to which it pertains to partake of the knowledge which alone of all forms of knowledge deserves the name of wisdom. Most true, he said. This one of our four, then, we have, I know not how, discovered, the thing itself and its place in the state. I certainly think, said he, that it has been discovered sufficiently.

But again there is no difficulty in seeing bravery itself and the part of the city in which it resides for which the city is called brave.[*] How so? Who, said I, 429b

in calling a city cowardly or brave would fix his eyes on any other part of it than that which defends it and wages war in its behalf? No one at all, he said. For the reason, I take it, said I, that the cowardice or the bravery[*] of the other inhabitants does not determine for it the one quality or the other.[*] It does not. Bravery too, then, belongs to a city by virtue of a part of itself owing to its possession in that part of a quality that under all conditions will preserve the conviction

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that things to be feared are precisely those which and such as the lawgiver[*] inculcated in their education. Is not that what you call bravery? I don't altogether understand[*] what you said, he replied; but say it again. A kind of conservation, I said, is what I mean by bravery. What sort of a conservation[*]? The conservation of the conviction which the law has created by education about fearful things—what and what sort of things are to be feared. And by the phrase under all conditions[*] I mean that the brave man preserves it both in pain

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and pleasures and in desires and fears and does not expel[*] it from his soul. And I may illustrate it by a similitude[*] if you please. I do. You are aware that dyers when they wish to dye wool so as to hold the purple hue begin by selecting from the many colors there be the one nature of the white and then give it a careful preparatory treatment so that it will take the hue in the best way, and after the treatment,[*] then and then only, dip it in the dye.

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And things that are dyed by this process become fast-colored[*] and washing either with or without lyes cannot take away the sheen of their hues. But otherwise you know what happens to them, whether[*] anyone dips other colors or even these without the preparatory treatment. I know, he said, that they present a ridiculous and washed-out appearance.

By this analogy, then, said I, you must conceive what we too to the best of our ability were doing when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music[*]

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and exercises of the body. The sole aim of our contrivance was that they should be convinced and receive our laws like a dye as it were, so that their belief and faith might be[*] fast-colored both about the things that are to be feared and all other things because of the fitness of their nature and nurture, and that so their dyes might not be washed out by those lyes that have such dread[*] power to scour our faiths away, pleasure more potent than any detergent or abstergent

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to accomplish this, and pain and fear and desire more sure than any lye. This power in the soul, then, this unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief[*] about things to be and not to be feared is what I call and would assume to be courage, unless you have something different to say. No, nothing, said he; for I presume that you consider mere right opinion about the same matters not produced by education, that which may manifest itself in a beast or a slave,[*] to have little or nothing to do with law[*] and that you would call it by another name than courage.

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That is most true, said I. Well then, he said, I accept this as bravery. Do so, said I, and you will be right with the reservation[*] that it is the courage of a citizen. Some other time,[*] if it please you, we will discuss it more fully. At present we were not seeking this but justice; and for the purpose of that inquiry I believe we have done enough. You are quite right, he said.

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Two things still remain, said I, to make out in our city, soberness[*] and the object of the whole inquiry, justice. Quite so. If there were only some way to discover justice so that we need not further concern ourselves about soberness. Well, I, for my part, he said, neither know of any such way nor would I wish justice to be discovered first if that means that we are not to go on to the consideration of soberness. But if you desire to please me, consider this before that. It would certainly

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be very wrong[*] of me not to desire it, said I. Go on with the inquiry then, he said. I must go on, I replied, and viewed from here it bears more likeness to a

kind of concord and harmony than the other virtues did. How so? Soberness is a kind of beautiful order[*] and a continence of certain pleasures and appetites, as they say, using the phrase master of himself I know not how; and there are other similar expressions that as it were point us to the same trail. Is that not so? Most certainly.

Now the phrase master of himself is an absurdity, is it not? For he who is master of himself would also be subject to himself,

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and he who is subject to himself would be master. For the same person is spoken of in all these expressions. Of course. But, said I, the intended meaning of this way of speaking appears to me to be that the soul of a man within him has a better part and a worse part, and the expression self-mastery means the control of the worse by the naturally better part. It is, at any rate, a term of praise. But when, because of bad breeding or some association, [*] the better part, which is the smaller, is dominated by the multitude[*] of the worse, I think that our speech

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censures this as a reproach, [*] and calls the man in this plight unselfcontrolled and licentious. That seems likely, he said. Turn your eyes now upon our new city, said I, and you will find one of these conditions existent in it. For you will say that it is justly spoken of as master of itself if that in which [*] the superior rules the inferior is to be called sober and self-mastered. I do turn my eyes upon it, he said, and it is as you say. And again, the mob of motley [*]

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appetites and pleasures and pains one would find chiefly in children [*] and women and slaves and in the base rabble of those who are freemen in name. [*] By all means. But the simple and moderate appetites which with the aid of reason and right opinion are guided by consideration you will find in few and those the best born and best educated. True, he said. And do you not find this too in your city and a domination there of the desires

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in the multitude and the rabble by the desires and the wisdom that dwell in the minority of the better? I do, he said.

If, then, there is any city that deserves to be described as master of its pleasures and desires and self-mastered, this one merits that designation. Most assuredly, he said. And is it not also to be called sober [*] in all these respects? Indeed it is, he said. And yet again, if there is any city in which

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the rulers and the ruled are of one mind as to who ought to rule, that condition will be found in this. Don't you think so? I most emphatically do, he said. In which class of the citizens, then, will you say that the virtue of soberness has its seat when this is their condition? In the rulers or in the ruled? In both, I suppose, [*] he said. Do you see then, said I, that our intuition was not a bad

one just now that discerned a likeness between soberness and a kind of harmony[*]? Why so?

Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts

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respectively made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally through the entire gamut[*] throughout, bringing about[*] the unison in the same chant of the strongest, the weakest and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if you please,[*] in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any similar criterion. So that we should be quite right in affirming this unanimity[*] to be soberness, the concord of the naturally superior and inferior

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as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual.[*]I entirely concur, he said. Very well, said I. We have made out these three forms in our city to the best of our present judgement.[*] What can be the remaining form that[*] would give the city still another virtue? For it is obvious that the remainder is justice. Obvious. Now then,[*] Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmen[*] to surround the covert and keep close watch that justice may not slip through and get away from us and vanish

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from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabouts. Keep your eyes open then and do your best to descry it. You may see it before I do and point it out to me. Would that I could, he said; but I think rather that if you find in me one who can follow you and discern what you point out to him you will be making a very fair[*] use of me. Pray[*] for success then, said I, and follow along with me. That I will do, only lead on, he said. And truly, said I, it appears to be an inaccessible place, lying in deep shadows. It certainly is a dark covert,

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not easy to beat up. But all the same on we must go. Yes, on. And I caught view and gave a hulloa and said, Glaucon, I think we have found its trail and I don't believe it will get away from us. I am glad to hear that, said he. Truly, said I, we were slackers[*] indeed. How so? Why, all the time, bless your heart, the thing apparently was tumbling about our feet[*] from the start and yet we couldn't see it, but were most ludicrous, like

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people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands.[*] So we did not turn our eyes upon it, but looked off into the distance, which perhaps was the reason it escaped us. What do you mean? he said. This, I replied, that it seems to me that though we were speaking of it and hearing about it all the time we did not understand ourselves[*] or realize that we were speaking of it in a sense. That is a tedious prologue, he said, for an eager listener.

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Listen then, said I, and learn if there is anything in what I say. For what we laid down in the beginning as a universal requirement when we were founding our city, this I think, or[*] some form of this, is justice. And what we did lay down, and often said, you recall, was that each one man must perform one social service in the state for which his nature is best adapted. Yes, we said that. And again that to do one's own business and not to be a busybody is justice,

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is a saying that we have heard from many and have often repeated ourselves. [*] We have. This, then, I said, my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice,[*] this principle of doing one's own business. Do you know whence I infer this? No, but tell me, he said. I think that this is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness, courage, and intelligence, a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body politic and which when they have sprung up preserves them as long as it is present. And I hardly need to remind you that[*]

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we said that justice would be the residue after we had found the other three. That is an unavoidable conclusion, he said. But moreover, said I, if we were required to decide what it is whose indwelling presence will contribute most to making our city good, it would be a difficult decision whether it was the unanimity of rulers and ruled or the conservation in the minds of the soldiers of the convictions produced by law as to what things are or are not to be feared, or the watchful intelligence

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that resides in the guardians, or whether this is the chief cause of its goodness, the principle embodied in child, woman, slave, free, artisan, ruler, and ruled, that each performed his one task as one man and was not a versatile busybody. Hard to decide indeed, he said. A thing, then, that in its contribution to the excellence of a state vies with and rivals its wisdom, its soberness, its bravery, is this principle of everyone in it doing his own task. It is indeed, he said. And is not justice the name you would have to give[*] to the principle that rivals these as conducing to

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the virtue of state? By all means. Consider it in this wise too[*] if so you will be convinced. Will you not assign the conduct of lawsuits in your state to the rulers? Of course. Will not this be the chief aim of their decisions, that no one shall have what belongs to others[*] or be deprived of his own? Nothing else but this. On the assumption that this is just? Yes.

From this point of view too, then, the having[*] and doing

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of one's own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice. That is so. Consider now[*] whether you agree with me. A carpenter undertaking to do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter or their interchange of one another's tools or honors or even the attempt of the same man to do both—the confounding of all other functions would not, think you, greatly injure a state, would it? Not much, he said. But when I fancy one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of money-maker

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tempted and incited by wealth or command of votes or bodily strength or some similar advantage tries to enter into the class of the soldiers or one of the soldiers into the class of counsellors and guardians, for which he is not fitted, and these interchange their tools and their honors or when the same man undertakes all these functions at once, then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution and meddlesomeness is the ruin of a state. By all means. The interference with one another's business, then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one for the other

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is the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly[*] works it harm. Precisely so. And the thing that works the greatest harm to one's own state, will you not pronounce to be injustice? Of course. This, then, is injustice.

Again,[*] let us put it in this way. The proper functioning[*] of the money-making class, the helpers and the guardians, each doing its own work in the state, being the reverse of that[*] just described, would be justice and would render the city just.

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I think the case is thus and no otherwise, said he. Let us not yet affirm it quite fixedly,[*] I said, but if this form[*] when applied to the individual man, accepted there also as a definition of justice, we will then concede the point—for what else will there be to say? But if not, then we will look for something else. But now let us work out the inquiry in which[*] we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there,[*] we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man.

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And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in the good[*] city it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well.

But if something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return again

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to the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by side[*] and rubbing them against one another, as it were from the fire-

sticks[*] we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth,[*] and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds. Well, he said, that seems a sound method[*] and that is what we must do. Then, said I, if you call a thing by the same[*] name whether it is big or little, is it unlike in the way in which it is called the same or like? Like, he said. Then a just man too

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will not differ[*] at all from a just city in respect of the very form of justice, but will be like it. Yes, like. But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and habits[*] of these three kinds. True, he said. Then, my friend, we shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms

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in his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations. Inevitable, he said. Goodness gracious, said I, here is another trifling[*] inquiry into which we have plunged, the question whether the soul really contains these three forms in itself or not. It does not seem to me at all trifling, he said, for perhaps, Socrates, the saying is true that 'fine things are difficult.'[*] Apparently, said I;

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and let me tell you, Glaucon, that in my opinion we shall never in the world apprehend this matter[*] from such methods as we are now employing in discussion. For there is another longer and harder way that conducts to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of previous statements and inquiries. May we acquiesce in that? he said. I for my part should be quite satisfied with that for the present. And I surely should be more than satisfied, I replied. Don't you weary then, he said, but go on with the inquiry. Is it not, then,

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said I, impossible for us to avoid admitting[*] this much, that the same forms and qualities are to be found in each one of us that are in the state? They could not get there from any other source.

It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this quality as the populations of the Thracian and Scythian lands and generally of northern regions; or the quality of love of knowledge, which would chiefly be attributed to[*] the region where we dwell,

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or the love of money[*] which we might say is not least likely to be found in Phoenicians[*] and the population of Egypt. One certainly might, he replied. This is the fact then, said I, and there is no difficulty in recognizing it. Certainly not.

But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition
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and generation and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul[*] that we function in each case when we once begin. That is what is really hard to determine properly. I think so too, he said. Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether they are identical with one another in this way. How? It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites[*] in the same respect[*] in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find[*] these contradictions in the functions of the mind
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we shall know that it was[*] not the same thing functioning but a plurality. Very well. Consider, then, what I am saying. Say on, he replied. Is it possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at rest[*] and in motion? By no means. Let us have our understanding still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute. If anyone should say of a man standing still but moving his hands and head that the same man is at the same time at rest and in motion we should not, I take it, regard that as the right way of expressing it, but rather that a part[*] of him is at rest
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and a part in motion. Is not that so? It is. Then if the disputant should carry the jest still further with the subtlety that tops at any rate[*] stand still as a whole at the same time that they are in motion when with the peg fixed in one point they revolve, and that the same is true of any other case of circular motion about the same spot—we should reject the statement on the ground that the repose and the movement in such cases[*] were not in relation to the same parts of the objects, but we would say
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that there was a straight line and a circumference in them and that in respect of the straight line they are standing still[*] since they do not incline to either side, but in respect of the circumference they move in a circle; but that when as they revolve they incline the perpendicular to right or left or forward or back, then they are in no wise at rest. And that would be right, he said. No such remarks then will disconcert us or any whit the more make us believe that it is ever possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect and the same relation
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to suffer, be, [*] or do opposites. They will not me, I am sure, said he. All the same, said I, that we may not be forced to examine at tedious length the entire list of such contentions[*] and convince ourselves that they are false, let us proceed on the hypothesis[*] that this is so, with the understanding that, if it

ever appear otherwise, everything that results from the assumption shall be invalidated. That is what we must do, he said.

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Will you not then, said I, set down as opposed to one another assent and dissent, and the endeavor after a thing to the rejection of it, and embracing to repelling—do not these and all things like these belong to the class of opposite actions or passions; it will make no difference which?[*] None, said he, but they are opposites. What then, said I, of thirst and hunger and the appetites generally, and again consenting[*] and willing, would you not put them all somewhere in the classes

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just described? Will you not say, for example, that the soul of one who desires either strives for that which he desires or draws towards its embrace what it wishes to accrue to it; or again, in so far as it wills that anything be presented to it, nods assent to itself thereon as if someone put the question,[*] striving towards its attainment? I would say so, he said. But what of not-willing[*] and not consenting nor yet desiring, shall we not put these under the soul's rejection[*] and repulsion from itself and

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generally into the opposite class from all the former? Of course. This being so, shall we say that the desires constitute a class[*] and that the most conspicuous members of that class[*] are what we call thirst and hunger? We shall, said he. Is not the one desire of drink, the other of food? Yes. Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be of anything more than that of which we say it is a desire in the soul?[*] I mean is thirst thirst for hot drink or cold or much or little or in a word for a draught of any particular quality, or is it the fact that if heat[*]

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is attached[*] to the thirst it would further render the desire—a desire of cold, and if cold of hot? But if owing to the presence of muchness the thirst is much it would render it a thirst for much and if little for little. But mere thirst will never be desire of anything else than that of which it is its nature to be, mere drink,[*] and so hunger of food. That is so, he said; each desire in itself is of that thing only of which it is its nature to be. The epithets belong to the quality—such or such.[*]

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Let no one then,[*] said I, disconcert us when off our guard with the objection that everybody desires not drink but good drink and not food but good food, because (the argument will run[*]) all men desire good, and so, if thirst is desire, it would be of good drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similarly of other desires. Why, he said, there perhaps would seem to be something in that objection. But I need hardly remind you, said I,

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that of relative terms those that are somehow qualified are related to a qualified correlate, those that are severally just themselves to a correlate that is just itself.[*] I don't understand, he said. Don't you understand, said I, that the greater[*] is such as to be greater than something? Certainly. Is it not than the less? Yes. But the much greater than the much less. Is that not so? Yes. And may we add the one time greater than the one time less and that which will be greater than that which will be less? Surely.

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And similarly of the more towards the fewer, and the double towards the half and of all like cases, and again of the heavier towards the lighter, the swifter towards the slower, and yet again of the hot towards the cold and all cases of that kind.[*] does not the same hold? By all means. But what of the sciences? Is not the way of it the same? Science which is just that, is of knowledge which is just that, or is of whatsoever[*] we must assume the correlate of science to be. But a particular science of a particular kind is of some particular thing of a particular kind.

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I mean something like this: As there was a science of making a house it differed from other sciences so as to be named architecture. Certainly. Was not this by reason of its being of a certain kind[*] such as no other of all the rest? Yes. And was it not because it was of something of a certain kind that it itself became a certain kind of science? And similarly of the other arts and sciences? That is so.

This then, said I, if haply you now understand, is what you must say I then meant, by the statement that of all things that are such as to be of something those that are just themselves only are of things just themselves only,

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but things of a certain kind are of things of a kind. And I don't at all mean[*] that they are of the same kind as the things of which they are, so that we are to suppose that the science of health and disease is a healthy and diseased science and that of evil and good, evil and good. I only mean that as science became the science not of just the thing[*] of which science is but of some particular kind of thing, namely, of health and disease, the result[*] was that it itself became some kind of science and this caused it to be no longer called simply science but with the addition of the particular kind, medical science. I understand, he said, and agree that it is so.

To return to thirst, then, said I,

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will you not class it with the things[*] that are of something and say that it is what it is[*] in relation to something—and it is, I presume, thirst? I will, said he, —namely of drink. Then if the drink is of a certain kind, so is the thirst, but thirst that is just thirst is neither of much nor little nor good nor bad, nor in a word of any kind, but just thirst is naturally of just drink only. By all means.

The soul of the thirsty then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and

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yearns for this and its impulse is towards this. Obviously. Then if anything draws it back[*] when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which thirsts and drives it like a beast[*] to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing. We must admit that it does not. So I fancy it is not well said of the archer[*] that his hands at the same time thrust away the bow and draw it nigh, but we should rather say that there is one hand that puts it away and another that draws it to.

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By all means, he said. Are we to say, then, that some men sometimes though thirsty refuse to drink? We are indeed, he said, many and often. What then, said I, should one affirm about them? Is it not that there is[*] something in the soul that bids them drink and a something that forbids, a different something that masters that which bids? I think so. And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such actions arises when it arises from the calculations of reason,

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but the impulses which draw and drag come through affections[*] and diseases? Apparently. Not unreasonably, said I, shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rational[*] and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter[*] and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive—companion[*] of various repletions and pleasures. It would not be unreasonable but quite natural,

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he said, for us to think this. These two forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as actually existing in the soul. But now the Thumos[*] or principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger, is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one of these? Perhaps, he said, with one of these, the appetitive.

But, I said, I once heard a story[*] which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglaion, on his way up from the Peiraeus under the outer side of the northern wall,[*] becoming aware of dead bodies[*] that lay at the place of public execution at the same time felt a desire to see them and a repugnance and aversion, and that for a time

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he resisted[*] and veiled his head, but overpowered in despite of all by his desire, with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses and cried, There, ye wretches,[*] take your fill of the fine spectacle! I too, he said, have heard the story. Yet, surely, this anecdote, I said, signifies that the principle of anger sometimes fights against desires as an alien thing against an alien. Yes, it

does, he said.

And do we not, said I, on many other occasions observe when his desires constrain a man contrary to his reason

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that he reviles himself and is angry with that within which masters him and that as it were in a faction of two parties the high spirit of such a man becomes the ally of his reason? But its[*] making common cause[*] with the desires against the reason when reason whispers low[*] Thou must not—that, I think, is a kind of thing you would not affirm ever to have perceived in yourself, nor, I fancy, in anybody else either.

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No, by heaven, he said. Again, when a man thinks himself to be in the wrong, [*] is it not true that the nobler he is the less is he capable of anger though suffering hunger and cold[*] and whatsoever else at the hands of him whom he believes to be acting justly therein, and as I say[*] his spirit refuses to be aroused against such a one? True, he said. But what when a man believes himself to be wronged, does not his spirit in that case[*] seethe and grow fierce (and also because of his suffering hunger,

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cold and the like) and make itself the ally of what he judges just, and in noble souls[*] it endures and wins the victory and will not let go until either it achieves its purpose, or death ends all, or, as a dog is called back by a shepherd, it is called back by the reason within and calmed. Your similitude is perfect, he said, and it confirms[*] our former statements that the helpers are as it were dogs subject to the rulers who are as it were the shepherds of the city. You apprehend my meaning excellently, said I. But do you also

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take note of this? Of what? That what we now think about the spirited element is just the opposite of our recent surmise. For then we supposed it to be a part of the appetitive, but now, far from that, we say that, in the factions[*] of the soul, it much rather marshals itself on the side of the reason. By all means, he said.

Is it then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the appetitive, or just as in the city there were

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three existing kinds that composed its structure, the moneymakers, the helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture? We have to assume it as a third, he said. Yes, said I, provided[*] it shall have been shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the appetitive. That is not hard to be shown, he said; for that much one can see in children, that they are from

their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason,
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some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the majority quite late. Yes, by heaven, excellently said, I replied; and further, one could see in animals that what you say is true. And to these instances we may add the testimony of Homer quoted above:

He smote his breast and chided thus his heart.

Hom. Od. 20.17 For there Homer has clearly represented that in us
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which has reflected about the better and the worse as rebuking that which feels unreasoning anger as if it were a distinct and different thing. You are entirely right, he said.

Through these waters, then, said I, we have with difficulty made our way[*] and we are fairly agreed that the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state and in the soul of each one of us. That is so. Then does not the necessity of our former postulate immediately follow, that as and whereby[*] the state was wise so and thereby is the individual wise? Surely. And so whereby and as

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the individual is brave, thereby and so is the state brave, and that both should have all the other constituents of virtue in the same way[*]? Necessarily. Just too, then, Glaucon, I presume we shall say a man is in the same way in which a city was just. That too is quite inevitable. But we surely cannot have forgotten this, that the state was just by reason of each of the three classes found in it fulfilling its own function. I don't think we have forgotten, he said. We must remember, then, that each of us also in whom[*] the several parts within him

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perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair. We must indeed remember, he said. Does it not belong to the rational part to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and to the principle of high spirit to be subject to this and its ally? Assuredly.

Then is it not, as we said,[*] the blending of music and gymnastics that will render them concordant, intensifying

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and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm? Quite so, said he. And these two thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase,[*] will preside over the appetitive part which is the mass[*] of the soul in each of us and the most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the body[*] and so waxing big and

strong, it may not keep to[*] its own work

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but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fitting[*] that it should, and so overturn[*] the entire life of all. By all means, he said. Would not these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from without[*] also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel, [*] the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler's designs? That is so. Brave, too, then, I take it, we call

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each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures[*] the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared. Right, he said. But wise by that small part that[*] ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possession[*] in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three. By all means. And again, was he not sober

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by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it? The virtue of soberness certainly, said he, is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an individual. But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have so often[*] described. That is altogether necessary. Well then, said I, has our idea of justice in any way lost the edge[*] of its contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed itself to be in the state? I think not, he said.

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We might, I said, completely confirm your reply and our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our definition—by applying commonplace and vulgar[*] tests to it. What are these?

For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a deposit[*] of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would be more likely so to act

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than men of a different kind? No one would, he said. And would not he be far removed from sacrilege and theft and betrayal of comrades in private life or of the state in public? He would. And, moreover, he would not be in any way faithless either in the keeping of his oaths or in other agreements. How could he? Adultery, surely, and neglect of parents and of the due service of the gods would pertain to anyone rather than to such a man. To anyone indeed,

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he said. And is not the cause of this to be found in the fact that each of the

principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled? Yes, that and nothing else. Do you still, then, look for justice to be anything else than this potency which provides men and cities of this sort?

No, by heaven, he said, I do not.

Finished, then, is our dream and perfected —the surmise we spoke of,[*] that, by some Providence, at the very beginning of our foundation of the state, 443c

we chanced to hit upon the original principle and a sort of type of justice. Most assuredly. It really was, it seems, Glaucon, which is why it helps,[*] a sort of adumbration of justice, this principle that it is right for the cobbler by nature to cobble and occupy himself with nothing else, and the carpenter to practice carpentry, and similarly all others. But the truth of the matter[*] was, as it seems,

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that justice is indeed something of this kind, yet not in regard to the doing of one's own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one's self, and the things of one's self—it means that[*] a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own,[*] and having first attained to self-mastery[*] and beautiful order[*] within himself, [*] and having harmonized[*] these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean,

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and all others there may be between them, and having linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit,[*] one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practice if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendance of the body or it may be in political action or private business, in all such doings believing and naming[*] the just and honorable action to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of soul, and wisdom the science

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that presides over such conduct; and believing and naming the unjust action to be that which ever tends to overthrow this spiritual constitution, and brutish ignorance, to be the opinion[*] that in turn presides[*] over this.

What you say is entirely true, Socrates. Well, said I, if we should affirm that we had found the just man and state and what justice really is[*] in them, I think we should not be much mistaken. No indeed, we should not, he said. Shall we affirm it, then? Let us so affirm.

So be it, then, said I; next after this, I take it, we must consider injustice.

Obviously.

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Must not this be a kind of civil war[*] of these three principles, their

meddlesomeness[*] and interference with one another's functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature is such that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle? Something of this sort, I fancy, is what we shall say, and that the confusion of these principles and their straying from their proper course is injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and brutish ignorance and, in general,[*] all turpitude. Precisely this,

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he replied. Then, said I, to act unjustly and be unjust and in turn to act justly the meaning of all these terms becomes at once plain and clear, since injustice and justice are so. How so? Because, said I, these are in the soul what[*] the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body; there is no difference. In what respect? he said. Healthful things surely engender health[*] and diseaseful disease. Yes. Then does not doing just acts engender justice

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and unjust injustice? Of necessity. But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating and being dominated[*] by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature. Yes, that is so. And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature? Exactly so, he said. Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health[*]

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and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be disease,[*] ugliness, and weakness. It is so. Then is it not also true that beautiful and honorable pursuits tend to the winning of virtue and the ugly to vice? Of necessity.

And now at last, it seems, it remains for us to consider whether it is profitable to do justice

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and practice honorable pursuits and be just, whether[*] one is known to be such or not, or whether injustice profits, and to be unjust, if only a man escape punishment and is not bettered by chastisement.[*]Nay, Socrates, he said, I think that from this point on our inquiry becomes an absurdity[*]—if, while life is admittedly intolerable with a ruined constitution of body even though accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world, we are yet to be asked to suppose that, when the very nature and constitution of that whereby we live[*] is disordered

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and corrupted, life is going to be worth living, if a man can only do as he pleases,[*] and pleases to do anything save that which will rid him of evil and injustice and make him possessed of justice and virtue—now that the two

have been shown to be as we have described them. Yes, it is absurd, said I; but nevertheless, now that we have won to this height, we must not grow weary in endeavoring to discover[*] with the utmost possible clearness that these things are so. That is the last thing in the world we must do, he said.
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Come up here[*] then, said I, that you may see how many are the kinds of evil, I mean those that it is worth while to observe and distinguish.[*] I am with you, he said; only do you say on. And truly, said I, now that we have come to this height[*] of argument I seem to see as from a point of outlook that there is one form[*] of excellence, and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet that there are some four among them that it is worth while to take note of. What do you mean? he said. As many as are the varieties of political constitutions that constitute specific types, so many, it seems likely,
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are the characters of soul. How many, pray? There are five kinds of constitutions, said I, and five kinds of soul. Tell me what they are, he said. I tell you, said I, that one way of government would be the constitution that we have just expounded, but the names that might be applied to it are two.[*] If one man of surpassing merit rose among the rulers, it would be denominated royalty; if more than one, aristocracy. True, he said. Well, then, I said, this is one of the forms I have in mind.
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For neither would a number of such men, nor one if he arose among them, alter to any extent worth mentioning the laws of our city—if he preserved the breeding and the education that we have described. It is not likely, he said.

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ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καλῶ, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον· κακὰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, εἴτερ αὕτη ὀρθή, περὶ τε πόλεων διοικήσεις καὶ περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπον κατασκευὴν, ἐν τέτταρσι πονηρίας εἶδουσιν οὐσας.

ποίας δὴ ταύτας; ἔφη.

καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἦα τὰς ἐφεξῆς ἐρῶν, ὥς μοι ἐφαίνοντο

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ἐκασται ἐξ ἀλλήλων μεταβαίνειν· ὁ δὲ Πολέμαρχος— σμικρὸν γὰρ ἄπωτέρω τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου καθῆστο— ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου ἄνωθεν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τὸν ὦμον, ἐκεῖνόν τε προσηγάγετο καὶ προτείνας ἑαυτὸν ἔλεγεν ἄττα προσκεκυφώς, ὦν ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν κατηκούσαμεν, τὸδε δέ· Ἀφήσομεν οὔν, ἔφη, ἢ τί δράσομεν;

ἡκιστὰ γε, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδειμάντος μέγα ἥδη λέγων.

καὶ ἐγὼ, τί μάλιστα, ἔφην, ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε;

σέ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

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ὅτι, ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα;

ἀπορραθυμεῖν ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καὶ εἶδος ὅλον οὐ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκκλέπτειν τοῦ λόγου ἵνα μὴ διέλθῃς, καὶ λήσῃσι οἰηθῆναι εἰπὼν αὐτὸ φαύλως, ὥς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται.

οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς, ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδειμάντε;

ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ τᾶλλα, λόγου δεῖται τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο.

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μὴ οὔν παρῆς ὄντινα σὺ λέγεις· ὥς ἡμεῖς πάλαι περιμένομεν οἰόμενοι σέ που μνησθήσεσθαι παιδοποιίας τε πέρι, πῶς παιδοποιήσονται, καὶ γενομένους πῶς θρέψουσιν, καὶ ὅλην ταύτην ἣν λέγεις κοινωνίαν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν· μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα φέρειν καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον.

νῦν οὔν, ἐπειδὴ ἄλλης ἐπιλαμβάνῃ πολιτείας πρὶν ταῦτα ἱκανῶς διελέσθαι, δέδοκται ἡμῖν τοῦτο

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ὁ σὺ ἤκουσας, τὸ σέ μὴ μεθίναν πρὶν ἂν ταῦτα πάντα ὥσπερ τᾶλλα διέλθῃς.

καὶ ἐμὲ τοίνυν, ὁ Γλαῦκων ἔφη, κοινωνὸν τῆς ψήφου ταύτης τίθετε.

ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, πᾶσι ταῦτα δεδογμένα ἡμῖν νόμιζε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰργάσασθε ἐπιλαβόμενοι μου. ὅσον λόγον πάλιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας· ἦν ὥς ἥδη διεληλυθὼς ἔγωγε ἔχαιρον,

ἀγαπῶν εἴ τις ἐάσοι ταῦτα ἀποδεξάμενος ὡς τότε ἐρρήθη. ἃ νῦν ὑμεῖς
παρακαλοῦντες

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οὐκ ἴστε ὅσον ἐσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρετε· ὃν ὁρῶν ἐγὼ παρήκα τότε, μὴ
παράσχοι πολὺν ὄχλον.

τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Θρασύμαχος· χρυσοχοήσοντας οἶει τοῦσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε
ἀφίχθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγων ἀκουσομένους;

ναί, εἶπον, μετρίων γε.

μέτρον δέ γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαῦκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ
βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον ἔα· σὺ δὲ περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶμεν
μηδαμῶς ἀποκάμῃς ἢ

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σοι δοκεῖ διεξιῶν, τίς ἡ κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν ἡμῖν παίδων τε πέρι καὶ
γυναικῶν ἔσται καὶ τροφῆς νέων ἔτι ὄντων, τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ
γιγνομένης γενέσεώς τε καὶ παιδείας, ἣ δὴ ἐπιπονωτάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι. πειρῶ
οὖν εἰπεῖν τίνα τρόπον δεῖ γίγνεσθαι αὐτήν.

οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ εὐδαιμον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διελθεῖν· πολλὰς γὰρ ἀπιστίας ἔχει ἔτι
μᾶλλον τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὧν διήλθομεν. καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπιστοῖτ'
ἄν, καὶ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα γένοιτο, ὡς ἄριστ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, καὶ ταῦτη
ἀπιστήσεται.

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διὸ δὴ καὶ ὅκνος τις αὐτῶν ἄπτεσθαι, μὴ εὐχὴ δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος, ὦ φίλε
ἐταῖρε.

μηδέν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅκνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγνώμονες οὔτε ἄπιστοι οὔτε δύσνοι οἱ
ἀκουσόμενοι.

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ ἄριστε, ἢ που βουλόμενός με παραθαρρύνειν λέγεις;
ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

πᾶν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦναντίον ποιεῖς. πιστεύοντος μὲν γὰρ ἐμοῦ ἐμοὶ
εἰδέναι ἃ λέγω, καλῶς εἶχεν ἢ παραμυθία· ἐν γὰρ φρονίμοις τε καὶ φίλοις
περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ

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φίλων τάληθ' εἰδότα λέγειν ἀσφαλές καὶ θαρραλέον,
ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ

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ἐγὼ δρῶ, φοβερόν τε καὶ σφαλερόν, οὗ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν— παιδικὸν γὰρ
τοῦτο γε—ἀλλὰ μὴ σφαλεῖς τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
φίλους συνεπισπασάμενος κείσομαι περὶ ἃ ἥκιστα δεῖ σφάλλεσθαι.
προσκυνῶ δὲ Ἀδράστειαν, ὦ Γλαῦκων, χάριν οὗ μέλλω λέγειν· ἐλπίζω γὰρ
οὖν ἔλαττον ἀμάρτημα ἀκουσίως τινὸς φονέα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπατεῶνα καλῶν
τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων πέρι. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κινδύνευμα
κινδυνεύειν ἐν ἐχθροῖς κρεῖττον ἢ

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φίλοις, ὥστε εὖ με παραμυθῇ.

καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων γελάσας, ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐάν τι πάθωμεν πλημμελὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἀφίεμέν σε ὥσπερ φόνου καὶ καθαρὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀπατεῶνα ἡμῶν. ἀλλὰ θαρρήσας λέγε.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, καθαρὸς γε καὶ ἐκεῖ ὁ ἀφεθείς, ὡς ὁ νόμος λέγει· εἰκὸς δέ γε, εἴπερ ἐκεῖ, κἀνθάδε.

λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, τούτου γ' ἕνεκα.

λέγειν δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, χρὴ ἀνάπαλιν αὖ νῦν, ἃ τότε ἴσως

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ἔδει ἐφεξῆς λέγειν· τάχα δὲ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι, μετὰ ἀνδρεῖον δρᾶμα παντελῶς διαπερανθὲν τὸ γυναικεῖον αὖ περαίνειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ σὺ οὕτω προκαλεῖ.

ἀνθρώποις γὰρ φύσι καὶ παιδευθεῖσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη ὀρθὴ παιδων τε καὶ γυναικῶν κτῆσις τε καὶ χρεῖα ἢ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν ὀρμὴν ἰοῦσιν, ἥνπερ τὸ πρῶτον ὠρμήσαμεν· ἐπεχειρήσαμεν δέ που ὡς ἀγέλης φύλακας τοὺς ἄνδρας καθιστάναι τῷ λόγῳ.

ναί.

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ἀκολουθοῦμεν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν παραπλησίαν ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἡμῖν πρέπει ἢ οὐ.

πῶς; ἔφη.

ὥδε. τὰς θηλείας τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν πότερα συμφυλάττειν οἰόμεθα δεῖν ἅπερ ἂν οἱ ἄρρενες φυλάττωσι καὶ συνθηρεῦειν καὶ τᾶλλα κοινῇ πράττειν, ἢ τὰς μὲν οἰκουρεῖν ἔνδον ὡς ἀδυνάτους διὰ τὸν τῶν σκυλάκων τόκον τε καὶ τροφήν, τοὺς δὲ πονεῖν τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν περὶ τὰ ποιμνία;

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κοινῇ, ἔφη, πάντα· πλὴν ὡς ἀσθενεστέραις χρώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἰσχυροτέροις.

οἷόν τ' οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ χρῆσθαι τινι ζώῳ, ἂν μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἀποδιδῷς;

οὐχ οἷόν τε.

εἰ ἄρα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἐπὶ ταῦτά χρῆσόμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ταῦτά καὶ διδασκτέον αὐτάς.

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ναί.

μουσικὴ μὴν ἐκείνοις γε καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἐδόθη.

ναί.

καὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἄρα τούτῳ τῷ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀποδοτέον καὶ χρηστότεον κατὰ ταῦτά.

εἰκὸς ἐξ ὧν λέγεις, ἔφη.

ἴσως δὴ, εἶπον, παρὰ τὸ ἔθος γελοῖα ἂν φαίνοιτο πολλὰ περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, εἰ πράζεται ἢ λέγεται.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

τί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γελοιότατον αὐτῶν ὀρᾷς; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι γυμνὰς τὰς γυναῖκας

ἐν ταῖς παλαιστραῖς γυμναζομένης μετὰ

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τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐ μόνον τὰς νέας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤδη τὰς πρεσβυτέρας, ὥσπερ τοὺς γέροντας ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις, ὅταν ῥυσοὶ καὶ μὴ ἡδεῖς τὴν ὄψιν ὁμῶς φιλογυμναστῶσιν;

νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· γελοῖον γὰρ ἄν, ὥς γε ἐν τῷ παρεστῶτι, φανείη. οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπεὶπερ ὠρμήσαμεν λέγειν, οὐ φοβητέον τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώμματα, ὅσα καὶ οἷα ἂν εἴποιεν εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολὴν γενομένην καὶ περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια

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καὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄπλων σχέσιν καὶ ἵππων ὀχήσεις.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶπερ λέγειν ἠρξάμεθα, πορευτέον πρὸς τὸ τραχὺ τοῦ νόμου, δεηθεῖσιν τε τούτων μὴ τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν ἀλλὰ σπουδάζειν, καὶ ὑπομνήσασιν ὅτι οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐξ οὗ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐδόκει αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα ἅπερ νῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων, γυμνοὺς ἄνδρας ὀρᾶσθαι, καὶ ὅτε ἦρχοντο τῶν γυμνασίων πρῶτοι μὲν Κρηῖτες, ἔπειτα Λακεδαιμόνιοι,

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ἐξῆν τοῖς τότε ἀστείοις πάντα ταῦτα κωμωδεῖν. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

ἔγωγε.

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶδὴ οἷμαι χρωμένοις ἄμεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρῆν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου· καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείξατο, ὅτι μάταιος ὁ γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὄψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοίου ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἄφρονός

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τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στησάμενος ἢ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνομολογητέον, εἰ δυνατὰ ἢ οὐ, καὶ δοτέον ἀμφισβήτησιν εἴτε τις φιλοπαίσιμων εἴτε σπουδαστικὸς ἐθέλει ἀμφισβητῆσαι, πότερον

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δυνατὴ φύσις ἢ ἀνθρωπίνη ἢ θήλεια τῇ τοῦ ἄρρενος γένους κοινωνῆσαι εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ ἔργα ἢ οὐδ' εἰς ἓν, ἢ εἰς τὰ μὲν οἷα τε, εἰς δὲ τὰ οὐ, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ποτέρων ἐστίν; ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως ἂν κάλλιστα τις ἀρχόμενος ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ κάλλιστα τελευτήσειεν;

πολύ γε, ἔφη.

βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡμεῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμφισβητήσωμεν, ἵνα μὴ ἔρημα τὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου λόγου πολιορκῇται;

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οὐδέν, ἔφη, κωλύει.

λέγωμεν δὴ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Γλαῦκων, οὐδὲν δεῖ ὑμῖν
ἄλλους ἀμφισβητεῖν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κατοικίσεως, ἦν ὠκίζετε πόλιν,
ὠμολογεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἓνα ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.

ὠμολογήσαμεν οἶμαι· πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως οὐ πάμπολυ διαφέρει γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς τὴν φύσιν;

πῶς δ' οὐ διαφέρει;

οὐκοῦν ἄλλο καὶ ἔργον ἑκατέρῳ προσήκει προστάττειν

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τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν;

τί μήν;

πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνετε νυνὶ καὶ τάναντία ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγετε φάσκοντες

αὐ τοὺς ἀνδρας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράττειν, πλεῖστον

κεχωρισμένην φύσιν ἔχοντας; ἔξεις τι, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς ταῦτ'

ἀπολογεῖσθαι;

ὡς μὲν ἐξαίφνης, ἔφη, οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον· ἀλλὰ σοῦ δεήσομαι τε καὶ δέομαι

καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λόγον, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, ἐρμηνεῦσαι.

ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ

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τοιαῦτα, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι προορῶν ἐφοβούμην τε καὶ ὤκνουν ἄπτεσθαι τοῦ

νόμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων κτῆσιν καὶ τροφήν.

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν.

οὐ γάρ, εἶπον. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὧδ' ἔχει· ἄντε τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ

ἄντε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέον σώζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ἥτοι

δελφινὰ τινα ἐλπιζοντας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἂν ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἀπορον σωτηρίαν.

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ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐάν πη εὐρωμεν τὴν ἔξοδον. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ

ἄλλην φύσιν ἄλλο δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύειν, γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἄλλην εἶναι·

τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις τὰ αὐτὰ φάμεν νῦν δεῖν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι. ταῦτα ἡμῶν

κατηγορεῖται;

κομιδῇ γε.

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ἦ γενναία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης.

τί δὴ;

ὅτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἶεσθαι

οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ

λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν

ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

ἔστι γὰρ δὴ, ἔφη, περὶ πολλοὺς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος· ἀλλὰ μῶν καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς

τοῦτο τείνει ἐν τῷ παρόντι;

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παντάσασι μὲν οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ· κινδυνεύομεν γοῦν ἄκοντες ἀντιλογίας
ἄπτεσθαι.

πῶς;

τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ὅτι οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τυγχάνειν πάνυ
ἀνδρείως τε καὶ ἐριστικῶς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκομεν, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δὲ οὐδ'
ὀπιοῦν τι εἶδος τὸ τῆς ἐτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τι τεῖνον
ὠριζόμεθα τότε, ὅτε τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἄλλη φύσει ἄλλα, τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτὰ
ἀπεδίδομεν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα.

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τοιγάρτοι, εἶπον, ἔξεστιν ἡμῖν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἀνερωτᾶν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ
φύσις φαλακρῶν καὶ κομητῶν καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐναντία, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ὁμολογῶμεν
ἐναντίαν εἶναι, ἐὰν φαλακροὶ σκυτοτομῶσιν, μὴ ἔαν κομήτας, ἐὰν δ' αὖ
κομῇται, μὴ τοὺς ἐτέρους.

γελοῖον μεντᾶν εἶη, ἔφη.

ἄρα κατ' ἄλλο τι, εἶπον ἐγώ, γελοῖον, ἢ ὅτι τότε οὐ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ
τὴν ἐτέραν φύσιν ἐπιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως τε καὶ
ὁμοιώσεως μόνον

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ἐφυλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τεῖνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα; οἷον ἱατρικὸν μὲν καὶ
ἱατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐλέγομεν· ἢ οὐκ οἶει;
ἐγwege.

ἱατρικὸν δέ γε καὶ τεκτονικὸν ἄλλην;

πάντως που.

οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος, ἐὰν μὲν
πρὸς τέχνην τινὰ ἢ ἄλλο ἐπιτήδευμα διαφέρον φαίνεται, τοῦτο δὴ φήσομεν
ἐκατέρωθι δεῖν ἀποδιδόναι· ἐὰν δ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ φαίνεται διαφέρειν, τῷ τὸ μὲν
θῆλυ τίκτειν,

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τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν ὀχεύειν, οὐδέν τι πω φήσομεν μᾶλλον ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὥς πρὸς ὃ
ἡμεῖς λέγομεν διαφέρει γυνὴ ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἔπι οἰησόμεθα δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ
ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς τε φύλακας ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο κελεύομεν τὸν τὰ ἐναντία λέγοντα

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τοῦτο αὐτὸ διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς, πρὸς τίνα τέχνην ἢ τί ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν περὶ
πόλεως κατασκευὴν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀλλὰ ἕτερα φύσις γυναικός τε καὶ ἀνδρός;
δίκαιον γοῦν.

τάχα τοίνυν ἄν, ὅπερ σὺ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἶποι ἄν καὶ ἄλλος, ὅτι ἐν
μὲν τῷ παραχρήμα ἱκανῶς εἰπεῖν οὐ ῥάδιον, ἐπισκεψαμένῳ δὲ οὐδὲν
χαλεπὸν.

εἶποι γὰρ ἄν.

βούλει οὖν δεώμεθα τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντιλέγοντος ἀκολουθεῖν

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ἡμῖν, ἐάν πως ἡμεῖς ἐκείνῳ ἐνδειξώμεθα ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδευμα ἴδιον
γυναικὶ πρὸς διοίκησιν πόλεως;

πάνυ γε.

ἴθι δὴ, φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀποκρίνου· ἄρα οὕτως ἔλεγες τὸν μὲν εὐφυῆ
πρὸς τι εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀφυῆ, ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν ῥαδίως τι μανθάνοι, ὁ δὲ χαλεπῶς;
καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ βραχείας μαθήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ εὐρετικὸς εἴη οὗ ἔμαθεν, ὁ δὲ
πολλῆς μαθήσεως τυχὼν καὶ μελέτης μὴδ' ἅ ἔμαθε σῶζοιτο; καὶ τῷ μὲν τὰ
τοῦ σώματος ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετοῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, τῷ

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δὲ ἐναντιοῖτο; ἄρ' ἄλλα ἅττα ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα, οἷς τὸν εὐφυῆ πρὸς ἕκαστα καὶ
τὸν μὴ ὠρίζου;

οὐδείς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἄλλα φήσει.

οἷσθα τι οὖν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μελετώμενον, ἐν ᾧ οὐ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ τῶν
ἀνδρῶν γένος διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ μακρολογῶμεν τήν τε
ὕφαντικὴν λέγοντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ποπάνων τε καὶ ἐφημάτων θεραπείαν, ἐν
οἷς δὴ τι δοκεῖ τὸ γυναικεῖον γένος εἶναι, οὗ καὶ καταγελαστότατόν

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ἐστὶ πάντων ἡττώμενον;

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅτι πολὺ κρατεῖται ἐν ἅπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τὸ γένος
τοῦ γένους. γυναῖκες μέντοι πολλὰ καὶ πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν βελτίους εἰς πολλὰ· τὸ
δὲ ὅλον ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις.

οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν πόλιν διοικούντων γυναικὸς διότι
γυνή, οὐδ' ἀνδρὸς διότι ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως διεσπαρμέναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν
ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ζώοις, καὶ πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνὴ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ

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φύσιν, πάντων δὲ ἀνὴρ, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός.

πάνυ γε.

ἦ οὖν ἀνδράσι πάντα προστάξομεν, γυναικὶ δ' οὐδέν;

καὶ πῶς;

ἀλλ' ἔστι γὰρ οἶμαι, ὡς φήσομεν, καὶ γυνὴ ἱατρικὴ, ἢ δ' οὐ, καὶ μουσικὴ, ἢ
δ' ἀμουσος φύσει.

τί μήν;

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καὶ γυμναστικὴ δ' ἄρα οὐ, οὐδὲ πολεμικὴ, ἢ δὲ ἀπόλεμος καὶ οὐ
φιλογυμναστικὴ;

οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

τί δέ; φιλόσοφος τε καὶ μισόσοφος; καὶ θυμοειδής, ἢ δ' ἄθυμὸς ἐστὶ;

καὶ ταῦτα.

ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ φυλακικὴ γυνή, ἢ δ' οὐ. ἢ οὐ τοιαύτην καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν
φυλακικῶν φύσιν ἐξελεξάμεθα;

τοιαύτην μὲν οὖν.

καὶ γυναικὸς ἄρα καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις εἰς φυλακὴν πόλεως, πλὴν ὅσα

ἀσθενεστέρα, ἢ δὲ ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστίν.

φαίνεται.

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καὶ γυναῖκες ἄρα αἱ τοιαῦται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδράσιν ἐκλεκτέαι συνοικεῖν τε καὶ συμφυλάττειν, ἐπεὶ περ εἰσὶν ἱκαναὶ καὶ συγγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν.

πάνυ γε.

τὰ δ' ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέα ταῖς αὐταῖς φύσεσιν;

τὰ αὐτά.

ἥκομεν ἄρα εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξὶ μουσικὴν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἀποδιδόναι.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὅμοια ἐνομοθετοῦμεν,

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ἐπεὶ περ κατὰ φύσιν ἐτίθεμεν τὸν νόμον· ἀλλὰ τὰ νῦν παρὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, ὥς ἔοικε, γίγνεται.

ἔοικεν.

οὐκοῦν ἢ ἐπίσκεψις ἡμῖν ἦν εἰ δυνατά γε καὶ βέλτιστα λέγοιμεν;

ἦν γάρ.

καὶ ὅτι μὲν δὴ δυνατά, διωμολόγηται;

ναί.

ὅτι δὲ δὴ βέλτιστα, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο δεῖ διομολογηθῆναι;

δεῖλον.

οὐκοῦν πρὸς γε τὸ φυλακικὴν γυναῖκα γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν ἡμῖν ἄνδρας ποιήσει παιδεία, ἄλλη δὲ γυναῖκας, ἄλλως

456d

τε καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν παραλαβοῦσα;

οὐκ ἄλλη.

πῶς οὖν ἔχεις δόξης τοῦ τοιοῦδε πέρι;

τίνος δὴ;

τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν παρὰ σεαυτῷ τὸν μὲν ἀμείνω ἄνδρα, τὸν δὲ χεῖρω· ἢ

πάντας ὁμοίους ἡγῆ;

οὐδαμῶς.

ἐν οὖν τῇ πόλει ἦν ὠκίζομεν, πότερον οἷοι ἡμῖν ἀμείνους ἄνδρας ἐξειργάσθαι τοὺς φύλακας, τυχόντας ἥς διήλθομεν παιδείας, ἢ τοὺς

σκυτοτόμους, τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευθέντας;

γελοῖον, ἔφη, ἐρωτᾷς.

μανθάνω, ἔφην. τί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν οὐχ οὕτοι

456e

ἄριστοι;

πολὺ γε.

τί δέ; αἱ γυναῖκες τῶν γυναικῶν οὐχ αὗται ἔσονται βέλτισται;

καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, πολὺ.

ἔστι δέ τι πόλει ἀμείνον ἢ γυναικᾶς τε καὶ ἄνδρας ὥς ἀρίστους ἐγγίγνεσθαι;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

τοῦτο δὲ μουσική τε καὶ γυμναστική παραγιγνόμεναι, ὥς

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ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν, ἀπεργάσσονται;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

οὐ μόνον ἄρα δυνατόν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄριστον πόλει νόμιμον ἐτίθεμεν.

οὕτως.

ἀποδυτέον δὴ ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν, ἐπεὶ περ ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἱματίων ἀμφιέσονται, καὶ κοινωνητέον πολέμου τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης φυλακῆς τῆς περὶ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρακτέον· τούτων δ' αὐτῶν τὰ ἐλαφρότερα ταῖς γυναιξίν ἢ τοῖς ἀνδράσι δοτέον διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀσθένειαν. ὁ

457b

δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ γυμναῖς γυναιξί, τοῦ βελτίστου ἔνεκα γυμναζομέναις, ἀτελῇ

τοῦ γελοίου

σοφίας δρέπων καρπὸν

, οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ᾧ γελᾷ οὐδ' ὅτι πράττει· κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφελίμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ᾧ περ κῦμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν τοῦ γυναικείου πέρι νόμου λέγοντες, ὥστε μὴ παντάπασι κατακλυσθῆναι τιθέντας ὥς δεῖ κοινῇ πάντα ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς τε

457c

φυλάκας ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς φυλακίδας, ἀλλὰ πῃ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι ὥς δυνατόν τε καὶ ὠφελίμα λέγει;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὐ σμικρὸν κῦμα διαφεύγεις.

φήσεις γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὅταν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἴδῃς.

λέγε δὴ, ἴδω, ἔφη.

τούτῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔπεται νόμος καὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, ὅδε.

τίς;

τὰς γυναῖκας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάντων πάσας

457d

εἶναι κοινὰς, ἰδίᾳ δὲ μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν συνοικεῖν· καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὖ κοινούς, καὶ μήτε γονέα ἔκγονον εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτοῦ μήτε παῖδα γονέα.

πολύ, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐκείνου μεῖζον πρὸς ἀπιστίαν καὶ τοῦ δυνατόυ πέρι καὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου.

οὐκ οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ γε τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἄν, ὥς οὐ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κοινὰς μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι, κοινούς δὲ τοὺς παῖδας, εἴπερ οἶόν τε· ἀλλ' οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ εἰ δυνατόν ἢ μὴ πλείστην ἄν ἀμφισβήτησιν γενέσθαι.

457e

περὶ ἀμφοτέρων, ἥ δ' ὅς, εὖ μάλ' ἂν ἀμφισβητηθεῖη.
λέγεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λόγων σύστασιν· ἐγὼ δ' ὦμην ἔκ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου
ἀποδράσασθαι, εἴ σοι δόξειεν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι, λοιπὸν δὲ δὴ μοι ἔσσεσθαι περὶ
τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ μὴ.

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἀποδιδράσκων, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρων πέρι δίδου λόγον.
ὑφεκτέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκην. τοσόνδε μέντοι χάρισαι

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μοι· ἕασόν με ἑορτάσαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄργοι τὴν διάνοιαν εἰώθασιν ἐστιᾶσθαι
ὑφ' ἐαυτῶν, ὅταν μόνοι πορεύωνται. καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοί που, πρὶν ἐξευρεῖν
τίνα τρόπον ἔσται τι ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τοῦτο παρέντες, ἵνα μὴ κάμνωσι
βουλευόμενοι περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ μὴ, θέντες ὡς ὑπάρχον εἶναι ὃ
βούλονται, ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διατάττουσιν καὶ χαίρουσιν διεξιόντες οἷα
δράσουσι γενομένου, ἄργον καὶ ἄλλως ψυχὴν ἔτι

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ἀργότεραν ποιοῦντες. ἤδη οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς μαλθακίζομαι, καὶ ἐκεῖνα μὲν
ἐπιθυμῶ ἀναβαλέσθαι καὶ ὕστερον ἐπισκέψασθαι, ἥ δυνατά, νῦν δὲ ὡς
δυνατῶν ὄντων θεὸς σκέψομαι, ἄν μοι παριῆς, πῶς διατάξουσιν αὐτὰ οἱ
ἄρχοντες γιγνόμενα, καὶ ὅτι πάντων συμφορώτατ' ἂν εἴη πραχθέντα τῇ τε
πόλει καὶ τοῖς φύλαξιν. ταῦτα πειράσομαι σοι πρότερα συνδιασκοπεῖσθαι,
ὕστερα δ' ἐκεῖνα, εἴπερ παριεῖς.

ἀλλὰ παρήμι, ἔφη, καὶ σκόπει.

οἶμαι τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ἔσονται οἱ ἄρχοντες ἄξιοι

458c

τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἷ τε τούτοις ἐπίκουροι κατὰ ταῦτά, τοὺς μὲν
ἐθελήσειν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιταττόμενα, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιτάξειν, τὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς
πειθομένους τοῖς νόμοις, τὰ δὲ καὶ μιμουμένους, ὅσα ἂν ἐκείνοις
ἐπιτρέψωμεν.

εἰκός, ἔφη.

σὺ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξέλεξας,
οὕτω καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐκλέξας παραδώσεις καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε ὁμοφυεῖς· οἱ
δὲ, ἅτε οἰκίας τε καὶ συσσίτια κοινὰ ἔχοντες, ἰδίᾳ δὲ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν
τοιοῦτον κεκτημένου,

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ὁμοῦ δὴ ἔσονται, ὁμοῦ δὲ ἀναμεμειγμένων καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ
ἄλλῃ τροφῇ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης οἶμαι τῆς ἐμφύτου ἄξονται πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων
μεῖξιν. ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖά σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;

οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς γε, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἀλλ' ἐρωτικάς ἀνάγκαις, αἱ κινδυνεύουσιν
ἐκείνων δριμύτεραι εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν τε καὶ ἔλκειν τὸν πολὺν λεών.
καὶ μάλα, εἶπον. ἀλλὰ μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἀτάκτως μὲν μείγνυσθαι
ἀλλήλοισι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ποιεῖν οὕτε

458e

ὅσιον ἐν εὐδαιμόνων πόλει οὔτ' ἐάσουσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες.

οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ἔφη.

δῆλον δὴ ὅτι γάμους τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποιήσομεν ἱεροὺς εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι
μάλιστα· εἶεν δ' ἂν ἱεροὶ οἱ ὠφελιμώτατοι.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

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πῶς οὖν δὴ ὠφελιμώτατοι ἔσσονται; τόδε μοι λέγε, ὦ Γλαῦκων· ὁρῶ γάρ σου
ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ καὶ κύνas θηρευτικοὺς καὶ τῶν γενναίων ὀρνίθων μάλα συχνοὺς·
ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ πρὸς Διός, προσέσχηκας τι τοῖς τούτων γάμοις τε καὶ παιδοποιῆα;
τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν τούτων, καίπερ ὄντων γενναίων, ἄρ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τινες καὶ
γίγονται ἄριστοι;

εἰσιν.

πότερον οὖν ἐξ ἀπάντων ὁμοίως γεννᾶς, ἢ προθυμῇ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν
ἀρίστων;

ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων.

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τί δ'; ἐκ τῶν νεωτάτων ἢ ἐκ τῶν γεραιτάτων ἢ ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων ὅτι μάλιστα;
ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων.

καὶ ἂν μὴ οὕτω γεννᾶται, πολὺ σοὶ ἡγῆ χειρὸν ἔσσεσθαι τὸ τε τῶν ὀρνίθων
καὶ τὸ τῶν κυνῶν γένος;

ἐγωγ', ἔφη.

τί δὲ ἕπων οἶει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων; ἢ ἄλλη πη ἔχειν;
ἄτοπον μεντᾶν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἴη.

βαβαῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε, ὥς ἄρα σφόδρα ἡμῖν δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν
ἀρχόντων, εἴπερ καὶ περὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὡσαύτως ἔχει.

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ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔχει, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τι δὴ;

ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φαρμάκοις πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι. ἰατρὸν δὲ που μὴ
δεομένοις μὲν σώμασι φαρμάκων, ἀλλὰ διαίτῃ ἐθελόντων ὑπακοῦειν, καὶ
φauλότερον ἐξαρκεῖν ἡγοῦμεθα εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ δὴ καὶ φαρμακεύειν δέη,
ἴσμεν ὅτι ἀνδρειότερου δεῖ τοῦ ἰατροῦ.

ἀληθῆ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι λέγεις;

πρὸς τόδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· συχνῶ τῷ ψεύδει καὶ τῇ ἀπάτῃ κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν
δεήσειν χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ

459d

τῶν ἀρχομένων. ἔφαμεν δὲ που ἐν φαρμάκου εἶδει πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
χρήσιμα εἶναι.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη.

ἐν τοῖς γάμοις τοίνυν καὶ παιδοποιῆαις ἔοικε τὸ ὀρθὸν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι οὐκ
ἐλάχιστον.

πῶς δὴ;

δεῖ μὲν, εἴπον, ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων τοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις
συγγίγνεσθαι ὥς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φauλοτάτους ταῖς φauλοτάταις
τούναντίον, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἔκγονα τρέφειν,

459e

τῶν δὲ μὴ, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποιμνιον ὅτι ἀκρότατον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γιγνόμενα λανθάνειν πλὴν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ αὖ ἢ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὅτι μάλιστα ἀστασίαστος ἔσται.

ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν δὴ ἔορται τινες νομοθετητέα ἐν αἷς συνάξομεν τάς τε νύμφας καὶ τοὺς νυμφίους καὶ θυσῖαι, καὶ ὕμνοι

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ποιητέοι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ποιηταῖς πρέποντες τοῖς γιγνομένοις γάμοις· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ποιήσομεν, ἵν' ὥς μάλιστα διασωῶσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὸς πολέμους τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοποῦντες, καὶ μήτε μεγάλη ἡμῖν ἢ πόλις κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν μήτε σμικρὰ γίγνηται.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

κλῆροι δὴ τινες οἷμαι ποιητέοι κομποί, ὥστε τὸν φαῦλον ἐκεῖνον αἰτιᾶσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστης συνέρξεως τύχην ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἄρχοντας.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

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καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γέ που τῶν νέων ἐν πολέμῳ ἢ ἄλλοθι που γέρα δοτέον καὶ ἄθλα ἄλλα τε καὶ ἀφθονεστέρα ἢ ἐξουσία τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν συγκοιμήσεως, ἵνα καὶ ἅμα μετὰ προφάσεως ὥς πλεῖστοι τῶν παίδων ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σπεῖρωνται.

ὀρθῶς.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ αἰεὶ γιγνόμενα ἔκγονα παραλαμβάνουσαι αἰ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐφεστηκυῖαι ἀρχαὶ εἴτε ἀνδρῶν εἴτε γυναικῶν εἴτε ἀμφοτέρω—κοινὰ μὲν γάρ που καὶ ἀρχαὶ γυναιξὶ τε καὶ ἀνδράσιν—

ναί.

460c

τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δοκῶ, λαβοῦσαι εἰς τὸν σηκὸν οἴσουσιν παρά τινας τροφοὺς χωρὶς οἰκούσας ἔν τινι μέρει τῆς πόλεως· τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐὰν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάτηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν ὥς πρέπει.

εἴπερ μέλλει, ἔφη, καθαρὸν τὸ γένος τῶν φυλάκων ἔσεσθαι.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι ἐπιμελήσονται τάς τε μητέρας ἐπὶ τὸν σηκὸν ἄγοντες ὅταν σπαργῶσι, πᾶσαν μηχανὴν

460d

μηχανώμενοι ὅπως μηδεμία τὸ αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ ἄλλας γάλα ἐχούσας ἐκπορίζοντες, ἐὰν μὴ αὐταὶ ἱκαναὶ ᾖσι, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐπιμελήσονται ὅπως μέτριον χρόνον θηλάσσονται, ἀγρυπνίας δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πόνον τίτθαις τε καὶ τροφοῖς παραδώσουσιν;

πολλὴν ῥαστώνην, ἔφη, λέγεις τῆς παιδοποιίας ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν. πρέπει γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς διέλθωμεν ὃ προουθέμεθα. ἔφαμεν γάρ δὴ ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων δεῖν τὰ ἔκγονα γίγνεσθαι.

ἀληθῆ.

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ἄρ' οὖν σοι συνδοκεῖ μέτριος χρόνος ἀκμῆς τὰ εἴκοσι ἔτη γυναικί, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τὰ τριάκοντα;

τὰ ποῖα αὐτῶν; ἔφη.

γυναικὶ μὲν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρξαμένη ἀπὸ εἰκοσιετίδος μέχρι τετταρακονταετίδος τίκτειν τῇ πόλει· ἀνδρὶ δέ, ἐπειδὰν τὴν ὀξυτάτην δρόμου ἀκμὴν παρῇ, τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου γενεῶν τῇ πόλει μέχρι

πεντεκαπεντηκονταέτους.

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ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν, ἔφη, αὕτη ἀκμὴ σώματός τε καὶ φρονήσεως.

οὐκοῦν ἕαντε πρεσβύτερος τούτων ἕαντε νεώτερος τῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γεννήσεων ἄφηται, οὔτε ὅσιον οὔτε δίκαιον φήσομεν τὸ ἀμάρτημα, ὡς παῖδα φυτύνοντος τῇ πόλει, ὅς, ἂν λάθῃ, γεννήσεται οὐχ ὑπὸ θουσιῶν οὐδ' ὑπὸ εὐχῶν φύς, ἅς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τοῖς γάμοις εὕξονται καὶ ἱέρεια καὶ ἱερεῖς καὶ σύμπασα ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀμείνους καὶ ἐξ ὠφελίμων

461b

ὠφελιμωτέρους ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σκοτοῦ μετὰ δεινῆς ἀκρατείας γεγυνώς.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ γ', εἶπον, νόμος, ἕάν τις τῶν ἔπι γεννώντων μὴ συνέρξαντος ἄρχοντος ἄπτηται τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γυναικῶν· νόθον γὰρ καὶ ἀνεγγυον καὶ ἀνίερον φήσομεν αὐτὸν παῖδα τῇ πόλει καθιστάναι.

ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

ὅταν δὲ δὴ οἶμαι αἶ τε γυναῖκες καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ γενεῶν ἐκβῶσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀφήσομέν που ἐλευθέρους αὐτοὺς συγγίγνεσθαι

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ὣ ἂν ἐθέλωσι, πλὴν θυγατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ ταῖς τῶν θυγατέρων παισὶ καὶ ταῖς ἄνω μητρός, καὶ γυναῖκας αὖ πλὴν ὑεῖ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς τούτων εἰς τὸ κάτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἤδη πάντα διακελευσάμενοι προθυμεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κῆμα μηδέ γ' ἔν, ἕάν γένηται, ἕάν δὲ τι βιάσῃται, οὔτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιοῦτω.

καὶ ταῦτα μὲν γ', ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεται· πατέρας δὲ καὶ

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θυγατέρας καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες πῶς διαγνώσσονται ἀλλήλων;

οὐδαμῶς, ἣν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ἄφ' ἧς ἂν ἡμέρας τις αὐτῶν νυμφίος γένηται, μετ' ἐκείνην δεκάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ ἐβδόμῳ δὴ ἃ ἂν γένηται ἔκγονα, ταῦτα πάντα προσερεῖ τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα ὑεῖς, τὰ δὲ θήλεα θυγατέρας, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐκείνων πατέρα, καὶ οὔτω δὴ τὰ τούτων ἔκγονα παίδων παῖδας, καὶ ἐκεῖν' αὖ ἐκείνους πάππους τε καὶ τηθὰς, τὰ δ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γεγονότα, ἐν ᾧ αἱ μητέρες καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἐγέννων,

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ἀδελφὰς τε καὶ ἀδελφοὺς, ὥστε, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀλλήλων μὴ ἄπτεσθαι.

ἀδελφοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀδελφὰς δώσει ὁ νόμος συνοικεῖν, ἐὰν ὁ κλῆρος ταύτη συμπίπτῃ καὶ ἡ Πυθία προσαναιρῇ.

ὀρθότατα, ἥ δ' ὅς.

ἡ μὲν δὴ κοινωνία, ὧ Γλαύκων, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν τοῖς φύλαξι σοι τῆς πόλεως· ὡς δὲ ἐπομένη τε τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτεία καὶ μακρῷ βελτίστη, δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου. ἡ πῶς ποιῶμεν;

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οὕτω νῆ Δία, ἥ δ' ὅς.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἦδε ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁμολογίας, ἐρέσθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τί ποτε τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν εἰς πόλεως κατασκευήν, οὐ δεῖ στοχαζόμενον τὸν νομοθέτην τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, καὶ τί μέγιστον κακόν, εἴτα ἐπισκέψασθαι ἄρα ἃ νυνδὴ διήλθομεν εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἵχνος ἡμῖν ἀρμόττει, τῷ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀναρμοστεῖ;

πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.

ἔχομεν οὖν τι μείζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν αὐτῇν

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διασπᾶ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; ἡ μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ὃ ἂν συνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν;

οὐκ ἔχομεν.

οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία συνδεῖ, ὅταν ὅτι μάλιστα πάντες οἱ πολῖται τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων παρατλησιῶς χαίρωσι καὶ λυπῶνται;

παντάσας μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἡ δέ γε τῶν τοιούτων ιδίωσις διαλύει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περιαλγεῖς, οἱ δὲ περιχαρεῖς γίνωνται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς

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παθήμασι τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει;

τί δ' οὐ;

ἄρ' οὖν ἐκ τοῦδε τὸ τοιόνδε γίγνεται, ὅταν μὴ ἅμα φθέγγωνται ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ τοιάδε ῥήματα, τὸ τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν; καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου κατὰ ταῦτα;

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ἐν ἧτινι δὴ πόλει πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταῦτα τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν, αὕτη ἄριστα διοικεῖται;

πολὺ γε.

καὶ ἥτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει; οἷον ὅταν πού ἡμῶν δάκτυλός του πληγῇ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος

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ἐν αὐτῇ ἦσθετό τε καὶ πᾶσα ἅμα συνήλγησεν μέρους πονήσαντος ὅλη, καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ· καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, περὶ τε λύπης πονοῦντος μέρους

καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς ῥαΐζοντος;

ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ, ἔφη· καὶ τοῦτο ὃ ἐρωτᾷς, τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἐγγύτατα ἢ ἄριστα πολιτευομένη πόλις οἶκεῖ.

ἐνδὸς δὴ οἶμαι πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτιοῦν ἢ ἀγαθὸν

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ἢ κακὸν ἢ τοιαύτη πόλις μάλιστά τε φήσει ἑαυτῆς εἶναι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἢ συνησθήσεται ἅπασα ἢ συλλυπήσεται.

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τὴν γε εὖνομον.

ὥρα ἂν εἴη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπανιέναι ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ λόγου ὁμολογήματα σκοπεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ, εἰ αὐτὴ μάλιστ' ἔχει εἶτε καὶ ἄλλη τις μᾶλλον.

οὐκοῦν χρή, ἔφη.

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τί οὔν; ἔστι μὲν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ;

ἔστι.

πολίτας μὲν δὴ πάντες οὗτοι ἀλλήλους προσεροῦσι;

πῶς δ' οὔ;

ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις δῆμος τοὺς ἄρχοντας

προσαγορεύει;

ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολλαῖς δεσπότας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατουμέναις αὐτὸ τοῦνομα τοῦτο, ἄρχοντας.

τί δ' ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δῆμος; πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί τοὺς ἄρχοντάς φησιν εἶναι;

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σωτῆράς τε καὶ ἐπικούρους, ἔφη.

τί δ' οὗτοι τὸν δῆμον;

μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφέας.

οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἄρχοντες τοὺς δήμους;

δούλους, ἔφη.

τί δ' οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀλλήλους;

συνάρχοντας, ἔφη.

τί δ' οἱ ἡμέτεροι;

συμφύλακας.

ἔχεις οὔν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, εἴ τις τίνα ἔχει προσεῖπεῖν τῶν συναρχόντων τὸν μὲν ὡς οἶκεῖον, τὸν δ' ὡς ἀλλότριον; καὶ πολλοὺς γε.

οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν οἶκεῖον ὡς ἑαυτοῦ νομίζει τε καὶ λέγει,

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τὸν δ' ἀλλότριον ὡς οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ;

οὕτω.

τί δὲ οἱ παρὰ σοὶ φύλακες; ἔσθ' ὅστις αὐτῶν ἔχοι ἂν τῶν συμφυλάκων νομίσει τινὰ ἢ προσεῖπεῖν ὡς ἀλλότριον;

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· παντὶ γὰρ ᾧ ἂν ἐντυγχάνῃ, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῇ ἢ ὡς

πατρί ἢ ὡς μητρί ἢ υἱὲ ἢ θυγατρὶ ἢ τούτων ἐκγόνοις ἢ προγόνοις νομιεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν.

κάλλιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τόδε εἶπέ· πότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον οἰκεῖα νομοθετήσεις, ἢ

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καὶ τὰς πράξεις πάσας κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα πράττειν, περὶ τε τοὺς πατέρας, ὅσα νόμος περὶ πατέρας αἰδοῦς τε πέρι καὶ κηδεμονίας καὶ τοῦ ὑπήκοον δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων, ἢ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια οὔτε δίκαια πράττοντος ἄν, εἰ ἄλλα πράττοι ἢ ταῦτα; αὐταῖ σοι ἢ ἄλλαι φῆμαι ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ὑμνήσουσιν εὐθύς περὶ τὰ τῶν παιδων ὧτα καὶ περὶ πατέρων, οὓς ἂν αὐτοῖς τις ἀποφήνῃ, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν;

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αὐται, ἔφη· γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ἄνευ ἔργων οἰκεῖα ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνον φθέγγονται.

πασῶν ἄρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ συμφωνήσουσιν ἐνός τινος ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντος ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εὖ πράττει ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς.

ἀληθέστατα αὖ, ἢ δ' ὅς.

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οὐκοῦν μετὰ τούτου τοῦ δόγματός τε καὶ ῥήματος ἔφαμεν συνακολουθεῖν τάς τε ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας κοινῇ;

καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἔφαμεν.

οὐκοῦν μάλιστα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ πολλῖται, ὃ δὴ ἐμὸν ὀνομάσουσιν; τούτου δὲ κοινωνοῦντες οὕτω δὴ λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μάλιστα κοινωνίαν ἔξουσιν;

πολὺ γε.

ἄρ' οὖν τούτων αἰτία πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ καταστάσει ἢ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδων κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν;

πολὺ μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ἔφη.

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ἀλλὰ μὴν μέγιστόν γε πόλει αὐτὸ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἀγαθόν, ἀπεικάζοντες εὖ οἰκουμένην πόλιν σώματι πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ λύπης τε πέρι καὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς ἔχει.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, ὡμολογήσαμεν.

τοῦ μεγίστου ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡμῖν πέφανται ἢ κοινωνία τοῖς ἐπικουροῖς τῶν τε παιδων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν γε ὁμολογοῦμεν· ἔφαμεν γάρ που οὔτε οἰκίας τούτοις ἰδίας δεῖν εἶναι οὔτε γῆν οὔτε

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τι κτῆμα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφήν λαμβάνοντας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς, κοινῇ πάντας ἀναλίσκειν, εἰ μέλλοιεν ὄντως φύλακες εἶναι.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὅπερ λέγω, τὰ τε πρόσθεν εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται αὐτοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας, καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ διασπᾶν τὴν πόλιν τὸ ἐμὸν ὀνομάζοντας μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἄλλον ἄλλο, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίαν ἔλκοντα ὅτι ἂν δύνηται χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων κτήσασθαι,
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τὸν δὲ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἑτέραν οὔσαν, καὶ γυναῖκά τε καὶ παῖδας ἑτέρους, ἡδονάς τε καὶ ἀλγηδónας ἐμποιοῦντας ἰδίων ὄντων ἰδίας, ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δόγματι τοῦ οἰκείου περὶ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τείνοντας πάντας εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμοπαθεῖς λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς εἶναι;

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

τί δέ; δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ οἰχίσηται ἐξ αὐτῶν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα κοινά; ὅθεν δὴ ὑπάρχει

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τούτοις ἀστασιάστοις εἶναι, ὅσα γε διὰ χρημάτων ἢ παιδων καὶ συγγενῶν κτῆσιν ἄνθρωποι στασιάζουσιν;

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἀπηλλάχθαι.

καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαιῶν γε οὐδ' αἰκίας δίκαι δικαίως ἂν εἶν ἐν αὐτοῖς· ἥλιξι μὲν γὰρ ἡλικίας ἀμύνεσθαι καλὸν καὶ δίκαιόν που φήσομεν, ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖα τιθέντες.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

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καὶ γὰρ τόδε ὀρθὸν ἔχει, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ νόμος· εἴ ποὺ τίς τῷ θυμοῖτο, ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πληρῶν τὸν θυμὸν ἦττον ἐπὶ μείζους ἂν ἴοι στάσεις.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴν νεωτέρων πάντων ἄρχειν τε καὶ κολάζειν προστετάσσεται. δῆλον.

καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε νεώτερος πρεσβύτερον, ἂν μὴ ἄρχοντες προστάττωσιν, οὔτε ἄλλο βιάζεσθαι ἐπιχειρήσει ποτὲ οὔτε τύπτειν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός. οἶμαι δ' οὐδὲ ἄλλως ἀτιμάσει· ἱκανῶ γὰρ τῷ φύλακε κωλύοντε, δέος τε καὶ αἰδώς, αἰδώς μὲν ὡς

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γονέων μὴ ἄπτεσθαι εἰργουσα, δέος δὲ τὸ τῷ πάσχοντι τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ὡς υἱεῖς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀδελφούς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς πατέρας.

συμβαίνει γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη.

πανταχῇ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἄνδρες ἄξουσιν; πολλήν γε.

τούτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ποτε ἡ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

τὰ γε μὴν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν δι' ἀπρέπειαν ὀκνῶ

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καὶ λέγειν, ὧν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν, κολακείας τε πλουσίων πένητες
ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀληθδόνας ὅσας ἐν παιδοτροφίᾳ καὶ χρηματισμοῖς διὰ
τροφὴν οἰκετῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχουσι, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δ'
ἐξαρνοῦμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάντως πορισάμενοι θέμενοι παρὰ γυναικῶν τε καὶ
οἰκέτας, ταμιεύειν παραδόντες, ὅσα τε, ὦ φίλε, περὶ αὐτὰ καὶ οἷα πάσχουσι,
δῆλὰ τε δὴ καὶ ἀγεννῇ καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

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δῆλα γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ τυφλῷ.

πάντων τε δὴ τούτων ἀπαλλάσσονται, ζήσουσί τε τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου ὃν οἱ
Ὀλυμπιονῖκαι ζῶσι μακαριώτερον.

πῇ;

διὰ σμικρόν που μέρος εὐδαιμονίζονται ἐκεῖνοι ὧν τούτοις ὑπάρχει. ἢ τε
γὰρ τῶνδε νίκη καλλίων, ἢ τ' ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου τροφή τελεωτέρα. νίκην τε
γὰρ νικῶσι συμπάσης τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν, τροφῇ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν
ὅσων βίος δεῖται αὐτοὶ τε καὶ παῖδες ἀναδοῦνται, καὶ γέρα δέχονται

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παρὰ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας
μετέχουσιν.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, καλὰ.

μέμνησαι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν
ἐπέπληξεν ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας

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ποιοῦμεν, οἷς ἐξὸν πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν; ἡμεῖς δέ που
εἵπομεν ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν, εἴ που παραπίπτοι, εἰς αὐθις σκεφοίμεθα, νῦν δὲ τοὺς
μὲν φύλακας φύλακας ποιοῦμεν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡς οἱοί τ' εἴμεν
εὐδαιμονεστάτην, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἓν ἔθνος ἀποβλέποντες ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦτο
εὐδαιμον πλάττοιμεν;

μέμνημαι, ἔφη.

τί οὖν; νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ τῶν ἐπικούρων βίος, εἴπερ τοῦ γε τῶν Ὀλυμπιονικῶν
πολύ τε καλλίων καὶ ἀμείνων φαίνεται,

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μή πη κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων φαίνεται βίον ἢ τινων ἄλλων δημιουργῶν
ἢ τὸν τῶν γεωργῶν;

οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὅ γε καὶ ἐκεῖ ἔλεγον, δίκαιον καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰπεῖν, ὅτι εἰ οὕτως
ὁ φύλαξ ἐπιχειρήσει εὐδαίμων γίνεσθαι, ὥστε μηδὲ φύλαξ εἶναι, μηδ'
ἄρκεσει αὐτῷ βίος οὕτω μέτριος καὶ βέβαιος καὶ ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν ἄριστος,
ἀλλ' ἀνόητός τε καὶ μειρακίωδης δόξα ἐμπεσοῦσα εὐδαιμονίας περὶ ὁρμήσει

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αὐτὸν διὰ δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἅπαντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἰκείοῦσθαι, γνώσεται τὸν
Ἡσίοδον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἦν σοφὸς λέγων

πλέον

εἶναι πως

ἥμισυ παντός.

Hes. WD 40

ἐμοὶ μέν, ἔφη, συμβούλῳ χρώμενος μενεῖ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ βίῳ.

συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίαν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, παιδείας τε περὶ καὶ παίδων καὶ φυλακῆς τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, κατὰ τε πόλιν μενούσας εἰς πόλεμόν τε ἰούσας καὶ συμφυλάττειν δεῖν καὶ 466d

συνθηρεῦειν ὥσπερ κύνας, καὶ πάντα πάντῃ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν κοινωνεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα πραττούσας τὰ τε βέλτιστα πράξειν καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, ἣ πεφύκατον πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ κοινωνεῖν;

συγχωρῶ, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο λοιπὸν διελέσθαι, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις δυνατόν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις ζώοις, ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ὅπῃ δυνατόν;

ἔφθης, ἔφη, εἰπὼν ἣ ἔμελλον ὑπολήψεσθαι.

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περὶ μέν γάρ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οἷμαι, ἔφην, δῆλον ὃν τρόπον πολεμήσουσιν.

πῶς; ἣ δ' ὅς.

ὅτι κοινῇ στρατεύσονται, καὶ πρὸς γε ἄξουσι τῶν παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὅσοι ἄδροί, ἵν' ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν θεῶνται ταῦτα ἅ τελεωθέντας δεήσει δημιουργεῖν·

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πρὸς δὲ τῇ θεᾷ διακονεῖν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ θεραπεύειν πατέρας τε καὶ μητέρας. ἣ οὐκ ἦσθησαι τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, οἷον τοὺς τῶν κεραμέων παῖδας, ὥς πολὺν χρόνον διακονοῦντες θεωροῦσι πρὶν ἅπτεσθαι τοῦ κεραμεύειν;

καὶ μάλα.

ἣ οὕν ἐκείνοις ἐπιμελέστερον παιδευτέον ἢ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ θεᾷ τῶν προσηκόντων;

καταγέλαστον μεντᾶν, ἔφη, εἴη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μαχεῖται γε πᾶν ζῶον διαφερόντως

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παρόντων ὧν ἂν τέκη.

ἔστιν οὕτω. κίνδυνος δέ, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐ σμικρὸς σφαλεῖσιν, οἷα δὴ ἐν πολέμῳ φιλεῖ, πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς παῖδας ἀπολέσαντας ποιῆσαι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν ἀδύνατον ἀναλαβεῖν.

ἀληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ πρῶτον μὲν ἡγῇ παρασκευαστέον τὸ μή ποτε κινδυνεῦσαι;

οὐδαμῶς.

τί δ'; εἰ που κινδυνευτέον, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ βελτίους ἔσονται κατορθοῦντες;

δῆλον δῆ.

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ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν οἷε διαφέρειν καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου θεωρεῖν ἢ μὴ τὰ περὶ
τὸν πόλεμον παῖδας τοὺς ἄνδρας πολεμικοὺς ἔσομένους;
οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει πρὸς ὃ λέγεις.
τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ὑπαρκτέον, θεωροὺς πολέμου τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖν,
προσμηχανᾶσθαι δ' αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλειαν, καὶ καλῶς ἔξει· ἦ γάρ;
ναί.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν οἱ πατέρες, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ
ἀμαθεῖς ἔσονται ἀλλὰ γνωμονικοὶ τῶν

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στρατειῶν ὅσαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπικίνδυνοι;
εἰκός, ἔφη.
εἰς μὲν ἄρα τὰς ἄξουσιν, εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐλαβήσονται.
ὀρθῶς.

καὶ ἄρχοντάς γε πού, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήσουσιν
ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐμπειρία τε καὶ ἡλικία ἱκανοὺς ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς
εἶναι.

πρέπει γάρ.

ἀλλὰ γάρ, φήσομεν, καὶ παρὰ δόξαν πολλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐγένετο.

καὶ μάλα.

πρὸς τοῖνυν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ φίλε, πτεροῦν χρή παιδία ὄντα εὐθύς, ἴν', ἂν τι
δέη, πετόμενοι ἀποφεύγωσιν.

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πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναβιβαστέον ὡς νεωτάτους, καὶ διδασκόμενους
ἵππευεῖν ἐφ' ἵππων ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν, μὴ θυμοειδῶν μηδὲ μαχητικῶν,
ἀλλ' ὅτι ποδωκεστάτων καὶ εὐηνιωτάτων. οὕτω γὰρ κάλλιστά τε θεάσονται
τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον, καὶ ἀσφαλέστατα, ἂν τι δέη, σωθήσονται μετὰ
πρεσβυτέρων ἡγεμόνων ἐπόμενοι.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

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τί δὲ δὴ, εἶπον, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον; πῶς ἐκτέον σοι τοὺς στρατιώτας πρὸς
αὐτούς τε καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους; ἄρ' ὀρθῶς μοι καταφαίνεται ἢ οὐ;
λέγ', ἔφη, ποῦ' αὖ.

αὐτῶν μὲν, εἶπον, τὸν λιπόντα τάξιν ἢ ὅπλα ἀποβαλόντα ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων
ποιήσαντα διὰ κάκην ἄρα οὐ δημιουργόν τινα δεῖ καθιστάναι ἢ γεωργόν;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

τὸν δὲ ζῶντα εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀλόντα ἄρ' οὐ δωρεὰν διδόναι τοῖς ἐλοῦσι
χρῆσθαι τῇ ἄγρᾳ ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται;

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κομιδῇ γε.

τὸν δὲ ἀριστεύσαντά τε καὶ εὐδοκιμήσαντα οὐ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ στρατιᾷς
ὑπὸ τῶν συστρατευομένων μεираκίων τε καὶ παιδων ἐν μέρει ὑπὸ ἐκάστου
δοκεῖ σοι χρῆναι στεφανωθῆναι; ἢ οὐ;

ἔμοιγε.
τί δέ; δεξιωθῆναι;
καὶ τοῦτο.
ἀλλὰ τὸδ' οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτι σοι δοκεῖ.
τὸ ποῖον;

τὸ φιλῆσαι τε καὶ φιληθῆναι ὑπὸ ἐκάστου.
πάντων, ἔφη, μάλιστα· καὶ προστίθηναι γε τῷ νόμῳ,
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ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ ταύτης ὥσι τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι ἀπαρνηθῆναι ὃν ἂν
βούληται φιλεῖν, ἵνα καί, ἐάν τις του τύχη ἐρῶν ἢ ἄρρενος ἢ θηλείας,
προθυμότερος ἢ πρὸς τὸ τᾶριστεῖα φέρειν.
καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθῷ ὄντι γάμοι τε ἔτοιμοι πλείους ἢ τοῖς
ἄλλοις καὶ αἰρέσεις τῶν τοιούτων πολλάκις παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔσσονται, ἵν'
ὅτι πλεῖστοι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου γίνωνται, εἴρηται ἤδη.

εἵπομεν γάρ, ἔφη.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον τοῖς τοιοῖσδε δίκαιον τιμᾶν
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τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἀγαθοί. καὶ γὰρ Ὅμηρος τὸν εὐδοκιμήσαντα ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
νώτοισιν

Αἶαντα ἔφη
διηνεκέεσσι γεραίρεσθαι,

Hom. Il. 7.321-322 ὡς ταύτην οἰκείαν οὔσαν τιμὴν τῷ ἡβῶντι τε καὶ
ἀνδρείῳ, ἐξ ἧς ἅμα τῷ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐξήσει.
ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

πεισόμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτά γε Ὅμηρῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις καὶ
τοῖς τοιούτοις πᾶσι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἀγαθοὶ φαίνωνται, καὶ
ὕμνοις καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τιμήσομεν, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις
ἔδραις τε καὶ κρέασιν

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ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσιν,

Hom. Il. 8.162 ἵνα ἅμα τῷ τιμᾶν ἀσκῶμεν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ
γυναικας.

κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις.
εἶεν· τῶν δὲ διὰ ἀποθανόντων ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς ὃς ἂν εὐδοκιμήσας τελευτήσῃ
ἄρ' οὐ πρῶτον μὲν φήσομεν τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι;
πάντων γε μάλιστα.

ἀλλ' οὐ πεισόμεθα Ἡσιόδῳ, ἐπειδὴν τινες τοῦ τοιούτου γένους
τελευτήσωσιν, ὡς ἄρα—

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οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἀγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν,
ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων;

πεισόμεθα μὲν οὖν.

διαπυθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ πῶς χρή τοὺς δαιμονίους τε καὶ θείους τιθέναι καὶ τινι διαφόρῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ θήσομεν ἢ ἂν ἐξηγῇται;

τί δ' οὐ μέλλομεν;

καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαιμόνων, οὕτω θεραπεύσομέν
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τε καὶ προσκυνήσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θήκας; ταῦτά δὲ ταῦτα νομιοῦμεν ὅταν τις γήρα ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ τελευτήσῃ τῶν ὅσοι ἂν διαφερόντως ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀγαθοὶ κριθῶσιν;

δίκαιον γοῦν, ἔφη.

τί δέ; πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πῶς ποιήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ στρατιῶται;

τὸ πῶλον δή;

πρῶτον μὲν ἀνδραποδισμοῦ πέρι, δοκεῖ δίκαιον Ἑλλήνας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀνδραποδιζεσθαι, ἢ μὴδ' ἄλλῃ ἐπιτρέπειν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τοῦτο ἐθίζειν, τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ

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γένους φείδεσθαι, εὐλαβουμένους τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων δουλείαν;

ὄλω καὶ παντί, ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ φείδεσθαι.

μηδὲ Ἑλλήνα ἄρα δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι μήτε αὐτοῦς, τοῖς τε ἄλλοις Ἑλλησιν οὕτω συμβουλεύειν;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη· μᾶλλον γ' ἂν οὖν οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους τρέποιντο, ἑαυτῶν δ' ἀπέχοιντο.

τί δέ; σκυλεύειν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τελευτήσαντας πλὴν ὅπλων, ἐπειδὴν νικήσωσιν, ἢ καλῶς ἔχει; ἢ οὐ πρόφασιν

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μὲν τοῖς δειλοῖς ἔχει μὴ πρὸς τὸν μαχόμενον ἰέναι, ὥς τι τῶν δεόντων δρῶντας ὅταν περὶ τὸν τεθνεῶτα κυπτάζωσι, πολλὰ δὲ ἤδη στρατόπεδα διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρπαγὴν ἀπώλετο;

καὶ μάλα.

ἀνελεύθερον δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ φιλοχρήματον νεκρὸν συλᾶν, καὶ γυναικειας τε καὶ σμικρᾶς διανοίας τὸ πολέμιον νομίζειν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ τεθνεῶτος ἀποπταμένου τοῦ ἐχθροῦ, λελοιπότης δὲ ὥς ἐπολέμει; ἢ οἷε τι διάφορον δρᾶν τοῦς τοῦτο

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ποιοῦντας τῶν κυνῶν, αἱ τοῖς λίθοις οἷς ἂν βληθῶσι χαλεπαίνουσι, τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἀπτόμεναι;

οὐδὲ σμικρὸν, ἔφη.

ἐατέον ἄρα τὰς νεκροσυλίας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναιρέσεων διακωλύσεις;

ἐατέον μέντοι, ἔφη, νῆ Δία.

οὐδὲ μὴν που πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ὅπλα οἴσομεν ὡς ἀναθήσοντες, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν μέλῃ

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τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας εὐνοίας· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ φοβησόμεθα μὴ τι μίαισμα ἦ πρὸς ἱερὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων φέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ τι δὴ ὁ θεὸς ἄλλο λέγῃ.

ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

τί δὲ γῆς τε τμήσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ οἰκιῶν ἐμπρήσεως; ποῖόν τι σοι δράσουσιν οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους;

σοῦ, ἔφη, δόξαν ἀποφαινομένου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι.

ἐμοὶ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τούτων μηδέτερα ποιεῖν,

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ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐπέτειον καρπὸν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα, βούλει σοι λέγω; πάνυ γε.

φαίνεται μοι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δύο ταῦτα ὀνόματα, πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσις, οὕτω καὶ εἶναι δύο, ὄντα ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινοιν διαφοραῖν. λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον καὶ συγγενές, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον καὶ ὀθνεῖον. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκείου ἔχθρᾳ στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος. καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἔφη, ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεις.

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ὄρα δὴ καὶ εἰ τόδε πρὸς τρόπου λέγω. φημὶ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτὸ αὐτῷ οἰκεῖον εἶναι καὶ συγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον.

καλῶς γε, ἔφη.

Ἑλληνας μὲν ἄρα βαρβάροις καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλησι πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίους φύσει εἶναι, καὶ πόλεμον τὴν ἔχθραν ταύτην κλητέον· Ἑλληνας δὲ Ἑλλήσιν, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον δρῶσιν, φύσει μὲν φίλους εἶναι, νοσεῖν δ' ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ στασιάζειν,

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καὶ στάσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχθραν κλητέον.

ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, συγχωρῶ οὕτω νομίζειν.

σκόπει δὴ, εἶπον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ νῦν ὁμολογουμένῃ στάσει, ὅπου ἂν τι τοιοῦτον γένηται καὶ διαστῇ πόλις, ἐὰν ἑκάτεροι ἑκατέρων τέμνωσιν ἀγροὺς καὶ οἰκίας ἐμπιμπρώσιν, ὥς ἀλιτηριώδης τε δοκεῖ ἡ στάσις εἶναι καὶ οὐδέτεροι αὐτῶν φιλοπόλιδες—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἐτόλμων τὴν τροφὸν τε καὶ μητέρα κεῖρειν—ἀλλὰ μέτριον εἶναι τοὺς καρποὺς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι

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τοῖς κρατοῦσι τῶν κρατουμένων, καὶ διανοεῖσθαι ὥς διαλλαγησομένων καὶ οὐκ αἰεὶ πολεμησόντων.

πολὺν γάρ, ἔφη, ἡμερωτέρων αὕτη ἡ διάνοια ἐκείνης.

τί δὲ δὴ; ἔφην· ἦν σὺ πόλιν οἰκίζεις, οὐχ Ἑλληνὶς ἔσται;

δεῖ γ' αὐτήν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ ἡμεροὶ ἔσσονται;

σφόδρα γε.

ἀλλ' οὐ φιλέλληνες; οὐδὲ οἰκείαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἡγήσονται, οὐδὲ κοινωνήσουσιν ὥνπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἱερῶν;

καὶ σφόδρα γε.

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οὐκοῦν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας διαφοράν, ὡς οἰκείους, στάσιν ἡγήσονται
καὶ οὐδὲ ὀνομάσουσιν πόλεμον;

οὐ γάρ.

καὶ ὡς διαλλαγησόμενοι ἄρα διοίσονται;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

εὐμενῶς δὴ σωφρονιοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ κολάζοντες οὐδ' ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ,
σωφρονιστὰὶ ὄντες, οὐ πολέμιοι.

οὕτως, ἔφη.

οὐδ' ἄρα τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ἑλληνες ὄντες κεροῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἰκήσεις ἐμπρήσουσιν,
οὐδὲ ὁμολογήσουσιν ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει πάντας ἐχθροὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ
ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας, ἀλλ' ὀλίγους αἰεὶ ἐχθροὺς τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς
διαφορᾶς.

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καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πάντα οὔτε τὴν γῆν ἐθελήσουσιν κεῖρειν αὐτῶν, ὡς φίλων
τῶν πολλῶν, οὔτε οἰκίας ἀνατρέπειν, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τοῦτου ποιήσονται τὴν
διαφοράν, μέχρι οὗ ἂν οἱ αἵτιοι ἀναγκασθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναιτίων
ἀλγούντων δοῦναι δίκην.

ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ὁμολογῶ οὕτω δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους
πολίτας προσφέρεσθαι· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ὡς νῦν οἱ Ἑλληνες πρὸς
ἀλλήλους.

πιθῶμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν νόμον τοῖς φύλαξι, μήτε γῆν

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τέμνειν μήτε οἰκίας ἐμπιμπράναι;

θῶμεν, ἔφη, καὶ ἔχειν γε καλῶς ταῦτα τε καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν.

ἀλλὰ γάρ μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν τις σοι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτρέπη λέγειν,
οὐδέποτε μνησθήσεσθαι ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρωσάμενος πάντα ταῦτα
εἴρηκας, τὸ ὡς δυνατὴ αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία γενέσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ποτὲ
δυνατὴ· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε, εἰ γένοιτο, πάντ' ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὰ πόλει ἢ γένοιτο, καὶ ἃ σὺ
παραλείπεις ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις

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ἄριστ' ἂν μάχοιντο τῷ ἥκιστα ἀπολείπειν ἀλλήλους, γινώσκοντές τε καὶ
ἀνακαλοῦντες ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα ἑαυτοῦς, ἀδελφούς, πατέρας, υἱεῖς· εἰ δὲ
καὶ τὸ θῆλυ συστρατεύοιτο, εἴτε καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει εἴτε καὶ ὀπισθεν
ἐπιτεταγμένον, φόβων τε ἔνεκα τοῖς ἐχθροῖς καὶ εἴ ποτὲ τις ἀνάγκη βοηθείας
γένοιτο, οἶδ' ὅτι ταύτην πάντη ἄμαχοι ἂν εἶεν· καὶ οἴκοι γε ἃ παραλείπεται
ἀγαθὰ, ὅσα ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς, ὁρῶ.

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ἀλλ' ὡς ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι εἴη ἂν καὶ ἄλλα γε μυρία, εἰ
γένοιτο ἡ πολιτεία αὕτη, μηκέτι πλείω περὶ αὐτῆς λέγε, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ
ἤδη πειρώμεθα ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πείθειν, ὡς δυνατὸν καὶ ἢ δυνατὸν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα
χαίρειν ἐῷμεν.

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ἐξαίφνης γε σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ καταδρομὴν ἐποιήσω ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον μου, καὶ οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις στραγγευσμένῳ. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ οἴσθα ὅτι μόγις μοι τῷ δὺο κύματε ἐκφυγόντι νῦν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ χαλεπώτατον τῆς τρικυμίας ἐπάγεις, ὃ ἐπειδὰν ἴδῃς τε καὶ ἀκούσῃς, πάνυ συγγνώμην ἔξεις, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα ὥκνουν τε καὶ ἐδεδοίκη οὕτω παράδοξον λόγον λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν.

ὅσῳ ἄν, ἔφη, τοιαῦτα πλείω λέγῃς, ἥττον ἀφεθήσῃ

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ὕψ' ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἰπεῖν πῇ δυνατὴ γίγνεσθαι αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία. ἀλλὰ λέγε καὶ μὴ διάτριβε.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε χρή ἀναμνησθῆναι, ὅτι ἡμεῖς ζητοῦντες δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι καὶ ἀδικίαν δεῦρο ἥκομεν.

χρή· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο; ἔφη.

οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὖρωμεν οἷόν ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ἄρα καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν δίκαιον ἀξιῶσομεν μηδέν δεῖν αὐτῆς ἐκείνης διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον δικαιοσύνη

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ἐστίν; ἢ ἀγαπήσομεν ἐὰν ὅτι ἐγγύτατα αὐτῆς ἦ καὶ πλεῖστα τῶν ἄλλων ἐκείνης μετέχῃ;

οὕτως, ἔφη· ἀγαπήσομεν.

παραδείγματος ἄρα ἔνεκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως δίκαιον εἰ γένοιτο, καὶ οἷος ἂν εἴη γενόμενος, καὶ ἀδικίαν αὖ καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνους ἀποβλέποντες, οἷοι ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνωνται εὐδαιμονίας τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀναγκαζώμεθα καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ὁμολογεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἐκείνοις ὅτι

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ὁμοιότατος ἦ, τὴν ἐκείνης μοῖραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἔξειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτου ἔνεκα, ἵν' ἀποδειξώμεν ὥς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι.

τοῦτο μὲν, ἔφη, ἀληθὲς λέγεις.

οἷοι ἂν οὖν ἥττον τι ἀγαθὸν ζωγράφον εἶναι ὃς ἂν γράψας παράδειγμα οἷον ἂν εἴη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἱκανῶς ἀποδοὺς μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὥς καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα;

μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

τί οὖν; οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς, φαμέν, παράδειγμα ἐποιοῦμεν

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λόγῳ ἀγαθῆς πόλεως;

πάνυ γε.

ἥττον τι οὖν οἷοι ἡμᾶς εὖ λέγειν τοῦτου ἔνεκα, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν ἀποδεῖξαι ὥς δυνατὸν οὕτω πόλιν οἰκῆσαι ὥς ἐλέγετο;

οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.

τὸ μὲν τοίνυν ἀληθές, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω· εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο προθυμηθῆναι δεῖ σὴν χάριν, ἀποδεῖξαι πῇ μάλιστα καὶ κατὰ τί δυνατώτατ' ἂν εἴη, πάλιν μοι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀποδείξιν τὰ αὐτὰ διομολόγησαι.

τὰ ποῖα;

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ἄρ' οἷόν τέ τι πραχθῆναι ὥς λέγεται, ἢ φύσιν ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἦττον ἀληθείας ἐφαπτεσθαι, κἂν εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ; ἀλλὰ σὺ πότερον ὁμολογεῖς οὕτως ἢ οὐ;

ὁμολογῶ, ἔφη.

τοῦτο μὲν δὴ μὴ ἀνάγκασέ με, οἷα τῷ λόγῳ διήλθομεν, τοιαῦτα παντάπασι καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ δεῖν γιγνόμενα ἂν ἀποφαίνειν· ἀλλ', ἐὰν οἱοί τε γενώμεθα εὑρεῖν ὥς ἂν ἐγγύτατα τῶν εἰρημένων πόλις οἰκήσειεν, φάναι ἡμᾶς

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ἐξηυρηκέναι ὥς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἃ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις. ἢ οὐκ ἀγαπήσεις τούτων τυγχάνων; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀγαπῶην.

καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ἔφη.

τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὥς ἔοικε, πειρώμεθα ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι τί ποτε νῦν κακῶς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττεται δι' ὃ οὐχ οὕτως οἰκοῦνται, καὶ τίνος ἂν σμικροτάτου μεταβαλόντος ἔλθοι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλις, μάλιστα μὲν ἐνός, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δυοῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅτι ὀλιγίστων τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ σμικροτάτων τὴν δύναμιν.

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παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἐνός μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβαλόντος δοκοῦμέν μοι ἔχειν δεῖξαι ὅτι μεταπέσοι ἂν, οὐ μέντοι σμικροῦ γε οὐδὲ ῥαδίου, δυνατοῦ δέ.

τίνος; ἔφη.

ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰμὶ ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσηκάζομεν κύματι. εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλῳτι τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κύμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλύσειν. σκόπει δὲ ὃ μέλλω λέγειν.

λέγε, ἔφη.

ἐὰν μὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν

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ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλεῖς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησιῶς τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτόν συμπέσῃ, δυνάμεις τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ' ἑκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, ὧ φίλε Γλαῦκων, ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει,

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οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία μὴ ποτε πρότερον φυῇ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατόν καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ἴδῃ, ἦν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ ἐμοὶ πάλαι ὄκνον ἐντίθησι λέγειν, ὁρῶντι ὥς πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθήσεται· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλη τις εὐδαιμονήσειεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ. καὶ ὅς, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον ἐκβέβληκας ῥῆμά τε καὶ λόγον, ὃν εἰπὼν ἡγοῦ ἐπὶ σὲ πάννυ πολλοὺς τε καὶ

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οὐ φαύλους νῦν οὕτως, οἷον ῥίψαντας τὰ ἱμάτια, γυμνοὺς λαβόντας ὅτι
ἐκάστω παρέτυχεν ὄπλον, θεῖν διατεταμένους ὡς θαυμάσια ἐργασομένους·
οὐς εἰ μὴ ἀμυνῇ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐκφεύξῃ, τῷ ὄντι τωθαζόμενος δώσεις δίκην.
οὐκοῦν σὺ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτων αἴτιος;
καλῶς γ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ ποιῶν. ἀλλὰ τοί σε οὐ προδώσω, ἀλλ' ἀμυνῶ οἷς
δύναμαι· δύναμαι δὲ εὐνοίᾳ τε καὶ τῷ παρακελεύεσθαι, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἄλλου
του ἐμμελέστερόν σοι

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ἀποκρινοίμην. ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχων τοιοῦτον βοηθὸν πειρῶ τοῖς ἀπιστοῦσιν
ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ἔχει ἢ σὺ λέγεις.
πειρατέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ οὕτω μεγάλην συμμαχίαν παρέχῃ.
ἀναγκαῖον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μέλλομέν πῃ ἐκφεύξεσθαι οὐς λέγεις,
διορίσασθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς φιλοσόφους τίνας λέγοντες τολμῶμεν φάναι
δεῖν ἄρχειν, ἵνα διαδηλῶν γενομένων δύνηται τις ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐνδεικνύμενος
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ὅτι τοῖς μὲν προσήκει φύσει ἄπτεσθαι τε φιλοσοφίας ἡγεμονεῦειν τ' ἐν πόλει,
τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις μῆτε ἄπτεσθαι ἀκολουθεῖν τε τῷ ἡγουμένῳ.
ῥα ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ὀρίζεσθαι.

ἴθι δὴ, ἀκολουθήσόν μοι τῇδε, ἐὰν αὐτὸ ἀμῇ γέ πῃ ἱκανῶς ἐξηγησώμεθα.
ἄγε, ἔφη.

ἀναμνησκειν οὖν σε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει, ἢ μέμνησαι ὅτι ὃν ἂν φῶμεν
φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτόν, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς λέγεται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα
ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ μὴ, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα;

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ἀναμνησκειν, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικεν, δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ γε ἐννοῶ.
ἄλλω, εἶπον, ἔπρεπεν, ὦ Γλαῦκων, λέγειν ἃ λέγεις· ἀνδρὶ δ' ἐρωτικῷ οὐ
πρέπει ἀμνημονεῖν ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐν ῥῳ τὸν φιλόπαιδα καὶ ἐρωτικὸν ἀμῇ γέ
πῃ δάκνουσί τε καὶ κινοῦσι, δοκοῦντες ἄξιοι εἶναι ἐπιμελείας τε καὶ τοῦ
ἀσπάζεσθαι. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς; ὁ μὲν, ὅτι σιμὸς,
ἐπίχαρις κληθεὶς ἐπαινεθήσεται ὑφ' ὑμῶν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ γρυπὸν βασιλικόν φατε
εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δὴ διὰ

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μέσου τούτων ἐμμετρώτατα ἔχειν, μέλανας δὲ ἀνδρικοὺς ἰδεῖν, λευκοὺς δὲ
θεῶν παῖδας εἶναι· μελιχλῶρους δὲ καὶ τοῦνομα οἷε τινὸς ἄλλου ποίημα
εἶναι ἢ ἐραστοῦ ὑποκοριζομένου τε καὶ εὐχερῶς φέροντος τὴν ὠχρότητα,
ἐὰν ἐπὶ ῥῳ ᾖ;

καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ πάσας προφάσεις προφασίζεσθῆ τε

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καὶ πάσας φωνὰς ἀφίετε, ὥστε μηδὲνα ἀποβάλλειν τῶν ἀνθούτων ἐν ῥῳ.
εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσι,
συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου χάριν.

τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς φιλοίνους οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιοῦντας ὀρᾷς; πάντα
οἷνον ἐπὶ πάσης προφάσεως ἀσπαζομένους;

καὶ μάλα.

καὶ μὴν φιλοτίμους γε, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, καθορᾷς ὅτι, ἂν μὴ στρατηγῆσαι
δύνωνται, τριτυναρχοῦσιν, κἄν μὴ ὑπὸ μειζόνων

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καὶ σεμνοτέρων τιμᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ σμικροτέρων καὶ φαυλοτέρων τιμώμενοι
ἀγαπῶσιν, ὡς ὅλως τιμῆς ἐπιθυμηταὶ ὄντες.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

τοῦτο δὴ φάθι ἢ μὴ· ἄρα ὃν ἂν τινος ἐπιθυμητικὸν λέγωμεν, παντὸς τοῦ
εἶδους τούτου φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μὲν, τοῦ δὲ οὐ;

παντός, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μὲν,
τῆς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάσης;

ἀληθῇ.

τὸν ἄρα περὶ τὰ μαθήματα δυσχεραίνοντα, ἄλλως τε

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καὶ νέον ὄντα καὶ μήπω λόγον ἔχοντα τί τε χρηστὸν καὶ μὴ, οὐ φήσομεν
φιλομαθῇ οὐδὲ φιλόσοφον εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸν περὶ τὰ σιτία δυσχερῇ οὐτε
πεινῇν φαμεν οὐτ' ἐπιθυμεῖν σιτίων, οὐδὲ φιλόσιτον ἀλλὰ κακόσιτον εἶναι.
καὶ ὀρθῶς γε φήσομεν.

τὸν δὲ δὴ εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γεύεσθαι καὶ ἀσμένως ἐπὶ
τὸ μαθάνειν ἰόντα καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα, τοῦτον δ' ἐν δίκῃ φήσομεν
φιλόσοφον· ἢ γάρ;

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καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ἔφη· πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἄτοποι ἔσσονται σοι τοιοῦτοι. οἳ τε γὰρ
φιλοθεάμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμαθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι
εἶναι, οἳ τε φιλήκοοι ἀτοπώτατοί τινές εἰσιν ὥς γ' ἐν φιλοσόφοις πιθέναι, οἳ
πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβὴν ἐκόντες οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν ἐλθεῖν,
ὥσπερ δὲ ἀπομεμισθωκότες τὰ ῥήματα ἐπακοῦσαι πάντων χορῶν περιθέουσι
τοῖς Διονυσίοις οὐτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὐτε τῶν κατὰ κώμας ἀπολειπόμενοι.
τούτους οὖν πάντας καὶ ἄλλους τοιοῦτων τινῶν

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μαθητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν τεχνυδρίων φιλοσόφους φήσομεν;

οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις.

τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις;

τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φιλοθεάμονας.

καὶ τοῦτο μὲν γ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς· ἀλλὰ πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις;

οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥαδίως πρὸς γε ἄλλον· σὲ δὲ οἶμαι ὁμολογήσειν μοι τὸ
τοιόνδε.

τὸ ποῖον;

ἐπειδὴ ἔστιν ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχροῦ, δύο αὐτῷ εἶναι.

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πῶς δ' οὐ;

οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δύο, καὶ ἐν ἑκάτερον;

καὶ τοῦτο.

καὶ περὶ δὴ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περὶ ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἑκάστων εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκάστων.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

ταύτῃ τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, διαιρῶ, χωρὶς μὲν οὖς νυνδὴ ἔλεγες φιλοθεάμονάς τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ πρακτικούς,

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καὶ χωρὶς αὖ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οὖς μόνους ἂν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους.

πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

οἱ μὲν που, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χροὰς καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἢ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι.

ἔχει γὰρ οὗν δὴ, ἔφη, οὕτως.

οἱ δὲ δὴ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰέναι τε καὶ ὀρᾶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἄρα οὐ σπάνιοι ἂν εἶεν;

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καὶ μάλα.

ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μήτε νομίζων μήτε, ἂν τις ἡγῇται ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος ἔπεσθαι, ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; σκόπει δέ. τὸ ὀνειρώττειν ἄρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, ἐάντε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάντ' ἐγρηγορῶς τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ μὴ ὁμοίον ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγῇται εἶναι ὃ ἔοικεν; ἐγὼ γοῦν ἂν, ἥ δ' ὅς, φαίην ὀνειρώττειν τὸν τοιοῦτον.

τί δέ; ὁ τάναντία τούτων ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ καλὸν

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καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, καὶ οὔτε τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτὸ οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μετέχοντα ἡγούμενος, ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ αὖ καὶ οὔτος δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ὕπαρ.

οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὥς γινώσκοντος γνῶμην ἂν ὀρθῶς φαῖμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὥς δοξάζοντος;

πάννυ μὲν οὖν.

τί οὖν ἐὰν ἡμῖν χαλεπαίνειῃ οὔτος, ὃν φαμεν δοξάζειν ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκειν, καὶ ἀμφισβητῇ ὥς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν;

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ἔξομέν τι παραμυθεῖσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ πείθειν ἡρέμα, ἐπικρυπτόμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιαίνει;

δεῖ γέ τοι δὴ, ἔφη.

ἴθι δὴ, σκόπει τί ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτόν. ἢ βούλει ᾧδε πυνθανώμεθα παρ' αὐτοῦ, λέγοντες ὥς εἴ τι οἶδεν οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ φθόνος, ἀλλ' ἄσμενοι ἂν ἴδοιμεν εἰδότα τι. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἶπε τόδε· ὁ γινώσκων γινώσκει τί ἢ οὐδέν;

σὺ οὖν μοι ὑπὲρ ἑκείνου ἀποκρίνου.
ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὅτι γινώσκει τί.
πότερον ὃν ἢ οὐκ ὄν;

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ὄν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθεῖη;
ἱκανῶς οὖν τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κἂν εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποῖμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν παντελῶς
ὄν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὄν δὲ μηδαμῇ πάντῃ ἄγνωστον;
ἱκανώτατα.

εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τι οὕτως ἔχει ὥς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μεταξὺ ἂν κέοιτο
τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηδαμῇ ὄντος;
μεταξὺ.

οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνώσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι, ἐπὶ
δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ μεταξὺ τι καὶ ζητητέον

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ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τι τυγχάνει ὄν τοιοῦτον;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἄρ' οὖν λέγομέν τι δόξαν εἶναι;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

πότερον ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐπιστήμης ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν;

ἄλλην.

ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἄρα τέτακται δόξα καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἐπιστήμη, κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν
ἐκατέρα τὴν αὐτῆς.

οὕτω.

οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γινῶναι ὥς ἔστι τὸ ὄν; —μᾶλλον
δὲ ὥδέ μοι δοκεῖ πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διελεῖσθαι.

πῶς;

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φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ
δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅτι περ ἂν δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν τῶν
δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος.

ἀλλὰ μανθάνω, ἔφη.

ἄκουσον δὴ ὅ μοι φαίνεται περὶ αὐτῶν. δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινὰ χρόαν
ὁρῶ οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οἷον καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, πρὸς ἃ
ἀποβλέπων ἔνια διορίζομαι παρ' ἐμαυτῷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα
δυνάμεως

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δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ταύτη
ἐκάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκάλεσα, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ
τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον
ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. τί δὲ σύ; πῶς ποιεῖς;

οὕτως, ἔφη.

δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε. ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμιν τινα φῆς
εἶναι αὐτήν, ἢ εἰς τί γένος τιθεῖς;

εἰς τοῦτο, ἔφη, πασῶν γε δυνάμεων ἐρρωμενεστάτην.

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τί δέ, δόξαν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος οἴσομεν;

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ὣ γὰρ δοξάζειν δυνάμεθα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ δόξα ἐστίν.

ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ὀλίγον γε πρότερον ὠμολόγεις μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δόξαν.

πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, τὸ γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταῦτόν τις νοῦν ἔχων τιθεῖν;

καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἐπιστήμης δόξα

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ὁμολογεῖται ἡμῖν.

ἕτερον.

ἐφ' ἐτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι δυναμένη ἐκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν;

ἀνάγκη.

ἐπιστήμη μὲν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ ὄν γινῶναι ὥς ἔχει;

ναί.

δόξα δέ, φαμέν, δοξάζειν;

ναί.

ἢ ταῦτόν ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη γινώσκει; καὶ ἔσται γνωστόν τε καὶ δοξαστόν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἀδύνατον;

ἀδύνατον, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων· εἴπερ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἄλλῃ δύναμις πέφυκεν, δυνάμεις δὲ ἀμφοτέραί ἐστον, δόξα τε

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καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλῃ δὲ ἐκατέρα, ὥς φαμεν, ἐκ τούτων δὴ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γνωστόν καὶ δοξαστόν ταῦτόν εἶναι.

οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ὄν γνωστόν, ἄλλο τι ἂν δοξαστόν ἢ τὸ ὄν εἴη;

ἄλλο.

ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζει; ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ γε μὴ ὄν; ἐννόει δέ.

οὐχ ὁ δοξάζων ἐπὶ τί φέρει τὴν δόξαν; ἢ οἷόν τε αὖ δοξάζειν μὲν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν;

ἀδύνατον.

ἀλλ' ἔν γε τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων;

ναί.

ἀλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἔν τι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ' ἂν

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προσαγορευέοιτο;

πάνυ γε.

μὴ ὄντι μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γινώσιν;

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

οὐκ ἄρα ὄν οὐδὲ μὴ ὄν δοξάζει;

οὐ γάρ.

οὔτε ἄρα ἄγνοια οὔτε γινῶσις δόξα ἂν εἴη;

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ἄρ' οὖν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, ὑπερβαίνουσα ἢ γινώσιν σαφηνεῖα ἢ ἄγνοιαν
ἀσαφεία;

οὐδέτερα.

ἀλλ' ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, γνώσεως μὲν σοι φαίνεται δόξα σκοτωδέστερον,
ἀγνοίας δὲ φανότερον;
καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη.

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ἐντὸς δ' ἀμφοῖν κεῖται;

ναί.

μεταξὺ ἄρα ἂν εἴη τούτοις δόξα.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἴ τι φανεῖται οἷον ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν, τὸ
τοιούτου μεταξὺ κεῖσθαι τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος,
καὶ οὔτε ἐπιστήμην οὔτε ἄγνοιαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξὺ αὐ
φανέν ἀγνοίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης;
ὀρθῶς.

νῦν δέ γε πέφανται μεταξὺ τούτοις ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν δόξαν;

πέφανται.

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ἐκεῖνο δὴ λείποιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν εὐρεῖν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ
εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰλικρινὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν
προσαγορευόμενον, ἵνα, ἐὰν φανῇ, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν δίκῃ
προσαγορεύωμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἄκρις τὰ ἄκρα, τοῖς δὲ μεταξὺ τὰ μεταξὺ
ἀποδιδόντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

οὕτω.

τούτων δὴ ὑποκειμένων λεγέτω μοι, φήσω, καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω

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ὁ χρηστὸς ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν
ἠγεῖται ἀεὶ μὲν κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει,
ἐκεῖνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος ἂν τις ἐν τῷ καλῷ φῇ εἶναι
καὶ δίκαιον καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω. τούτων γὰρ δὴ, ὦ ἄριστε, φήσομεν, τῶν
πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν ὃ οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ
οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὁσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον;

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οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ καλὰ πως αὐτὰ καὶ αἰσχροὺς φανῆναι, καὶ ὅσα
ἄλλα ἐρωτᾷς.

τί δὲ τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια; ἥττον τι ἡμίσεα ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται;

οὐδέν.

καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μὴ τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἂν
φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τάναντία;

οὐκ, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ, ἔφη, ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἔξεταί.

πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν τοῦτο ὃ ἂν τις
φῇ αὐτὸ εἶναι;

τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐστιάσεσιν, ἔφη, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἔοικεν,
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καὶ τῷ τῶν παιδῶν αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ εὐνοῦχου, τῆς βολῆς περὶ τῆς
νυκτερίδος, ᾧ καὶ ἐφ' οὗ αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα
ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὐτ' εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως
νοῆσαι, οὔτε ἀμφοτέρα οὔτε οὐδέτερον.

ἔχεις οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι χρήσι, ἢ ὅποι θήσεις καλλίῳ θέσιν τῆς
μεταξὺ οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι; οὔτε γὰρ που σκοτωδέστερα μὴ ὄντος
πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον μὴ εἶναι

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φανήσεται, οὔτε φανότερα ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον εἶναι.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

ἠϋρήκαμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε περὶ
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξὺ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος
εἰλικρινῶς.

ἠϋρήκαμεν.

προωμολογήσαμεν δέ γε, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον φανείη, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ ἀλλ' οὐ
γνωστὸν δεῖν λέγεσθαι, τῇ μεταξὺ δυνάμει τὸ μεταξὺ πλανητὸν
ἀλίσκόμενον.

ὠμολογήκαμεν.

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τοὺς ἄρα πολλὰ καλὰ θεωμένους, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν μὴ ὀρῶντας μηδ' ἄλλῳ
ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἄγοντι δυναμένους ἔπρεσθαι, καὶ πολλὰ δίκαια, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον
μὴ, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, δοξάζειν φήσομεν ἅπαντα, γινώσκειν δὲ ὧν
δοξάζουσιν οὐδέν.

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

τί δὲ αὖ τοὺς αὐτὰ ἕκαστα θεωμένους καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ὡσαύτως ὄντα;
ἄρ' οὐ γινώσκειν ἀλλ' οὐ δοξάζειν;

ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τε καὶ φιλεῖν τούτους μὲν ταῦτα

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φήσομεν ἐφ' οἷς γνώσις ἐστίν, ἐκείνους δὲ ἐφ' οἷς δόξα; ἢ οὐ μνημονεύομεν
ὅτι φωνάς τε καὶ χροάς καλὰς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἔφαμεν τούτους φιλεῖν τε καὶ
θεᾶσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ἀνέχεσθαι ὥς τι ὄν;

μεμνήμεθα.

μὴ οὖν τι πλημμελήσομεν φιλοδόξους καλοῦντες αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ
φιλοσόφους; καὶ ἄρα ἡμῖν σφόδρα χαλεπανοῦσιν ἂν οὕτω λέγωμεν;
οὐκ, ἂν γέ μοι πείθωνται, ἔφη· τῷ γὰρ ἀληθεῖ χαλεπαίνειν οὐ θέμις.

τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ ὃν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους ἀλλ' οὐ
φιλοδόξους κλητέον;

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Republic

English translation

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To such a city, then, or constitution I apply the terms good[*] and right—and to the corresponding kind of man; but the others I describe as bad and mistaken, if this one is right, in respect both to the administration of states and to the formation[*] of the character of the individual soul, they falling under four forms of badness. What are these, he said. And I was going on[*] to enumerate them in what seemed to me the order of their evolution[*]

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from one another, when Polemarchus—he sat at some little distance[*] from Adeimantus—stretched forth his hand, and, taking hold of his garment[*] from above by the shoulder, drew the other toward him and, leaning forward himself, spoke a few words in his ear, of which we overheard nothing[*] else save only this, Shall we let him off,[*] then, he said, or what shall we do? By no means, said Adeimantus, now raising his voice. What, pray,[*] said I, is it that you are not letting off? You,

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said he. And for what reason, pray? said I. We think you are a slacker, he said, and are trying to cheat[*] us out of a whole division,[*] and that not the least, of the argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it, and expect to get away with it by observing thus lightly that, of course, in respect to women and children it is obvious to everybody that the possessions of friends will be in common.[*] Well, isn't that right, Adeimantus? I said. Yes, said he, but this word right,[*] like other things, requires defining[*] as to the way[*] and manner of such a community. There might be many ways. Don't, then, pass over the one

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that you[*] have in mind. For we have long been lying in wait for you, expecting that you would say something both of the procreation of children and their bringing up,[*] and would explain the whole matter of the community of women and children of which you speak. We think that the right or wrong management of this makes a great difference, all the difference in the world,[*] in the constitution of a state;

so now, since you are beginning on another constitution before sufficiently defining this, we are firmly resolved,

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as you overheard, not to let you go till you have expounded all this as fully as you did the rest. Set me down, too, said Glaucon, as voting this ticket.[*] Surely, said Thrasymachus, you may consider it a joint resolution of us all, Socrates.

What a thing you have done, said I, in thus challenging[*] me! What a huge debate you have started afresh, as it were, about this polity, in the supposed completion of which I was rejoicing, being only too glad to have it accepted

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as I then set it forth! You don't realize what a swarm[*] of arguments you are stirring up[*] by this demand, which I foresaw and evaded to save us no end of trouble. Well, said Thrasymachus,[*]do you suppose this company has come here to prospect for gold[*] and not to listen to discussions? Yes, I said, in measure. Nay, Socrates, said Glaucon, the measure[*] of listening to such discussions is the whole of life for reasonable men. So don't consider us, and do not you yourself grow weary

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in explaining to us what we ask or, your views as to how this communion of wives and children among our guardians will be managed, and also about the rearing of the children while still young in the interval between[*] birth and formal schooling which is thought to be the most difficult part of education. Try, then, to tell us what must be the manner of it. It is not an easy thing to expound, my dear fellow, said I, for even more than the provisions that precede it, it raises many doubts. For one might doubt whether what is proposed is possible[*] and, even conceding the possibility,[*] one might still be sceptical whether it is best.

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For which reason one as it were, shrinks from touching on the matter lest the theory be regarded as nothing but a wish-thought,[*] my dear friend. Do not shrink, he said, for your hearers will not be inconsiderate[*] nor distrustful nor hostile. And I said, My good fellow, is that remark intended to encourage me? It is, he said. Well, then, said I, it has just the contrary effect. For, if I were confident that I was speaking with knowledge, it would be an excellent encouragement.

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For there is both safety and security in speaking the truth with knowledge about our greatest and dearest concerns to those who are both wise and dear. But to speak when one doubts himself and is seeking while he talks is

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a fearful and slippery venture. The fear is not of being laughed at,[*] for that is childish, but, lest, missing the truth, I fall down and drag my friends with me in matters where it most imports not to stumble. So I salute Nemesis,[*] Glaucon, in what I am about to say. For, indeed,[*] I believe that involuntary homicide is a lesser fault than to mislead opinion about the honorable, the good, and the just. This is a risk that it is better to run with enemies[*]

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than with friends, so that your encouragement is none. And Glaucon, with a laugh, said, Nay, Socrates, if any false note in the argument does us any harm, we release you as[*] in a homicide case, and warrant you pure of hand and no deceiver of us. So speak on with confidence. Well, said I, he who is released in that case is counted pure as the law bids, and, presumably, if there, here

too. Speak on, then, he said, for all this objection. We must return then, said I, and say now what perhaps ought to have been said in due sequence there.

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But maybe this way is right, that after the completion of the male drama we should in turn go through with the female,[*] especially since you are so urgent.

For men, then, born and bred as we described there is in my opinion no other right possession and use of children and women than that which accords with the start we gave them. Our endeavor, I believe, was to establish these men in our discourse as the guardians of a flock[*]? Yes.

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Let us preserve the analogy, then, and assign them a generation and breeding answering to it, and see if it suits us or not. In what way? he said. In this. Do we expect the females of watch-dogs to join in guarding what the males guard and to hunt with them and share all their pursuits or do we expect the females to stay indoors as being incapacitated by the bearing and the breeding of the whelps while the males toil and have all the care of the flock? They have all things in common,

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he replied, except that we treat the females as weaker and the males as stronger. Is it possible, then, said I, to employ any creature for the same ends as another if you do not assign it the same nurture and education? It is not possible.

If, then, we are to use the women for the same things as the men,

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we must also teach them the same things. Yes. Now music together with gymnastic was the training we gave the men. Yes. Then we must assign these two arts to the women also and the offices of war and employ them in the same way. It would seem likely from what you say, he replied. Perhaps, then, said I, the contrast with present custom[*] would make much in our proposals look ridiculous if our words[*] are to be realized in fact. Yes, indeed, he said. What then, said I, is the funniest thing you note in them? Is it not obviously the women exercising unclad in the palestra

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together with the men, not only the young, but even the older, like old men in gymnasiums,[*] when, though wrinkled and unpleasant to look at, they still persist in exercising? Yes, on my word, he replied, it would seem ridiculous under present conditions. Then, said I, since we have set out to speak our minds, we must not fear all the jibes[*] with which the wits would greet so great a revolution, and the sort of things they would say about gymnastics

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and culture, and most of all about the bearing of arms and the bestriding of horses. You're right, he said. But since we have begun we must go forward to

the rough part of our law,[*] after begging these fellows not to mind their own business[*] but to be serious, and reminding them that it is not long since the Greeks thought it disgraceful and ridiculous, as most of the barbarians[*] do now, for men to be seen naked. And when the practice of athletics began, first with the Cretans

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and then with the Lacedaemonians, it was open to the wits of that time to make fun of these practices, don't you think so? I do. But when, I take it, experience showed that it is better to strip than to veil all things of this sort, then the laughter of the eyes[*] faded away before that which reason revealed to be best, and this made it plain that he talks idly who deems anything else ridiculous but evil, and who tries to raise a laugh by looking to any other pattern of absurdity than

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that of folly and wrong or sets up any other standard of the beautiful as a mark for his seriousness than the good. Most assuredly, said he.

Then is not the first thing that we have to agree upon with regard to these proposals whether they are possible or not? And we must throw open the debate[*] to anyone who wishes either in jest or earnest to raise the question

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whether female human nature is capable of sharing with the male all tasks or none at all, or some but not others,[*] and under which of these heads this business of war falls. Would not this be that best beginning which would naturally and proverbially lead to the best end[*]?Far the best, he said. Shall we then conduct the debate with ourselves in behalf of those others[*] so that the case of the other side may not be taken defenceless and go by default[*]?

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Nothing hinders, he said. Shall we say then in their behalf: There is no need, Socrates and Glaucon, of others disputing against you, for you yourselves at the beginning of the foundation of your city agreed[*] that each one ought to mind as his own business the one thing for which he was fitted by nature? We did so agree, I think; certainly! Can it be denied then that there is by nature a great difference between men and women? Surely there is. Is it not fitting, then, that a different function should be appointed

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for each corresponding to this difference of nature? Certainly. How, then, can you deny that you are mistaken and in contradiction with yourselves when you turn around and affirm that the men and the women ought to do the same thing, though their natures are so far apart? Can you surprise me with an answer to that question? Not easily on this sudden challenge, he replied: but I will and do beg you to lend your voice to the plea in our behalf, whatever it may be. These and many similar difficulties, Glaucon, said I,

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I foresaw and feared, and so shrank from touching on the law concerning the getting and breeding of women and children. It does not seem an easy thing, by heaven, he said, no, by heaven. No, it is not, said I; but the fact is that whether one tumbles into a little diving-pool or plump into the great sea he swims all the same. By all means. Then we, too, must swim and try to escape out of the sea[*] of argument in the hope that either some dolphin[*] will take us on its back or some other desperate rescue.

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So it seems, he said. Come then, consider, said I, if we can find a way out. We did agree that different natures should have differing pursuits and that the nature of men and women differ. And yet now we affirm that these differing natures should have the same pursuits. That is the indictment. It is.

What a grand[*] thing, Glaucon, said I,

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is the power of the art of contradiction[*]! Why so? Because, said I, many appear to me to fall into it even against their wills, and to suppose that they are not wrangling but arguing, owing to their inability to apply the proper divisions and distinctions to the subject under consideration. They pursue purely verbal oppositions, practising eristic, not dialectic on one another. Yes, this does happen to many, he said; but does this observation apply to us too at present?

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Absolutely, said I; at any rate I am afraid that we are unawares[*] slipping into contentiousness. In what way? The principle that natures not the same ought not to share in the same pursuits we are following up most manfully and eristically[*] in the literal and verbal sense but we did not delay to consider at all what particular kind of diversity and identity[*] of nature we had in mind and with reference to what we were trying to define it when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same. No, we didn't consider that, he said.

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Wherefore, by the same token, I said, we might ask ourselves whether the natures of bald[*] and long-haired men are the same and not, rather, contrary. And, after agreeing that they were opposed, we might, if the bald cobbled, forbid the long-haired to do so, or vice versa. That would be ridiculous, he said. Would it be so, said I, for any other reason than that we did not then posit likeness and difference of nature in any and every sense, but were paying heed solely to the kind of diversity

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and homogeneity that was pertinent[*] to the pursuits themselves? We meant, for example, that a man and a woman who have a physician's[*] mind have the same nature. Don't you think so? I do. But that a man physician and a man carpenter have different natures? Certainly, I suppose.

Similarly, then, said I, if it appears that the male and the female sex have distinct qualifications for any arts or pursuits, we shall affirm that they ought to be assigned respectively to each. But if it appears that they differ only in just this respect that the female bears

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and the male begets, we shall say that no proof has yet been produced that the woman differs from the man for our purposes, but we shall continue to think that our guardians and their wives ought to follow the same pursuits. And rightly, said he.

Then, is it not the next thing to bid our opponent tell us

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precisely for what art or pursuit concerned with the conduct of a state the woman's nature differs from the man's? That would be at any rate fair. Perhaps, then, someone else, too, might say what you were saying a while ago, that it is not easy to find a satisfactory answer on a sudden, [*] but that with time for reflection there is no difficulty. He might say that. Shall we, then, beg the raiser of such objections to follow us,

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if we may perhaps prove able to make it plain to him that there is no pursuit connected with the administration of a state that is peculiar to woman? By all means. Come then, we shall say to him, answer our question. Was this the basis of your distinction between the man naturally gifted for anything and the one not so gifted—that the one learned easily, the other with difficulty; that the one with slight instruction could discover [*] much for himself in the matter studied, but the other, after much instruction and drill, could not even remember what he had learned; and that the bodily faculties of the one adequately served [*] his mind,

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while, for the other, the body was a hindrance? Were there any other points than these by which you distinguish the well endowed man in every subject and the poorly endowed? No one, said he, will be able to name any others. Do you know, then, of anything practised by mankind in which the masculine sex does not surpass the female on all these points? [*] Must we make a long story of it by alleging weaving and the watching of pancakes

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and the boiling pot, whereon the sex plumes itself and wherein its defeat will expose it to most laughter? You are right, he said, that the one sex [*] is far surpassed by the other in everything, one may say. Many women, it is true, are better than many men in many things, but broadly speaking, it is as you say. Then there is no pursuit of the administrators of a state that belongs to a woman because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. But the natural capacities are distributed alike among both creatures, and women naturally share in all pursuits and men in all—

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yet for all the woman is weaker than the man. Assuredly. Shall we, then, assign them all to men and nothing to women? How could we? We shall rather, I take it, say that one woman has the nature of a physician and another not, and one is by nature musical, and another unmusical? Surely.

Can we, then, deny that one woman is naturally athletic

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and warlike and another unwarlike and averse to gymnastics? I think not. And again, one a lover, another a hater, of wisdom? And one high-spirited, and the other lacking spirit? That also is true. Then it is likewise true that one woman has the qualities of a guardian and another not. Were not these the natural qualities of the men also whom we selected for guardians? They were. The women and the men, then, have the same nature in respect to the guardianship of the state, save in so far as the one is weaker, the other stronger. Apparently.

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Women of this kind, then, must be selected to cohabit with men of this kind and to serve with them as guardians since they are capable of it and akin by nature. By all means. And to the same natures must we not assign the same pursuits? The same. We come round, [*] then, to our previous statement, and agree that it does not run counter to nature to assign music and gymnastics to the wives of the guardians.

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By all means. Our legislation, then, was not impracticable or utopian, [*] since the law we proposed accorded with nature. Rather, the other way of doing things, prevalent today, proves, as it seems, unnatural. Apparently. The object of our inquiry was the possibility and the desirability [*] of what we were proposing. It was. That it is possible has been admitted. Yes. The next point to be agreed upon is that it is the best way. Obviously. For the production of a guardian, then, education will not be one thing for our men and another for our women, especially since

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the nature which we hand over to it is the same. There will be no difference. How are you minded, now, in this matter? In what? In the matter of supposing some men to be better and some worse, [*] or do you think them all alike? By no means. In the city, then, that we are founding, which do you think will prove the better men, the guardians receiving the education which we have described or the cobblers educated by the art of cobbling [*]? An absurd question, he said.

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I understand, said I; and are not these the best of all the citizens? By far. And will not these women be the best of all the women? They, too, by far. Is there anything better for a state than the generation in it of the best possible women [*] and men? There is not.

And this, music and gymnastics

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applied as we described will effect. Surely. Then the institution we proposed is not only possible but the best for the state. That is so. The women of the guardians, then, must strip, since they will be clothed with virtue as a garment, [*] and must take their part with the men in war and the other duties of civic guardianship and have no other occupation. But in these very duties lighter tasks must be assigned to the women than to the men

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because of their weakness as a class. But the man who ridicules unclad women, exercising because it is best that they should, plucks the unripe [*] fruit of laughter and does not know, it appears, the end of his laughter nor what he would be at. For the fairest thing that is said or ever will be said is this, that the helpful is fair [*] and the harmful foul. Assuredly.

In this matter, then, of the regulation of women, we may say that we have surmounted one of the waves of our paradox

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and have not been quite swept [*] away by it in ordaining that our guardians and female guardians must have all pursuits in common, but that in some sort the argument concurs with itself in the assurance that what it proposes is both possible and beneficial. It is no slight wave that you are thus escaping. You will not think it a great [*] one, I said, when you have seen the one that follows. Say on then and show me, said he. This, said I, and all that precedes has for its sequel, in my opinion, the following law. What? That these women shall all be common [*] to all the men,

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and that none shall cohabit with any privately; and that the children shall be common, and that no parent shall know its own offspring nor any child its parent. This is a far bigger paradox than the other, and provokes more distrust as to its possibility and its utility. [*] I presume, said I, that there would be no debate about its utility, no denial that the community of women and children would be the greatest good, supposing it possible. But I take it that its possibility or the contrary

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would be the chief topic of contention. Both, he said, would be right sharply debated. You mean, said I, that I have to meet a coalition of arguments. But I expected to escape from one of them, and that if you agreed that the thing was beneficial, it would remain for me to speak only of its feasibility. You have not escaped detection, he said, in your attempted flight, but you must render an account of both.

I must pay the penalty, I said, yet do me this much grace:

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Permit me to take a holiday, just as men of lazy minds are wont to feast themselves on their own thoughts when they walk alone.[*] Such persons, without waiting to discover how their desires may be realized, dismiss that topic to save themselves the labor of deliberating about possibilities and impossibilities, assume their wish fulfilled, and proceed to work out the details in imagination, and take pleasure in portraying what they will do when it is realized, thus making still more idle a mind that is idle without that.[*] I too now succumb to this weakness[*]

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and desire to postpone[*] and examine later the question of feasibility, but will at present assume that, and will, with your permission, inquire how the rulers will work out the details in practice, and try to show that nothing could be more beneficial to the state and its guardians than the effective operation of our plan. This is what I would try to consider first together with you, and thereafter the other topic, if you allow it. I do allow it, he said: proceed with the inquiry. I think, then, said I, that the rulers,

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if they are to deserve that name, and their helpers likewise, will, the one, be willing to accept orders,[*] and the other, to give them, in some things obeying our laws, and imitating[*] them in others which we leave to their discretion. Presumably. You, then, the lawgiver, I said, have picked these men and similarly will select to give over to them women as nearly as possible of the same nature.[*] And they, having houses and meals in common, and no private possessions of that kind,

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will dwell together, and being commingled in gymnastics and in all their life and education, will be conducted by innate necessity to sexual union. Is not what I say a necessary consequence? Not by the necessities of geometry, he said, but by those of love,[*] which are perhaps keener and more potent than the other to persuade and constrain the multitude.

They are, indeed, I said; but next, Glaucon, disorder and promiscuity in these unions or

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in anything else they do would be an unhallowed thing in a happy state and the rulers will not suffer it. It would not be right, he said. Obviously, then, we must arrange marriages, sacramental so far as may be. And the most sacred marriages would be those that were most beneficial.

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By all means. How, then, would the greatest benefit result? Tell me this, Glaucon. I see that you have in your house hunting-dogs and a number of pedigree cocks.[*] Have you ever considered something about their unions and procreations? What?[*] he said. In the first place, I said, among these themselves, although they are a select breed, do not some prove better than

the rest? They do. Do you then breed from all indiscriminately, or are you careful to breed from the best[*]?

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From the best. And, again, do you breed from the youngest or the oldest, or, so far as may be, from those in their prime? From those in their prime. And if they are not thus bred, you expect, do you not, that your birds and hounds will greatly degenerate? I do, he said. And what of horses and other animals? I said; is it otherwise with them? It would be strange if it were, said he.

Gracious, said I, dear friend, how imperative, then, is our need of the highest skill in our rulers, if the principle holds also for mankind.

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Well, it does, he said, but what of it? This, said I, that they will have to employ many of those drugs[*] of which we were speaking. We thought that an inferior physician sufficed for bodies that do not need drugs but yield to diet and regimen. But when it is necessary to prescribe drugs we know that a more enterprising and venturesome physician is required. True; but what is the pertinency? This, said I: it seems likely that our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception

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for the benefit[*] of their subjects. We said, I believe, that the use of that sort of thing was in the category of medicine. And that was right, he said. In our marriages, then, and the procreation of children, it seems there will be no slight need of this kind of right. How so? It follows from our former admissions, I said, that the best men must cohabit with the best women in as many cases as possible and the worst with the worst in the fewest,

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and that the offspring of the one must be reared and that of the other not, if the flock[*] is to be as perfect as possible. And the way in which all this is brought to pass must be unknown to any but the rulers, if, again, the herd of guardians is to be as free as possible from dissension. Most true, he said.

We shall, then, have to ordain certain festivals and sacrifices, in which we shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms, and our poets must compose hymns

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suitable to the marriages that then take place. But the number of the marriages we will leave to the discretion of the rulers, that they may keep the number of the citizens as nearly as may be the same,[*] taking into account wars and diseases and all such considerations, and that, so far as possible, our city may not grow too great or too small. Right, he said. Certain ingenious lots, then, I suppose, must be devised so that the inferior man at each conjugation may blame chance and not the rulers. Yes, indeed, he said.

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And on the young men, surely, who excel in war and other pursuits we must

bestow honors and prizes, and, in particular, the opportunity of more frequent intercourse with the women, which will at the same time be a plausible pretext for having them beget as many of the children as possible. Right. And the children thus born will be taken over by the officials appointed for this, men or women or both, since, I take it, the official posts too are common to women and men.

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The offspring of the good, I suppose, they will take to the pen or crèche, to certain nurses who live apart in a quarter of the city, but the offspring of the inferior, and any of those of the other sort who are born defective, they will properly dispose of in secret,[*] so that no one will know what has become of them. That is the condition, he said, of preserving the purity of the guardians' breed. They will also supervise the nursing of the children, conducting the mothers to the pen when their breasts are full, but employing every device[*]

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to prevent anyone from recognizing her own infant. And they will provide others who have milk if the mothers are insufficient. But they will take care that the mothers themselves shall not suckle too long, and the trouble of wakeful nights and similar burdens they will devolve upon the nurses, wet and dry. You are making maternity a soft job[*] for the women of the guardians. It ought to be, said I, but let us pursue our design. We said that the offspring should come from parents in their prime.

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True. Do you agree that the period of the prime may be fairly estimated at twenty years for a woman and thirty for a man? How do you reckon it?[*] he said. The women, I said, beginning at the age of twenty, shall bear for the state[*] to the age of forty, and the man shall beget for the state from the time he passes his prime in swiftness in running to the age of fifty-five.

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That is, he said, the maturity and prime for both of body and mind. Then, if anyone older or younger than the prescribed age meddles with procreation for the state, we shall say that his error is an impiety and an injustice, since he is begetting for the city a child whose birth, if it escapes discovery, will not be attended by the sacrifices and the prayers which the priests and priestesses and the entire city prefer at the ceremonial marriages, that ever better offspring may spring from good sires[*] and from fathers helpful to the state

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sons more helpful still. But this child will be born in darkness and conceived in foul incontinence. Right, he said. And the same rule will apply, I said, if any of those still within the age of procreation goes in to a woman of that age with whom the ruler has not paired him. We shall say that he is imposing on the state a base-born, uncertified, and unhallowed child. Most rightly, he said. But when, I take it, the men and the women have passed the age of lawful

procreation, we shall leave the men free to form such relations

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with whomsoever they please, except[*] daughter and mother and their direct descendants and ascendants, and likewise the women, save with son and father, and so on, first admonishing them preferably not even to bring to light[*] anything whatever thus conceived, but if they are unable to prevent a birth to dispose of it on the understanding that we cannot rear such an offspring. All that sounds reasonable, he said; but how are they to distinguish one another's fathers and daughters,

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and the other degrees of kin that you have just mentioned? They won't, said I, except that a man will call all male offspring born in the tenth and in the seventh month after he became a bridegroom his sons, and all female, daughters, and they will call him father.[*] And, similarly, he will call their offspring his grandchildren[*] and they will call his group grandfathers and grandmothers. And all children born in the period in which their fathers and mothers were procreating will regard one another as brothers and sisters.

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This will suffice for the prohibitions of intercourse of which we just now spoke. But the law will allow brothers and sisters to cohabit if the lot so falls out and the Delphic oracle approves. Quite right, said he.

This, then, Glaucon, is the manner of the community of wives and children among the guardians. That it is consistent with the rest of our polity and by far the best way is the next point that we must get confirmed

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by the argument. Is not that so?

It is, indeed, he said. Is not the logical first step towards such an agreement to ask ourselves what we could name as the greatest good for the constitution of a state and the proper aim of a lawgiver in his legislation, and what would be the greatest evil, and then to consider whether the proposals we have just set forth fit into the footprints[*] of the good and do not suit those of the evil? By all means, he said. Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that distracts it

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and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one? We do not. Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths? By all means, he said. But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings

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to the city and its inhabitants? Of course. And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as mine and not mine, and

similarly with regard to the word alien?[*]Precisely so. That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression mine and not mine of the same things in the same way. Much the best. And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man.[*] For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connections stretching to the soul for integration[*]

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with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labors in pain or is eased by pleasure. The same, he said, and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism. That is the kind of a state,

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then, I presume, that, when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil, will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole. Inevitably, he said, if it is well governed.

It is time, I said, to return to our city and observe whether it, rather than any other, embodies the qualities agreed upon in our argument.[*] We must, he said.

Well, then,

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there are to be found in other cities rulers and the people as in it, are there not? There are. Will not all these address one another as fellow-citizens? Of course. But in addition to citizens, what does the people in other states call its rulers. In most cities, masters. In democratic cities, just this, rulers. But what of the people in our city. In addition to citizens,

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what do they call their rulers? Saviors and helpers, he said. And what term do these apply to the people? Payers of their wage and supporters. And how do the rulers in other states denominate the populace? Slaves, he said. And how do the rulers describe one another? Co-rulers, he said. And ours? Co-guardians. Can you tell me whether any of the rulers in other states would speak of some of their co-rulers as belonging and others as outsiders? Yes, many would. And such a one thinks and speaks of the one that belongs as his own, doesn't he, and of the outsider as not his own? That is so. But what of your guardians. Could any of them think or speak of

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his co-guardian as an outsider? By no means, he said; for no matter whom he meets, he will feel that he is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a mother, a son, a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of these. Excellent, said I; but tell me this further,

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will it be merely the names[*] of this kinship that you have prescribed for them or must all their actions conform to the names in all customary observance toward fathers and in awe and care and obedience for parents, if they look for the favor[*] of either gods or men, since any other behaviour would be neither just nor pious? Shall these be the unanimous oracular voices that they hear from all the people, or shall some other kind of teaching beset[*] the ears of your children from their birth, both concerning[*] what is due to those who are pointed out as their fathers

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and to their other kin? These, he said; for it would be absurd for them merely to pronounce with their lips the names of kinship without the deeds. Then, in this city more than in any other, when one citizen fares well or ill, men will pronounce in unison the word of which we spoke: It is mine that does well; it is mine that does ill. That is most true, he said.

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And did we not say that this conviction and way of speech[*] brings with it a community in pleasures and pains? And rightly, too. Then these citizens, above all others, will have one and the same thing in common which they will name mine, and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasures and pains in common. Quite so. And is not the cause of this, besides the general constitution of the state, the community of wives and children among the guardians? It will certainly be the chief cause, he said.

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But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts. And we were right in so agreeing. Then it is the greatest blessing for a state of which the community of women and children among the helpers has been shown to be the cause. Quite so, he said. And this is consistent with what we said before. For we said, [*] I believe, that these helpers must not possess houses of their own or

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land or any other property, but that they should receive from the other citizens for their support the wage of their guardianship and all spend it in common. That was the condition of their being true guardians. Right, he said. Is it not true, then, as I am trying to say, that those former and these present prescriptions tend to make them still more truly guardians and prevent them from distracting the city by referring mine not to the same but to different things, one man dragging off to his own house anything he is able to acquire apart from the rest,

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and another doing the same to his own separate house, and having women and children apart, thus introducing into the state the pleasures and pains of

individuals? They should all rather, we said, share one conviction about their own, tend to one goal, and so far as practicable have one experience of pleasure and pain. By all means, he said. Then will not law-suits and accusations against one another vanish,[*] one may say,[*] from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common?

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So that we can count on their being free from the dissensions that arise among men from the possession of property, children, and kin. They will necessarily be quit of these, he said. And again, there could not rightly arise among them any law-suit for assault or bodily injury. For as between age-fellows[*] we shall say that self-defence is honorable and just, thereby compelling them to keep their bodies in condition. Right, he said.

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And there will be the further advantage in such a law that an angry man, satisfying his anger in such wise, would be less likely to carry the quarrel to further extremes. Assuredly. As for an older man, he will always have the charge of ruling and chastising the younger. Obviously. Again, it is plain that the young man, except by command of the rulers, will probably not do violence to an elder or strike him, or, I take it, dishonor him in any other way. Two guardians sufficient to prevent that

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there are, fear and awe, awe restraining him from laying hands on one who may be his parent, and fear in that the others will rush to the aid of the sufferer, some as sons, some as brothers, some as fathers. That is the way it works out, he said. Then in all cases the laws will leave these men to dwell in peace together. Great peace. And if these are free from dissensions among themselves, there is no fear that[*] the rest of the city will ever start faction against them or with one another. No, there is not.

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But I hesitate, so unseemly[*] are they, even to mention the pettiest troubles of which they would be rid, the flatterings[*] of the rich, the embarrassments and pains of the poor in the bringing-up of their children and the procuring of money for the necessities of life for their households, the borrowings, the repudiations, all the devices with which they acquire what they deposit with wives and servitors to husband,[*] and all the indignities that they endure in such matters, which are obvious and

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ignoble and not deserving of mention. Even a blind[*] man can see these, he said.

From all these, then, they will be finally free, and they will live a happier life than that men count most happy, the life of the victors at Olympia.[*] How so? The things for which those are felicitated are a small part of what is

secured for these. Their victory is fairer and their public support more complete. For the prize of victory that they win is the salvation of the entire state, the fillet that binds their brows is the public support of themselves and their children—

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they receive honor from the city while they live and when they die a worthy burial. A fair guerdon, indeed, he said.

Do you recall, said I, that in the preceding[*] argument the objection of somebody or other rebuked us for not making our guardians happy,

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since, though it was in their power to have everything of the citizens, they had nothing, and we, I believe, replied that this was a consideration to which we would return if occasion offered, but that at present we were making our guardians guardians and the city as a whole as happy as possible, and that we were not modelling[*] our ideal of happiness with reference to any one class?

I do remember, he said. Well then, since now the life of our helpers[*] has been shown to be fairer and better than that of the victors at Olympia,

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need we compare[*] it with the life of cobblers and other craftsmen and farmers? I think not, he said. But further, we may fairly repeat what I was saying then also, that if the guardian shall strive for a kind of happiness that will unmake[*] him as a guardian and shall not be content with the way of life that is moderate and secure and, as we affirm, the best, but if some senseless and childish opinion about happiness shall beset him and impel him to use his power to appropriate

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everything in the city for himself, then he will find out that Hesiod[*] was indeed wise, who said that

the half was in some sort more than the whole.

Hes. WD 40 If he accepts my counsel, he said, he will abide in this way of life. You accept, then, as we have described it, this partnership of the women with our men in the matter of education and children and the guardianship of the other citizens, and you admit that both within the city and when they go forth to war they ought to keep guard together and hunt together as it were like hounds,

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and have all things in every way, so far as possible, in common, and that so doing they will do what is for the best and nothing that is contrary to female human nature[*] in comparison with male or to their natural fellowship with one another. I do admit it, he said.

Then, I said, is not the thing that it remains to determine this, whether, namely, it is possible for such a community to be brought about among men as it is in the other animals,[*] and in what way it is possible? You have

anticipated, he said, the point I was about to raise. For[*] as for their wars, I said,

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the manner in which they will conduct them is too obvious for discussion. How so, said he. It is obvious that they will march out together,[*] and, what is more, will conduct their children to war when they are sturdy, in order that, like the children of other craftsmen,[*] they may observe the processes of which they must be masters in their maturity; and in addition to looking on

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they must assist and minister in all the business of war and serve their fathers and mothers. Or have you never noticed the practice in the arts, how for example the sons of potters look on as helpers a long time before they put their hands to the clay? They do, indeed. Should these then be more concerned than our guardians to train the children by observation and experience of what is to be their proper business? That would be ridiculous, he said. But, further, when it comes to fighting,

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every creature will do better in the presence of its offspring? That is so, but the risk, Socrates, is not slight, in the event of disasters such as may happen in war, that, losing their children as well as themselves, they make it impossible for the remnant of the state to recover. What you say is true, I replied; but, in the first place, is it your idea that the one thing for which we must provide is the avoidance of all danger? By no means. And, if they are to take chances, should it not be for something success in which will make them better?

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Clearly. Do you think it makes a slight difference and not worth some risk whether men who are to be warriors do or do not observe war as boys? No, it makes a great difference for the purpose of which you speak. Starting, then, from this assumption that we are to make the boys spectators of war, we must further contrive[*] security for them and all will be well, will it not? Yes. To begin with, then, said I, will not the fathers be, humanly speaking, not ignorant of war

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and shrewd judges of which campaigns are hazardous and which not? Presumably, he said. They will take the boys with them to the one and avoid the others? Rightly. And for officers, I presume, said I, they will put in charge of them not those who are good for nothing else but men who by age and experience are qualified to serve at once as leaders and as caretakers of children. Yes, that would be the proper way. Still, we may object, it is the unexpected[*] that happens to many in many cases. Yes, indeed. To provide against such chances, then, we must wing[*] the children from the start so that if need arises they may fly away and escape.

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What do you mean? he said. We must mount them when very young, said I, and first have them taught to ride, and then conduct them to the scene of war, not on mettlesome war-steeds, but on the swiftest and gentlest horses possible; for thus they will have the best view of their own future business and also, if need arises, will most securely escape to safety in the train of elder guides. I think you are right, he said.

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But now what of the conduct of war? What should be the attitude of the soldiers to one another and the enemy? Am I right in my notions or not? Tell me what notions, he said. Anyone of them who deserts his post, or flings away his weapons,[*] or is guilty of any similar act of cowardice, should be reduced to the artisan or farmer class, should he not? By all means. And anyone who is taken alive by the enemy[*] we will make a present of to his captors, shall we not, to deal with their catch[*]

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as they please? Quite so. And don't you agree that the one who wins the prize of valor and distinguishes himself shall first be crowned by his fellows in the campaign, by the lads and boys each in turn? I do. And be greeted with the right hand? That, too. But I presume you wouldn't go as far as this? What? That he should kiss and be kissed by everyone[*]? By all means, he said, and I add to the law the provision that during that

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campaign none whom he wishes to kiss be allowed to refuse, so that if one is in love with anyone, male or female, he may be the more eager to win the prize. Excellent, said I, and we have already said that the opportunity of marriage will be more readily provided for the good man, and that he will be more frequently selected than the others for participation in that sort of thing, in order that as many children as possible may be born from such stock. We have, he replied.

But, furthermore, we may cite Homer[*]

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too for the justice of honoring in such ways the valiant among our youth. For Homer says that Ajax, who had distinguished himself in the war, was honored with the long chine,[*] assuming that the most fitting meed for a brave man in the prime of his youth is that from which both honor and strength will accrue to him. Most rightly, he said. We will then, said I, take Homer as our guide in this at least. We, too, at sacrifices and on other like occasions, will reward the good so far as they have proved themselves good with hymns and the other privileges of which we have just spoken,

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and also with

seats of honor and meat and full cups

Hom. Il. 8.162, so as to combine physical training with honor for the good, both men and women. Nothing could be better, he said. Very well; and of those who die on campaign, if anyone's death has been especially glorious, shall we not, to begin with, affirm that he belongs to the golden race?[*] By all means.

And shall we not believe Hesiod[*] who tells us that when anyone of this race dies, so it is that they become

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Hallowed spirits dwelling on earth, averters of evil,
Guardians watchful and good of articulate-speaking mortals?

Hes. WD 121 We certainly shall believe him. We will inquire of Apollo, [*] then, how and with what distinction we are to bury men of more than human, of divine, qualities, and deal with them according to his response. [*] How can we do otherwise? And ever after [*] we will bestow on their graves the tendance and

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worship paid to spirits divine. And we will practice the same observance when any who have been adjudged exceptionally good in the ordinary course of life die of old age or otherwise. That will surely be right, he said. But again, how will our soldiers conduct themselves toward enemies? In what respect? First, in the matter of making slaves of the defeated, do you think it right for Greeks to reduce Greek cities [*] to slavery, or rather that so far as they are able, they should not suffer any other city to do so, but should accustom Greeks

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to spare Greeks, foreseeing the danger [*] of enslavement by the barbarians? Sparing them is wholly and altogether the better, said he. They are not, then, themselves to own Greek slaves, either, and they should advise the other Greeks not to? By all means, he said; at any rate in that way they would be more likely to turn against the barbarians and keep their hands from one another. And how about stripping the dead after victory of anything except their weapons: is that well? Does it not furnish a pretext to cowards

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not to advance on the living foe, as if they were doing something needful when poking [*] about the dead? Has not this snatching at the spoils ere new destroyed many an army? Yes, indeed. And don't you think it illiberal and greedy to plunder a corpse, and is it not the mark of a womanish and petty [*] spirit to deem the body of the dead an enemy when the real foeman has flown away [*] and left behind only the instrument [*] with which he fought?

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Do you see any difference between such conduct and that of the dogs [*] who snarl at the stones that hit them but don't touch the thrower? Not the slightest. We must abandon, then, the plundering of corpses and the refusal to permit

their burial.[*] By heaven, we certainly must, he said.

And again, we will not take weapons to the temples for dedicatory[*] offerings, especially the weapons of Greeks,

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if we are at all concerned to preserve friendly relations with the other Greeks. Rather we shall fear that there is pollution in bringing such offerings to the temples from our kind unless in a case where the god bids otherwise[*].Most rightly, he said. And in the matter of devastating the land of Greeks and burning their houses, how will your soldiers deal with their enemies. I would gladly hear your opinion of that. In my view,

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said I, they ought to do neither, but confine themselves to taking away the annual harvest. Shall I tell you why? Do. In my opinion, just as we have the two terms, war and faction, so there are also two things, distinguished by two differentiae.[*] The two things I mean are the friendly and kindred on the one hand and the alien and foreign on the other. Now the term employed for the hostility of the friendly is faction, and for that of the alien is war. What you say is in nothing beside the mark, he replied. Consider, then,

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if this goes to the mark. I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian. Rightly, he said. We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature,[*] and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred. Greeks, however, we shall say, are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction,

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and faction is the name we must give to that enmity. I will allow you that habit of speech, he said. Then observe, said I, that when anything of this sort occurs in faction, as the word is now used, and a state is divided against itself, if either party devastates the land and burns the houses of the other such factional strife is thought to be an accursed thing and neither party to be true patriots. Otherwise, they would never have endured thus to outrage their nurse and mother.[*] But the moderate and reasonable thing is thought to be that the victors

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shall take away the crops of the vanquished, but that their temper shall be that of men who expect to be reconciled and not always to wage war. That way of feeling, he said, is far less savage than the other. Well, then, said I, is not the city that you are founding to be a Greek city? It must be, he said. Will they then not be good and gentle? Indeed they will. And won't they be philhellenes,[*] lovers of Greeks, and will they not regard all Greece as their own and not renounce their part in the holy places common to all Greeks ?

Most certainly.

Will they not then regard any difference with Greeks

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who are their own people as a form of faction and refuse even to speak of it as war? Most certainly. And they will conduct their quarrels always looking forward to a reconciliation? By all means. They will correct them, then, for their own good, not chastising them with a view to their enslavement[*] or their destruction, but acting as correctors, not as enemies. They will, he said. They will not, being Greeks, ravage Greek territory nor burn habitations, and they will not admit that in any city all the population are their enemies, men, women and children, but will say that only a few at any time are their foes,[*]

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those, namely, who are to blame for the quarrel. And on all these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste the soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the suffering of the innocent. I, he said, agree that our citizens ought to deal with their Greek opponents on this wise, while treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks. Shall we lay down this law also, then,

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for our guardians that they are not to lay waste the land or burn the houses? Let us so decree, he said, and assume that this and our preceding prescriptions are right.

But[*] I fear, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this fashion, you will never get to speak of the matter you put aside in order to say all this, namely, the possibility of such a polity coming into existence, and the way in which it could be brought to pass. I too am ready to admit that if it could be realized everything would be lovely[*] for the state that had it, and I will add what you passed by, that they would also be

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most successful in war because they would be least likely to desert one another, knowing and addressing each other by the names of brothers, fathers, sons. And if the females should also join in their campaigns, whether in the ranks or marshalled behind to intimidate the enemy,[*] or as reserves in case of need, I recognize that all this too would make them irresistible. And at home, also, I observe all the benefits that you omit to mention. But, taking it for granted that I concede

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these and countless other advantages, consequent on the realization of this polity, don't labor that point further; but let us at once proceed to try to convince ourselves of just this, that it is possible and how it is possible,

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dismissing everything else.

This is a sudden assault,[*] indeed, said I, that you have made on my theory, without any regard for my natural hesitation. Perhaps you don't realize that when I have hardly escaped the first two waves, you are now rolling up against me the great third wave[*] of paradox, the worst of all. When you have seen and heard that, you will be very ready to be lenient,[*] recognizing that I had good reason after all for shrinking and fearing to enter upon the discussion of so paradoxical a notion. The more such excuses you offer, he said, the less

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you will be released by us from telling in what way the realization of this polity is possible. Speak on, then, and do not put us off. The first thing to recall, then, I said, is that it was the inquiry into the nature of justice and injustice that brought us to this pass.[*] Yes; but what of it? he said. Oh, nothing,[*] I replied, only this: if we do discover what justice is, are we to demand that the just man shall differ from it in no respect,

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but shall conform in every way to the ideal? Or will it suffice us if he approximate to it as nearly as possible and partake of it more than others? That will content us, he said. A pattern, then, said I, was what we wanted when we were inquiring into the nature of ideal justice and asking what would be the character of the perfectly just man, supposing him to exist, and, likewise, in regard to injustice and the completely unjust man. We wished to fix our eyes upon them as types and models, so that whatever we discerned in them of happiness or the reverse would necessarily apply to ourselves

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in the sense that whosoever is likest them will have the allotment most like to theirs. Our purpose was not to demonstrate the possibility of the realization of these ideals. In that, he said, you speak truly. Do you think, then, that he would be any the less a good painter,[*] who, after portraying a pattern of the ideally beautiful man and omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture, should not be able to prove that it is actually possible for such a man to exist? Not I, by Zeus, he said. Then were not we,

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as we say, trying to create in words the pattern of a good state? Certainly. Do you think, then, that our words are any the less well spoken if we find ourselves unable to prove that it is possible for a state to be governed in accordance with our words? Of course not, he said. That, then, said I, is the truth[*] of the matter. But if, to please you, we must do our best to show how most probably and in what respect these things would be most nearly realized, again, with a view to such a demonstration, grant me the same point.[*]

What?

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Is it possible for anything to be realized in deed as it is spoken in word, or is it the nature of things that action should partake of exact truth less than speech, even if some deny it[*]? Do you admit it or not? I do, he said. Then don't insist, said I, that I must exhibit as realized in action precisely what we expounded in words. But if we can discover how a state might be constituted most nearly answering to our description, you must say that we have discovered that possibility of realization which you demanded.

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Will you not be content if you get this? I for my part would. And I too, he said.

Next, it seems, we must try to discover and point out what it is that is now badly managed in our cities, and that prevents them from being so governed, and what is the smallest change that would bring a state to this manner of government, preferably a change in one thing, if not, then in two, and, failing that, the fewest possible in number and the slightest in potency.

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By all means, he said. There is one change, then, said I, which I think that we can show would bring about the desired transformation. It is not a slight or an easy thing but it is possible. What is that? said he. I am on the very verge, said I, of what we likened to the greatest wave of paradox. But say it[*] I will, even if, to keep the figure, it is likely to wash[*] us away on billows of laughter and scorn. Listen. I am all attention, he said. Unless, said I, either philosophers become kings[*]

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in our states or those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophic intelligence, while the motley horde of the natures who at present pursue either apart from the other are compulsorily excluded, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, for our states, nor, I fancy, for the human race either. Nor, until this happens, will this constitution which we have been expounding in theory

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ever be put into practice within the limits of possibility and see the light of the sun. But this is the thing that has made me so long shrink from speaking out, because I saw that it would be a very paradoxical saying. For it is not easy[*] to see that there is no other way of happiness either for private or public life. Whereupon he, Socrates, said he, after hurling at us such an utterance and statement as that, you must expect to be attacked by a great multitude of our men of light and leading,[*] who forthwith will, so to speak, cast off their garments[*]

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and strip and, snatching the first weapon that comes to hand, rush at you with might and main, prepared to do[*] dreadful deeds. And if you don't find

words to defend yourself against them, and escape their assault, then to be scorned and flouted will in very truth[*] be the penalty you will have to pay. And isn't it you, said I, that have brought this upon me and are to blame? And a good thing, too, said he; but I won't let you down, and will defend you with what I can. I can do so with my good will and my encouragement, and perhaps I might answer your questions more suitably[*] than another.

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So, with such an aid to back you, try to make it plain to the doubters that the truth is as you say. I must try, I replied, since you proffer so strong an alliance. I think it requisite, then, if we are to escape the assailants you speak of, that we should define for them whom we mean by the philosophers, who we dare to say ought to be our rulers. When these are clearly discriminated it will be possible to defend ourselves by showing that to them by their very nature belong the study of philosophy

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and political leadership, while it befits the other sort to let philosophy alone and to follow their leader. It is high time, he said, to produce your definition. Come, then, follow me on this line, if we may in some fashion or other explain our meaning. Proceed, he said. Must I remind you, then, said I, or do you remember, that when we affirm that a man is a lover of something, it must be apparent that he is fond of all of it? It will not do to say that some of it he likes and some[*] does not.

I think you will have to remind me, he said,

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for I don't apprehend at all. That reply, Glaucon, said I, befitted another rather than you. It does not become a lover to forget that all adolescents in some sort sting and stir the amorous lover of youth and appear to him deserving of his attention and desirable. Is not that your reaction to the fair? One, because his nose is tip-tilted,[*] you will praise as piquant, the beak of another you pronounce right-royal, the intermediate type you say strikes the harmonious mean,

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the swarthy are of manly aspect, the white are children of the gods divinely fair, and as for honey-hued, do you suppose the very word is anything but the euphemistic invention of some lover who can feel no distaste for sallowness when it accompanies the blooming time of youth?

And, in short, there is no pretext

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you do not allege and there is nothing you shrink from saying to justify you in not rejecting any who are in the bloom of their prime. If it is your pleasure, he said, to take me as your example of this trait in lovers, I admit it for the sake of the argument. Again, said I, do you not observe the same thing in the lovers of wine?[*] They welcome every wine on any pretext. They do, indeed. And

so I take it you have observed that men who are covetous of honor,[*] if they can't get themselves elected generals, are captains of a company.[*] And if they can't be honored

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by great men and dignitaries, are satisfied with honor from little men and nobodies. But honor they desire and must have. Yes, indeed. Admit, then, or reject my proposition. When we say a man is keen about something, shall we say that he has an appetite for the whole class or that he desires only a part and a part not? The whole, he said. Then the lover of wisdom, too, we shall affirm, desires all wisdom, not a part and a part not.

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Certainly. The student, then, who is finical[*] about his studies, especially when he is young and cannot yet know by reason what is useful and what is not, we shall say is not a lover of learning or a lover of wisdom, just as we say that one who is dainty about his food is not really hungry, has not an appetite for food, and is not a lover of food, but a poor feeder. We shall rightly say so. But the one who feels no distaste in sampling every study, and who attacks his task of learning gladly and cannot get enough of it, him we shall justly pronounce the lover of wisdom, the philosopher, shall we not? To which Glaucon replied,[*]

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You will then be giving the name to a numerous and strange band, for all the lovers of spectacles[*] are what they are, I fancy, by virtue of their delight in learning something. And those who always want to hear some new thing[*] are a very queer lot to be reckoned among philosophers. You couldn't induce them to attend a serious debate or any such entertainment,[*] but as if they had farmed out their ears to listen to every chorus in the land, they run about to all the Dionysiac festivals,[*] never missing one, either in the towns or in the country-villages. Are we to designate all these, then, and similar folk

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and all the practitioners of the minor arts as philosophers? Not at all, I said; but they do bear a certain likeness[*] to philosophers.

Whom do you mean, then, by the true philosophers? Those for whom the truth is the spectacle of which they are enamored,[*] said I. Right again,[*] said he; but in what sense do you mean it? It would be by no means easy to explain it to another, I said, but I think that you will grant me this. What? That since the fair and honorable is the opposite of the base and ugly, they are two.

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Of course. And since they are two, each is one.[*] That also. And in respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects. Right, he said. This,

then, said I, is my division. I set apart and distinguish those of whom you were just speaking, the lovers of spectacles and the arts,
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and men of action, and separate from them again those with whom our argument is concerned and who alone deserve the appellation of philosophers or lovers of wisdom. What do you mean? he said. The lovers of sounds and sights, I said, delight in beautiful tones and colors and shapes and in everything that art fashions out of these, but their thought is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful in itself. Why, yes, he said, that is so. And on the other hand, will not those be few[*] who would be able to approach beauty itself and contemplate it in and by itself?
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They would, indeed. He, then, who believes in beautiful things, but neither believes in beauty itself nor is able to follow when someone tries to guide him to the knowledge of it—do you think that his life is a dream or a waking[*]? Just consider. Is not the dream state, whether the man is asleep or awake, just this: the mistaking of resemblance for identity? I should certainly call that dreaming, he said. Well, then, take the opposite case: the man whose thought recognizes a beauty in itself,
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and is able to distinguish that self-beautiful and the things that participate in it, and neither supposes the participants to be it nor it the participants—is his life, in your opinion, a waking or a dream state? He is very much awake, he replied. Could we not rightly, then, call the mental state of the one as knowing, knowledge, and that of the other as opining, opinion? Assuredly. Suppose, now, he who we say opines but does not know should be angry and challenge our statement as not true.
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Can we find any way of soothing him and gently[*] winning him over, without telling him too plainly that he is not in his right mind? We must try, he said. Come, then, consider what we are to say to him, or would you have us question him in this fashion—premising that if he knows anything, nobody grudges it him, but we should be very glad to see him knowing something—but tell[*] us this: Does he who knows know something or nothing? Do you reply in his behalf. I will reply, he said, that he knows something. Is it something that is or is not[*]?
That is. How could
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that which is not be known? We are sufficiently assured of this, then, even if we should examine it from every point of view, that that which entirely[*] is entirely knowable, and that which in no way is is in every way unknowable. Most sufficiently. Good. If a thing, then, is so conditioned as both to be and not to be, would it not lie between that which absolutely and

unqualifiedly is and that which in no way is? Between. Then if knowledge pertains to that which is and ignorance of necessity to that which is not,
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for that which lies between we must seek for something between nescience and science, if such a thing there be. By all means. Is there a thing which we call opinion? Surely. Is it a different faculty from science or the same? A different. Then opinion is set over one thing and science over another, each by virtue of its own distinctive power or faculty. That is so. May we say, then, that science is naturally related to that which is, [*] to know that and how that which is is? But rather, before we proceed, I think we must draw the following distinctions. What ones?

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Shall we say that faculties, [*] powers, abilities are a class of entities by virtue of which we and all other things are able to do what we or they are able to do? I mean that sight and hearing, for example, are faculties, if so be that you understand the class or type that I am trying to describe. I understand, he said. Hear, then, my notion about them. In a faculty I cannot see any color or shape or similar mark such as those on which in many other cases I fix my eyes in discriminating in my thought one thing

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from another. But in the case of a faculty I look to one thing only—that to which it is related and what it effects, [*] and it is in this way that I come to call [*] each one of them a faculty, and that which is related to [*] the same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the same faculty, and that to another I call other. How about you, what is your practice? The same, he said. To return, then, my friend, said I, to science or true knowledge, do you say that it is a faculty and a power,

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or in what class do you put it? Into this, he said, the most potent of all [*] faculties. And opinion—shall we assign it to some other class than faculty. By no means, he said, for that by which we are able to opine is nothing else than the faculty of opinion. [*] But not long ago you agreed that science and opinion are not identical. How could any rational man affirm the identity of the infallible with the fallible?

Excellent, said I, and we are plainly agreed

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that opinion is a different [*] thing from scientific knowledge. Yes, different. Each of them, then, since it has a different power, is related to a different object. Of necessity. Science, I presume, to that which is, to know the condition of that which is. But opinion, we say, opines. Yes. Does it opine the same thing that science knows, and will the knowable and the opinable be identical, or is that impossible? Impossible by our admissions, [*] he said. If different faculties are naturally related to different objects

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and both opinion and science are faculties, but each different from the other, as we say—these admissions do not leave place for the identity of the knowable and the opinable. Then, if that which is is knowable, something other than that which is would be the opinable.[*] Something else. Does it opine that which is not,[*] or is it impossible even to opine that which is not? Reflect: Does not he who opines bring his opinion to bear upon something or shall we reverse ourselves and say that it is possible to opine, yet opine nothing? That is impossible. Then he who opines opines some one thing. Yes. But surely that which is not could not be designated as some one thing, but

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most rightly as nothing at all. To that which is not we of necessity assigned nescience, and to that which is, knowledge. Rightly, he said. Then neither that which is nor that which is not is the object of opinion. It seems not. Then opinion would be neither nescience nor knowledge. So it seems. Is it then a faculty outside of these, exceeding either knowledge in lucidity or ignorance in obscurity? It is neither. But do you deem opinion something darker than knowledge but brighter than ignorance? Much so, he said. And does it lie within the boundaries

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of the two? Yes. Then opinion would be between the two. Most assuredly. Were we not saying a little while ago[*] that if anything should turn up[*] such that it both is and is not, that sort of thing would lie between that which purely and absolutely is and that which wholly is not, and that the faculty correlated with it would be neither science or nescience, but that which should appear to hold a place correspondingly between nescience and science. Right. And now there has turned up between these two the thing that we call opinion. There has.

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It would remain, then, as it seems, for us to discover that which partakes of both, of to be and not to be, and that could not be rightly designated either in its exclusive purity; so that, if it shall be discovered, we may justly pronounce it to be the opinable, thus assigning extremes to extremes and the intermediate to the intermediate. Is not that so? It is.

This much premised, let him tell me,

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I will say, let him answer me, that good[*] fellow who does not think there is a beautiful in itself or any[*] idea of beauty in itself always remaining the same and unchanged, but who does believe in many beautiful things—the lover of spectacles, I mean, who cannot endure to hear anybody say that the beautiful is one and the just one, and so of other things—and this will be our question: My good fellow, is there any one of these many fair-and-honorable things that will not sometimes appear ugly and base[*]? And of the just

things, that will not seem unjust? And of the pious things, that will not seem impious? No, it is inevitable, he said, that they would appear

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to be both beautiful in a way and ugly, and so with all the other things you asked about. And again, do the many double things[*] appear any the less halves than doubles? None the less. And likewise of the great and the small things, the light and the heavy things—will they admit these predicates any more than their opposites? No, he said, each of them will always hold of, partake of, both. Then is each of these multiples rather than it is not that which one affirms it to be? They are like those jesters who palter with us in a double sense at banquets, he replied, and resemble the children's riddle[*]

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about the eunuch and his hitting of the bat—with what and as it sat on what they signify that he struck it. For these things too equivocate, and it is impossible to conceive firmly[*] any one of them to be or not to be or both or neither. Do you know what to do with them, then? said I, and can you find a better place to put them than that midway between existence or essence and the not-to-be? For we shall surely not discover a darker region than not-being[*] that they should still more not be,

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nor brighter than being that they should still more be. Most true, he said. We would seem to have found, then, that the many conventions[*] of the many about the fair and honorable and other things are tumbled about in[*] the mid-region between that which is not and that which is in the true and absolute sense. We have so found it. But we agreed in advance that, if anything of that sort should be discovered, it must be denominated opinable, not knowable, the wanderer between being caught by the faculty that is betwixt and between. We did. We shall affirm, then, that those who view many beautiful things

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but do not see the beautiful itself and are unable to follow another's guidance[*] to it, and many just things, but not justice itself, and so in all cases—we shall say that such men have opinions about all things, but know nothing of the things they opine. Of necessity. And, on the other hand, what of those who contemplate the very things themselves in each case, ever remaining the same and unchanged—shall we not say that they know and do not merely opine? That, too, necessarily follows.

Shall we not also say that the one welcomes to his thought and loves the things

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subject to knowledge and the other those to opinion? Do we not remember that we said that those loved and regarded tones and beautiful colours and the like, but they could not endure the notion of the reality of the beautiful itself? We do remember. Shall we then offend their ears if we call them

doxophilists[*] rather than philosophers and will they be very angry if we so speak? Not if they heed my counsel, he said, for to be angry with truth is not lawful. Then to those who in each and every kind welcome the true being, lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion[*] is the name we must give. By all means.

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οἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντες λόγου μόγισ πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἱ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι.

ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ῥάδιον.

οὐ φαίνεται, εἶπον· ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατόψεσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος

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δίκαιος ἀδίκου.

τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν;

τί δ' ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τὸ ἐξῆς; ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἄλλ' ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἴσχουσιν πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι;

πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγοιμεν;

ὁπότεροι ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνονται φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, τούτους καθιστάναι

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φύλακας.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

τόδε δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄρα δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὁξὺ ὀρῶντα χρὴ φύλακα τηρεῖν ὅτιοῦν;

καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον;

ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσιν τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἔστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κάκεῖσε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε

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καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαι τε, ἐὰν δέη τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σώζειν;

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρει.

τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας;

ἄτοπον μεντᾶν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους αἰρεῖσθαι, εἴ γε τᾶλλα μὴ ἐλλείποντο· τοῦτ' γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέχοιεν.

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οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἷοι τ' ἔσονται οἱ αὐτοὶ κάκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ὁ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενος τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖ καταμαθεῖν· καὶ οἶμαι, ἐὰν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσειν καὶ ὅτι οἱοί τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἢ τούτους.

πῶς;

τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων περὶ ὁμολογήσθω

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ἡμῖν ὅτι μαθήματός γε αἰεὶ ἐρῶσιν ὁ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς αἰεὶ οὐσης καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.

ὁμολογήσθω.

καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμιωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἐκόντες ἀφίενται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν περὶ τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν.

ὁρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

τόδε τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς

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τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει οἱ ἂν μέλλωσιν ἔσεσθαι οἶους ἐλέγομεν.

τὸ ποῖον;

τὴν ἀψευδῆ καὶ τὸ ἐκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δ' ἀλήθειαν στέργειν.

εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικῶς του φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ συγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπᾶν.

ὁρθῶς, ἔφη.

ἦ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφία τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὗροις;

καὶ πῶς; ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἦ οὖν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφον τε καὶ

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φιλοψευδῆ;

οὐδαμῶς γε.

τὸν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῇ πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθύς ἐκ νέου ὅτι μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι.

παντελῶς γε.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἓν τι αἰεὶ ἐπιθυμία σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν πού ὅτι εἰς τᾶλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκείσε ἀπωχετευμένον.

τί μὴν;

ὦι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐρρυήκασιν, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οἶμαι ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι ἂν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ'

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ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος τις εἴη.

μεγάλη ἀνάγκη.

σώφρων μὴν ὅ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος· ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα

χρήματα μετά πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται, ἄλλω τινὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τούτῳ
προσῆκει σπουδάζειν.

οὕτω.

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καὶ μὴν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλης φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε
καὶ μὴ.

τὸ ποῖον;

μὴ σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας· ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία
ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς αἰὲ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ
ἀνθρωπίνου.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

ἦ ἢ οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοία μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου,
πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἶε τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον
βίον;

ἀδύνατον, ἦ δ' ὅς.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος;

ἥκιστα γε.

δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευθέρῳ φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς, ὥς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἂν
μετεῖη.

οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

τί οὖν; ὁ κόσμος καὶ μὴ φιλοχρήματος μὴδ' ἀνελευθερος μὴδ' ἀλαζών μὴδὲ
δειλὸς ἔσθ' ὅπῃ ἂν δυσσύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος γένοιτο;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψυχὴν σκοπῶν φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθύς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψῃ,
εἰ ἄρα δικαία τε καὶ ἡμερος ἢ δυσκοινώνητος καὶ ἄγρια.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις, ὥς ἐγώ μαι.

τὸ ποῖον;

εὐμαθὲς ἢ δυσμαθὲς. ἢ προσδοκᾷς ποτὲ τινὰ τι ἱκανῶς ἂν στέρξαι, ὃ
πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις σμικρὸν ἀνύτων;

οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο.

τί δ' εἰ μὴδὲν ὧν μάθοι σώζειν δύναίτο, λήθης ὧν πλέως; ἄρ' ἂν οἷός τ' εἶη
ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι;

καὶ πῶς;

ἀνόνητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ οἶε ἀναγκασθήσεται τελευτῶν αὐτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ
τὴν τοιαύτην πράξιν;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

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ἐπιλήσμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μὴ ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν,
ἀλλὰ μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι.

παντάσας μὲν οὖν.

ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ ἀσχήμονος φύσεως ἄλλοσέ ποι ἂν φαῖμεν ἔλκειν ἢ εἰς ἀμετρίαν.

τί μὴν;

ἀλήθειαν δ' ἀμετρία ἡγῆ συγγενῇ εἶναι ἢ ἐμμετρία;

ἐμμετρία.

ἐμμετρον ἄρα καὶ εὐχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἐκάστου τὸ αὐτοφυνὲς εὐάγων παρέξει.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

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τί οὖν; μὴ πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθῆναι καὶ ἐπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ μεταλήψεσθαι;

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ἀναγκαιότατα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἔστιν οὖν ὅπῃ μέμψῃ τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὃ μὴ ποτ' ἂν τις οἷός τε γένοιτο ἱκανῶς ἐπιτηδεῦσαι, εἰ μὴ φύσει εἴη μνημῶν, εὐμαθῆς, μεγαλοπρεπῆς,

εὐχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ συγγενῆς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας,

σωφροσύνης;

οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο.

ἀλλ', ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τελειωθεῖσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ ἄρα οὐ μόνοις ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις;

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καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός τ' εἴη ἀντεπεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἐκάστοτε ἂ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεῦειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι

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φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅτι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας αὖ ταύτης τινὸς ἐτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτῃ ἔχειν. λέγω δ' εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας. νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἂν τις σοι λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἔργῳ δὲ ὁρᾶν, ὅσοι ἂν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὁρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι ἔνεκα ἀψάμενοι νέοι ὄντες

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ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψωσιν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνυ ἄλλοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήρους εἴπωμεν, τοὺς δ' ἐπεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας ὅμως τοῦτο γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὗ σὺ ἐπαινεῖς πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους.

καὶ ἐγώ ἀκούσας, οἶει οὖν, εἶπον, τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι;

οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούοιμι.

ἀκούοις ἂν ὅτι ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τάλῃθ' ἔλεγειν.

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πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, εὖ ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν παύσονται αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἄρξωσιν, οὓς ἀχρήστους ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι;

ἐρωτᾷς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως δι' εἰκόνος λεγομένης.

σὺ δέ γε, ἔφη, οἴμαι οὐκ εἴωθας δι' εἰκόνων λέγειν.

εἶεν, εἶπον· σκώπτεις ἐμβεβληκῶς με εἰς λόγον οὕτω

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δυσσapidεικτον; ἄκουε δ' οὖν τῆς εἰκόνος, ἵν' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω. οὕτω γάρ χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων, ὃ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις πεπόνθασιν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἔστιν ἐν οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον πεπονθός, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὸ συναγαγεῖν εἰκάζοντα καὶ ἀπολογοῦμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οἷον οἱ γραφῆς τραγελάφους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μειγνύντες γράφουσιν. νόησον γάρ τοιουτονὶ γενόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν νεῶν περί εἴτε μιᾶς· ναύκληρον μεγέθει μὲν καὶ

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ῥώμῃ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηὶ πάντας, ὑπόκωφον δὲ καὶ ὀρῶντα ὡσαύτως βραχὺ τι καὶ γινώσκοντα περὶ ναυτικῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, τοὺς δὲ ναύτας στασιάζοντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως, ἕκαστον οἰόμενον δεῖν κυβερνᾶν, μήτε μαθόντα πῶποτε τὴν τέχνην μέτε ἔχοντα ἀποδεῖξαι διδάσκαλον ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ χρόνον ἐν ᾧ ἐμάνθανεν, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις φάσκοντας μηδὲ διδασκτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὡς διδασκτὸν ἐτοίμους κατατέμνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ τῷ

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ναυκλήρῳ περιεχεῦσθαι δεομένους καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ, ἐνίστε δ' ἂν μὴ πείθωσιν ἀλλὰ ἄλλοι μᾶλλον, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἀποκτείνοντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας ἐκ τῆς νεώς, τὸν δὲ γενναῖον ναύκληρον μανδραγόρῃ ἢ μέθῃ ἢ τινὶ ἄλλῳ συμποδίσαντας τῆς νεώς ἄρχειν χρωμένους τοῖς ἐνοῦσι, καὶ πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχομένους πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἐπαινοῦντας

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ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν, ὃς ἂν συλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ἦ ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον, τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον φέγοντας ὡς ἄχρηστον, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου περί μηδ' ἐπαίοντες, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὥρων καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἄστρον καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλλει τῷ ὄντι νεὼς ἀρχικὸς ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει

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ἐάντε τινες βούλωνται ἐάντε μή, μήτε τέχνην τούτου μήτε μελέτην οἰόμενοι δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν.

τοιούτων δὴ περὶ τὰς ναῦς γιγνομένων τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐχ ἡγῆ ἂν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον

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τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην καὶ ἄχρηστόν σφισι καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὕτω
κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ πλωτῆρων;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος.

οὐ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἴμαι δεῖσθαι σε ἐξεταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς
πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ
μανθάνειν ὃ λέγω.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν ἐκεῖνον τὸν θαυμάζοντα ὅτι οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ τιμῶνται ἐν
ταῖς πόλεσι διδάσκῃ τε τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ πειρῶ πείθειν ὅτι πολὺ ἂν
θαυμαστότερον ἦν

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εἰ ἐτιμῶντο.

ἀλλὰ διδάξω, ἔφη.

καὶ ὅτι τοῖνυν τάληθῃ λέγεις, ὡς ἄχρηστοι τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ ἐπεικέστατοι
τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ· τῆς μὲντοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους κέλευε
αἰτιᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν
δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑφ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας
ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν, ἔαντε
πλούσιος ἔαντε πένης κάμνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον

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εἶναι ἐπὶ ἱατρῶν θύρας ἰέναι καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ
ἄρχειν δυναμένου, οὐ τὸν ἄρχοντα δεῖσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων ἄρχεσθαι, οὔ ἂν
τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τι ὄφελος ἦ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς νῦν πολιτικοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀπεικάζων οἷς
ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν ναύταις οὐχ ἁμαρτήσῃ, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἀχρήστους
λεγομένους καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις.

ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

ἔκ τε τοῖνυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ράδιον εὐδοκιμεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον
ἐπιτήδευμα ὑπὸ τῶν τάναντία ἐπιτηδευόντων·

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πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ ἰσχυροτάτη διαβολὴ γίγνεται φιλοσοφία διὰ τοὺς τὰ
τοιαῦτα φάσκοντας ἐπιτηδεύειν, οὓς δὴ σὺ φῆς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα τῇ
φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγειν ὡς παμπόνηροι οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἰόντων ἐπ' αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ
ἐπεικέστατοι ἄχρηστοι, καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. ἦ γάρ;
ναί.

οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἐπεικῶν ἀχρηστίας τὴν αἰτίαν διεληλύθαμεν;

καὶ μάλα.

τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διέλθωμεν,
καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ τούτου φιλοσοφία αἰτία,

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ἂν δυνώμεθα, πειραθῶμεν δεῖξαι;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

ἀκούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν ἐκεῖθεν ἀναμνησθέντες, ὅθεν διῆμιν τὴν φύσιν

οἷον ἀνάγκη φῦναι τὸν καλὸν τε κάγαθόν

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ἐσόμενον. ἡγεῖτο δ' αὐτῷ, εἰ νῶ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ ἀλαζόνι ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς.

ἦν γὰρ οὕτω λεγόμενον.

οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῦτο σφόδρα οὕτω παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὄν πεφυκὼς εἶη ἀμιλλᾶσθαι ὃ γε ὄντως φιλομαθῆς, καὶ οὐκ

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ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἐκάστοις, ἀλλ' ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοντο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἄψασθαι ὥς προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου—προσῆκει δὲ συγγενεῖ— ὥς πλησιάσας καὶ μιγείς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῶη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδίνος, πρὶν δ' οὕ;

ὥς οἷόν τ', ἔφη, μετριώτατα.

τί οὖν; τούτῳ τι μετέσται ψεῦδος ἀγαπᾶν ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον μισεῖν;

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μισεῖν, ἔφη.

ἡγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἴμαι φამὲν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθεῖν.

πῶς γάρ;

ἀλλ' ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ὃ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἔπασσεν.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσοφου φύσεως χορὸν τί δεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν; μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι συνέβη προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη· καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλαβομένου ὅτι πᾶς μὲν ἀναγκασθήσεται

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ὁμολογεῖν οἷς λέγομεν, ἔσας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, φαίη ὁρᾶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπισκοποῦντες ἐπὶ τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, καὶ τούτου δὴ ἔνεκα πάλιν ἀνειλήφामεν τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὠρισάμεθα.

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ἔστιν, ἔφη, ταῦτα.

ταύτης δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆς φύσεως δεῖ θεάσασθαι τὰς φθοράς, ὥς διόλγυται ἐν πολλοῖς, σμικρὸν δὲ τι ἐκφεύγει, οὕς δὴ καὶ οὐ πονηροὺς, ἀχρήστους δὲ καλοῦσι· καὶ μετὰ

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τοῦτο αὖ τὰς μιμουμένας ταύτην καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καθισταμένας αὐτῆς, οἷαι οὔσαι φύσεις ψυχῶν εἰς ἀνάξιον καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτῶν ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπιτήδευμα, πολλαχῇ πλημμελοῦσαι, πανταχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας δόξαν οἶαν λέγεις φιλοσοφία προσῆψαν.

τίνας δέ, ἔφη, τὰς διαφθορὰς λέγεις;

ἐγὼ σοι, εἶπον, ἂν οἷός τε γένωμαι, πειράσομαι διελθεῖν. τόδε μὲν οὖν οἶμαι πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει, τοιαύτην φύσιν καὶ πάντα ἔχουσαν ὅσα προσετάξαμεν νυνδὴ, εἰ τελέως

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μέλλοι φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι, ὀλιγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

σφόδρα γε.

τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων σκοπεῖ ὥς πολλοὶ ὄλεθροι καὶ μεγάλοι.

τίνες δὴ;

ὁ μὲν πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν ἑκαστῷ ὧν ἐπηρεάσαμεν τῆς φύσεως ἀπόλλυσι τὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποσπᾷ φιλοσοφίας. λέγω δὲ ἀνδρείαν, σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα ἃ διήλθομεν.

ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι.

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ἔτι τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πάντα φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾷ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεῖα· ἔχεις γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω.

ἔχω, ἔφη· καὶ ἡδέως γ' ἂν ἀκριβέστερον ἃ λέγεις πυθοίμην.

λαβοῦ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς, καὶ σοι εὐδηλὸν τε φανεῖται καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπα δόξει τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν.

πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, κελεύεις;

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παντός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σπέρματος περὶ ἢ φυτοῦ, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων, ἴσμεν ὅτι τὸ μὴ τυχὸν τροφῆς ἥς προσήκει ἐκάστῳ μηδ' ὥρας μηδὲ τόπου, ὅσω ἂν ἐρρωμενέστερον ἦ, τοσοῦτῳ πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων· ἀγαθῷ γὰρ που κακὸν ἐναντιώτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ ἀγαθῷ.

πῶς δ' οὖ;

ἔχει δὴ οἶμαι λόγον τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν ἀλλοτριωτέρῃ οὔσαν τροφῇ κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης.

ἔχει.

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οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφροεστάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίνεσθαι; ἢ οἶει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδίκηματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίνεσθαι, ἀσθενῇ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι;

οὐκ, ἀλλὰ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως.

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ἦν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν, ἂν μὲν οἶμαι μαθήσεως
προσηκούσης τύχῃ, εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἀνάγκη αὐξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι,
ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα τρέφεται, εἰς πάντα
τάναντία αὖ, ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχῃ. ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγῇ, ὥσπερ οἱ
πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθείροντας δὲ
τινας σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς
ταῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστους

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μὲν εἶναι σοφιστὰς, παιδεύειν δὲ τελεώτατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἷους
βούλονται εἶναι καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας;
πότε δὴ; ἢ δ' ὅς.

ὅταν, εἶπον, συγκαθεζόμενοι ἄθροοι πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια
ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλῆθους σύλλογον σὺν πολλῶ
θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν,
ὑπερβαλλόντως ἐκάτερα, καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δ'

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αὐτοῖς αἱ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὧσιν ἐπιχοῦντες διπλάσιον
θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου. ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ
λεγόμενον, τίνα οἶει καρδίαν ἴσχειν; ἢ ποῖαν ἂν αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν
ἀνθέξειν, ἦν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτου ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου
οἰκήσεσθαι φερομένην κατὰ ῥοῦν ἢ ἂν οὗτος φέρῃ, καὶ φήσῃεν τε τὰ αὐτὰ
τούτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχροὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσεσθαι
τοιοῦτον;

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πολλή, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνάγκη.

καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀνάγκην εἰρήκαμεν.

ποῖαν; ἔφη.

ἦν ἔργῳ προσπιθέας λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες οὗτοι οἱ παιδεύται τε καὶ σοφισταί.
ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις
κολάζουσι;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα.

τίνα οὖν ἄλλον σοφιστὴν οἶει ἢ ποίους ἰδιωτικούς λόγους ἐναντία τούτοις
τεινόντας κρατήσῃν;

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οἶμαι μὲν οὐδένα, ἢ δ' ὅς.

οὐ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἄνοια.

οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἄλλοιον ἥθος πρὸς
ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὃ ἐταῖρε—
θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου· εὖ γὰρ χρή εἰδέναι,
ὅτιπερ ἂν σωθῇ τε

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καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ

σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς.

οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἄλλως, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

ἔτι τοίνυν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω.

τὸ ποῖον;

ἕκαστος τῶν μισθαρνούντων ιδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὔτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσιν, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν· οἷόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργὰς τις καὶ

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ἐπιθυμίας κατεμάνθανεν, ὅπη τε προσελθεῖν χρή καὶ ὅπη ἄψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅποτε χαλεπώτατον ἢ πρῶτάτατον καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ' οἷς ἐκάστας εἴωθεν φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἷας αὖ ἄλλου φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦται τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει, καταμαθῶν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα συνουσίᾳ τε καὶ χρόνου τριβῇ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὥς τέχνην συστησάμενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν

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ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζώου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακὰ, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλὰ, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαιου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἐωρακῶς εἴη μήτε ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι. τοιοῦτος δὴ ὢν πρὸς Διὸς οὐκ ἄτοπος ἂν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι παιδευτής;

ἔμοιγ', ἔφη.

ἦ οὖν τι τούτου δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ

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παντοδαπῶν συνιόντων ὀργὴν καὶ ἡδονὰς κατανενοηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτ' ἐν γραφικῇ εἴτ' ἐν μουσικῇ εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἂν τις τούτοις ὁμιλῇ ἐπιδεικνύμενος, ἢ ποιῇσιν ἢ τινα ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἢ πόλει διακονίαν, κυρίους αὐτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς, πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἢ Διομηδεῖα λεγομένη ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὔτοι ἐπαινῶσιν· ὥς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἥδη πώποτε του ἥκουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ καταγέλαστον;

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οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἀκούσομαι.

ταῦτα τοίνυν πάντα ἐννοήσας ἐκεῖνο ἀναμνήσθητι· αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ, ἢ αὐτὸ τι ἕκαστον καὶ

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μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα, ἔσθ' ὅπως πληθὸς ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι; ἥκιστα γ', ἔφη.

φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πληθὸς ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

ἀδύνατον.

καὶ τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη ψέγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ιδιωτῶν, ὅσοι προσομιλοῦντες ὀχλῷ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσι.

δῆλον.

ἐκ δὴ τούτων τίνα ὀρᾷς σωτηρίαν φιλοσόφῳ φύσει, ὥστ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι μείνασαν πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν; ἐννόει δ'

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ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν. ὠμολόγηται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν εὐμάθεια καὶ μνήμη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια ταύτης εἶναι τῆς φύσεως.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν εὐθύς ἐν παισὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος πρῶτος ἔσται ἐν ἅπασιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τὸ σῶμα φυῇ προσφερῆς τῇ ψυχῇ;

τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη.

βουλήσονται δὴ οἷμαι αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν πράγματα οἱ τε οἰκεῖοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

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ὑποκείσονται ἄρα δεόμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες, προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολλακεύοντες τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν.

φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.

τί οὖν οἶει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ποιήσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τύχῃ μεγάλης πόλεως ὣν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλούσιός τε καὶ γενναῖος, καὶ ἔτι εὐειδῆς καὶ μέγας; ἄρ' οὐ πληρωθήσεσθαι ἀμυχάνου ἐλπίδος, ἡγούμενον καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἱκανὸν ἔσσεσθαι

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πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν αὐτόν, σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ ἄνευ νοῦ ἐμπιμπλάμενον;

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

τῷ δὴ οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ ἐὰν τις ἡρέμα προσελθὼν τάληθῇ λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ, δεῖται δέ, τὸ δὲ οὐ κτητὸν μὴ δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, ἄρ' εὐπετὲς οἶει εἶναι εἰσακοῦσαι διὰ τοσούτων κακῶν;

πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἐὰν δ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς

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τῶν λόγων εἰσαισθάνηται τέ πῃ καὶ κάμπτηται καὶ ἔλκηται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, τί οἰόμεθα δράσειν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν χρείαν τε καὶ ἑταιρίαν; οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον, πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας καὶ περὶ αὐτόν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ πεισθῇ, καὶ περὶ τὸν πείθοντα, ὅπως ἂν μὴ οἷός τ' ἦ, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας;

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πολλή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀνάγκη.

ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλοσοφήσει;

οὐ πάνν.

ὀρῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ κακῶς ἐλέγομεν ὡς ἄρα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται, αἵτια τρόπον τινὰ τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ, πλοῦτοι τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή;

οὐ γάρ, ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ἐλέχθη.

οὗτος δὴ, εἶπον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὀλεθρὸς τε καὶ διαφθορά

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τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς βελτίστης φύσεως εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἐπιτηδεύμα, ὀλίγης καὶ ἄλλως γιγνομένης, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν. καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, καὶ οἱ τὰγαθὰ, οἱ ἂν ταύτη τύχῃσι ῥυέντες· σμικρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ.

ἀληθέστατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὔτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐκπίπτοντες, οἷς μάλιστα προσήκει,

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ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελεῖ φιλοσοφίαν λείποντες αὐτοὶ τε βίον οὐ προσήκοντα οὐδ' ἀληθῆ ζῶσιν, τὴν δέ, ὥσπερ ὀρφανὴν συγγενῶν, ἄλλοι ἐπεισελθόντες ἀνάξιοι ἥσυχνάν τε καὶ ὄνειδη περιῆψαν, οἷα καὶ σὺ φῆς ὀνειδίζειν τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας, ὡς οἱ συνόντες αὐτῇ οἱ μὲν οὐδενός, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἄξιοι εἰσιν.

καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, τὰ γε λεγόμενα ταῦτα.

εἰκότως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λεγόμενα. καθορῶντες γὰρ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωπίσκοι κενὴν τὴν χώραν ταύτην γιγνομένην, καλῶν

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δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ προσχημάτων μεστήν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργμῶν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, ἄσμενοι καὶ οὔτοι ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπηδῶσιν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ ἂν κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι περὶ τὸ αὐτῶν τεχνίον. ὅμως γὰρ δὴ πρὸς γε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας καίπερ οὕτω πραττούσης φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀξίωμα μεγαλοπρεπέστερον λείπεται, οὗ δὴ ἐφίεμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται, οὔτω

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καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς συγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βανανυσίας τυγχάνουσιν—ἦ οὐκ ἀνάγκη;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

δοκεῖς οὖν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν ἀργῦριον κτησαμένου χαλκῶς φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ, νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου, νεοουγὸν ἱμάτιον ἔχοντος, ὡς νυμφίου παρεσκευασμένου, διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ δεσπότης τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν;

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οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, διαφέρει.

ποῦ' ἄττα οὖν εἰκὸς γεννᾷν τοὺς τοιούτους; οὐ νόθα καὶ φαῦλα;

πολλή ἀνάγκη.

τί δέ; τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως, ὅταν αὐτῇ πλησιάζοντες ὁμιλῶσι μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, ποῦ ἄττα φῶμεν γεννᾶν διανοήματά τε καὶ δόξας; ἄρ' οὐχ ὡς ἀληθῶς προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα, καὶ οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἄξιον ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον;

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

πάνσμικρον δὴ τι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδεϊμαντε, λείπεται τῶν

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κατ' ἀξίαν ὁμιλούντων φιλοσοφία, ἥ που ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθὲν γενναῖον καὶ εὖ τεθραμμένον ἦθος, ἀπορία τῶν διαφθερούντων κατὰ φύσιν μέιναν ἐπ' αὐτῇ, ἥ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῇ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ· βραχὺ δέ ποῦ τι καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλης τέχνης δικαίως ἀτιμάσαν εὐφυὲς ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου Θεάγουρ χαλινὸς οἷος κατασχεῖν· καὶ γὰρ

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Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημείον· ἡ γὰρ ποῦ τινι ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονεν. καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὖ ἱκανῶς ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττει οὐδ' ἔστι

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σύμμαχος μεθ' ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν σώζοιτ' ἂν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσών, οὔτε συναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε ἱκανὸς ὢν εἰς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρὶν τι τὴν πόλιν ἢ φίλους ὀνῆσαι προαπολόμενος ἀνωφελὲς αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν γένοιτο—ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβών, ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων, οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς, ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιπλαμένους ἀνομίας, ἀγαπᾷ εἰ πῃ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσιῶν

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ἔργων τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἰλεῶς τε καὶ εὐμενῆς ἀπαλλάσσεται.

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ἀλλὰ τοι, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα ἂν διαπραξάμενος ἀπαλλάττοιο. οὐδέ γε, εἴπον, τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ τυχὼν πολιτείας προσηκούσης· ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτὸς τε μᾶλλον ἀυξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει.

τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὢν ἔνεκα διαβολὴν εἴληφεν καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ μετρίως εἰρησθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔτ' ἄλλο λέγεις τι σὺ.

ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἔτι λέγω περὶ τούτου· ἀλλὰ τὴν προσηκούσαν αὐτῇ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολιτειῶν;

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οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαιτιῶμαι, μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν
νῦν κατὰστασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως· διὸ καὶ στρέφεσθαι τε καὶ
ἀλλοιοῦσθαι αὐτήν, ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα ἐν γῇ ἄλλῃ σπειρόμενον
ἐξίτηλον εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἰέναι, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο τὸ γένος
νῦν μὲν οὐκ ἴσχειν τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀλλότριον ἦθος ἐκπίπτειν·
εἰ δὲ λήφεται τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, ὥσπερ

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καὶ αὐτὸ ἀριστόν ἐστιν, τότε δηλώσει ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὄντι θεῖον ἦν, τὰ δὲ
ἄλλα ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ τε τῶν φύσεων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. δῆλος δὲ οὖν
εἶ ὅτι μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρήση τίς αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία.
οὐκ ἔγνω, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔμελλον, ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτὴ ἦν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν
οἰκίζοντες τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἄλλη.

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐρρήθη μὲν καὶ τότε, ὅτι
δεῖσσι τι αἰεὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει λόγον

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ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν αὐτὸν ὄνπερ καὶ σὺ ὁ νομοθέτης ἔχων τοὺς νόμους
ἐτίθεις.

ἐρρήθη γάρ, ἔφη.

ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱκανῶς, εἶπον, ἐδηλώθη, φόβῳ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι
δεδηλώκατε μακρὰν καὶ χαλεπὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν
οὐ πάντων ῥᾶστον διελθεῖν.

τὸ ποῖον;

τίνα τρόπον μεταχειριζομένη πόλις φιλοσοφίαν οὐ διολεῖται. τὰ γὰρ διὰ
μεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῆ, καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά.

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ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἔφη, λαβέτω τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου.
οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει·
παρὼν δὲ τὴν γ' ἐμὴν προθυμίαν εἴσῃ. σκόπει δὲ καὶ νῦν ὡς προθυμῶς καὶ
παρακινδυνευτικῶς μέλλω λέγειν, ὅτι τοῦναντίον ἢ νῦν δεῖ τοῦ
ἐπιτηδεύματος τούτου πόλιν ἄπτεσθαι.

πῶς;

νῦν μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ ἀπτόμενοι μεираκια ὄντα ἄρτι

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ἐκ παίδων τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάσαντες αὐτοῦ τῷ
χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται, οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι—λέγω δὲ
χαλεπώτατον τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους—ἐν δὲ τῷ ἔπειτα, ἐὰν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο
πραπτόντων παρακαλούμενοι ἐθέλωσιν ἀκροατὰς γίνεσθαι, μεγάλα
ἡγοῦνται, πάρεργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν· πρὸς δὲ τὸ γῆρας ἐκτὸς δὲ
τινων ὀλίγων ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ

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Ἡρακλείτειον ἡλίου, ὅσον αὐθις οὐκ ἐξάπτονται.

δεῖ δὲ πῶς; ἔφη.

πάν τούναντιον· μεираκία μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μεираκιῶδη παιδεῖαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων, ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὔ μάλα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφία κτωμένους· προΐουσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ἣ ἡ ψυχὴ τελεοῦσθαι ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια· ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ

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στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, τότε ἥδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν, ὅτι μὴ πάρεργον, τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐδαιμόνως βιώσεσθαι καὶ τελευτήσαντας τῷ βίῳ τῷ βεβιωμένῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν ἐπιστήσειν πρέπουσαν.

ὥς ἀληθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, λέγειν γε προθύμως, ὦ Σώκρατες· οἶμαι μέντοι τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀκουόντων προθυμότερον ἔτι ἀντιτείνειν οὐδ' ὅπως ποιοῦν πεισομένους, ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξαμένους.

μὴ διάβαλλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι

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φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐχθροὺς ὄντας. πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, ἕως ἄν ἡ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωσι λόγοις.

εἰς μικρόν γ', ἔφη, χρόνον εἴρηκας.

εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὔν, ἔφην, ὥς γε πρὸς τὸν ἅπαντα. τὸ μέντοι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις τοὺς πολλοὺς θαῦμα οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον,

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ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ῥήματα ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὠμοιωμένα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ὥσπερ νῦν συμπεσόντα.

ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ παρισωμένον καὶ ὠμοιωμένον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ, δυναστεύοντα

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ἐν πόλει ἐτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ, οὐ πώποτε ἐωράκασιν, οὔτε ἓνα οὔτε πλείους, ἢ οἷε;

οὐδαμῶς γε.

οὐδὲ γε αὖ λόγων, ὦ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἱκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγόνασιν, οἷων ζητεῖν μὲν τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τοῦ γινῶναι χάριν, τὰ δὲ κομψὰ τε καὶ ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμῶσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων.

οὐδὲ τούτων, ἔφη.

τούτων τοι χάριν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτα προορώμενοι

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ἡμεῖς τότε καὶ δεδιότες ὅμως ἐλέγομεν, ὑπὸ τάληθοῦς ἠναγκασμένοι, ὅτι οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδὲ γ' ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτε γένηται τέλεος, πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν

κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, πόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι, καὶ τῇ πόλει κατηκόω γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων ὕεσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς

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ἐκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ. τούτων δὲ πότερα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ὡς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένα φημὶ ἔχειν λόγον. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς δικαίως καταγελώμεθα, ὡς ἄλλως εὐχαῖς ὅμοια λέγοντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

οὕτως.

εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρελθλυθότῳ χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἐν τινι βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ, πόρρω που

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ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἔτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἢ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστιν καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατῆς γένηται. οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ' ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν· χαλεπὰ δὲ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖται.

καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, οὕτω δοκεῖ.

τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐκ αὖ δοκεῖ, ἐρεῖς;

ἴσως, ἔφη.

ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει.

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ἄλλοιαν τοι δόξαν ἔξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ φιλονικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος καὶ ἀπολυόμενος τὴν τῆς φιλομαθείας διαβολὴν ἐνδεικνύῃ οὕς λέγεις τοὺς φιλοσόφους, καὶ διορίζῃ

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ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὴν τε φύσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡγῶνται σε λέγειν οὕς αὐτοὶ οἴονται.

ἢ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται, ἄλλοιαν τοι φήσεις αὐτοὺς δόξαν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἄλλα ἀποκρινέσθαι. ἢ οἶε τινα χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μὴ χαλεπῷ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ μὴ φθονερῷ ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾶον ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ σε προφθάσας λέγω ὅτι ἐν ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἡγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλήθει, χαλεπὴν οὕτω φύσιν γίγνεσθαι.

καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμέλει, ἔφη, συνοίομαι.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συνοίει, τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς πολλοὺς διακεῖσθαι ἐκείνους αἰτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἔξωθεν οὐ προσῆκον ἐπεiskewμακότας, λοιδορουμένους τε αὐτοῖς καὶ φιλαπεχνημόνως ἔχοντας καὶ αἰεὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένων, ἥκιστα φιλοσοφίᾳ πρέπον ποιοῦντας;

πολύ γ', ἔφη.

οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ Ἀδεΐμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὔσι τὴν

διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων

500c

πραγματείας, καὶ μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἅττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἔχοντα ὀρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὐτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὐτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαι τε καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἶει τινὰ μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτ' τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο; ἀδύνατον, ἔφη.

θείῳ δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὃ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε

500d

καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται· διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλή.

παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν.

ἂν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἥθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἄρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἶει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς;

ἥκιστα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἀλλ' ἐὰν δὴ αἰσθωνται οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀληθῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ

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λέγομεν, χαλεπανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν λέγουσιν ὥς οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσῃε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψῃαν οἱ τῷ θεῷ παραδειγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι;

οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐάνπερ αἰσθωνται.

ἀλλὰ δὴ

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τίνα λέγεις τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς;

λαβόντες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἥθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσῃαν ἂν, ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον· ἀλλ' οὖν οἷσθ' ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εὐθύς τῶν ἄλλων διενέγκοιεν, τῷ μῆτε ἰδιώτου μῆτε πόλεως ἐθέλῃσαι ἂν ἄψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα οἶει ὑπογράψασθαι ἂν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας;

τί μὴν;

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ἔπειτα οἷμαι ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἐκατέρωσ' ἀποβλέποιεν, πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖν' αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, συμμειγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρεῖκελον, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοεῖκελον.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

καὶ τὸ μὲν ἂν οἷμαι ἐξαλείφοιεν, τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἐγγράφοιεν,

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ἔως ὅτι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἦθη εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλεῖ ποιήσειαν.
καλλίστη γοῦν ἄν, ἔφη, ἡ γραφή γένοιτο.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πείθομένῃ πῃ ἐκείνους, οὓς διατεταμένους ἐφ' ἡμᾶς
ἐφησθα ἰέναι, ὡς τοιοῦτός ἐστι πολιτείων ζωγράφος ὃν τότε ἐπηνοῦμεν
πρὸς αὐτούς, δι' ὃν ἐκεῖνοι ἐχαλέπαινον ὅτι τὰς πόλεις αὐτῷ παρεδίδομεν,
καὶ τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούοντες πραΰνονται;
καὶ πολὺ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ σωφρονοῦσιν.

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πῇ γὰρ δὴ ἔξουσιν ἀμφισβητῆσαι; πότερον μὴ τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀληθείας
ἐραστὰς εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσόφους;

ἄτοπον μεντᾶν, ἔφη, εἴη.

ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου, ἢν ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν;
οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην τυχοῦσαν τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτηδεύματων οὐκ ἀγαθὴν
τελέως ἔσεσθαι καὶ φιλόσοφον, εἴπερ τινὰ ἄλλην; ἢ ἐκείνους φήσει μᾶλλον,
οὓς ἡμεῖς ἀφωρίσαμεν;

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οὐ δῆπου.

ἔτι οὖν ἀγριανοῦσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι πρὶν ἂν πόλεως τὸ φιλόσοφον γένος
ἐγκρατὲς γένηται, οὔτε πόλει οὔτε πολίταις κακῶν παῦλα ἔσται, οὐδὲ ἡ

πολιτεία ἢν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ ἔργῳ τέλος λήψεται;

ἴσως, ἔφη, ἦττον.

βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ ἦττον φῶμεν αὐτούς ἀλλὰ

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παντάσῃσι πράγους γεγονέναι καὶ πεπεῖσθαι, ἵνα, εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ αἰσχυρθέντες
ὁμολογήσωσιν;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

οὗτοι μὲν τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο πεπεισμένοι ἔστων· τοῦδε δὲ πέρι τις
ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι βασιλέων ἔκγονοι ἢ δυναστῶν
τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι;

οὐδ' ἂν εἷς, ἔφη.

τοιούτους δὲ γενομένους ὡς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη διαφθαρῆναι, ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς
μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς

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συγχωροῦμεν· ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτε οὐδ' ἂν εἷς
σωθῇ, ἔσθ' ὅστις ἀμφισβητήσει;

καὶ πῶς;

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἷς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων πειθομένην, πάντ'
ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστοῦμενα.

ἱκανὸς γάρ, ἔφη.

ἄρχοντας γάρ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τιθέντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἃ
διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δῆπου ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας.

οὐδ' ὅπωστιοῦν.

ἀλλὰ δὴ, ἅπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, δόξαι καὶ ἄλλοις θαυμαστόν τι καὶ ἀδύνατον;
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οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, εἴπερ δυνατὰ, ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὥς
ἐγὼμαι, διήλθομεν.

ἱκανῶς γάρ.

νῦν δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, συμβαίνει ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ
λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε.

συμβαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόνις τέλος ἔσχεν, τὰ ἐπίλοιπα δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον,
τίνα τρόπον ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων

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τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ σωτῆρες ἐνέσονται τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ κατὰ ποίας
ἡλικίας ἕκαστοι ἐκάστων ἀπτόμενοι;

λεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη.

οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ σοφόν μοι ἐγένετο τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν τῆς κτήσεως
δυσχέρειαν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παραλιπόντι καὶ παιδογονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν
ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν, εἰδότι ὥς ἐπίφθονός τε καὶ χαλεπὴ γίγνεσθαι ἢ
παντελῶς ἀληθής· νῦν γὰρ οὐδέν ἦττον ἦλθεν τὸ δεῖν αὐτὰ διελθεῖν.

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καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων πεπέρανται, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων
ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν δεῖ.

ἐλέγομεν

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δ', εἰ μνημονεύεις, δεῖν αὐτοὺς φιλοπόλιδάς τε φαίνεσθαι, βασανιζομένους
ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λύπαις, καὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μὴτ' ἐν πόνοις μὴτ' ἐν φόβοις
μὴτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ μηδεμιᾷ μεταβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἦ τὸν
ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον, τὸν δὲ πανταχοῦ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα ὥσπερ
χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασανιζόμενον, στατέον ἄρχοντα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι
καὶ τελευτήσαντι καὶ ἄθλα. τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξιόντος καὶ
παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ

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λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις· μέμνημαι γάρ.

ὅκνος γάρ, ἔφην, ὦ φίλε, ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀποτετολημένα· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο
μὲν τετολημήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ
καθιστάναι.

εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἔφη.

νόησον δὴ ὥς εἰκότως ὀλίγοι ἔσσονται σοι· ἦν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν
υὑάρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταὐτὸν συμφέεσθαι αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη ὀλιγάκις ἐθέλει, τὰ
πολλὰ δὲ διεσπασμένη φύεται.

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πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἔπεται
οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοὶ τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς
διανοίας οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλουν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ
τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπη ἂν τύχωσιν, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν
αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἦθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς

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ἂν τις μᾶλλον ὥς πιστοῖς χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους
δυσκίνητα ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταῦτόν· δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ
δυσμαθῶς ὥσπερ ἀπονεναρκωμένα, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσματος ἐμπίμπλονται,
ὅταν τι δέη τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν.

ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη.

ἡμεῖς δὲ γέ φαμεν ἀμφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς μετέχειν, ἢ μήτε
παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης δεῖν αὐτῷ μεταδιδόναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς.
ὀρθῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς.

οὐκοῦν σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἷοι ἔσεσθαι;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

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βασανιστέον δὴ ἐν τε οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν πόνοις τε καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς,
καὶ ἔτι δὴ ὁ τότε παρεῖμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν μαθήμασι πολλοῖς
γυμνάζειν δεῖ, σκοποῦντας εἰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατὴ ἔσται
ἐνεγκεῖν εἴτε καὶ

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ἀποδεδιλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποδεδιλιῶντες.

πρέπει γέ τοι δὴ, ἔφη, οὕτω σκοπεῖν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα;
μνημονεύεις μὲν που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τριττὰ εἶδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι
συνεβιβάζομεν δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ
σοφίας ὃ ἕκαστον εἶη.

μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων, ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἶην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν.

ἦ καὶ τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν;

τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

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ἐλέγομέν που ὅτι ὥς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν ἄλλη
μακροτέρα εἶη περίοδος, ἦν περιελθόντι καταφανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι
ἔμπροσθεν προειρημένων ἐπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν τ' εἶη προσάψαι. καὶ
ὑμεῖς ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὥς
ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο, ἑλλιπῆ, εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν τοῦτο εἴποιτε.
ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, μετρίως· ἐφαίνετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

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ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον καὶ ὅτιοῦν τοῦ
ὄντος οὐ πάννυ μετρίως γίγνεται· ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον. δοκεῖ δ'

ἐνιοτέτισιν ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζητεῖν.
καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχουσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥαθυμίαν.
τοῦτου δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦ παθήματος ἥκιστα προσδεῖ φύλακι πόλεώς τε
καὶ νόμων.

εἰκός, ἦ δ' ὅς.

τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἔφην, περιιτέον τῷ

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τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ· ἢ, ὃ νυνδὴ
ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος
οὔποτε ἤξει.

οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλ' ἔτι τι μεῖζον δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὦν
διηλθομεν;

καὶ μεῖζον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν
θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι. ἢ οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ
μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις

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πᾶν ποιεῖν συντεινόμενους ὅπως ὅτι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα ἔξει, τῶν
δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα· ὃ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὅτι
αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἷε τιν' ἂν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστίν;

οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα.

πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας, νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὖ διανοῇ

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ἐμοὶ πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος. οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον· ἐπεὶ ὅτι
γε ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ἦ δὴ καὶ δίκαια
καὶ τᾶλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνονται. καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν
οἶσθ' ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν·
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τᾶλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἶσθ' ὅτι
οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ

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κεκτῆμεθα τι ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οἷε τι πλεον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσιν
ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθὴν; ἢ πάντα τᾶλλα φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν;

μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ
ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομποτέροις φρόνησις.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις,
ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως.

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πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ὄνειδίζοντές γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσι
πάλιν ὥς εἰδόσιν; φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτὸ φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὥς αὖ συνιέντων

ἡμῶν ὅτι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγγωνται ὄνομα.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

τί δέ οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὀριζόμενοι; μὴν μὴ τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεω τῶν ἐτέρων; ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακάς;

σφόδρα γε.

συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς οἷμαι ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταῦτά. ἦ γάρ; 505d

τί μὴν;

οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ ἀμφισβητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν; πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

τί δέ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὥς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἔλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν εἰ μὴ εἶναι, ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτηῖσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσιν, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

ὁ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα

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πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἷα καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν, περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον

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οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν;

ἡκιστὰ γ', ἔφη.

οἷμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπη ποτὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτηῖσθαι ἂν ἐαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα· μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδὲνα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνῶσεσθαι ἱκανῶς.

καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντεύῃ.

οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὁ

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τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῆς εἶναι ἢ ἡδονὴν, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα;

οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνὴρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλα καταφανῆς ὅτι σοι οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν.

οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ μὴ, τοσοῦτον

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χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον.

τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἶδεν λέγειν ὥς εἰδότα;

οὐδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, ὥς εἰδότες, ὥς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθ' ἃ οἶται ἐθέλειν λέγειν.

τί δέ; εἶπον· οὐκ ἦσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὥς πᾶσαι αἰσχυραί; ὣν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί—ἡ δοκοῦσι τί σοι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες;

οὐδέν, ἔφη.

βούλει οὖν αἰσχυρὰ θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά, ἐξὸν
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παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανὰ τε καὶ καλὰ;

μὴ πρὸς Διός, ἣ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαῦκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὦν ἀποστῆς. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἄν ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διήλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθης.

καὶ γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει· ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριοι, αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ'

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ἐστὶ τάγαθὸν ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι—πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοί τὰ νῦν—ὅς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔαν.

ἀλλ', ἔφη, λέγε· εἰς αὕθις γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτείσεις τὴν διήγησιν.

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βουλοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς τόκους μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε. εὐλαβεῖσθε μέντοι μὴ πη ἐξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον ἀποδιδούς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου.

εὐλαβησόμεθα, ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν· ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε.

διομολογησάμενός γ' ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τὰ τ' ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρημένα.

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τὰ ποῖα; ἣ δ' ὅς.

πολλὰ καλὰ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναι φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ.

φαμέν γάρ.

καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὥς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου ὥς μιᾶς οὔσης τιθέντες, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν.

ἔστι ταῦτα.

καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὀρᾶσθαι φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι δ' οὐ, τὰς δ' αὖ ιδέας νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ὀρᾶσθαι δ' οὐ.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

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τῷ οὖν ὀρώμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὀρώμενα;

τῇ ὀψει, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά;

τί μήν;

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐννενόηκας τὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὅσω πολυτελεστάτην τὴν τοῦ ὀρᾶν τε καὶ ὀρᾶσθαι δύναμιν ἐδημιούργησεν; οὐ πάννυ, ἔφη.

ἀλλ' ὥδε σκόπτει. ἔστιν ὅτι προσδεῖ ἀκοῇ καὶ φωνῇ γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀκοῦειν, τὴν δὲ ἀκοῦεσθαι, ὃ

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ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον, ἢ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσεται, ἢ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται; οὐδενός, ἔφη.

οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδ' ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾶ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός. ἢ σὺ τίνα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

τὴν δὲ τῆς ὀψεως καὶ τοῦ ὀρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσδεῖται;

πῶς;

ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν ὀψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χροᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ

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παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα ὅτι ἢ τε ὀψις οὐδὲν ὀψεται, τὰ τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα.

τίνος δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτου;

ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶς.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

οὐ μικρᾷ ἄρα ἰδέα ἢ τοῦ ὀρᾶν αἰσθησις καὶ ἢ τοῦ ὀρᾶσθαι

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δύναμις τῶν ἄλλων συζευξέων τιμιωτέρῳ ζυγῷ ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς.

ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι.

τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὅψιν τε ποιεῖ ὀρᾶν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα ὀρᾶσθαι;

ὄνπερ καὶ σὺ, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὸν ἥλιον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς.

ἄρ' οὖν ὥδε πέφυκεν ὀψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν;

πῶς;

οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἢ ὀψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτ' ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ

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δὴ καλοῦμεν ὄμμα.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ἀλλ' ἡλιοειδέστατόν γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων.

πολύ γε.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει ἐκ τούτου ταμιευομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ' ὢν αὐτῆς ὁράται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης;

οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς.

τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τάγαθόν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅτιπερ αὐτὸ

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ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρὸς τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρὸς τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα.

πῶς; ἔφη· ἔτι διελθέ μοι.

ὀφθαλμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷσθ' ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπη ὢν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχη, ἀλλὰ ὢν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώπτουσι τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὀψεως;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

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ὅταν δέ γ' οἷμαι ὢν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται.

τί μήν;

οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὥδε νόει· ὅταν μὲν οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπηρείσσεται, ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δέ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.

ἔοικε γάρ.

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τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι· αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὕσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσῃ·

ἐπιστήμην

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δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῇ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δ' ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐναυῦθα ἀγαθοειδῇ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ' ἀμφοτέρα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι μειζρόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξιν.

ἀμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ ἐπιστήμην μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ' ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις. εὐφήμει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὥδε μᾶλλον τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει.

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πῶς;

τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐ μόνον οἷμαι τὴν τοῦ ὀρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν

φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὖξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα.
πῶς γάρ;

καὶ τοῖς γιγνώσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεισθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς
προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας
πρεσβεῖα καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

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καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων μάλα γελοίως, Ἄπολλον, ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς.
σὺ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἔμοι δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν.
καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα
αὐ διεξιὼν, εἴ πῃ ἀπολείπεις.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπολείπω.

μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπη.

οἴμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολὺ· ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατὸν,
ἐκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω.

μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.

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νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτῷ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεῦειν τὸ
μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὅρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν
δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' οὕν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἶδη,
ὅρατόν, νοητόν;

ἔχω.

ὥσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε
ἐκάτερον τὸ τμήμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ ὀρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ
τοῦ νοουμένου, καὶ σοι ἔσται σαφηνεῖα καὶ ἀσαφεῖα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν τῷ
ὀρωμένῳ

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τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμήμα εἰκόνες—

λέγω δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον

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μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε
καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ συνέστηκεν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς.

ἀλλὰ κατανοῶ.

τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον τίθει ὧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν, τὰ τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶα καὶ πᾶν τὸ
φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος.

τίθημι, ἔφη.

ἦ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διηρηῆσθαι ἀληθεῖα τε καὶ μῆ, ὡς τὸ
δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστὸν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ὧ ὁμοιώθη;

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ἔγωγ', ἔφη, καὶ μάλα.

σκοπεῖ δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ἣ τμητέον.

πῆ;

ἦ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν χρωμένη ψυχῇ ζητεῖν

ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτὴν, τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον—τὸ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον—ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων, αὐτοῖς εἶδεσι δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη. ταῦτ', ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔμαθον.

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ἀλλ' αὐθις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ῥῆον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσῃ. οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τὸ τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἶδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι

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ὡς παντὶ φανερωῖν, ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὀρμήσωσι.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὀρωμένοις εἶδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοοῦμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πέρι οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ

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ταύτης ἦν γράφουσιν, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἃ πλάττουσιν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασι εἰκόνες εἰσίν, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὐτὸν χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντες

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δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσει δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζητήσιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις.

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μανθάνω, ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις.

τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάνθανε τμήμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἄπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὀρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰὼν, ἀψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὐτὸν ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνει,

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αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρῶμενος, ἀλλ' εἶδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἶδη.

μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὐ—δοκεῖς γάρ μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν—ὅτι

μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοία μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν

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ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσι σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἔξιν ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξὺ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὔσαν.

ἱκανώτατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καὶ μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, διάνοιαν

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δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν.

μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ συγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὡς λέγεις.

Republic

English translation

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So now, Glaucon, I said, our argument after winding[*] a long[*] and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not. Yes, he said, a shorter way is perhaps not feasible.

Apparently not, I said. I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose[*] of discerning the difference between the just and

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the unjust life requires us to discuss. What, then, he said, comes next? What else, said I, but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging,[*] while those who are incapable of this but lose themselves and wander[*] amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state? What, then, he said, would be a fair statement of the matter? Whichever, I said, appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society,

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these we should establish as guardians. Right, he said. Is this, then, said I, clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight? Of course it is clear, he said. Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind[*] and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern[*] in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to

their models, fix their eyes[*] on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it

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establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established? No, by heaven, he said, there is not much difference. Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience[*] and are not second to them in any part of virtue? It would be strange indeed, he said, to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge

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of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.

Then what we have to say is how it would be possible for the same persons to have both qualifications, is it not? Quite so. Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from birth; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this we shall also agree that the combination of qualities that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that we need no others for guardians of states than these. How so?

We must accept as agreed this trait of the philosophical nature,

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that it is ever enamored of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay.[*] Let us take that as agreed. And, further, said I, that their desire is for the whole of it and that they do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more precious or a less honored, part of it. That was the point of our former illustration[*] drawn from lovers and men covetous of honor. You are right, he said. Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements

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must not have this further quality in their natures. What quality? The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth. It is likely, he said. It is not only likely, my friend, but there is every necessity[*] that he who is by nature enamored of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object of his love. Right, he said. Could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth[*]? Impossible, he said. Then can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and of falsehood?

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By no means. Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form. By all means. But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been

diverted into another channel.[*] Surely. So, when a man's desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument,[*] if the man is a true and not a sham[*] philosopher.

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That is quite necessary. Such a man will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth; for the things for the sake of which money and great expenditure are eagerly sought others may take seriously, but not he. It is so. And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing

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the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature. What point? You must not overlook any touch of illiberality.[*] For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness[*] in all things human and divine. Most true, he said. Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence[*] can deem this life of man a thing of great concern[*]? Impossible, said he.

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Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?[*] Least of all. Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy. I think not. What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains[*]? Impossible. This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.[*] Assuredly. Nor will you overlook this,

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I fancy. What? Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully[*] and with little result[*] from much toil? That could not be. And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion,[*] could he fail to be void of knowledge? How could he? And so, having all his labor for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation?

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Of course. The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory. By all means. But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and proportion. Certainly. And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion? To proportion. Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided

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to the aspect of the ideal[*] reality in all things. Assuredly. Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible[*] with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?

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Nay, most necessary, he said. Is there any fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a man could not properly practise unless he were by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent,[*] gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety? Momus[*] himself, he said, could not find fault with such a combination. Well, then, said I, when men of this sort are perfected by education and maturity of age, would you not entrust the state solely to them?

And Adeimantus said, No one, Socrates,

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would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you[*] argue thus feel in this way[*]: They think that owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answer[*] they are at every question led astray[*] a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their fall[*] and the apparent contradiction of what they at first said[*]; and that just as by expert draught-players[*] the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move,

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so they are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by that outcome.[*] I say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each question, but that when it comes to facts[*] he sees that of those who turn to philosophy,[*] not merely touching upon it to complete their education[*]

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and dropping it while still young, but lingering too long[*] in the study of it, the majority become cranks,[*] not to say rascals, and those accounted the finest spirits among them are still rendered useless[*] to society by the pursuit[*] which you commend. And I, on hearing this, said, Do you think that they are mistaken in saying so? I don't know, said he,

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but I would gladly hear your opinion. You may hear, then, that I think that what they say is true. How, then, he replied, can it be right to say that our cities will never be freed from their evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be useless to them, become their rulers? Your question, I said, requires an answer expressed in a comparison or parable.[*] And you, he said,

of course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!

So, said I, you are making fun of me after driving me into such an impasse of argument. But, all the same, hear my comparison

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so that you may still better see how I strain after[*] imagery. For so cruel is the condition of the better sort in relation to the state that there is no single thing[*] like it in nature. But to find a likeness for it and a defence for them one must bring together many things in such a combination as painters mix when they portray goat-stags[*] and similar creatures.[*] Conceive this sort of thing happening either on many ships or on one: Picture a shipmaster[*] in height and strength surpassing all others on the ship,

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but who is slightly deaf[*] and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge of navigation is on a par with[*] his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming that it is his right to steer though he has never learned the art and cannot point out his teacher[*] or any time when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm that it cannot be taught at all,[*] but they are ready to make mincemeat of anyone[*] who says that it can be taught,

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and meanwhile they are always clustered about[*] the shipmaster importuning him and sticking at nothing[*] to induce him to turn over the helm to them. And sometimes, if they fail and others get his ear, they put the others to death or cast them out[*] from the ship, and then, after binding[*] and stupefying the worthy shipmaster[*] with mandragora or intoxication or otherwise, they take command of the ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage[*] of it as is to be expected[*] from such, and as if that were not enough, they praise and celebrate as a navigator,

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a pilot, a master of shipcraft, the man who is most cunning to lend a hand[*] in persuading or constraining the shipmaster to let them rule,[*] while the man who lacks this craft[*] they censure as useless. They have no suspicions[*] that the true pilot must give his attention[*] to the time of the year, the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a ship, and that he does not believe that there is any art or science of seizing the helm[*]

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with or without the consent of others, or any possibility of mastering this alleged art[*] and the practice of it at the same time with the science of navigation.

With such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed[*] be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler,

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a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion? Quite so, said Adeimantus. You take my meaning, I presume, and do not require us to put the comparison to the proof[*] and show that the condition[*] we have described is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers. It is indeed, he said. To begin with, then, teach this parable[*] to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honored in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising

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if they were honored. I will teach him, [*] he said. And say to him further: You are right in affirming that the finest spirit among the philosophers are of no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness, [*] not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them. For it is not the natural[*] course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him or that wise men should go to the doors of the rich. [*] The author of that epigram[*] was a liar. But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician,

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and everyone who needs to be governed[*] to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything. [*] But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we are just describing, and those whom these call useless and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots. Just so, he said. Hence, and under these conditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit should be highly esteemed by those whose way of life is quite the contrary.

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But far the greatest and chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon it by the pretenders[*] to that way of life, those whom you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser of philosophy says that the majority of her followers[*] are rascals and the better sort useless, while I admitted[*] that what you said was true. Is not that so? Yes.

Have we not, then, explained the cause of the uselessness of the better sort? We have. Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the degeneracy of the majority, and try to show if we can that philosophy

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is not to be blamed for this either? By all means.

Let us begin, then, what we have to say and hear by recalling the starting-point of our description of the nature which he who is to be

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a scholar and gentleman[*] must have from birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recollect, was truth. That he was to seek always and altogether, on pain of[*] being an impostor without part or lot in true philosophy. Yes, that

was said. Is not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing opinion about him? It is indeed, he said. Will it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over

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the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with[*] the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs[*] to lay hold on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge and truly live and grow, [*] and so find surcease from his travail[*] of soul, but not before? No plea could be fairer. Well, then, will such a man love falsehood, 490c

or, quite the contrary, hate it? Hate it, he said. When truth led the way, no choir[*] of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train. How could it? But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance. Right, he said. What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the choir that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory.[*] And when you interposed

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the objection that though everybody will be compelled to admit our statements, [*] yet, if we abandoned mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom the words referred, everyone would say that he actually saw some of them to be useless and most of them base with all baseness, it was in our search for the cause of this ill-repute that we came to the present question: Why is it that the majority are bad? And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it must necessarily be?

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That is so, he said.

We have, then, I said, to contemplate the causes of the corruption of this nature in the majority, while a small part escapes, [*] even those whom men call not bad but useless; and after that in turn

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we are to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp its pursuits and see what types of souls they are that thus entering upon a way of life which is too high[*] for them and exceeds their powers, by the many discords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute of which you speak. Of what corruptions are you speaking? I will try, I said, to explain them to you if I can. I think everyone will grant us this point, that a nature such as we just now postulated

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for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men and is found in only a few. Don't you think so? Most emphatically. Observe, then, the number and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy these few. What are they? The most surprising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.[*] That does sound like a paradox, said he.

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Furthermore, said I, all the so-called goods[*] corrupt and divert, beauty and wealth and strength of body and powerful family connections in the city and all things akin to them—you get my general meaning? I do, he said, and I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it. Well, said I, grasp it rightly as a general proposition and the matter will be clear and the preceding statement will not seem to you so strange. How do you bid me proceed? he said.

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We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed to the good than to the not-good.[*] Of course. So it is, I take it, natural that the best nature should fare worse[*] than the inferior under conditions of nurture unsuited to it. It is. Then, said I, Adeimantus,

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shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature[*] and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil? No, he said, that is the case.

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Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown[*] and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue.[*] Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists,[*] and that there are sophists in private life[*] who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning,[*] and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain

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who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart's desire young and old, men and women? When? said he. Why, when, I said, the multitude are seated together[*] in assemblies or in court-rooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with

loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamor

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and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise.[*] In such case how do you think the young man's heart, as the saying is, is moved within him?[*] What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm[*] the same things that they do to be honorable and base,

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and will do as they do, and be even such as they? That is quite inevitable, Socrates, he said.

And, moreover, I said, we have not yet mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion. What is it? said he. That which these educators and sophists impose by action when their words fail to convince. Don't you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and death? They most emphatically do, he said. What other sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think

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will prevail in opposition to these? None, I fancy, said he. No, said I, the very attempt[*] is the height of folly.

For there is not, never has been and never will be,[*] a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running counter to theirs[*]—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend; for the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail.[*] And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well

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in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God[*] preserves it you will not be speaking ill. Neither do I think otherwise, he said. Then, said I, think this also in addition. What? Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals,[*] inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast[*] which he had in his keeping,

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how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust,

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but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable,[*] never having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator? I do, he said. Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks

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that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics? For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry[*] or any other product of his craft or any political service, [*] and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable,[*] the proverbial necessity of Diomede[*] will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honorable, have you ever heard an attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous[*]?

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No, he said, and I fancy I never shall hear it either.

Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars? Not in the least, he said.

Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom,

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is impossible for the multitude.[*] Impossible. It is inevitable,[*] then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them. Inevitable. And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favor[*] with it. Obviously. From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before.

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We agreed[*] that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature. Yes. Then even as a boy[*] among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul. How could he fail to do so? he said. His kinsmen and fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs. Of course.

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Then they will fawn[*] upon him with petitions and honors, anticipating[*] and flattering the power that will be his. That certainly is the usual way. How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and

thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes,[*] and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians,[*]

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and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense[*] He surely will, he said. And if to a man in this state of mind[*] someone gently[*] comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave[*] to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear[*] to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings[*] Far from it, said he. And even supposing, said I, that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition

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one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at[*] to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it,[*] both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?

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That is inevitable, he said. Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize? None at all, he said.

Do you see, then, said I, that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding,[*] and so do the so-called goods—[*] riches and all such instrumentalities[*]?

No, he replied, it was rightly said. Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit,

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is the destruction and corruption[*] of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case,[*] as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel,[*] but a small nature[*] never does anything great to a man or a city. Most true, said he.

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Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers[*] rush in and defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin,[*] and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils. Why, yes, he replied, that is what they do say. And plausibly, said I; for other mannikins, observing that the place is

unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions,
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just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical[*] arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft.[*] For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated[*] by their vulgar occupations[*]

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even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable? Quite so, he said. Is not the picture which they present, I said, precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker[*] who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master's daughter

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who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?

There is no difference at all, he said. Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents? Will they not be bastard[*] and base? Inevitably. And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence[*]? Quite so, he said.

There is a very small remnant,[*] then, Adeimantus, I said,

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of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check[*] by exile,[*] and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns[*] and disregards its parochial affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion Theages[*] also might operate as a restraint. For in the case of Theages all other conditions were at hand

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for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign,[*] is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company[*] and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics,[*] and that there is no ally

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with whose aid the champion of justice[*] could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts,[*] unwilling to share their misdeeds[*] and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others,—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall[*] in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way

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he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope,[*] serene and well content when the end comes.

Well, he said, that is no very slight thing

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to have achieved before taking his departure. He would not have accomplished any very great thing either,[*] I replied, if it were not his fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature[*] and together with his own preserve the common weal.

The causes and the injustice of the calumny of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add.[*] No, he said, I have nothing further to offer on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy?

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None whatever, I said; but the very ground of my complaint is that no polity[*] of today is worthy of the philosophic nature. This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to be overcome and die out[*] into the native growth,[*] so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever

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it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent[*] that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices.

Obviously then you are next, going to ask what is this best form of government. Wrong, he said[*] I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another. In other respects it is this one, said I; but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element

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having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.[*] That was said, he replied. But it was not sufficiently

explained, I said, from fear of those objections on your part which have shown that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. And apart from that the remainder of the exposition is by no means easy.[*] Just what do you mean? The manner in which a state that occupies itself with philosophy can escape destruction. For all great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly says, fine things are hard.[*] All the same,
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he said, our exposition must be completed by making this plain. It will be no lack of will, I said, but if anything,[*] a lack of ability, that would prevent that. But you shall observe for yourself my zeal. And note again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in just the reverse of our present fashion.[*] In what way?

At present,

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said I, those who do take it up are youths, just out of boyhood,[*] who in the interval[*] before they engage in business and money-making approach the most difficult part of it, and then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. In later life they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to listen[*] to the philosophic discussions of others. That sort of thing they think should be by-work. And towards old age,[*] with few exceptions, their light is quenched more completely

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than the sun of Heracleitus,[*] inasmuch as it is never rekindled. And what should they do? he said. Just the reverse. While they are lads and boys they should occupy themselves with an education and a culture suitable to youth, and while their bodies are growing to manhood take right good care of them, thus securing a basis and a support[*] for the intellectual life. But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain its maturity, they should make its exercises more severe, and when

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the bodily strength declines and they are past the age of political and military service, then at last they should be given free range of the pasture[*] and do nothing but philosophize,[*] except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world.

You really seem to be very much in earnest, Socrates, he said; yet I think most of your hearers are even more earnest in their opposition and will not be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasymachus. Do not try to breed a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus,

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who have just become friends and were not enemies before either. For we will spare no effort until we either convince him and the rest or achieve something

that will profit them when they come to that life in which they will be born gain[*] and meet with such discussions as these. A brief time[*] your forecast contemplates, he said. Nay, nothing at all, I replied, as compared with eternity.[*] However, the unwillingness of the multitude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a token,[*]

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but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here.

But the figure of a man equilibrated and assimilated to virtue's self perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen

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in one case or in many. Do you think they have? By no means. Neither, my dear fellow, have they ever seriously inclined to hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole endeavor was to search out the truth[*] at any cost for knowledge's sake, and which dwell apart and salute from afar[*] all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but opinion[*] and strife in courtroom and in private talk. They have not, he said.

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For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears[*] declared under compulsion of the truth[*] that neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration[*] a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession[*]

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either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as day-dreams are.[*] Is not that so? It is. If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past,[*] or now are in some barbaric region[*]

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far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention[*] that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be[*] realized[*] when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state.[*] It is not a thing impossible to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit. I also think so, he said. But the multitude—are you going to say?—does not think so, said I. That may be, he said. My dear fellow,

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said I, do not thus absolutely condemn the multitude.[*] They will surely be of another mind if in no spirit of contention but soothingly and endeavoring to do away with the dispraise of learning you point out to them whom you mean by philosophers, and define as we recently did their nature

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and their pursuits so that the people may not suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking.

Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging[*] and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found. And I, you may be assured,

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he said, concur. And do you not also concur[*] in this very point that the blame for this harsh attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in[*] where they do not belong, wrangling with one another,[*] filled with spite[*] and always talking about persons,[*] a thing least befitting philosophy? Least of all, indeed, he said.

For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities[*] has no leisure

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to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate[*] himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration?

Impossible, he said. Then the lover of wisdom

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associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man.[*] But calumny[*] is plentiful everywhere. Yes, truly. If, then, I said, some compulsion[*] is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there,[*] and not merely to mould[*] and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman[*] of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue[*]? By no means, he said. But if the multitude become aware

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that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced[*] by artists who used the heavenly

model? They will not be harsh,

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he said, if they perceive that.

But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind? They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—[*] no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean. And they would be right, he said. And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution? Surely. And then,

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I take it, in the course of the work they would glance[*] frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things,[*] and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity[*] which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God.[*] Right, he said. And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint in another

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until in the measure of the possible[*] they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be. That at any rate[*] would be the fairest painting. Are we then making any impression on those who you said[*] were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying? Much gentler,

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he said, if they are reasonable. How can they controvert it[*]? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth? That would be monstrous, he said. Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best? Not that either. Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded?

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Surely not. Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophic class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable[*] in words be brought to pass in deed? They will perhaps be less so, he said.

Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that

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for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent? Certainly, said he. Let us assume, then, said I, that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature? Not one, he said. And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty[*] of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time

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not one of all could be saved,[*] will anyone maintain that? How could he? But surely, said I, the occurrence of one such is enough,[*] if he has a state which obeys him,[*] to realize[*] all that now seems so incredible. Yes, one is enough, he said. For if such a ruler, I said, ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out. By no means. Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come[*]?

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I think not, said he. And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown. Yes, sufficiently. Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult[*] yet not impossible. That is the conclusion, he said.

This difficulty disposed of, we have next

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to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers[*] of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study. Yes, we have to speak of that, he said. I gained nothing, I said, by my cunning[*] in omitting heretofore[*] the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization;

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for now I am none the less compelled to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of,[*] but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting-point.

We were saying, if you recollect,

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that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested[*] in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon[*] this fixed faith[*] under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must be rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire,[*] is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as

well.[*] Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face[*]

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in fear[*] of starting[*] our present debate. Most true, he said; I remember. We shrank, my friend, I said, from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect[*] guardians we must establish philosophers. Yes, assume it to have been said, said he. Note, then, that they will naturally be few,[*] for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart.

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What do you mean? he said. Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives;[*] but such men, by reason of their quickness,[*] are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them. You speak truly, he said. And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use,

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and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way[*] when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed,[*] and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them. It is so, he said. But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest[*] education nor in honors nor in rule. And rightly, he said. Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing?

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Of course. They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke,[*] and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies

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or whether it will faint and flinch[*] as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body.

That is certainly the right way of looking at it, he said. But what do you understand by the greatest studies?

You remember, I presume, said I, that after distinguishing three kinds[*] in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally. If I did not remember, he said, I should not deserve to hear the rest. Do you also remember

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what was said before this? What? We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way[*] was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say. Well, he said, it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently

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to the rest of the company. Nay, my friend, said I, a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,[*] though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough[*] and that there is no need of further inquiry. Yes, indeed, he said, many experience this because of their sloth. An experience, said I, that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws. That seems likely, he said. Then, said I, such a one must go around[*]

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the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him. Why, are not these things the greatest? said he; but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described? There is not only something greater, I said, but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline[*] as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve[*] to attain

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to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest[*] matters? It would indeed,[*] he said; but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned? By no means, said I; but do you ask the question. You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me

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by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard[*] that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good[*] by reference to which[*] just things[*] and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing,

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just as no possession either is of any avail[*] without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit[*] in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good[*]? No, by Zeus, I do not, he said.

But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure[*] to be the good, and the finer[*] spirits intelligence or knowledge.[*] Certainly. And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge[*] it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good. Most absurdly, he said. Is it not absurd, 505c

said I, if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,[*] as if we understood their meaning when they utter[*] the word good. Most true, he said. Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion[*] of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner[*] compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures[*]? Most assuredly. The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting

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the same things to be both good and bad, are they not? Certainly. Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes[*] about it? Of course. And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance[*] without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here?

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Quite so, he said. That, then, which every soul pursues[*] and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition[*] of its reality, but yet baffled[*] and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things,[*] and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,—

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in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens[*] to whose hands we are to entrust all things?

Least of all, he said. I fancy, at any rate, said I, that the just and the honorable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known,[*] will not have secured a guardian[*] of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this. You surmise well, he said. Then our constitution

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will have its perfect and definitive organization[*] only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it.

Necessarily, he said. But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different? What a man it is, said I; you made it very plain[*] long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it. Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates, he said, to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one's own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long.[*]

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But then, said I, do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know? By no means, he said, as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines. Nay, said I, have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge[*] are ugly things? The best of them are blind.[*] Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way? They do not differ at all, he said. Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer

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to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous[*] and fair? Nay, in heaven's name, Socrates, said Glaucon, do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal.[*] For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues. It will right well[*] content me, my dear fellow, I said, but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock.[*] Nay, my beloved,

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let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself;[*] for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today.[*] But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness[*] I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop. Well, speak on, he said, for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time.

I could wish,

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I said, that I were able to make and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest[*] and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest. We will do our best, he said, to be on our guard. Only speak on. Yes, I said, after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.[*]

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What? said he. We predicate to be[*] of many beautiful things and many good

things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech. We do. And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.[*] It is so. And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought,

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while the ideas can be thought but not seen. By all means. With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things? With sight, he said. And do we not, I said, hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses? Surely. Have you ever observed, said I, how much the greatest expenditure the creator[*] of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?[*] Why, no, I have not, he said. Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium[*] so that the one may hear and the other be heard,

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in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard? They need nothing, he said. Neither, I fancy, said I, do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any? Not I, he said. But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need? How? Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though color be present, yet without

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the presence of a third thing[*] specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible.[*] What[*] is this thing of which you speak? he said. The thing, I said, that you call light. You say truly, he replied.

The bond, then, that yokes together

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visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form[*] that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honor. It surely is far from being so, he said.

Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven[*] as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen? Why, the one that you too and other people mean, he said; for your question evidently refers to the sun.[*] Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity? What? Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun.

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Why, no. But it is, I think, the most sunlike[*] of all the instruments of sense. By far the most. And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun? Certainly. Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself? That

is so, he said. This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good[*] which the good

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begot to stand in a proportion[*] with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision. How is that? he said; explain further. You are aware, I said, that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them. Yes, indeed, he said. But when, I take it,

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they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes. Certainly. Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent[*] it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason.

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Yes, it does, This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea[*] of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.[*] Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still[*] than these you will think rightly of it.

But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration

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it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform.[*] but to think that either of them is the good[*] is not right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and habit[*] of the good. An inconceivable beauty you speak of, he said, if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely[*] cannot mean that it is pleasure. Hush, said I, but examine

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the similitude of it still further in this way.[*] How? The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation. Of course not. In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence[*] in dignity and

surpassing power.

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And Glaucon very ludicrously[*] said, Heaven save us, hyperbole[*] can no further go. The fault is yours, I said, for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it. And don't desist, he said, but at least[*] expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting. Why, certainly, I said, I am omitting a great deal. Well, don't omit the least bit, he said. I fancy, I said, that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out. Do not,

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he said. Conceive then, said I, as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball,[*] but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible. I do. Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided[*] into two unequal[*] sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections

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of the visible world, images.

By images[*] I mean,

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first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend. I do. As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man. I so assume it, he said. Would you be willing to say, said I, that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion:[*] as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that

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of which it is a likeness? I certainly would. Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section. In what way? By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,[*] and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas[*] only and progressing systematically through ideas. I don't fully understand[*] what you mean by this, he said. Well, I will try again,

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said I, for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are

aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them[*] to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start

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from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out. Certainly, he said, I know that. And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw[*]?

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And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn[*] as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen

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only by the mind.[*]

True, he said.

This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true,[*] but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter[*] are esteemed as clear and held in honor.[*] I understand,

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said he, that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts. Understand then, said I, that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason[*] itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,[*] treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, [*] underpinnings, footings,[*] and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,[*] and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion,

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making no use whatever of any object of sense[*] but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.[*] I understand, he said; not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the

intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding[*] and not
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their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true intelligence[*] about them although[*] the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding[*] and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason. Your interpretation is quite sufficient, I said; and now, answering to[*] these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest,

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understanding for the second; assign belief[*] to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,[*] and arrange them in a proportion,[*] considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality. I understand, he said; I concur and arrange them as you bid.

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μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ, εἶπον, ἀπεικασον τοιοῦτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε περὶ καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας. ἰδὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώπους οἷον ἐν καταγείῳ οἰκῇσιν σπηλαιώδει, ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούσῃ μακρὰν παρὰ πᾶν τὸ σπήλαιον, ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παιδῶν ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας, ὥστε μένειν τε αὐτοὺς εἷς τε τὸ

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πρόσθεν μόνον ὄραν, κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν, φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καόμενον ὀπισθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἐπάνω ὁδόν, παρ' ἣν ἰδὲ τειχίον παρῳκοδομημένον, ὥσπερ τοῖς θυματοποιοῖς πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν. ὁρῶ, ἔφη.

ὄρα τοῖνυν παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας ἀνθρώπους

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σκεῦη τε παντοδαπὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ τειχίου καὶ ἀνδριάντας

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καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα λίθινά τε καὶ ξύλινα καὶ παντοῖα εἰργασμένα, οἷον εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν φθεγγομένους, τοὺς δὲ σιγῶντας τῶν παραφερόντων.

ἄτοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτόπους.

ὁμοίους ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς γὰρ τοιοῦτους πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων οἶε ἂν τι ἑωρακέναι ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσπιπτούσας;

πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἠναγκασμένοι

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εἶεν διὰ βίου;

τί δὲ τῶν παραφερομένων; οὐ ταῦτ' οὐτο;

τί μήν;

εἰ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἶοι τ' εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ ταῦτα ἡγῆ ἂν τὰ ὄντα αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ἄπερ ὁρῶεν;

ἀνάγκη.

τί δ' εἰ καὶ ἡχώ τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ἔχοι; ὁπότε τις τῶν παριόντων φθέγγαιτο, οἶε ἂν ἄλλο τι αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ φθεγγόμενον ἢ τὴν παριοῦσαν σκιάν;

μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

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παντάσας δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθές ἢ τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς.

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

σκόπει δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν λύσιν τε καὶ ἴασιν τῶν τε δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς

ἀφροσύνης, οἷα τις ἂν εἴη, εἰ φύσει τοιάδε συμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς· ὅποτε τις
λυθείη καὶ ἀναγκάζεται ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαι τε καὶ περιάγειν τὸν αὐχένα
καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀναβλέπειν, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἀλγοῖ τε
καὶ διὰ τὰς μαρμαρυγὰς ἀδυνατοῖ καθορᾶν ἐκεῖνα ὧν

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τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἑώρα, τί ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἰ τις αὐτῷ λέγοι ὅτι τότε μὲν
ἑώρα φλυαρίας, νῦν δὲ μᾶλλον τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα
τετραμμένος ὀρθότερον βλέποι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν παριόντων δεικνὺς
αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζει ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἔστιν; οὐκ οἶει αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε
ἂν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὀρώμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα;
πολύ γ', ἔφη.

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οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι αὐτὸν βλέπειν, ἀλγεῖν τε ἂν τὰ
ὄμματα καὶ φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ δύνатаι καθορᾶν, καὶ
νομίζειν ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα τῶν δεικνυμένων;

οὕτως, ἔφη.

εἰ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως
καὶ ἀνάντους, καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα
οὐχὶ ὀδυνᾶσθαι τε

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ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἂν
ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστὰ ὀρᾶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων
ἀληθῶν;

οὐ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, ἐξαίφνης γε.

συνηθείας δὴ οἶμαι δεοίτ' ἂν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν
τὰς σκιὰς ἂν ῥᾶστα καθορῶ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τὰ τε τῶν
ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἶδωλα, ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά· ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν
τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν νύκτωρ ἂν ῥᾶον θεάσαιτο, προσβλέπων
τὸ τῶν

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ἄστρων τε καὶ σελήνης φῶς, ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν τὸν ἡλιόν τε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου.
πῶς δ' οὐ;

τελευταῖον δὴ οἶμαι τὸν ἡλιον, οὐκ ἐν ὕδασι οὐδ' ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἔδρᾳ
φαντάσματα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ δύναιτ' ἂν
κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν.

ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη.

καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τάς τε ὥρας
παρέχων καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων

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τὰ ἐν τῷ ὀρωμένῳ τόπῳ, καὶ ἐκείνων ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων τρόπον τινὰ πάντων
αἴτιος.

δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἂν μετ' ἐκεῖνα ἔλθοι.

τί οὖν; ἀναμιμνησκόμενον αὐτὸν τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ σοφίας

καὶ τῶν τότε συνδεσμωτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἶε αὐτὸν μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἔλεειν;
καὶ μάλα.

τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς ἦσαν τότε παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ ὀξὺτάτα καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα, καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα

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εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ δυνατώτατα ἀπομαντευομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἦξειν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ' ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας, ἢ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἂν πεπονθέναι καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ

Hom. Od. 11.489 καὶ ὅτιοῦν ἂν πεπονθέναι μᾶλλον ἢ 'κεῖνά τε δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκείνως ζῆν;

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οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔγωγε οἶμαι, πᾶν μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι ἂν δέξασθαι ἢ ζῆν ἐκείνως.

καὶ τότε δὴ ἐννόησον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἰ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβάς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θᾶκον καθίζοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ σκότους ἂν ἀνάπλεως σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς, ἐξαίφνης ἦκων ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου;

καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη.

τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιὰς ἐκείνας πάλιν εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν γνωματεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀεὶ δεσμώταις ἐκείνοις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμβλυώττει,

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πρὶν καταστῆναι τὰ ὄμματα, οὗτος δ' ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος εἴη τῆς συνηθείας, ἄρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἂν παράσχοι, καὶ λέγοιτο ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀναβάς ἄνω διεφθαρμένος ἦκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι ἄνω ἵεναι; καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λῦειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιτο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνουνα ἂν; σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

ταύτην τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων,

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προσαπτεόν ἅπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν δι' ὄψεως φαινομένην ἔδραν τῇ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου οἰκῇσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει· τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θεᾶν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεῖς οὐχ ἀμαρτήσῃ τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκοῦειν. θεὸς δὲ που οἶδεν εἰ ἀληθὴς οὕσα τυγχάνει. τὰ δ' οὕν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἢ τοῦ

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ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὀρᾶσθαι, ὀφθεῖσα δὲ συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ἔν τε ὀρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τοῦτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἔν τε νοητῷ αὕτῃ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη,

καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. συνοίομαι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὃν γε δὴ τρόπον δύναμαι.

ἴθι τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τόδε συνοιήθητι καὶ μὴ θαυμάσης ὅτι οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω ἀεὶ ἐπείγονται αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ διατρίβειν.

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εἰκὸς γάρ που οὕτως, εἴπερ αὖ κατὰ τὴν προειρημένην εἰκόνα τοῦτ' ἔχει. εἰκὸς μέντοι, ἔφη.

τί δέ; τόδε οἶε τι θαυμαστόν, εἰ ἀπὸ θείων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά τις ἐλθὼν κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρὶν ἱκανῶς συνήθης γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκασζόμενος ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθι που ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, καὶ διαμιλλᾶσθαι

517e

περὶ τούτου, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὑπολαμβάνεται ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην μὴ πώποτε ἰδόντων;

οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν θαυμαστόν, ἔφη.

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ἀλλ' εἰ νοῦν γε ἔχοι τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεμνητ' ἂν ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμμασιν, ἕκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς. ταῦτά δὲ ταῦτα νομίσας γίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν, ὁπότε ἴδοι θορυβουμένην τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦσάν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἂν ἀλογίστως γελῶ, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοποῖ ἂν πότερον ἐκ φανότερου βίου ἤκουσα ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἐσκότῳται, ἢ ἐξ ἀμαθίας πλείονος εἰς φανότερον ἰοῦσα ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς

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ἐμπέπλησται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου, τὴν δὲ ἐλεήσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπ' αὐτῇ βούλοιο, ἦττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ εἶη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἡκούση. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεις.

δεῖ δὴ, εἴπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ· τὴν παιδείαν οὐχ οἷαν τινὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοι φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δὲ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ

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ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐνπιθέναί, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐνπιθέντες. φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄλλως ἢ σὺν ὄλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω σὺν ὄλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιακτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὄν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχεῖσθαι θεωμένη· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι φαμεν

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τάγαθόν. ἦ γάρ;

ναί.

τούτου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη, τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον
ὡς ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ
ὀρᾶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἷ
ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι.

ἔοικεν γάρ, ἔφη.

αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα ἀρεταὶ καλοῦμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγὺς τι εἶναι
τῶν τοῦ σώματος—τῷ ὄντι γάρ

518e

οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν—ἡ δὲ τοῦ
φρονῆσαι παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔσα, ὃ τὴν
μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρησιμὸν τε καὶ
ὠφέλιμον

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καὶ ἄχρηστον αὖ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται.

ἡ οὕτω ἐννενόηκας, τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μὲν, σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν
βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην
ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακίᾳ δ' ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν, ὥστε ὅσω ἂν ὀξύτερον
βλέπῃ, τοσοῦτω πλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

τοῦτο μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθύς
κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τὰς τῆς γενέσεως

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συγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἱ δὴ ἐδωδαῖς τε καὶ τοιοῦτων ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ
λιχνεῖαις προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι περὶ κάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν·
ὧν εἰ ἀπαλλαγὴν περιστρέφετο εἰς τὰ ἀληθῆ, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀξύτερα ἑώρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἃ νῦν τέτραπται.

εἰκὸς γε, ἔφη.

τί δέ; τὸδε οὐκ εἰκός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, μήτε
τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπείρους

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ἱκανῶς ἂν ποτε πόλιν ἐπιτροπεῦσαι, μήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἑωμένους
διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους, τοὺς μὲν ὅτι σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἓνα, οὔ
στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ,
τοὺς δὲ ὅτι ἐκόντες εἶναι οὐ πράξουσιν, ἡγούμενοι ἐν μακάρων νήσοις
ζῶντες ἔτι ἀπωκίσθαι;

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν οἰκιστῶν τὰς τε βελτίστας φύσεις
ἀναγκάσαι ἀφικέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μάθημα ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἔφαμεν εἶναι
μέγιστον, ἰδεῖν τε τὸ ἀγαθόν

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καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀναβάντες ἱκανῶς ἴδωσι,

μή ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτοῖς ὁ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται.

τὸ ποῖον δῆ;

τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταμένειν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν πάλιν καταβαίνειν παρ' ἐκείνους τοὺς δεσμώτας μηδὲ μετέχειν τῶν παρ' ἐκείνοις πόνων τε καὶ τιμῶν, εἴτε φαυλότεραι εἴτε σπουδαιότεραι.

ἔπειτ', ἔφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χεῖρον ζῆν, δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὄν ἄμεινον;

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ἐπελάθου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι νόμῳ οὐ τοῦτο μέλει, ὅπως ἔν τι γένος ἐν πόλει διαφερόντως εὖ πράξει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τοῦτο μηχανᾶται ἐγγενέσθαι, συναρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας πειθοῖ τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, ποιῶν μεταδιδόναι

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ἀλλήλοις τῆς ὠφελίας ἦν ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν δυνατοὶ ὥσιν ὠφελεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφιῇ τρέπεσθαι ὅπῃ ἕκαστος βούλεται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καταχρῆται αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸν σύνδεσμον τῆς πόλεως.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη· ἐπελαθόμην γάρ.

σκέψαι τοῖνυν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδικήσομεν τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν φιλοσόφους γιγνομένους, ἀλλὰ δίκαια πρὸς αὐτούς ἐροῦμεν,

προσαναγκάζοντες τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τε καὶ φυλάττειν. ἐροῦμεν γὰρ ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις

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πόλεσι τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς πόνων· αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἑκάστη πολιτείας, δίκην δ' ἔχει τό γε αὐτοφυὲς μηδενὶ τροφῇν ὀφεῖλον μηδ' ἐκτίνειν τῷ προθυμεῖσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα· ὑμᾶς δ' ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννήσαμεν, ἄμεινόν τε καὶ τελεώτερον ἐκείνων πεπαιδευμένους καὶ μᾶλλον δυνατοὺς

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ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν. καταβατέον οὖν ἐν μέρει ἑκάστῳ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων συνοίκησιν καὶ συνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι· συνεθιζόμενοι γὰρ μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεί καὶ γνώσεσθε ἕκαστα τὰ εἰδῶλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν, διὰ τὸ τάληθῆ ἑωρακέναι καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι. καὶ οὕτω ὕπαρ ἡμῖν καὶ ὑμῖν ἡ πόλις οἰκήσεται ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄναρ, ὥς νῦν αἱ πολλαὶ ὑπὸ σκιαμαχούντων τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν

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οἰκοῦνται, ὥς μεγάλου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος. τὸ δὲ που ἀληθὲς ὧδ' ἔχει· ἐν πόλει ἥ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν, ταύτην ἄριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι, τὴν δ' ἐναντίους ἄρχοντας schoῦσαν ἐναντίως.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἀπειθήσουσιν οὖν ἡμῖν οἷοι οἱ τρόφιμοι ταῦτ' ἀκούοντες, καὶ οὐκ
ἐθελήσουσιν συμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἕκαστοι ἐν μέρει, τὸν δὲ πολὺν χρόνον
μετ' ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ;

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ἀδύνατον, ἔφη· δίκαια γὰρ δὴ δίκαιοις ἐπιτάξομεν. παντὸς μὴν μᾶλλον ὥς
ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἴσι τὸ ἄρχειν, τοῦναντίον τῶν νῦν ἐν
ἐκάστη πόλει ἀρχόντων.

οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε· εἰ μὲν βίον ἐξευρήσεις

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ἀμείνω τοῦ ἄρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἄρξειν, ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ γενέσθαι πόλις εὖ
οἰκουμένη· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ ἄρξουσιν οἱ τῷ ὄντι πλούσιοι, οὐ χρυσίου
ἀλλ' οὗ δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ ἔμφρονος. εἰ δὲ
πτωχοὶ καὶ πεινῶντες ἀγαθῶν ἰδίων ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἴασιν, ἐντεῦθεν
οἰόμενοι τὰγαθὸν δεῖν ἀρπάζειν, οὐκ ἔστι· περιμάχητον γὰρ τὸ ἄρχειν
γιγνόμενον, οἰκεῖος ὢν καὶ ἔνδον ὁ τοιοῦτος πόλεμος αὐτοῦς τε ἀπόλλυσι
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

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ἔχεις οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βίον ἄλλον τινὰ πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν καταφρονοῦντα ἢ
τὸν τῆς ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας;

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε μὴ ἐραστὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἐπ' αὐτό· εἰ δὲ μή, οἳ γε
ἀντρασταὶ μαχοῦνται.

πῶς δ' οὕ;

τίνας οὖν ἄλλους ἀναγκάσεις ἰέναι ἐπὶ φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως ἢ οἱ περὶ
τούτων τε φρονιμώτατοι δι' ὧν ἄριστα πόλις οἰκεῖται, ἔχουσι τε τιμὰς ἄλλας
καὶ βίον ἀμείνω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ;

οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἔφη.

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βούλει οὖν τοῦτ' ἤδη σκοπῶμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐγγενήσονται, καὶ
πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ Αἰδου λέγονται δὴ τινες εἰς θεοὺς
ἀνελθεῖν;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἔφη.

τοῦτο δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴῃ περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς
περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὄντος οὕσαν
ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἔχει τοιαύτην

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δύναμιν;

πῶς γὰρ οὕ;

τί ἂν οὖν εἴῃ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ
ὄν; τότε δ' ἐννοῶ λέγων ἅμα· οὐκ ἀθλητὰς μέντοι πολέμου ἔφαμεν τούτους

ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νέους ὄντας;

ἔφαμεν γάρ.

δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα ὃ ζητοῦμεν πρὸς ἐκείνῳ.

τὸ ποῖον;

μὴ ἄχρηστον πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶναι.

δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη, εἴπερ οἶόν τε.

γυμναστικῇ μὴν καὶ μουσικῇ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπαιδεύοντο

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ἡμῖν.

ἦν ταῦτα, ἔφη.

καὶ γυμναστικὴ μὲν που περὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον τετεύτακεν·

σώματος γὰρ αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως. ἐπιστατεῖ.

φαίνεται.

τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν μάθημα.

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οὐ γάρ.

ἀλλ' ἄρα μουσικὴ ὅσῃν τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν;

ἀλλ' ἦν ἐκείνη γ', ἔφη, ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἔθεσι

παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατὰ τε ἁρμονίαν εὐαρμοστίαν τινά, οὐκ

ἐπιστήμην, παραδιδούσα, καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς λόγοις

ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ἔθῃ ἅττα ἔχουσα, καὶ ὅσοι μυθώδεις τῶν λόγων καὶ

ὅσοι ἀληθινώτεροι ἦσαν· μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι

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ἄγον, οἶον σὺ νῦν ζητεῖς, οὐδὲν ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ.

ἀκριβέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναμιμνήσκεις με· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν

εἶχεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Γλαῦκων, τί ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτον; αἶ τε γὰρ τέχναι

βάνανσοι που ἅπασαι ἔδοξαν εἶναι—

πῶς δ' οὐ; καὶ μὴν τί ἔτ' ἄλλο λείπεται μάθημα, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς

καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν κεχωρισμένον;

φέρε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μηδὲν ἔτι ἐκτὸς τούτων ἔχομεν λαβεῖν, τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα

τεινόντων τι λάβωμεν.

τὸ ποῖον;

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οἶον τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ὃ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ

ἐπιστήμαι—ὃ καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώτοις ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν.

τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

τὸ φαῦλον τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἔν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγιγνώσκειν·

λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν κεφαλαιῷ ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμὸν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ

τούτων ἔχει, ὥς πᾶσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν μέτοχος

γίγνεσθαι;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ πολεμική;

πολλή, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη.

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παγγέλοιον γοῦν, ἔφην, στρατηγὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις
Παλαμήδης ἐκάστοτε ἀποφαίνει. ἦ οὐκ ἐννεόηκας ὅτι φησὶν ἀριθμὸν
εὐρὺν τάς τε τάξεις τῷ στρατοπέδῳ καταστήσαι ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ ἐξαριθμῆσαι
ναῦς τε καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ ἀναριθμῆτων ὄντων καὶ τοῦ
Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδ' ὅσους πόδας εἶχεν εἰδότης, εἴπερ ἀριθμεῖν μὴ
ἠπίστατο; καίτοι πόλιν τιν' αὐτὸν οἶει στρατηγὸν εἶναι;
ἄτοπὸν τιν', ἔφη, ἔγωγε, εἰ ἦν τοῦτ' ἀληθές.

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ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μάθημα ἀναγκαῖον πολεμικῷ ἀνδρὶ θήσομεν
λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ ἀριθμεῖν δύνασθαι;
πάντων γ', ἔφη, μάλιστα, εἰ καὶ ὅτιοῦν μέλλει τάξεων ἐπαΐειν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰ
καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἔσεσθαι.
ἐννοεῖς οὖν, εἶπον, περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα ὅπερ ἐγώ;
τὸ πόλιν;

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κινδυνεύει τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἀγόντων φύσει εἶναι ὧν ζητοῦμεν, χρῆσθαι
δ' οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς, ἐλκτικῷ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν.

πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν δηλῶσαι. ἃ γὰρ διαιροῦμαι
παρ' ἐμαυτῷ ἀγωγά τε εἶναι οἷ' λέγομεν καὶ μὴ, συνθεατῆς γενόμενος
σύμφαθι ἢ ἄπειπε, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σαφέστερον ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον
μαντεύομαι.

δείκνυ', ἔφη.

δείκνυμι δὴ, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾶς, τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν

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οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως
κρινόμενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελυόμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς
αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης.

τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα.

οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὗ λέγω.

ποῖα μὴν, ἔφη, λέγεις;

τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ ἐκβαίνει

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εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα· τὰ δ' ἐκβαίνοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι,
ἐπειδὴν ἡ αἴσθησις μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἴτ' ἐγγύθεν
προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν. ὥδε δὲ ἃ λέγω σαφέστερον εἴσῃ. οὗτοί φαμεν
τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν δάκτυλοι, ὃ τε μικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ μέσος.
πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

ὡς ἐγγύθεν τοίνυν ὀρωμένους λέγοντός μου διανοοῦ. ἀλλὰ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν
τόδε σκόπει.

τὸ πόλιν;

δάκτυλος μὲν πού αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἕκαστος, καὶ

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ταύτη γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἔαντε ἓν μέσῳ ὁρᾶται ἔαντ' ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ, ἔαντε λευκὸς ἔαντε μέλας, ἔαντε παχὺς ἔαντε λεπτός, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον. ἓν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἢ ψυχῇ τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶ δάκτυλος· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἢ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἅμα ἐσήμηνεν τὸ δάκτυλον τοῦναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰκότως τὸ γε τοιοῦτον νοήσεως οὐκ

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ἂν παρακλητικὸν οὐδ' ἐγερτικὸν εἴη.

εἰκότως.

τί δὲ δῆ; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἢ ὄψις ἄρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἓν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἢ ἀφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν;

ἦ

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ὥδε ποιεῖ ἐκάστη αὐτῶν· πρῶτον μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη αἴσθησις ἠνάγκασται καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μαλακῷ τετάχθαι, καὶ παραγγέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ταύτῳ σκληρόν τε καὶ μαλακὸν αἰσθανομένη;

οὕτως, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἓν γε τοῖς τοιούτοις αὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν τί ποτε σημαίνει αὕτη ἢ αἴσθησις τὸ σκληρόν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μαλακὸν λέγει, καὶ ἢ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἢ τοῦ βαρέος, τί τὸ κοῦφον καὶ βαρὺ, εἰ τὸ τε βαρὺ κοῦφον καὶ τὸ κοῦφον βαρὺ σημαίνει;

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καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, αὐταῖ γε ἄτοποι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἐρμηνεῖαι καὶ ἐπισκέψεως δεόμεναι.

εἰκότως ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πρῶτον μὲν πειρᾶται λογισμὸν τε καὶ νόησιν ψυχῇ παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἴτε ἓν εἴτε δύο ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνεται, ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἓν ἑκάτερον φαίνεται; ναί.

εἰ ἄρα ἓν ἑκάτερον, ἀμφοτέρα δὲ δύο, τὰ γε δύο κεχωρισμένα

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νοήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀχώριστά γε δύο ἐνόει, ἀλλ' ἓν.

ὁρθῶς.

μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἦ γάρ;

ναί.

διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἢ νόησις ἠνάγκασθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγκεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τοῦναντίον ἢ 'κείνη.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐκοῦν ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρχεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν τί οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὖ καὶ τὸ σμικρόν;

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δ' ὁρατὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.

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ὀρθότατ', ἔφη.

ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεχειροῦν λέγειν, ὥς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐστὶ, τὰ δ' οὐ, ἃ μὲν εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπίπτει, παρακλητικὰ ὀριζόμενος, ὅσα δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως. μαθάνω τοίνυν ἤδη, ἔφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.

τί οὖν; ἀριθμὸς τε καὶ τὸ ἐν ποτέρων δοκεῖ εἶναι;

οὐ συννωῶ, ἔφη.

ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ἔφην, ἀναλογίζου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὀρᾶται ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει

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λαμβάνεται τὸ ἐν, οὐκ ἂν ὀλκὸν εἴη ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν·

εἰ δ' αἰεὶ τι αὐτῷ ἅμα ὀρᾶται ἐναντίωμα, ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν ἢ καὶ τοῦναντίον φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινουῦντος δὴ δέοι ἂν ἤδη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, κινουσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἐννοίαν, καὶ ἀνερωτᾷν τί ποτέ ἐστίν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν

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ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἴη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἢ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοὔτο γ' ἔχει οὐχ ἥκιστα ἢ περὶ αὐτὸ ὄψις· ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτόν ὥς ἐν τε ὀρῶμεν καὶ ὥς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.

οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ ἐν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σύμπας ἀριθμὸς ταῦτόν πέπονθε τοὔτο; πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἀλλὰ μὴν λογιστικὴ τε καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμὸν πᾶσα.

καὶ μάλα.

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ταῦτα δὲ γε φαίνεται ἀγωγὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.

ὑπερφυσῶς μὲν οὖν.

ὦν ζητοῦμεν ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, μαθημάτων ἂν εἴη· πολεμικῶ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὰς τάξεις ἀναγκαῖον μαθεῖν ταῦτα, φιλοσόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτεόν εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι, ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῶ γενέσθαι.

ἔστι ταῦτ', ἔφη.

ὁ δὲ γε ἡμέτερος φύλαξ πολεμικός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος τυγχάνει ὦν.

τί μὴν;

προσηκόν δὴ τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἴη, ὧ Γλαύκων, νομοθετῆσαι καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν μεγίστων

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μεθέξειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι καὶ ἀνθάπτεσθαι αὐτῆς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ’
ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ θεᾶν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσῃ αὐτῇ, οὐκ
ὦνῃς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους μελετῶντας, ἀλλ’ ἔνεκα
πολέμου τε καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ῥαστώνης μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ’
ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν.

κάλλιστ’, ἔφη, λέγεις.

καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ, ῥηθέντος τοῦ περὶ

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τοὺς λογισμοὺς μαθήματος, ὡς κομψὸν ἐστὶ καὶ πολλαχῇ χρησίμον ἡμῖν
πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα, ἐὰν τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἔνεκά τις αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύῃ ἀλλὰ μὴ
τοῦ καπηλεύειν.

πῇ δὴ; ἔφη.

τοῦτ’ οὖν γε, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς σφόδρα ἄνω ποι ἄγει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ
αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀναγκάζει διαλέγεσθαι, οὐδαμῇ ἀποδεχόμενον ἐὰν τις
αὐτῇ ὁρατὰ ἢ ἀπὰ σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμοὺς προτεινόμενος διαλέγηται.
οἴσθα γάρ που τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὺς αὖ ὡς, ἐὰν τις αὐτὸ τὸ

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ἐν ἐπιχειρῇ τῷ λόγῳ τέμνειν, καταγελῶσί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν
σὺ κερματίζῃς αὐτό, ἐκεῖνοι πολλαπλασιοῦσιν, εὐλαβοῦμενοι μὴ ποτε φανῇ
τὸ ἐν μὴ ἐν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

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τί οὖν οἶει, ὦ Γλαῦκων, εἴ τις ἔροιτο αὐτοὺς· ὦ θαυμάσιοι, περὶ ποιῶν
ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οἷον ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦτέ ἐστιν, ἴσον τε ἕκαστον
πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον, μόριόν τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν; τί ἂν
οἶει αὐτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι;

τοῦτο ἔγωγε, ὅτι περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν ὧν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ,
ἄλλως δ’ οὐδαμῶς μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν.

ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον

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ἡμῖν κινδυνεύει εἶναι τὸ μάθημα, ἐπειδὴ φαίνεται γε προσαναγκάζον αὐτῇ
τῇ νοήσῃ χρῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε ποιεῖ αὐτό.

τί δέ; τόδε ἤδη ἐπεσκέψω, ὡς οἱ τε φύσει λογιστικοὶ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὅξεῖς φύονται, οἱ τε βραδεῖς, ἂν ἐν τούτῳ παιδευθῶσιν καὶ
γυμνάσωνται, κἂν μηδὲν ἄλλο ὠφεληθῶσιν, ὅμως εἰς γε τὸ ὀξύτεροι αὐτοὶ
αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιδιδόασιν;

ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτω.

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καὶ μὴν, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, ἃ γε μείζω πόνον παρέχει μανθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι,
οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὐροις ὡς τοῦτο.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

πάντων δὴ ἔνεκα τούτων οὐκ ἀφετέον τὸ μάθημα, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἄριστοι τὰς

φύσεις παιδευτέοι ἐν αὐτῷ.

σύμφημι, ἧ δ' ὅς.

τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, ἐν ἡμῖν κείσθω· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου σκεψώμεθα ἅρα τι προσήκει ἡμῖν.

τὸ ποῖον; ἢ γεωμετρίαν, ἔφη, λέγεις;

αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

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ὅσον μὲν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ αὐτοῦ τείνει, δῆλον ὅτι προσήκει· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις καὶ καταλήψεις χωρίων καὶ συναγωγὰς καὶ ἐκτάσεις στρατιᾶς καὶ ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουν τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐν αὐταῖς τε ταῖς μάχαις καὶ πορείαις διαφέροι ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ γεωμετρικός τε καὶ μὴ ὤν.

ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ, εἶπον, πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ βραχὺ τι ἂν ἐξαρκοῖ γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν μόριον· τὸ δὲ πολὺ αὐτῆς καὶ πορρωτέρω προῖδον σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ εἰ τι πρὸς ἐκείνο

526e

τείνει, πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν καπιδεῖν ῥᾶον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν. τείνει δέ, φαμέν, πάντα αὐτόσε, ὅσα ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς ἐκείνον τὸν τόπον μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος, ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν ἀναγκάζει θεάσασθαι, προσήκει, εἰ δὲ γένεσιν, οὐ προσήκει.

φαμέν γε δὴ.

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οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτ' οὐ γέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφισβητήσουσιν ἡμῖν ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη πᾶν τούναντίον ἔχει τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ λόγοις λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν μεταχειριζομένων.

πῶς; ἔφη.

λέγουσι μὲν πού μάλα γελοιῶς τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως· ὥς γὰρ πράττοντές τε καὶ πράξεως ἔνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι λέγουσιν τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ προσπιθεῖναι καὶ πάντα οὕτω φθεγγόμενοι, τὸ δ' ἐστὶ πού

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πᾶν τὸ μάθημα γνώσεως ἔνεκα ἐπιτηδευόμενον.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔτι διομολογητέον;

τὸ ποῖον;

ὥς τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦ ποτὲ τι γιγνομένου καὶ ἀπολλυμένου.

εὐομολόγητον, ἔφη· τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσις ἐστίν.

ὀλκὸν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε, ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶη ἂν καὶ ἀπεργαστικὸν φιλοσόφου διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἄνω σχεῖν ἢ νῦν κάτω οὐ δέον ἔχομεν.

ὥς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ἔφη.

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ὥς οἷόν τ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μάλιστα προστακτέον ὅπως οἱ ἐν τῇ καλλιπόλει σοι μηδενὶ τρόπῳ γεωμετρίας ἀφέζονται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πάρεργα αὐτοῦ οὐ σμικρά.

ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἅ τε δὴ σὺ εἶπες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς πάσας μαθήσεις, ὥστε κάλλιον ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἴσμεν που ὅτι τῷ ὄλῳ καὶ παντὶ διοίσει ἡμμένος τε γεωμετρίας καὶ μή.

τῷ παντὶ μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη.

δεύτερον δὴ τοῦτο τιθῶμεν μάθημα τοῖς νέοις;

τιθῶμεν, ἔφη.

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τί δέ; τρίτον θῶμεν ἀστρονομίαν; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ;

ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη· τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὥρας εὐαισθητοτέρως ἔχειν καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν οὐ μόνον γεωργίᾳ οὐδὲ ναυτιλίᾳ προσήκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατηγίᾳ οὐχ ἥττον.

ἡδὺς εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔοικας δεδιότι τοὺς πολλούς, μὴ δοκῆς ἄχρηστα μαθήματα προστάττειν. τὸ δ' ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ φαῦλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται τε καὶ

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ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον ὃν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὁμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὁράται. οἷς μὲν οὖν ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ ἀμυχανῶς ὥς εὖ δόξεις λέγειν, ὅσοι δὲ τούτου μηδαμῇ ἠσθημένοι εἰσὶν εἰκότως ἠγήσονται σε λέγειν οὐδέν· ἄλλην γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐχ ὁρώσιν ἀξίαν λόγου ὠφελίαν.

σκόπει

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οὖν αὐτόθεν πρὸς ποτέρους διαλέγη· ἢ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους, ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ ἔνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιῇ τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλῳ, εἴ τις τι δύναιτο ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι.

οὕτως, ἔφη, αἰροῦμαι, ἐμαυτοῦ ἔνεκα τὸ πλεῖστον λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ἄναγε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς τοὔπισω· νυνδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸ ἐξῆς ἐλάβομεν τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ.

πῶς λαβόντες; ἔφη.

μετὰ ἐπίπεδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν περιφορᾷ ὃν ἦδη στερεὸν

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λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ λαβεῖν· ὀρθῶς δὲ ἔχει ἐξῆς μετὰ δευτέραν αὔξην τρίτην λαμβάνειν. ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο περὶ τὴν τῶν κύβων αὔξην καὶ τὸ βάθους μετέχον.

ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ οὕτω ἠρῆσθαι.

διττὰ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὰ αἴτια· ὅτι τε οὐδεμία πόλις ἐντίμως αὐτὰ ἔχει,

ἀσθενῶς ζητεῖται χαλεπὰ ὄντα, ἐπιστάτου τε δέονται οἱ ζητοῦντες, ἄνευ οὗ

οὐκ ἂν εὐροιεν, ὃν πρῶτον μὲν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἔπειτα καὶ γενομένου, ὥς νῦν ἔχει,

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οὐκ ἂν πείθοντο οἱ περὶ ταῦτα ζητητικοὶ μεγαλοφρονούμενοι. εἰ δὲ πόλις ὅλη συνεπιστατοῖ ἐντίμως ἄγουσα αὐτά, οὗτοί τε ἂν πείθοντο καὶ συνεχῶς τε ἂν καὶ ἐντόνως ζητούμενα ἐκφανῇ γένοιτο ὅπῃ ἔχει· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων λόγον οὐκ ἐχόντων καθ’ ὅτι χρήσιμα, ὅμως πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα βίᾳ ὑπὸ χάριτος αὐξάνεται, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν αὐτὰ φανῆναι.

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καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, τό γε ἐπίχαρι καὶ διαφερόντως ἔχει. ἀλλὰ μοι σαφέστερον εἰπέ ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες. τὴν μὲν γάρ που τοῦ ἐπιτέδου πραγματεῖαν γεωμετρίαν ἐτίθεις.

ναί, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ.

εἰτά γ’, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀστρονομίαν μετὰ ταύτην, ὕστερον δ’ ἀνεχώρησας.

σπεύδων γάρ, ἔφην, ταχὺ πάντα διεξελθεῖν μᾶλλον βραδύνω· ἐξῆς γὰρ οὔσαν τὴν βάθους αὐξῆς μέθοδον, ὅτι τῇ ζητήσει γελοιῶς ἔχει, ὑπερβὰς αὐτὴν μετὰ γεωμετρίαν

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ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὔσαν βάθους.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

τέταρτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τιθῶμεν μάθημα ἀστρονομίαν, ὥς ὑπαρχούσης τῆς νῦν παραλειπομένης, ἐὰν αὐτὴν πόλις μετῇ.

εἰκός, ἦ δ’ ὅς. καὶ ὁ γε νυνδὴ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέπληξας περὶ ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι, νῦν ἡ σὺ μετέρχη

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ἐπαινῶ· παντὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δῆλον ὅτι αὕτη γε ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὀρᾶν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε ἄγει.

ἴσως, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, παντὶ δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοί· ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ἀλλὰ πῶς; ἔφη.

ὥς μὲν νῦν αὐτὴν μεταχειρίζονται οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες, πάνυ ποιεῖν κάτω βλέπειν.

πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

οὐκ ἀγεννῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν λαμβάνειν παρὰ σαντῶ ἢ ἐστι· κινδυνεύεις γὰρ

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καὶ εἴ τις ἐν ὀροφῇ ποικίλματα θεώμενος ἀνακύπτων καταμανθάνοι τι, ἠγεῖσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν νοήσῃ ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὅμμασι θεωρεῖν. ἴσως οὖν καλῶς ἠγῇ, ἐγώ δ’ εὐθηκῶς. ἐγώ γὰρ αὖ οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιοῦν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν περὶ τὸ ὄν τε ἦ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον, ἐὰν τέ τις ἄνω κεχηνῶς ἢ κάτω συμμαμκῶς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τι ἐπιχειρῇ μαθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ἂν ποτέ φημι αὐτόν—ἐπιστήμην

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γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔχειν τῶν τοιούτων—οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ βλέπειν τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνῃ. δίκην, ἔφη, ἔχω· ὀρθῶς γάρ μοι ἐπέπληξας. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ ἔλεγες δεῖν ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν παρὰ ἃ νῦν μανθάνουσιν, εἰ μέλλοιεν ὠφελίμως πρὸς ἃ λέγομεν μαθήσεσθαι; ὦδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπείπερ ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποικίλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ

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ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἃς τὸ ὄν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὐσα βραδυτῆς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει, ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτὰ, ὅψει δ' οὐ· ἢ σὺ οἶει; οὐδαμῶς γε, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, τῇ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἂν

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εἴ τις ἐντύχοι ὑπὸ Δαιδάλου ἢ τινος ἄλλου δημιουργοῦ ἢ γραφέως διαφερόντως γεγραμμένοις καὶ ἐκπεπονημένοις διαγράμμασιν.

ἡγήσαιο γὰρ ἂν πού τις ἔμπειρος γεωμετρίας, ἰδὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα, κάλλιστα μὲν ἔχειν ἀπεργασίᾳ, γελοῖον μὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν αὐτὰ σπουδῇ ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ληψόμενον

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ἴσων ἢ διπλασίων ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς συμμετρίας.

τί δ' οὐ μέλλει γελοῖον εἶναι; ἔφη.

τῷ ὄντι δὴ ἀστρονομικόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄντα οὐκ οἶει ταῦτόν πείσεσθαι εἰς τὰς τῶν ἄστρωνφοράς ἀποβλέποντα; νομιεῖν μὲν ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω συνεστάναι τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἡμέραν συμμετρίαν καὶ τούτων πρὸς μῆνα καὶ μηνὸς πρὸς ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων

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πρὸς τε ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, οὐκ ἄτοπον, οἶει, ἡγήσεται τὸν νομίζοντα γίγνεσθαι τε ταῦτα αἰὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν, σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὀρώμενα, καὶ ζητεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν; ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, σοὺ νῦν ἀκούοντι.

προβλήμασιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρώμενοι ὥσπερ γεωμετρίαν οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίαν μέτιμεν, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὄντως ἀστρονομίας μεταλαμβάνοντες χρήσιμον

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τὸ φύσει φρόνιμον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐξ ἀχρήστου ποιήσιν.

ἢ πολλαπλάσιον, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον ἢ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται προστάττεις.

οἶμαι δὲ γε, εἶπον, καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον προστάξειν ἡμᾶς, ἐάν τι ἡμῶν ὡς νομοθετῶν ὄφελος ᾖ. ἀλλὰ γάρ τι ἔχεις ὑπομνησαι τῶν

προσηκόντων μαθημάτων;

οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν γ' οὕτωςί.

οὐ μὴν ἔν, ἀλλὰ πλείω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶδη παρέχεται ἡ φορά,

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ὥς ἐγῶμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πάντα ἴσως ὅστις σοφὸς ἔξει εἰπεῖν· ἃ δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν
προφανῆ, δύο.

ποῖα δὴ;

πρὸς τοῦτω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντίστροφον αὐτοῦ.

τὸ ποῖον;

κινδυνεύει, ἔφην, ὥς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὥς πρὸς
ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὥτα παγῆναι, καὶ αὖται ἀλλήλων ἀδελφαὶ τινες αἱ
ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, ὥς οἱ τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὧ Γλαῦκων,
συγχωροῦμεν. ἢ πῶς ποιοῦμεν;

οὕτως, ἔφη.

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οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ πολὺ τὸ ἔργον, ἐκείνων πευσόμεθα πῶς λέγουσι
περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο πρὸς τοῦτοις· ἡμεῖς δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα
φυλάξομεν τὸ ἡμέτερον.

ποῖον;

μὴ ποτ' αὐτῶν τι ἀτελὲς ἐπιχειρῶσιν ἡμῖν μανθάνειν οὓς θρέφομεν, καὶ οὐκ
ἐξῆκον ἐκείσε ἀεὶ, οἱ πάντα δεῖ ἀφήκειν, οἷον ἄρτι περὶ τῆς ἀστρονομίας
ἐλέγομεν.

ἢ οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι

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531a

καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ποιοῦσι; τὰς γὰρ ἀκουόμενας αὖ
συμφωνίας καὶ φθόγγους ἀλλήλοις ἀναμετροῦντες ἀνήνυστα, ὥσπερ οἱ
ἀστρονόμοι, πονοῦσιν.

νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἔφη, καὶ γελοιῶς γε, πυκνώματ' ἅττα ὀνομάζοντες καὶ
παραβάλλοντες τὰ ὥτα, οἷον ἐκ γειτόνων φωνὴν θηρευόμενοι, οἱ μὲν φασιν
ἔτι κατακοῦειν ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ ἤχην καὶ σμικρότατον εἶναι τοῦτο διάστημα, ὧ
μετρητέον, οἱ δὲ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ὥς ὅμοιον ἦδη φθεγγομένωνν, ἀμφότεροι

531b

ὥτα τοῦ νοῦ προστησάμενοι.

σὺ μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα
παρέχοντας καὶ βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας· ἵνα δὲ μὴ
μακροτέρα ἢ εἰκὼν γίγνηται πληκτρῶ τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων καὶ κατηγορίας
πέρι καὶ ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας χορδῶν, παύομαι τῆς εἰκόνης καὶ οὐ
φημι τούτους λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους οὓς ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ περὶ ἀρμονίας
ἐρήσεσθαι. ταῦτὸν γὰρ ποιοῦσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ

531c

ἀστρονομίᾳ· τοὺς γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουόμεναις
ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίστασιν, ἐπισκοπεῖν τίνες
σύμφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τίνες οὐ, καὶ διὰ τί ἐκάτεροι.

δαίμονιον γάρ, ἔφη, πρᾶγμα λέγεις.

χρήσιμον μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησιν, ἄλλως δὲ μεταδιωκόμενον ἄχρηστον.

εἰκὸς γ', ἔφη.

οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ τούτων πάντων ὧν διεληλύθαμεν
531d

μέθοδος ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκεται καὶ συγγένειαν, καὶ συλλογισθῇ ταῦτα ἢ ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεῖα, φέρειν τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ βουλόμεθα τὴν πραγματείαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνόνητα πονεῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνόνητα. καὶ ἐγώ, ἔφη, οὕτω μαντεύομαι. ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ ἔργον λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τίνος λέγεις; ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα προοιμίᾳ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν; οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦσι γέ σοι οἱ ταῦτα δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ

531e

εἶναι.

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δι', ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μάλα γέ τινες ὀλίγοι ὧν ἐγώ ἐντετύχηκα. ἀλλὰ δὴ, εἶπον, μὴ δυνατοὶ οἷτινες δοῦναι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἴσεσθαι ποτέ τι ὧν φάμεν δεῖν εἰδέναι;

οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

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οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαῦκων, οὗτος ἤδη αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ νόμος ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει; ὃν καὶ ὄντα νοητὸν μιμοῖτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις, ἦν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς αὐτὰ ἤδη τὰ ζῶα ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον. οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὁρμαῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ πρὶν

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ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσῃ λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τότε ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

τί οὖν; οὐ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν καλεῖς;

τί μήν;

ἡ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφή ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἰδῶλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῶα τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἔτι ἄδυναμία

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βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα καὶ σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδῶλων σκιὰς δι' ἑτέρου τοιοῦτου φωτὸς ὡς πρὸς ἥλιον κρίνειν ἀποσκιαζόμενας—πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν ἃς διήλθομεν ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὐσί θέαν, ὥσπερ τότε τοῦ σαφεστάτου ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου ἐν τῷ σωματοειδεῖ τε καὶ

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ὀρατῶ τόπω.

ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ἀποδέχομαι οὕτω. καίτοι παντάσῃ γέ μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπὰ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἶναι, ἄλλον δ' αὖ τρόπον χαλεπὰ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι. ὅμως δέ—οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι μόνον ἀκουστέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὖθις πολλάκις ἐπανιτέον —ταῦτα θέντες ἔχειν ὡς νῦν λέγεται, ἐπ' αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν νόμον ἴωμεν, καὶ διέλθωμεν οὕτως ὥσπερ τὸ προοίμιον διήλθομεν. λέγε οὖν τις ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμεως, καὶ

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κατὰ ποῖα δὴ εἶδη διέστηκεν, καὶ τινες αὖ ὁδοί· αὗται γὰρ ἂν ἤδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἱ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἄγουσαι εἴεν, οἱ ἀφικομένῳ ὥσπερ ὁδοῦ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἶη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας.

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οὐκέτ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαῦκων, οἷός τ' ἔσῃ ἀκολουθεῖν—ἐπεὶ τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι—οὐδ' εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὗ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθές, ὃ γε δὴ μοι φαίνεται—εἰ δ' ὄντως ἦ μὴ, οὐκέτ' ἄξιον τοῦτο διισχυρίζεσθαι· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτόν τι ἰδεῖν, ἰσχυριστέον. ἦ γάρ; τί μὴν;

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνη ἂν φήνειεν ἐμπείρῳ ὄντι ὥν νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ἄλλῃ δὲ οὐδαμῇ δυνατόν;

καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἄξιον διισχυρίζεσθαι.

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τόδε γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἐκάστου περὶ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὁδῶ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλα πᾶσαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις, ἢ πρὸς θεραπείαν τῶν φυομένων τε καὶ συντιθεμένων ἅπασαι τετράφαται· αἱ δὲ λοιπαί, αἵ τοῦ ὄντος τι ἔφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς ταύτη ἐπομένας, ὁρῶμεν ὡς ὀνειρώττουσι μὲν

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περὶ τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, ἕως ἂν ὑποθέσῃσι χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῷσι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. ὥ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδεν συμπεπλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι; οὐδεμία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν

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ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορυσγμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγαῖς χρωμένη αἷς διήλθομεν τέχναις· αἵ ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσεῖπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέοντα δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης—διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν

που ὠρισάμεθα—ἔστι δ', ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ

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ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πως τὴν ἔξιν σαφηνεῖα λέγειν ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρκέσει;
ναί.

ἀρκέσει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ τὸ πρότερον, τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν
ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δευτέραν δὲ διάνοιαν, τρίτην

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δὲ πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην· καὶ συναμφότερα μὲν ταῦτα δόξαν,
συναμφότερα δ' ἐκεῖνα νόησιν· καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ
οὐσίαν· καὶ ὅτι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὅτι νόησις πρὸς
δόξαν, ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν· τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς
ταῦτα ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῇ ἑκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ τε καὶ νοητοῦ,
ἔωμεν, ὧ Γλαῦκων, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ
παρεληλυθότες.

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ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγ', ἔφη, τά γε ἄλλα, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι ἔπεσθαι, συνδοκεῖ.
ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ
τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ
τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τοῦτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν;

πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς, φαίην;

οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως· ὅς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ
ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν

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τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ιδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιὼν, μὴ κατὰ
δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τοῦτοις ἀπῴτι
τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως
ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἴ πῃ εἰδῶλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξη,
οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον ὀνειροπολοῦντα καὶ
ὑπνώπτοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδ' ἐξεγρέσθαι, εἰς Αἶδου

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πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθεῖν;

νῆ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα γε πάντα ταῦτα φήσω.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τοὺς γε σαντοῦ παῖδας, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ
ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ
γραμμάς, ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

νομοθετήσεις δὴ αὐτοῖς ταύτης μάλιστα τῆς παιδείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐξ
ἧς ἐρωτᾷν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστημονέστατα οἰοί τ' ἔσονται;

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νομοθετήσω, ἔφη, μετὰ γε σοῦ.

ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ διαλεκτικῇ

ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν

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ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων;

ἔμοιγ', ἔφη.

διανομὴ τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λοιπὸν σοί, τίσιν ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα δώσομεν καὶ τίνα τρόπον.

δῆλον, ἔφη.

μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἷους ἐξελέξαμεν;

πῶς γάρ, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὐ;

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις οἷου δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι· τοὺς τε γὰρ βεβαιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρειοτάτους προαιρετέον, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τοὺς εὐειδεστάτους·

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πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ζητητέον μὴ μόνον γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἦθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ τῇδε τῇ παιδείᾳ τῆς φύσεως πρόσφορα ἐκτέον αὐτοῖς.

ποῖα δὴ διαστέλλῃ;

δριμύτητα, ὧ μακάριε, ἔφην, δεῖ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς μανθάνειν. πολὺ γάρ τοι μᾶλλον ἀποδειλιῶσι ψυχαὶ ἐν ἰσχυροῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις· οἰκειότερος γάρ αὐταῖς ὁ πόνος, ἴδιος ἄλλ' οὐ κοινὸς ὢν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

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καὶ μνήμονα δὴ καὶ ἄρρατον καὶ πάντῃ φιλόπονον ζητητέον. ἢ τίνι τρόπῳ οἷσι τὰ τε τοῦ σώματος ἐτελέσειν τινὰ διαπονεῖν καὶ τοσαύτην μάθησιν τε καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν;

οὐδένα, ἣ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν μὴ παντάπασι γ' ἡ εὐφυής.

τὸ γοῦν νῦν ἀμάρτημα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφία διὰ ταῦτα προσπέπτωκεν, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἵπομεν, ὅτι οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἄπτονται· οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει ἄπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γνησίους.

πῶς; ἔφη.

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πρῶτον μὲν, εἶπον, φιλοπονία οὐ χωλὸν δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἀφόμενον, τὰ μὲν ἡμίσεα φιλόπονον ὄντα, τὰ δ' ἡμίσεα ἄπονον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν τις φιλογυμναστῆς μὲν καὶ φιλόθηρος ἦ καὶ πάντα τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος φιλοπονῇ, φιλομαθῆς δὲ μὴ, μηδὲ φιλήκοος μηδὲ ζητητικός, ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις μισοπονῇ· χωλὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ τάναντία τούτου μεταβεβληκὼς τὴν φιλοπονίαν.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἀνάπηρον

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ψυχὴν θήσομεν, ἣ ἂν τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον ψεῦδος μισῇ καὶ χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτὴ τε καὶ ἐτέρων ψευδομένων ὑπεραγανακτῇ, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον εὐκόλως

προσδέχεται καὶ ἀμαθαίνουσά που ἀλισκομένη μὴ ἀγανακτῇ, ἀλλ' εὐχερῶς
ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνεται;

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παντάσασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ
πάντα τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη οὐχ ἥκιστα δεῖ φυλάττειν τὸν νόθον τε καὶ τὸν
γνήσιον. ὅταν γάρ τις μὴ ἐπίσταιται πάντῃ τὰ τοιαῦτα σκοπεῖν καὶ ἰδιώτης
καὶ πόλις, λανθάνουσι χωλοῖς τε καὶ νόθοις χρώμενοι πρὸς ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι
τούτων, οἱ μὲν φίλοις, οἱ δὲ ἄρχουσι.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει.

ἡμῖν δὴ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διευλαβητέον·

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ὥς ἐὰν μὲν ἀρτιμελεῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίφρονας ἐπὶ τοσαύτην μάθησιν καὶ
τοσαύτην ἄσκησιν κομίσαντες παιδεύωμεν, ἣ τε δίκη ἡμῖν οὐ μέμψεται
αὐτῇ, τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ πολιτείαν σώσομεν, ἀλλοίους δὲ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ ταῦτα
τάναντία πάντα καὶ πράξομεν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω γέλωτα
καταντλήσομεν.

αἰσχρὸν μεντὰν εἶη, ἣ δ' ὅς.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, εἶπον· γελοῖον δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τι ἔοικα παθεῖν.
τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

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ἐπελαθόμεν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπαίζομεν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντεινόμενος εἶπον.

λέγων γὰρ ἅμα ἔβλεψα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ ἰδὼν προπεπηλακισμένην
ἀναξίως ἀγανακτήσας μοι δοκῶ καὶ ὥσπερ θυμωθεὶς τοῖς αἰτίοις
σπουδαιότερον εἰπεῖν ἢ εἶπον.

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ οὖν ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ ἀκροατῇ.

ἀλλ' ὥς ἐμοί, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ῥήτορι. τόδε δὲ μὴ ἐπιλανθάνωμεθα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ
προτέρᾳ ἐκλογῇ πρεσβύτας ἐξελέγομεν,

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ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐκ ἐγχωρήσει· Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον ὥς γηράσκων τις
πολλὰ δυνατός μανθάνειν, ἀλλ' ἦττον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι
καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι.

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεωμετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἣν
τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δεῖ προπαιδευθῆναι, παισὶν οὕσι χρή προβάλλειν, οὐχ ὥς
ἐπάναγκες μαθεῖν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς διδαχῆς ποιουμένους.

τί δὴ;

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ὅτι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρή μανθάνειν.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βίᾳ πονοῦμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα
ἀπεργάζονται, ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

μὴ τοίνυν βίᾳ, εἶπον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοὺς παῖδας ἐν τοῖς

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μαθήμασιν ἄλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ μᾶλλον οἷός τ' ἦς καθορᾶν ἐφ' ὃ ἕκαστος πέφυκεν.

ἔχει ὃ λέγεις, ἔφη, λόγον.

οὐκοῦν μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἔφαμεν τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων θεωροῦς, καὶ ἐάν που ἀσφαλὲς ἦ, προσακτέον ἐγγὺς καὶ γευστέον αἵματος, ὥσπερ τοὺς σκύλακας;

μέμνημαι, ἔφη.

ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς τε πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις ὃς ἂν ἐντρεχέστατος ἀεὶ φαίνεται, εἰς ἀριθμὸν τινα ἐγκριτέον.

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ἐν τίνι, ἔφη, ἡλικία;

ἡνίκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων μεθίενται· οὗτος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος, ἐάντε δύο ἐάντε τρία ἔτη γίγνηται, ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι· κόποι γὰρ καὶ ὕπνοι μαθήμασι πολέμιοι. καὶ ἅμα μία καὶ αὕτη τῶν βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη, τίς ἕκαστος ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις φανεῖται.

πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη.

μετὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσιετῶν οἱ προκριθέντες τιμὰς τε μείζους τῶν ἄλλων οἴσονται,

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τά τε χύδην μαθήματα παισὶν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτοις συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκειότητός τε ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως. μόνη γοῦν, εἶπεν, ἡ τοιαύτη μάθησις βέβαιος, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται.

καὶ μεγίστη γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πεῖρα διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως καὶ μὴ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὐ.

συνοίομαι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει σε ἐπισκοποῦντα οἱ ἂν

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μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι ἐν αὐτοῖς ὥσι καὶ μόνιμοι μὲν ἐν μαθήμασι, μόνιμοι δ' ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, τούτους αὖ, ἐπειδὴν τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐκβαίνωσιν, ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκρινάμενον εἰς μείζους τε τιμὰς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν, τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει βασανίζοντα τίς ὁμμάτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθιέμενος ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν μετ' ἀληθείας ἰέναι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἔργον, ὧ ἐταῖρε.

τί μάλιστα; ἦ δ' ὅς.

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οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ νῦν περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι κακὸν γιγνόμενον ὅσον γίγνεται;

τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

παρανομίας που, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐμπίμπλονται.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

θαυμαστὸν οὖν τι οἶει, εἶπον, πάσχειν αὐτούς, καὶ οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις;

πῇ μάλιστα; ἔφη.

οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴ τις ὑποβολιμαῖος τραφεῖη ἐν πολλοῖς

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μὲν χρήμασι, πολλῷ δὲ καὶ μεγάλῳ γένει καὶ κόλαξι πολλοῖς, ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος αἰσθοίτο ὅτι οὐ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν φασκόντων γονέων, τοὺς δὲ τῷ ὄντι γεννήσαντας μὴ εὖροι, τοῦτον ἔχεις μαντεύσασθαι πῶς ἂν διατεθεῖη πρὸς τε τοὺς κόλακας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑποβαλομένους ἐν ἐκείνῳ τε τῷ χρόνῳ ὃ οὐκ ἦδει τὰ περὶ τῆς ὑποβολῆς, καὶ ἐν ᾧ αὖ ἦδει; ἢ βούλει ἐμοῦ μαντευομένου ἀκοῦσαι;

βούλομαι, ἔφη.

μαντεύομαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν τιμᾶν ἂν τὸν

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πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους δοκοῦντας ἢ τοὺς κολακεύοντας, καὶ ἦττον μὲν ἂν περιδεῖν ἐνδεεῖς τινος, ἦττον δὲ παράνομόν τι δρᾶσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν εἰς αὐτούς, ἦττον δὲ ἀπειθεῖν τὰ μεγάλα ἐκείνοις ἢ τοῖς κόλαξιν, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ εἶδει.

εἰκός, ἔφη.

αἰσθόμενον τοίνυν τὸ ὃν μαντεύομαι αὖ περὶ μὲν τούτους ἀνεῖναι ἂν τὸ τιμᾶν τε καὶ σπουδάζειν, περὶ δὲ τοὺς κόλακας ἐπιτεῖναι, καὶ πείθεσθαι τε αὐτοῖς διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον

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καὶ ζῆν ἂν ἥδη κατ' ἐκείνους, συνόντα αὐτοῖς ἀπαρακαλύπτως, πατρός δὲ ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων, εἰ μὴ πάνυ εἴη φύσει ἐπεικῆς, μέλειν τὸ μηδέν.

πάντ', ἔφη, λέγεις οἷά περ ἂν γένοιτο. ἀλλὰ πῆ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπτομένους τῶν λόγων αὕτη φέρει ἢ εἰκῶν;

τῇδε. ἔστι που ἡμῖν δόγματα ἐκ παιδῶν περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι, πειθαρχοῦντές τε καὶ τιμῶντες αὐτά. ἔστι γάρ.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ἐναντία τούτων ἐπιτηδεύματα ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα, ἃ κολακεύει μὲν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἔλκει ἐφ' αὐτά, πείθει δ' οὐ τοὺς καὶ ὀπηροῦν μετρίους· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα τιμῶσι τὰ πάτρια καὶ ἐκείνοις πειθαρχοῦσιν.

ἔστι ταῦτα.

τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐλθὼν ἐρώτημα ἔρηται· τί ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἀποκριναμένου ὃ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἦκουεν ἐξελέγχῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ πολλακίς καὶ πολλαχῇ ἐλέγχων εἰς δόξαν καταβάλῃ ὥς τοῦτο οὐδὲν μᾶλλον

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καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἦγεν ἐν τιμῇ, μετὰ τοῦτο τί οἶει ποιήσῃν αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτὰ τιμῆς τε πέρι καὶ πειθαρχίας;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, μήτε τιμᾶν ἔτι ὁμοίως μήτε πείθεσθαι.

ὅταν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτε ταῦτα ἡγῆται τίμια καὶ οἰκεῖα ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ, τὰ τε ἀληθῆ μὴ εὐρίσκη, ἔστι πρὸς ὅποῖον

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βιον ἄλλον ἢ τὸν κολακεύοντα εἰκότως προσχωρήσεται;

οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη.

παράνομος δὴ οἶμαι δόξει γεγονέναι ἐκ νομίμου.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφην, εἰκὸς τὸ πάθος τῶν οὕτω λόγων ἀπτομένων καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, πολλῆς συγγνώμης ἄξιον;

καὶ ἐλέου γ', ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν ἵνα μὴ γίγνηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι,

εὐλαβουμένῳ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν λόγων ἀπτέον;

καὶ μάλ', ἢ δ' ὅς.

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ἄρ' οὖν οὐ μία μὲν εὐλάβεια αὕτη συχνή, τὸ μὴ νέους ὄντας αὐτῶν γεύεσθαι; οἶμαι γάρ σε οὐ λεληθέναι ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύωνται, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, αἰεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια τῷ ἔλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίον αἰεὶ.

ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοὶ ἐλέγξωσιν, ὑπὸ πολλῶν

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δὲ ἐλεγχθῶσι, σφόδρα καὶ ταχὺ ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ὥνπερ πρότερον· καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

ὁ δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης μανίας οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι μετέχειν, τὸν δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἐθέλοντα καὶ σκοπεῖν τάληθές μᾶλλον μιμήσεται ἢ τὸν παιδιᾶς χάριν παίζοντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα, καὶ αὐτὸς τε μετριώτερος ἔσται

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καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τιμιώτερον ἀντὶ ἀτιμοτέρου ποιήσει.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ προειρημένα τούτου ἐπ' εὐλαβείᾳ πάντα προείρηται, τὸ τὰς φύσεις κοσμίους εἶναι καὶ στασίμους οἷς τις μεταδῶσει τῶν λόγων, καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτό;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἄρκεῖ δὴ ἐπὶ λόγων μεταλήψει μεῖναι ἐνδελεχῶς καὶ συντόνως μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι, ἀλλ' ἀντιστρόφως γυμναζομένῳ τοῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμνασίοις, ἔτη διπλάσια ἢ τότε;

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ἔξ, ἔφη, ἢ τέτταρα λέγεις;

ἀμέλει, εἶπον, πέντε θεός. μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καταβιβαστέοι ἔσονται σοι εἰς τὸ σπήλαιον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἀναγκαστέοι ἄρχειν τὰ τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ

ὄσαι νέων ἀρχαί, ἵνα μηδ' ἐμπειρίᾳ ὑστερῶσι τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐν
τούτοις

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βασανιστέοι εἰ ἐμμενοῦσιν ἐλκόμενοι πανταχόσε ἥ τι καὶ παρακινήσουσι.
χρόνον δέ, ἧ δ' ὅς, πόσον τοῦτον τιθεῖς;

πεντεκαίδεκα ἔτη, ἧν δ' ἐγώ. γενομένων δὲ πεντηκοντουτῶν τοὺς
διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας πάντα πάντη ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις
πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἀκτέον, καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς
αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν
αὐτὸ, παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας

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καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἐκάστους, τὸ μὲν πολὺ
πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ τὸ μέρος ἦκη, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς
ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐκάστους τῆς πόλεως ἔνεκα, οὐχ ὥς
καλὸν τι ἄλλ' ὥς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας, καὶ οὕτως ἄλλους αἰεὶ
παιδεύσαντας τοιοῦτους, ἀντικαταλιπόντας τῆς πόλεως φύλακας, εἰς
μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντας οἰκεῖν· μνημεῖα δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ θυσίας

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τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία συναναιρῇ, ὥς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ
μῆ, ὥς εὐδαίμοσι τε καὶ θείοις.

παγκάλους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς
ἀπειργασαί.

καὶ τὰς ἀρχούσας γε, ἧν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ Γλαῦκων· μηδὲν γάρ τι οἴου με περὶ
ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκέναι μᾶλλον ἢ εἴρηκα ἢ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὅσαι ἂν αὐτῶν ἱκαναὶ
τὰς φύσεις ἐγγίγνωνται.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, εἴπερ ἴσα γε πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι κοινωνήσουσιν, ὥς διήλθομεν.

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τί οὖν; ἔφη· συγχωρεῖτε περὶ τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ πολιτείας μὴ παντάπασιν
ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ δὲ πῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη ἢ
εἴρηται, ὅταν οἱ ὥς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς, ἐν πόλει
γενόμενοι τῶν μὲν νῦν τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ἡγήσάμενοι ἀνελευθέρους
εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίας, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν περὶ

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πλείστου ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτου τιμάς, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ
ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦντές τε καὶ αὖξοντες
αὐτὸ διασκευωρήσωσιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν;

πῶς; ἔφη.

ὅσοι μὲν ἂν, ἧν δ' ἐγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκετῶν

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ἐν τῇ πόλει, πάντας ἐκπέμψωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς, τοὺς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν
παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς τῶν νῦν ἡθῶν, ἃ καὶ οἱ γονεῖς ἔχουσι, θρέψωνται ἐν
τοῖς σφετέροις τρόποισι καὶ νόμοις, οὔσιν οἷοις διεληλύθαμεν τότε· καὶ οὕτω

τάχιστα τε καὶ ῥᾶστα πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν ἐλέγομεν, καταστᾶσαν
αὐτὴν τε εὐδαιμονήσιν καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται πλεῖστα ὀνήσειν;
πολὺ γ', ἔφη· καὶ ὥς ἂν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο,

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δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ εἰρηκέναι.

οὐκοῦν ἄδην ἤδη, εἶπον ἐγὼ, ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι περὶ τε τῆς πόλεως
ταύτης καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου ταύτῃ ἀνδρός; δῆλος γάρ που καὶ οὗτος οἷον
φήσομεν δεῖν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

δῆλος, ἔφη· καὶ ὅπερ ἐρωτᾷς, δοκεῖ μοι τέλος ἔχειν.

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English translation

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Next, said I, “compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such
an experience as this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern[*]
with a long entrance open[*] to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as
having their legs and necks fettered[*] from childhood, so that they remain in
the same spot,

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able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their
heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance
behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road
along which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of puppet-shows[*]
have partitions before the men themselves, above which they show the
puppets.” “All that I see,” he said. “See also, then, men carrying[*] past the
wall

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implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images

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and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material,
some of these bearers presumably speaking and others silent.”

“A strange image you speak of,” he said, “and strange prisoners.” “Like to
us,” I said; “for, to begin with, tell me do you think that these men would have
seen anything of themselves or of one another except the shadows cast from
the fire on the wall of the cave that fronted them?” “How could they,” he said,
“if they were compelled

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to hold their heads unmoved through life?” “And again, would not the same
be true of the objects carried past them?” Surely. “If then they were able to
talk to one another, do you not think that they would suppose that in naming
the things that they saw[*] they were naming the passing objects?”

Necessarily. “And if their prison had an echo[*] from the wall opposite them,
when one of the passersby uttered a sound, do you think that they would

suppose anything else than the passing shadow to be the speaker?" "By Zeus, I do not," said he. "Then in every way

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such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects." "Quite inevitably," he said. "Consider, then, what would be the manner of the release[*] and healing from these bonds and this folly if in the course of nature[*] something of this sort should happen to them: When one was freed from his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and, because of the dazzle and glitter of the light, was unable to discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw,

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what do you suppose would be his answer if someone told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality and turned toward more real things, he saw more truly? And if also one should point out to him each of the passing objects and constrain him by questions to say what it is, do you not think that he would be at a loss[*] and that he would regard what he formerly saw as more real than the things now pointed out to him?" "Far more real," he said.

"And if he were compelled to look at the light itself,

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would not that pain his eyes, and would he not turn away and flee to those things which he is able to discern and regard them as in very deed more clear and exact than the objects pointed out?" "It is so," he said.

"And if," said I, "someone should drag him thence by force up the ascent[*] which is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not think that he would find it painful to be so haled along, and would chafe at it, and when

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he came out into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its beams so that he would not be able to see[*] even one of the things that we call real?"

"Why, no, not immediately," he said. "Then there would be need of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses or reflections in water[*] of men and other things, and later, the things themselves, and from these he would go on to contemplate the appearances in the heavens and heaven itself, more easily by night, looking at the light

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of the stars and the moon, than by day the sun and the sun's light.[*]" Of course. "And so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting,[*] but in and by itself in its own place." Necessarily, he said. "And at this point he would infer and conclude that this it is that provides the

seasons and the courses of the year and presides over all things in the visible region,

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and is in some sort the cause[*] of all these things that they had seen.”

Obviously, he said, “that would be the next step.” “Well then, if he recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed for wisdom there, and his fellow-bondsmen, do you not think that he would count himself happy in the change and pity them[*]?” “He would indeed.” “And if there had been honors and commendations among them which they bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary precedences,

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sequences and co-existences,[*] and so most successful in guessing at what was to come, do you think he would be very keen about such rewards, and that he would envy and emulate those who were honored by these prisoners and lorded it among them, or that he would feel with Homer[*] and greatly prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a landless man,

Hom. Od. 11.489 and endure anything rather than opine with them

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and live that life?” Yes, he said, “I think that he would choose to endure anything rather than such a life.” “And consider this also,” said I, “if such a one should go down again and take his old place would he not get his eyes full[*] of darkness, thus suddenly coming out of the sunlight?” “He would indeed.”

“Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners

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in evaluating these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time required for habituation would not be very short—would he not provoke laughter,[*] and would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him[*]?” “They certainly would,” he said.

“This image then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said,

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likening the region revealed through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above is the soul’s ascension to the intelligible region,[*] you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But God knows[*] whether it is true. But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good,

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and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth[*] in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely[*] in private or public must have caught sight of this.” “I concur,” he said, “so far as I am able.” “Come then,” I said, “and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who have attained to this height are not willing[*] to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and

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the yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeness of our image holds” “Yes, it is likely.” “And again, do you think it at all strange,” said I, “if a man returning from divine contemplations to the petty miseries[*] of men cuts a sorry figure[*] and appears most ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, and before he has become sufficiently accustomed to the environing darkness, he is compelled in courtrooms[*] or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the images[*] that cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate

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about the notions of these things in the minds of those who have never seen justice itself?” “It would be by no men strange,” he said.

“But a sensible man,”

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I said, “would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light,[*] and, believing that the same thing happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh[*] unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the unfamiliar darkness, or

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whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision.[*] And so[*] he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above.” “That is a very fair statement,” he said.

“Then, if this is true, our view of these matters must be this, that education is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their professions.[*]

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What they aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if they were inserting[*] vision into blind eyes.” “They do indeed,” he said. “But our present argument indicates,” said I, “that the true

analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-shifting periact[*] in the theater, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being.

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And this, we say, is the good,[*] do we not?" Yes. "Of this very thing, then," I said, "there might be an art,[*] an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about." "Yes, that seems likely," he said. "Then the other so-called virtues[*] of the soul do seem akin to those of the body.

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For it is true that where they do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by habit[*] and practice. But the excellence of thought,[*] it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality, a thing that never loses its potency, but, according to the direction of its conversion, becomes useful and beneficent,

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or, again, useless and harmful.

Have you never observed in those who are popularly spoken of as bad, but smart men,[*] how keen is the vision of the little soul,[*] how quick it is to discern the things that interest it,[*] a proof that it is not a poor vision which it has, but one forcibly enlisted in the service of evil, so that the sharper its sight the more mischief it accomplishes?" "I certainly have," he said. "Observe then," said I, "that this part of such a soul, if it had been hammered from childhood, and had thus been struck free[*] of the leaden weights, so to speak, of our birth

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and becoming, which attaching themselves to it by food and similar pleasures and gluttonies turn downwards the vision of the soul[*]—If, I say, freed from these, it had suffered a conversion towards the things that are real and true, that same faculty of the same men would have been most keen in its vision of the higher things, just as it is for the things toward which it is now turned." "It is likely," he said. "Well, then," said I, "is not this also likely[*] and a necessary consequence of what has been said, that neither could men who are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever adequately

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preside over a state, nor could those who had been permitted to linger on to the end in the pursuit of culture—the one because they have no single aim[*] and purpose in life to which all their actions, public and private, must be directed, and the others, because they will not voluntarily engage in action,

believing that while still living they have been transported to the Islands of the Blest.[*]” True, he said. “It is the duty of us, the founders, then,” said I, “to compel the best natures to attain the knowledge which we pronounced the greatest, and to win to the vision of the good,

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to scale that ascent, and when they have reached the heights and taken an adequate view, we must not allow what is now permitted.” “What is that?” “That they should linger there,” I said, “and refuse to go down again[*] among those bondsmen and share their labors and honors, whether they are of less or of greater worth.” “Do you mean to say that we must do them this wrong, and compel them to live an inferior life when the better is in their power?”

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“You have again forgotten,[*] my friend,” said I, “that the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition[*] in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion,[*] and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit[*]

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which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a view to using them for the binding together of the commonwealth.”

True, he said, “I did forget it.” “Observe, then, Glaucon,” said I, “that we shall not be wronging, either, the philosophers who arise among us, but that we can justify our action when we constrain them to take charge of the other citizens and be their guardians.[*]

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For we will say to them that it is natural that men of similar quality who spring up in other cities should not share in the labors there. For they grow up spontaneously[*] from no volition of the government in the several states, and it is justice that the self-grown, indebted to none for its breeding, should not be zealous either to pay to anyone the price of its nurture.[*] But you we have engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city to be, as it were, king-bees[*] and leaders in the hive. You have received a better

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and more complete education[*] than the others, and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go[*] then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there. For once habituated you will discern them infinitely[*] better than the dwellers there, and you will know what each of the idols[*] is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good. So our city will be governed by us and you

with waking minds, and not, as most cities now which are inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream[*] by men who fight one another

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for shadows[*] and wrangle for office as if that were a great good, when the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office[*] must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this.” “By all means,” he said. “Will our alumni, then, disobey us when we tell them this, and will they refuse to share in the labors of state each in his turn while permitted to dwell the most of the time with one another in that purer world[*]?”

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Impossible, he said: “for we shall be imposing just commands on men who are just. Yet they will assuredly approach office as an unavoidable necessity, [*] and in the opposite temper from that of the present rulers in our cities.”

“For the fact is, dear friend,” said I, “if you can discover a better way of life than office-holding

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for your future rulers, a well-governed city becomes a possibility. For only in such a state will those rule who are really rich,[*] not in gold, but in the wealth that makes happiness—a good and wise life. But if, being beggars and starvelings[*] from lack of goods of their own, they turn to affairs of state thinking that it is thence that they should grasp their own good, then it is impossible. For when office and rule become the prizes of contention,[*] such a civil and internecine strife[*] destroys the office-seekers themselves and the city as well.”

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“Most true,” he said. “Can you name any other type or ideal of life that looks with scorn on political office except the life of true philosophers[*]?” I asked.

“No, by Zeus,” he said. “But what we require,” I said, “is that those who take office[*] should not be lovers of rule. Otherwise there will be a contest with rival lovers.” Surely. “What others, then, will you compel to undertake the guardianship of the city than those who have most intelligence of the principles that are the means of good government and who possess distinctions of another kind and a life that is preferable to the political life?”

“No others,” he said.

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“Would you, then, have us proceed to consider how such men may be produced in a state and how they may be led upward[*] to the light even as some[*] are fabled to have ascended from Hades to the gods?” “Of course I would.” “So this, it seems, would not be the whirling of the shell[*] in the children’s game, but a conversion and turning about of the soul from a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day—that ascension[*] to reality of

our parable which we will affirm to be true philosophy.” “By all means.”

“Must we not, then, consider what studies have

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the power to effect this?” Of course. “What, then, Glaucon, would be the study that would draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being? A thought strikes me while I speak[*]: Did we not say that these men in youth must be athletes of war[*]” “We did.” “Then the study for which we are seeking must have this additional[*] qualification.” “What one?” “That it be not useless to soldiers.[*]” “Why, yes, it must,” he said, “if that is possible.”

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“But in our previous account they were educated in gymnastics and music. [*]” “They were, he said. “And gymnastics, I take it, is devoted[*] to that which grows and perishes; for it presides over the growth and decay of the body.[*]” Obviously. “Then this cannot be the study

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that we seek.”

No. “Is it, then, music, so far as we have already described it?[*]” “Nay, that,” he said, “was the counterpart of gymnastics, if you remember. It educated the guardians through habits, imparting by the melody a certain harmony of spirit that is not science,[*] and by the rhythm measure and grace, and also qualities akin to these in the words of tales that are fables and those that are more nearly true. But it included no study that tended to any such good as

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you are now seeking.” “Your recollection is most exact,” I said; “for in fact it had nothing of the kind. But in heaven’s name, Glaucon, what study could there be of that kind? For all the arts were in our opinion base and mechanical. [*]” “Surely; and yet what other study is left apart from music, gymnastics and the arts?” Come, said I, “if we are unable to discover anything outside of these, let us take

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something that applies to all alike.[*]” What? “Why, for example, this common thing that all arts and forms of thought[*] and all sciences employ, and which is among the first things that everybody must learn.” What? he said. “This trifling matter.[*]” I said, “of distinguishing one and two and three. I mean, in sum, number and calculation. Is it not true of them that every art and science must necessarily partake of them?” “Indeed it is,” he said. “The art of war too?” said I. “Most necessarily,” he said.

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“Certainly, then,” said I, “Palamedes[*] in the play is always making Agamemnon appear a most ridiculous[*] general. Have you not noticed that he affirms that by the invention of number he marshalled the troops in the army at Troy in ranks and companies and enumerated the ships and

everything else as if before that they had not been counted, and Agamemnon apparently did not know how many feet he had if he couldn't count? And yet what sort of a General do you think he would be in that case?" "A very queer one in my opinion," he said, "if that was true."

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"Shall we not, then," I said, "set down as a study requisite for a soldier the ability to reckon and number?" "Most certainly, if he is to know anything whatever of the ordering of his troops—or rather if he is to be a man at all. [*]" "Do you observe then," said I, "in this study what I do?" What?

"It seems likely

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that it is one of those studies which we are seeking that naturally conduce to the awakening of thought, but that no one makes the right use[*] of it, though it really does tend to draw the mind to essence and reality." "What do you mean?" he said. "I will try," I said, "to show you at least my opinion. Do you keep watch and observe the things I distinguish in my mind as being or not being conducive to our purpose, and either concur or dissent, in order that here too we may see more clearly[*] whether my surmise is right." "Point them out," he said. "I do point them out," I said, "if you can discern that some reports of our perceptions

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do not provoke thought to reconsideration because the judgement[*] of them by sensation seems adequate,[*] while others always invite the intellect to reflection because the sensation yields nothing that can be trusted.[*]" "You obviously mean distant[*] appearances," he said, "and shadow-painting.[*]" "You have quite missed my meaning,[*]" said I. "What do you mean?" he said. "The experiences that do not provoke thought are those that do not

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at the same time issue in a contradictory perception.[*] Those that do have that effect I set down as provocatives, when the perception no more manifests one thing than its contrary, alike whether its impact[*] comes from nearby or afar. An illustration will make my meaning plain. Here, we say, are three fingers, the little finger, the second and the middle." "Quite so," he said. "Assume that I speak of them as seen near at hand. But this is the point that you are to consider." What? "Each one of them appears to be

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equally a finger,[*] and in this respect it makes no difference whether it is observed as intermediate or at either extreme, whether it is white or black, thick or thin, or of any other quality of this kind. For in none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled to question the reason and to ask what in the world is a finger, since the faculty of sight never signifies to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite of a finger." "Why, no, it does not," he said. Then, said I, "it is to be expected that such a perception will not provoke

or awaken[*]

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reflection and thought.” “It is.” “But now, what about the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision’s view of them adequate, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them is situated[*] outside or in the middle; and similarly of the relation of touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And are not the other senses also defective in their reports of such things?

Or is the operation of each of them as follows?

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In the first place, the sensation that is set over the hard is of necessity related also to the soft,[*] and it reports to the soul that the same thing is both hard and soft to its perception.” “It is so,” he said. Then, said I, “is not this again a case where the soul must be at a loss[*] as to what significance for it the sensation of hardness has, if the sense reports the same thing as also soft? And, similarly, as to what the sensation of light and heavy means by light and heavy, if it reports the heavy as light, and the light as heavy?”

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“Yes, indeed,” he said, “these communications[*] to the soul are strange and invite reconsideration.” “Naturally, then,” said I, “it is in such cases as these that the soul first summons to its aid the calculating reason[*] and tries to consider whether each of the things reported to it is one or two.[*]” Of course. “And if it appears to be two, each of the two is a distinct unit.[*]” Yes. “If, then, each is one and both two, the very meaning[*] of two is that the soul will conceive them as distinct.[*] For if they were not separable,

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it would not have been thinking of two, but of one.” Right. “Sight too saw the great and the small, we say, not separated but confounded.[*] “Is not that so?” Yes. “And for[*] the clarification of this, the intelligence is compelled to contemplate the great and small,[*] not thus confounded but as distinct entities, in the opposite way from sensation.” True. “And is it not in some such experience as this that the question first occurs to us, what in the world, then, is the great and the small?” “By all means.” “And this is the origin of the designation intelligible for the one, and visible for the other.”

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“Just so,” he said.

“This, then, is just what I was trying to explain a little while ago when I said that some things are provocative of thought and some are not, defining as provocative things that impinge upon the senses together with their opposites, while those that do not I said do not tend to awaken reflection.” “Well, now I understand,” he said, “and agree.” “To which class, then, do you think number and the one belong[*]?” “I cannot conceive,” he said. “Well, reason it out from what has already been said. For, if unity is adequately[*] seen by itself

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or apprehended by some other sensation, it would not tend to draw the mind to the apprehension of essence, as we were explaining in the case of the finger.

But if some contradiction is always seen coincidentally with it, so that it no more appears to be one than the opposite, there would forthwith be need of something to judge between them, and it would compel the soul to be at a loss and to inquire, by arousing thought in itself, and to ask,

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whatever then is the one as such, and thus the study of unity will be one of the studies that guide and convert the soul to the contemplation of true being.”

“But surely,” he said, “the visual perception of it[*] does especially involve this. For we see the same thing at once as one and as an indefinite plurality.

[*]” “Then if this is true of the one,” I said, “the same holds of all number, does it not?” Of course. “But, further, reckoning and the science of arithmetic[*] are wholly concerned with number.”

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“They are, indeed.” “And the qualities of number appear to lead to the apprehension of truth.” “Beyond anything,” he said. “Then, as it seems, these would be among the studies that we are seeking. For a soldier must learn them in order to marshal his troops, and a philosopher, because he must rise out of the region of generation and lay hold on essence or he can never become a true reckoner.[*]” “It is so,” he said. “And our guardian is soldier and philosopher in one.” Of course. “It is befitting, then, Glaucon, that this branch of learning should be prescribed by our law and that we should induce those who are to share the highest functions of state

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to enter upon that study of calculation and take hold of it, not as amateurs, but to follow it up until they attain to the contemplation of the nature of number, [*] by pure thought, not for the purpose of buying and selling,[*] as if they were preparing to be merchants or hucksters, but for the uses of war and for facilitating the conversion of the soul itself from the world of generation to essence and truth.” “Excellentlly said,” he replied. “And, further,” I said, “it occurs to me,[*] now that the study of reckoning has been mentioned,

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that there is something fine in it, and that it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided it is pursued for the sake of knowledge[*] and not for huckstering.” “In what respect?” he said. “Why, in respect of the very point of which we were speaking, that it strongly directs the soul upward and compels it to discourse about pure numbers,[*] never acquiescing if anyone proffers to it in the discussion numbers attached to visible and tangible bodies. For you are doubtless aware

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that experts in this study, if anyone attempts to cut up the one in argument, laugh at him and refuse to allow it; but if you mince it up,[*] they multiply, always on guard lest the one should appear to be not one but a multiplicity of parts.[*]" "Most true," he replied.

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"Suppose now, Glaucon, someone were to ask them, My good friends, what numbers[*] are these you are talking about, in which the one is such as you postulate, each unity equal to every other without the slightest difference and admitting no division into parts? What do you think would be their answer?"

"This, I think—that they are speaking of units which can only be conceived by thought, and which it is not possible to deal with in any other way." "You see, then, my friend," said I, "that this branch of study really seems to be

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indispensable for us, since it plainly compels the soul to employ pure thought with a view to truth itself." "It most emphatically does." "Again, have you ever noticed this, that natural reckoners are by nature quick in virtually all their studies? And the slow, if they are trained and drilled in this, even if no other benefit results, all improve and become quicker than they were[*]?" "It is so," he said.

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"And, further, as I believe, studies that demand more toil in the learning and practice than this we shall not discover easily nor find many of them.[*]"

"You will not, in fact." "Then, for all these reasons, we must not neglect this study, but must use it in the education of the best endowed natures." "I agree," he said.

"Assuming this one point to be established," I said, "let us in the second place consider whether the study that comes next[*] is suited to our purpose."

"What is that? Do you mean geometry," he said. "Precisely that," said I. "So much of it," he said,

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"as applies to the conduct of war[*] is obviously suitable. For in dealing with encampments and the occupation of strong places and the bringing of troops into column and line and all the other formations of an army in actual battle and on the march, an officer who had studied geometry would be a very different person from what he would be if he had not." "But still," I said, "for such purposes a slight modicum[*] of geometry and calculation would suffice. What we have to consider is

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whether the greater and more advanced part of it tends to facilitate the apprehension of the idea of good.[*] That tendency, we affirm, is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn its vision round to the region where dwells the most blessed part of reality,[*] which it is imperative that it should behold." "You are right," he said. "Then if it compels the soul to contemplate

essence, it is suitable; if genesis,[*] it is not.” “So we affirm.[*]”

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“This at least,” said I, “will not be disputed by those who have even a slight acquaintance with geometry, that this science is in direct contradiction with the language employed in it by its adepts.[*]” “How so?” he said. “Their language is most ludicrous,[*] though they cannot help it,[*] for they speak as if they were doing something[*] and as if all their words were directed towards action. For all their talk[*] is of squaring and applying[*] and adding and the like,[*] whereas in fact

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the real object of the entire study is pure knowledge.[*]” “That is absolutely true,” he said. “And must we not agree on a further point?” What? “That it is the knowledge of that which always is,[*] and not of a something which at some time comes into being and passes away.” “That is readily admitted,” he said, “for geometry is the knowledge of the eternally existent.” “Then, my good friend, it would tend to draw the soul to truth, and would be productive of a philosophic attitude of mind, directing upward the faculties that now wrongly are turned earthward.” “Nothing is surer,” he said.

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“Then nothing is surer,” said I, “than that we must require that the men of your Fair City[*] shall never neglect geometry, for even the by-products of such study are not slight.” “What are they?” said he. “What you mentioned,” said I, “its uses in war, and also we are aware that for the better reception of all studies[*] there will be an immeasurable[*] difference between the student who has been imbued with geometry and the one who has not.” “Immense indeed, by Zeus,” he said. “Shall we, then, lay this down as a second branch of study for our lads?” “Let us do so,” he said.

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“Shall we set down astronomy as a third, or do you dissent?” “I certainly agree,” he said; “for quickness of perception about the seasons and the courses of the months and the years is serviceable,[*] not only to agriculture and navigation, but still more to the military art.” “I am amused,[*]” said I, “at your apparent fear lest the multitude[*] may suppose you to be recommending useless studies.[*] It is indeed no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified[*] and kindled afresh

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by such studies when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes[*]; for by it only is reality beheld. Those who share this faith will think your words superlatively[*] true. But those who have and have had no inkling of it will naturally think them all moonshine.[*] For they can see no other benefit from such pursuits worth mentioning.

Decide, then, on the spot, to which party you address yourself.

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Or are you speaking to neither, but chiefly carrying on the discussion for your own sake,[*] without however judging any other who may be able to profit by it?" "This is the alternative I choose," he said, "that it is for my own sake chiefly that I speak and ask questions and reply." "Fall back[*] a little, then," said I; "for we just now did not rightly select the study that comes next[*] after geometry." "What was our mistake?" he said. "After plane surfaces," said I, "we went on to solids in revolution before studying them in themselves.

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The right way is next in order after the second dimension[*] to take the third. This, I suppose, is the dimension of cubes and of everything that has depth." "Why, yes, it is," he said; "but this subject, Socrates, does not appear to have been investigated yet.[*]" "There are two causes of that," said I: "first, inasmuch as no city holds them in honor, these inquiries are languidly pursued owing to their difficulty. And secondly, the investigators need a director,[*] who is indispensable for success and who, to begin with, is not easy to find, and then, if he could be found, as things are now, seekers in this field would be too arrogant[*]

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to submit to his guidance. But if the state as a whole should join in superintending these studies and honor them, these specialists would accept advice, and continuous and strenuous investigation would bring out the truth. Since even now, lightly esteemed as they are by the multitude and hampered by the ignorance of their students[*] as to the true reasons for pursuing them, [*] they nevertheless in the face of all these obstacles force their way by their inherent charm[*]

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and it would not surprise us if the truth about them were made apparent." "It is true," he said, "that they do possess an extraordinary attractiveness and charm. But explain more clearly what you were just speaking of. The investigation[*] of plane surfaces, I presume, you took to be geometry?" Yes, said I. "And then," he said, "at first you took astronomy next and then you drew back." Yes, I said, "for in my haste to be done I was making less speed. [*] For, while the next thing in order is the study[*] of the third dimension or solids, I passed it over because of our absurd neglect[*] to investigate it, and mentioned next after geometry astronomy,[*]

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which deals with the movements of solids." "That is right," he said. "Then, as our fourth study," said I, "let us set down astronomy, assuming that this science, the discussion of which has been passed over, is available,[*] provided, that is, that the state pursues it."

“That is likely,” said he; “and instead of the vulgar utilitarian[*] commendation of astronomy, for which you just now rebuked me, Socrates, I now will praise it on your principles.

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For it is obvious to everybody, I think, that this study certainly compels the soul to look upward[*] and leads it away from things here to those higher things.” “It may be obvious to everybody except me,” said I, “for I do not think so.” “What do you think?” he said. “As it is now handled by those who are trying to lead us up to philosophy,[*] I think that it turns the soul’s gaze very much downward.” “What do you mean?” he said. “You seem to me in your thought to put a most liberal[*] interpretation on the study of higher things,”

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I said, “for apparently if anyone with back-thrown head should learn something by staring at decorations on a ceiling, you would regard him as contemplating them with the higher reason and not with the eyes.[*] Perhaps you are right and I am a simpleton. For I, for my part, am unable to suppose that any other study turns the soul’s gaze upward[*] than that which deals with being and the invisible. But if anyone tries to learn about the things of sense, whether gaping up[*] or blinking down,[*] I would never say that he really learns—for nothing of the kind admits of true knowledge—nor would I say that his soul looks up, but down,

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even though he study floating on his back[*] on sea or land.”

“A fair retort,[*]” he said; “your rebuke is deserved. But how, then, did you mean that astronomy ought to be taught contrary to the present fashion if it is to be learned in a way to conduce to our purpose?” Thus, said I, “these sparks that paint the sky,[*] since they are decorations on a visible surface, we must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and

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most exact of material things but we must recognize that they fall far short of the truth,[*] the movements, namely, of real speed and real slowness in true number and in all true figures both in relation to one another and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain. These can be apprehended only by reason and thought, but not by sight; or do you think otherwise?” “By no means,” he said. Then, said I, “we must use the blazonry of the heavens as patterns to aid in the study of those realities, just as

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one would do who chanced upon diagrams drawn with special care and elaboration by Daedalus or some other craftsman or painter.

For anyone acquainted with geometry who saw such designs would admit the beauty of the workmanship, but would think it absurd to examine them seriously in the expectation of finding in them the absolute truth

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with regard to equals or doubles or any other ratio.” “How could it be otherwise than absurd?” he said. “Do you not think,” said I, “that one who was an astronomer in very truth would feel in the same way when he turned his eyes upon the movements of the stars? He will be willing to concede that the artisan[*] of heaven fashioned it and all that it contains in the best possible manner for such a fabric; but when it comes to the proportions of day and night, and of their relation to the month, and that of the month to the year, and

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of the other stars to these and one another, do you not suppose that he will regard as a very strange fellow the man who believes that these things go on for ever without change[*] or the least deviation[*]—though they possess bodies and are visible objects—and that his unremitting quest[*] the realities of these things?” “I at least do think so,” he said, “now that I hear it from you.” “It is by means of problems,[*] then,” said I, “as in the study of geometry, that we will pursue astronomy too, and

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we will let be the things in the heavens,[*] if we are to have a part in the true science of astronomy and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul.” “You enjoin a task,” he said, “that will multiply the labor[*] of our present study of astronomy many times.” “And I fancy,” I said, “that our other injunctions will be of the same kind if we are of any use as lawgivers.

“However, what suitable studies have you to suggest?” Nothing, he said, “thus off-hand.” “Yet, surely,” said I, “motion[*] in general provides not one but many forms or species,

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according to my opinion. To enumerate them all will perhaps be the task of a wise man,[*] but even to us two of them are apparent.” “What are they?” “In addition to astronomy, its counterpart, I replied.” “What is that?” “We may venture to suppose,” I said, “that as the eyes are framed for astronomy so the ears are framed,[*] for the movements of harmony; and these are in some sort kindred sciences,[*] as the Pythagoreans[*] affirm and we admit,[*] do we not, Glaucon?” “We do,” he said.

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Then, said I, since the task is, so great, shall we not inquire of them[*] what their opinion is and whether they have anything to add? And we in all this[*] will be on the watch for what concerns us.” “What is that?” “To prevent our fosterlings from attempting to learn anything that does not conduce to the end[*] we have in view, and does not always come out at what we said ought to be the goal of everything, as we were just now saying about astronomy.

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Or do you not know that they repeat the same procedure in the case of harmonies[*]? They transfer it to hearing and measure audible concords and sounds against one another,[*] expending much useless labor just as the astronomers do.” “Yes, by heaven,” he said, “and most absurdly too. They talk of something they call minims[*] and, laying their ears alongside, as if trying to catch a voice from next door,[*] some affirm that they can hear a note between and that this is the least interval and the unit of measurement, while others insist that the strings now render identical sounds,[*]

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both preferring their ears to their minds.[*]” You, said I, “are speaking of the worthies[*] who vex and torture the strings and rack them[*] on the pegs; but—not to draw out the comparison with strokes of the plectrum and the musician’s complaints of too responsive and too reluctant strings[*]—I drop the figure,[*] and tell you that I do not mean these people, but those others[*] whom we just now said we would interrogate about harmony.

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Their method exactly corresponds to that of the astronomer; for the numbers they seek are those found in these heard concords, but they do not ascend[*] to generalized problems and the consideration which numbers are inherently concordant and which not and why in each case.” “A superhuman task,” he said. “Say, rather, useful,[*] said I, for the investigation of the beautiful and the good,[*] but if otherwise pursued, useless.” “That is likely,” he said. “And what is more,” I said, I take it that if the investigation[*]

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of all these studies goes far enough to bring out their community and kinship[*] with one another, and to infer their affinities, then to busy ourselves with them contributes to our desired end, and the labor taken is not lost; but otherwise it is vain.” “I too so surmise,” said he; “but it is a huge task of which you speak, Socrates.” “Are you talking about the prelude,[*]” I said, “or what? Or do we not know that all this is but the preamble of the law itself, the prelude of the strain that we have to apprehend? For you surely do not suppose that experts in these matters are reasoners

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and dialecticians[*]? “ “No, by Zeus,” he said, “except a very few whom I have met.” “But have you ever supposed,” I said, “that men who could not render and exact an account[*] of opinions in discussion would ever know anything of the things we say must be known?”

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“No is surely the answer to that too.”

“This, then, at last, Glaucon,” I said, “is the very law which dialectics[*] recites, the strain which it executes, of which, though it belongs to the intelligible, we may see an imitation in the progress[*] of the faculty of vision, as we described[*] its endeavor to look at living things themselves and

the stars themselves and finally at the very sun. In like manner, when anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense[*] to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist

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till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our parable, came to the goal of the visible.” “By all means,” he said. “What, then, will you not call this progress of thought dialectic?” Surely. “And the release from bonds,” I said, “and the conversion from the shadows to the images[*] that cast them and to the light and the ascent[*] from the subterranean cavern to the world above, [*] and there the persisting inability[*] to look directly at animals and plants and the light of the sun,

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but the ability to see the phantasms created by God[*] in water and shadows of objects that are real and not merely, as before, the shadows of images cast through a light which, compared with the sun, is as unreal as they—all this procedure of the arts and sciences that we have described indicates their power to lead the best part of the soul up to the contemplation of what is best among realities, as in our parable the clearest organ in the body was turned to the contemplation of what is brightest

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in the corporeal and visible region.” “I accept this,” he said, “as the truth; and yet it appears to me very hard to accept, and again, from another point of view, hard to reject.[*] Nevertheless, since we have not to hear it at this time only, but are to repeat it often hereafter, let us assume that these things are as now has been said, and proceed to the melody itself, and go through with it as we have gone through the prelude. Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of dialectic?

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Into what divisions does it fall? And what are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest on the road and then come to the end of our journeying.”

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“You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further,[*] though on my part there will be no lack of goodwill.[*] And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm.[*] But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm.[*] Is not that so?” Surely. “And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal[*] this, and that only to one experienced[*] in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?” “That, too,” he said, “we may properly affirm.” “This, at any rate,” said I, “no

one will maintain in dispute against us[*]:

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that there is any other way of inquiry[*] that attempts systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said[*] did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it—

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are, as we see, dreaming[*] about being, but the clear waking vision[*] of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account[*] of them. For where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known,[*] what possibility is there that assent[*] in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science?” None, said he.

Then, said I, “is not dialectics the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul[*] is sunk

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in the barbaric slough[*] of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences often from habit,[*] though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. Understanding, [*] I believe, was the term we employed. But I presume we shall not dispute about the name[*]

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when things of such moment lie before us for consideration.” “No, indeed,” he said.[*]...

“Are you satisfied, then,” said I, “as before,[*] to call the first division science,

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the second understanding, the third belief,[*] and the fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellection, opinion dealing with generation and intellection with essence, and this relation being expressed in the proportion[*]: as essence is to generation, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to image-thinking or surmise? But the relation between their objective correlates[*] and the division into two parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the intelligible, let us dismiss,[*] Glaucon, lest it involve us in discussion many times as long as the preceding.”

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Well, he said, "I agree with you about the rest of it, so far as I am able to follow." "And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to exact an account[*] of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that the one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence[*] about the matter?" "How could I say that he does?" he replied. "And is not this true of the good likewise[*]—that the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good,

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and who cannot, as it were in battle, running the gauntlet[*] of all tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping[*] in his reasoning—the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends any adumbration[*] of it, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge; and dreaming and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here

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he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep for ever?[*]" "Yes, by Zeus," said he, "all this I will stoutly affirm." "But, surely," said I, "if you should ever nurture in fact your children[*] whom you are now nurturing and educating in word,[*] you would not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state, and determine the greatest matters, being themselves as irrational[*] as the lines so called in geometry." "Why, no," he said. "Then you will provide by law that they shall give special heed to the discipline that will enable them to ask and answer[*] questions in the most scientific manner?"

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"I will so legislate," he said, "in conjunction with you."

"Do you agree, then," said I, "that we have set dialectics above all other studies to be as it were the coping-stone[*]—and that no other higher kind of study could rightly be placed above it,

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but that our discussion of studies is now complete[*]" "I do," he said.

"The distribution, then, remains," said I, "to whom we are to assign these studies and in what way." Clearly, he said. "Do you remember, then, the kind of man we chose in our former selection[*] of rulers?" "Of course," he said.

"In most respects, then," said I, "you must suppose that we have to choose those same natures. The most stable, the most brave and enterprising[*] are to be preferred, and, so far as practicable, the most comely.[*] But in addition

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we must now require that they not only be virile and vigorous[*] in temper, but that they possess also the gifts of nature suitable to this type of education."

“What qualities are you distinguishing?” “They must have, my friend, to begin with, a certain keenness for study, and must not learn with difficulty. For souls are much more likely to flinch and faint[*] in severe studies than in gymnastics, because the toil touches them more nearly, being peculiar to them and not shared with the body.” True, he said. “And

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we must demand a good memory and doggedness and industry[*] in every sense of the word. Otherwise how do you suppose anyone will consent both to undergo all the toils of the body and to complete so great a course of study and discipline?” “No one could,” he said, “unless most happily endowed.”

“Our present mistake,” said I, “and the disesteem that has in consequence fallen upon philosophy are, as I said before,[*] caused by the unfitness of her associates and wooers. They should not have been bastards[*] but true scions.” “What do you mean?” he said. “In the first place,”

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I said, “the aspirant to philosophy must not limp[*] in his industry, in the one half of him loving, in the other shunning, toil. This happens when anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all the labors of the body, yet is not fond of learning or of listening[*] or inquiring, but in all such matters hates work. And he too is lame whose industry is one-sided in the reverse way.” “Most true,” he said. “Likewise in respect of truth,” I said, “we shall regard as maimed

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in precisely the same way the soul that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood[*] and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively as a pig.[*]”

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“By all means,” he said. “And with reference to sobriety,” said I, “and bravery and loftiness of soul[*] and all the parts of virtue,[*] we must especially be on our guard to distinguish the base-born from the true-born. For when the knowledge necessary to make such discriminations is lacking in individual or state, they unawares employ at random[*] for any of these purposes the crippled and base-born natures, as their friends or rulers.” “It is so indeed,” he said. “But we,” I said, “must be on our guard in all such cases,

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since, if we bring men sound of limb and mind to so great a study and so severe a training, justice herself will have no fault to find[*] with us, and we shall preserve the state and our polity. But, if we introduce into it the other sort, the outcome will be just the opposite, and we shall pour a still greater flood[*] of ridicule upon philosophy.” “That would indeed be shameful,” he said. “Most certainly,” said I: “but here again I am making myself a little ridiculous.” “In what way?”

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"I forgot," said I, "that we were jesting,[*] and I spoke with too great intensity.[*] For, while speaking, I turned my eyes upon philosophy,[*] and when I saw how she is undeservedly reviled, I was revolted, and, as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are in fault." "No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for me[*] as a hearer." "But too much so for me as a speaker," I said. "But this we must not forget, that in our former selection we chose old men, but in this one that will not do. For we must not take Solon's[*] word for it

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that growing old a man is able to learn many things. He is less able to do that than to run a race. To the young[*] belong all heavy and frequent labors." Necessarily, he said.

"Now, all this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies that are indispensable preparation for dialectics must be presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory instruction.[*]" "Why so?" Because, said I,

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"a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly; for while bodily labors[*] performed under constraint do not harm the body, nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind." True, he said.

"Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion

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but by play.[*] That will also better enable you to discern the natural capacities of each." "There is reason in that," he said. "And do you not remember," I said, "that we also declared[*] that we must conduct the children to war on horseback to be spectators, and wherever it may be safe, bring them to the front and give them a taste of blood as we do with whelps?" "I do remember." "And those who as time goes on show the most facility in all these toils and studies and alarms are to be selected and enrolled on a list. [*]"

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"At what age?" he said. "When they are released from their prescribed gymnastics. For that period, whether it be two or three years, incapacitates them for other occupations.[*] For great fatigue and much sleep are the foes of study, and moreover one of our tests of them, and not the least, will be their behavior in their physical exercises.[*]" "Surely it is," he said. "After this period," I said, "those who are given preference from the twenty-year class will receive greater honors than the others,

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and they will be required to gather the studies which they disconnectedly pursued as children in their former education into a comprehensive survey[*] of their affinities with one another and with the nature of things." "That, at any

rate, he said, is the only instruction that abides with those who receive it.”
“And it is also,” said I, “the chief test of the dialectical nature and its opposite. For he who can view things in their connection is a dialectician; he who cannot, is not.” “I concur,” he said. “With these qualities in mind,” I said,
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“it will be your task to make a selection of those who manifest them best from the group who are steadfast in their studies and in war and in all lawful requirements, and when they have passed the thirtieth year to promote them, by a second selection from those preferred in the first,[*] to still greater honors, and to prove and test them by the power of dialectic[*] to see which of them is able to disregard the eyes and other senses[*] and go on to being itself in company with truth. And at this point, my friend, the greatest care[*] is requisite.” “How so?” he said. “Do you not note,”

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said I, “how great is the harm caused by our present treatment of dialectics?” “What is that?” he said. “Its practitioners are infected with lawlessness.[*]” “They are indeed.” “Do you suppose,” I said, “that there is anything surprising in this state of mind, and do you not think it pardonable[*]?” “In what way, pray?” he said.

“Their case,” said I, “resembles that of a supposititious son reared in abundant wealth and a great and numerous family

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amid many flatterers, who on arriving at manhood should become aware that he is not the child of those who call themselves his parents, and should I not be able to find his true father and mother. Can you divine what would be his feelings towards the flatterers and his supposed parents in the time when he did not know the truth about his adoption, and, again, when he knew it? Or would you like to hear my surmise?” “I would.”

“Well, then, my surmise is,” I said, “that he would be more likely to honor

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his reputed father and mother and other kin than the flatterers, and that there would be less likelihood of his allowing them to lack for anything, and that he would be less inclined to do or say to them anything unlawful, and less liable to disobey them in great matters than to disobey the flatterers—during the time when he did not know the truth.” “It is probable,” he said. “But when he found out the truth, I surmise that he would grow more remiss in honor and devotion to them and pay more regard to the flatterers, whom he would heed

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more than before[*] and would henceforth live by their rule, associating with them openly, while for that former father and his adoptive kin he would not care at all, unless he was naturally of a very good disposition.” “All that you say,” he replied, “would be likely to happen.[*] But what is the pertinency of this comparison to the novices of dialectic[*]?” “It is this. We have, I take it,

certain convictions[*] from childhood about the just and the honorable, in which, in obedience and honor to them, we have been bred as children under their parents.”

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“Yes, we have.” “And are there not other practices going counter to these, that have pleasures attached to them and that flatter and solicit our souls, but do not win over men of any decency; but they continue to hold in honor the teachings of their fathers and obey them?” “It is so” “Well, then,” said I, “when a man of this kind is met by the question,[*] What is the honorable? and on his giving the answer which he learned from the lawgiver, the argument confutes him, and by many and various refutations upsets[*] his faith

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and makes him believe that this thing is no more honorable than it is base,[*] and when he has had the same experience about the just and the good and everything that he chiefly held in esteem, how do you suppose that he will conduct himself thereafter in the matter of respect and obedience to this traditional morality?” “It is inevitable,” he said, “that he will not continue to honor and obey as before.”

“And then,” said I, “when he ceases to honor these principles and to think that they are binding on him,[*] and cannot discover the true principles,

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will he be likely to adopt any other way of life than that which flatters his desires[*]?” “He will not,” he said. “He will, then, seem to have become a rebel to law and convention instead of the conformer that he was.”

Necessarily. “And is not this experience of those who take up dialectics in this fashion to be expected and, as I just now said, deserving of much leniency?”

“Yes, and of pity too,” he said. “Then that we may not have to pity thus your thirty-year-old disciples, must you not take every precaution when you introduce them to the study of dialectics?” “Yes, indeed,” he said. “And is it not

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one chief safeguard not to suffer them to taste of it while young?[*] For I fancy you have not failed to observe that lads, when they first get a taste of disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always employing it contentiously, and, imitating confuters, they themselves confute others.[*] They delight like spies in pulling about and tearing with words all who approach them.”

“Exceedingly so,” he said. “And when they have themselves confuted many and been confuted by many,

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they quickly fall into a violent distrust of all that they formerly held true; and the outcome is that they themselves and the whole business of philosophy are discredited with other men.” “Most true,” he said. “But an older man will not

share this craze,[*]" said I, "but rather choose to imitate the one who consents to examine truth dialectically than the one who makes a jest[*] and a sport of mere contradiction,

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and so he will himself be more reasonable and moderate, and bring credit rather than discredit upon his pursuit." Right, he said. "And were not all our preceding statements made with a view to this precaution our requirement that those permitted to take part in such discussions must have orderly and stable natures, instead of the present practice[*] of admitting to it any chance and unsuitable applicant?" "By all means," he said.

"Is it enough, then, to devote to the continuous and strenuous study of dialectics undisturbed by anything else, as in the corresponding discipline in bodily exercises,

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twice as many years as were allotted to that?" "Do you mean six or four?" he said.

Well, I said, "set it down as five.[*] For after that you will have to send them down into the cave[*] again, and compel them to hold commands in war and the other offices suitable to youth, so that they may not fall short of the other type in experience[*] either. And in these offices, too, they are to be tested to see whether they will remain steadfast under diverse solicitations

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or whether they will flinch and swerve.[*]" "How much time do you allow for that?" he said. "Fifteen years," said I, "and at the age of fifty[*] those who have survived the tests and approved themselves altogether the best in every task and form of knowledge must be brought at last to the goal. We shall require them to turn upwards the vision of their souls[*] and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld the good itself they shall use it as a pattern[*] for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves

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throughout the remainder of their lives, each in his turn,[*] devoting the greater part of their time to the study of philosophy, but when the turn comes for each, toiling in the service of the state and holding office for the city's sake, regarding the task not as a fine thing but a necessity[*]; and so, when each generation has educated others[*] like themselves to take their place as guardians of the state, they shall depart to the Islands of the Blest[*] and there dwell. And the state shall establish public memorials[*]

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and sacrifices for them as to divinities if the Pythian oracle approves[*] or, if not, as to divine and godlike men.[*]" "A most beautiful finish, Socrates, you have put upon your rulers, as if you were a statuary.[*]" "And on the women[*] too, Glaucon," said I; "for you must not suppose that my words

apply to the men more than to all women who arise among them endowed with the requisite qualities.” “That is right,” he said, “if they are to share equally in all things with the men as we laid it down.”

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“Well, then,” said I, “do you admit that our notion of the state and its polity is not altogether a daydream,[*] but that though it is difficult,[*] it is in a way possible[*] and in no other way than that described—when genuine philosophers,[*] many or one, becoming masters of the state scorn[*] the present honors, regarding them as illiberal and worthless, but prize the right[*]

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and the honors that come from that above all things, and regarding justice as the chief and the one indispensable thing, in the service and maintenance of that reorganize and administer their city?” “In what way?” he said.

“All inhabitants above the age of ten,” I said,

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“they will send out into the fields, and they will take over the children,[*] remove them from the manners and habits of their parents, and bring them up in their own customs and laws which will be such as we have described. This is the speediest and easiest way in which such a city and constitution as we have portrayed could be established and prosper and bring most benefit to the people

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among whom it arises.” “Much the easiest,” he said, “and I think you have well explained the manner of its realization if it should ever be realized.”

Then, said I, “have we not now said enough[*] about this state and the corresponding type of man—for it is evident what our conception of him will be?” “It is evident,” he said, “and, to answer your question, I think we have finished.”

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εἶλεν· ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὠμολόγηται, ὦ Γλαύκων, τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει κοινὰς μὲν γυναικάς, κοινοὺς δὲ παῖδας εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν παιδείαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα κοινὰ ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ εἰρήνῃ, βασιλέας δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον γεγονότας ἀρίστους.

ὠμολόγηται, ἔφη.

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καὶ μὴν καὶ τάδε συνεχωρήσαμεν, ὥς, ὅταν δὴ καταστῶσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, ἄγοντες τοὺς στρατιώτας κατοικιοῦσιν εἰς οἰκῆσεις οἷας προείπομεν, ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐχούσας, κοινὰς δὲ πᾶσι· πρὸς δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις οἰκῆσεσι, καὶ τὰς κτήσεις, εἰ μνημονεύεις, διωμολογησάμεθ' ἃς οἶα ἔσονται αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μνημονεύω, ἔφη, ὅτι γε οὐδὲν οὐδένα ὠόμεθα δεῖν κεκτῆσθαι ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀθλητάς τε πολέμου

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καὶ φύλακας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς δεχομένους εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν τὴν εἰς ταῦτα τροφήν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτῶν τε δεῖν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφην, λέγεις. ἀλλ' ἄγ', ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ' ἀπετελέσαμεν, ἀναμνησθῶμεν πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἴωμεν.

οὐ χαλεπὸν, ἔφη. σχεδὸν γάρ, καθάπερ νῦν, ὥς διεληλυθὼς περὶ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς λόγους ἐποιοῦ, λέγων ὥς ἀγαθὴν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην, οἷαν τότε διήλθες, τιθείης πόλιν,

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καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν ἐκείνῃ ὅμοιον, καὶ ταῦτα, ὥς ἔοικας, καλλίω

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ἔτι ἔχων εἰπεῖν πόλιν τε καὶ ἄνδρα.

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔτι δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημένας ἔλεγες, εἰ αὕτη ὀρθή. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν ἔφησθα, ὥς μνημονεύω, τέτταρα εἶδη εἶναι, ὧν καὶ περὶ λόγον ἄξιον εἶη ἔχειν καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τοὺς ἐκείναις αὐτοῖς ὁμοίους, ἵνα πάντας αὐτοὺς ἰδόντες, καὶ ὁμολογησάμενοι τὸν ἄριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα, ἐπισκεψαίμεθα εἰ ὁ ἄριστος εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ὁ κάκιστος ἀθλιώτατος, ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοι· καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου τίνας λέγοις

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τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας, ἐν τούτῳ ὑπέλαβε Πολέμαρχος τε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ σὺ ἀναλαβὼν τὸν λόγον δεῦρ' ἀφῆξαι.

ὀρθότατα, εἶπον, ἐμνημόνευσας.

πάλιν τοίνυν, ὥσπερ παλαιστής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν ἀρέχε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἅπερ τότε ἔμελλες λέγειν.

ἐάνπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύνωμαι.

καὶ μὴν, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἐπιθυμῶ γε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαι τίνας ἔλεγες τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας.

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οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀκούσῃ. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἃς λέγω, αἵπερ καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχουσιν, ἥ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινουμένη, ἡ Κρητικὴ τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ αὕτη· καὶ δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη, καλουμένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία, συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία· ἡ τε ταύτῃ διάφορος καὶ ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη δημοκρατία, καὶ ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα, τέταρτόν τε καὶ ἔσχατον πόλεως νόσημα. ἡ τινὰ ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἥ τις καὶ ἐν εἶδει διαφανεῖ

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τινὶ κεῖται; δυναστεῖαι γὰρ καὶ ὠνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι καὶ τοιαῦται τινες πολιτεῖαι μεταξὺ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὖροι δ' ἂν τις αὐτὰς οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

πολλαὶ γοῦν καὶ ἄτοποι, ἔφη, λέγονται.

οἷσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν; ἢ οἷε ἐκ δρυὸς ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ'

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οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τᾶλλα ἐφελκύσῃται;

οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐντεῦθεν.

οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πέντε, καὶ αἱ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε ἂν εἶεν.

τί μὴν;

τὸν μὲν δὴ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ὅμοιον διεληλύθαμεν ἤδη, ὃν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ δίκαιον ὀρθῶς φάμεν εἶναι.

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διεληλύθαμεν.

ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διιτέον τοὺς χεῖρους, τὸν φιλόνικόν τε καὶ φιλότιμον, κατὰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐστῶτα πολιτείαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὖ καὶ δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν τυραννικόν, ἵνα τὸν ἀδικώτατον ἰδόντες ἀντιθῶμεν τῷ δικαιωτάτῳ καὶ ἡμῖν τελέα ἢ σκέψις ἦ, πῶς ποτε ἡ ἄκρατος δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν τὴν ἄκρατον ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας τε περὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἀθλιότητος, ἵνα ἡ Θρασυμάχῳ πειθόμενοι

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διώκωμεν ἀδικίαν ἢ τῷ νῦν προφανομένῳ λόγῳ δικαιοσύνην;

παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιητέον.

ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ ἡρξάμεθα ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις πρότερον σκοπεῖν τὰ ἥθη ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἰδιώταις, ὥς ἐναργέστερον ὂν, καὶ νῦν οὕτω πρῶτον μὲν τὴν φιλότιμον σκεπτέον πολιτείαν — ὄνομα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον ἄλλο· ἢ τιμοκρατίαν ἢ τιμαρχίαν αὐτὴν κλητέον — πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὸν τοιοῦτον

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ἄνδρα σκεψόμεθα, ἔπειτα ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἄνδρα ὀλιγαρχικόν, αὐθις δὲ εἰς δημοκρατίαν ἀποβλέψαντες θεασόμεθα ἄνδρα δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τέταρτον εἰς τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἔλθόντες καὶ ἰδόντες, πάλιν εἰς τυραννικὴν ψυχὴν βλέποντες, πειρασόμεθα περὶ ὧν προουθέμεθα ἱκανοὶ κριταὶ γενέσθαι; κατὰ λόγον γέ τοι ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεται ἢ τε θεὰ καὶ ἡ κρίσις. φέρε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πειρώμεθα λέγειν τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας. ἡ τόδε μὲν ἀπλοῦν,

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ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται· ὁμονοοῦντος δέ, κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον ᾖ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι;

ἔστι γὰρ οὕτω.

πῶς οὖν δῆ, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται, καὶ πῇ στασιάζουσιν οἱ ἐπικουροὶ καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτούς; ἡ βούλει, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, εὐχόμεθα ταῖς Μοῦσαις εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν ὅπως δῆ

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πρῶτον

στάσις

ἔμπεσε

Hom. Il. 1.6, καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἔρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δῆ σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν; πῶς;

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ὥδε πως. χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω συστᾶσαν· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ γενομένην παντὶ φθορά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται. λύσις δὲ ἤδε· οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιγείοις ζώοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίνονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἐκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς συνάπτωσι, βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας. γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ ὄντες σοφοί,

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οὕς ἡγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμῷ μετ' αἰσθήσεως τεύξονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτούς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδας ποτε οὐ δέον. ἔστι δὲ θεῖω μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος ἦν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἀνθρωπεῖω δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι ὁμοιοῦντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα προσήγορα

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καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν· ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρεῖς αὐξηθεῖς, τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις, τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ

διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων ἐνὸς ἐκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν,
ἐκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος. σύμπας δὲ οὗτος ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός, τοιοῦτου
κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων,

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ἂς ὅταν ἀγνοήσαντες ὑμῖν οἱ φύλακες συνοικίζωσιν νύμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ
καιρόν, οὐκ εὐφρεῖς οὐδ' εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται· ὧν καταστήσουσι μὲν
τοὺς ἀρίστους οἱ πρότεροι, ὅμως δὲ ὄντες ἀνάξιοι, εἰς τὰς τῶν πατέρων αὐ
δυνάμεις ἐλθόντες, ἡμῶν πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν φύλακες ὄντες, παρ'
ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἡγησάμενοι τὰ μουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς,
ὅθεν ἀμουςότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν οἱ νέοι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἄρχοντες οὐ πάνυ
φυλακικοὶ

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καταστήσονται πρὸς τὸ δοκιμάζειν τὰ Ἡσιόδου τε καὶ τὰ παρ'

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ὑμῖν γένη, χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ σιδηροῦν·
ὁμοῦ δὲ μιγέντος σιδηροῦ ἀργυρῷ καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσοῦ ἀνομοιότης
ἐγγενήσεται καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος, ἃ γενόμενα, οὗ ἂν ἐγγένηται, ἀεὶ
τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν.

ταύτης τοι γενεῆς

Hom. Il. 6.211 χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσιν, ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται ἀεὶ.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, αὐτὰς ἀποκρίνεσθαι φήσομεν.

καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη μούσας γε οὔσας.

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τί οὔν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν αἱ Μοῦσαι;
στάσεως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γενομένης εἰλκέτην ἄρα ἐκατέρω τῷ γένει, τὸ μὲν
σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτῆσιν καὶ οἰκίας χρυσοῦ
τε καὶ ἀργύρου, τῷ δ' αὖ, τὸ χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν, ἅτε οὐ πενομένω
ἀλλὰ φύσει ὄντε πλουσίω, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν
κατάστασιν ἡγέτην· βιαζομένων δὲ καὶ ἀντιτεινόντων ἀλλήλοις, εἰς μέσον
ὠμολόγησαν γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας κατανειμαμένους

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ἰδιώσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέρους φίλους
τε καὶ τροφέας, δουλωσάμενοι τότε περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες, αὐτοὶ
πολέμου τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, αὕτη ἢ μετάβασις ἐντεῦθεν γίγνεσθαι.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν μέσῳ τις ἂν εἴη ἀριστοκρατίας τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας
αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

μεταβήσεται μὲν δὴ οὕτω· μεταβᾶσα δὲ πῶς οἰκήσει; ἦ

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φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ μὲν μιμήσεται τὴν προτέραν πολιτείαν, τὰ δὲ τὴν
ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἅτ' ἐν μέσῳ οὔσα, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ αὐτῆς ἔξει ἴδιον;
οὕτως, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ γεωργιῶν ἀπέχεσθαι τὸ
προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ χειροτεχνιῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου χρηματισμοῦ, συσσίτια
δὲ κατεσκευάσθαι καὶ γυμναστικῆς τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται;
ναί.

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τῷ δέ γε φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγειν, ἅτε οὐκέτι
κεκτημένην ἀπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μεικτούς,
ἐπὶ δὲ θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ ἀπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πόλεμον
μᾶλλον πεφυκότας ἢ πρὸς

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εἰρήνην, καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δόλους τε καὶ μηχανὰς ἐντίμως ἔχειν, καὶ
πολεμοῦσα τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διάγειν, αὕτη ἑαυτῆς αὖ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων
ἴδια ἔξει;

ναί.

ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρημάτων οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς
ὀλιγαρχίαις, καὶ τιμῶντες ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον, ἅτε
κεκτημένοι ταμιεῖα καὶ οἰκείους θησαυρούς, οἳ θέμενοι ἂν αὐτὰ κρύψειαν,
καὶ αὖ περιβόλους οἰκήσεων, ἀτεχνῶς νεοττιὰς ἰδίας, ἐν αἷς

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ἀναλίσκοντες γυναῖξί τε καὶ οἷς ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοις πολλὰ ἂν δαπανῶντο.
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ φειδωλοὶ χρημάτων, ἅτε τιμῶντες καὶ οὐ φανερώς κτώμενοι,
φιλαναλωταὶ δὲ ἄλλοτρίων δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ λάθρα τὰς ἡδονὰς
καρποῦμενοι, ὥσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, οὐχ ὑπὸ
πειθοῦς ἀλλ' ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ
λόγων

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τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἡμεληκέναι καὶ πρεσβυτέρως γυμναστικὴν μουσικῆς
τετιμηκέναι.

παντάπασιν, ἔφη, λέγεις μεμειγμένην πολιτείαν ἐκ κακοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ.
μέμεικται γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· διαφανέστατον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἐν τι μόνον ὑπὸ
τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατοῦντος, φιλονικία καὶ φιλοτιμία.

σφόδρα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὕτω γεγενηῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἂν τις
εἴη, ὥς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα

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μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς
τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἀμήχανον δὲ μήκει ἔργον εἶναι
πάσας μὲν πολιτείας, πάντα δὲ ἦθῃ μηδὲν παραλιπόντα διελθεῖν.

καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

τίς οὖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν ἀνὴρ; πῶς τε γενόμενος ποῖός τέ τις ὢν;
οἶμαι μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδεΐμαντος, ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαῦκωνος τουτουὶ τείνειν

ἔνεκά γε φιλονικίας.

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ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε· ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ τάδε οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον πεφυκέναι.
τὰ ποῖα;

αὐθαδέστερόν τε δεῖ αὐτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑποαμουσότερον,
φιλόμουσον δέ, καὶ φιλήκοον μέν, ῥητορικὸν δ'

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οὐδαμῶς. καὶ δούλοις μέν τις ἂν ἄγριος εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος, οὐ καταφρονῶν
δούλων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένος, ἐλευθέροις δέ ἡμερος, ἀρχόντων
δὲ σφόδρα ὑπῆκοος, φίλαρχος δὲ καὶ φιλότιμος, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἀξιῶν
ἄρχειν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοιούτου οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἔργων τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ
τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, φιλογυμναστής τέ τις ὢν καὶ φιλόθηρος.

ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο τὸ ἦθος ἐκείνης τῆς πολιτείας.

οὐκοῦν καὶ χρημάτων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τοιοῦτος νέος μέν ὢν

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καταφρονοῖ ἄν, ὅσῳ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γίγνοιτο, μᾶλλον αἰεὶ ἀσπάζοιτο ἂν τῷ
τε μετέχειν τῆς τοῦ φιλοχρημάτων φύσεως καὶ μὴ εἶναι εἰλικρινῆς πρὸς
ἀρετὴν διὰ τὸ ἀπολειφθῆναι τοῦ ἀρίστου φύλακος;

τίνας; ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Ἀδεϊμαντος.

λόγου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μουσικῇ κεκραμένου· ὅς μόνος ἐγγενόμενος σωτὴρ ἀρετῆς
διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι.

καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

καὶ ἔστι μέν γ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιοῦτος ὁ τιμοκρατικὸς νεανίας, τῇ τοιαύτῃ
πόλει ἐοικώς.

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πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

γίγνεται δέ γ', εἶπον, οὗτος ὧδέ πως· ἐνίστε πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὢν νέος ὕδὲ ἐν
πόλει οἰκοῦντος οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένη, φεύγοντος τάς τε τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ
δίκας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πᾶσαν φιλοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐθέλοντος ἐλαττοῦσθαι
ὥστε πράγματα μὴ ἔχειν—

πῇ δὴ, ἔφη, γίγνεται;

ὅταν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούῃ ἀχθομένης ὅτι οὐ τῶν
ἀρχόντων αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐλαττουμένης διὰ

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ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναιξίν, ἔπειτα ὀρώσης μὴ σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα
σπουδάζοντα μηδὲ μαχόμενον καὶ λοιδορούμενον ἰδίᾳ τε ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ
δημοσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ῥαθύμως πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα φέροντα, καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν τὸν
νοῦν προσέχοντα αἰεὶ αἰσθάνηται, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μήτε πάνυ τιμῶντα μήτε
ἀτιμάζοντα, ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων ἀχθομένης τε καὶ λεγούσης ὥς ἀνανδρὸς τε
αὐτῷ ὁ πατήρ καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ

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οἷα φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμεῖν.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη ὁ Ἀδεϊμαντος, πολλὰ τε καὶ ὅμοια ἑαυταῖς.

οἶσθα οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ οἱ οἰκέται τῶν τοιούτων ἐνίοτε λάθρα πρὸς τοὺς ὑεῖς τοιαῦτα λέγουσιν, οἱ δοκοῦντες εὖνοι εἶναι, καὶ ἐάν τινα ἴδωσιν ἢ ὀφείλοντα χρήματα, ᾧ μὴ ἐπεξέρχεται ὁ πατήρ, ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀδικοῦντα, διακελεύονται ὅπως, ἐπειδὴν ἀνὴρ γένηται, τιμωρήσεται πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους

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καὶ ἀνὴρ μᾶλλον ἔσται τοῦ πατρὸς. καὶ ἐξιῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούει καὶ ὄρᾳ, τοὺς μὲν τὰ αὐτῶν πράττοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡλιθίους τε καλουμένους καὶ ἐν σμικρῷ λόγῳ ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ μὴ τὰ αὐτῶν τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐπαινουμένους. τότε δὴ ὁ νέος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκούων τε καὶ ὄρων, καὶ αὖ τοὺς τοῦ πατρὸς λόγους ἀκούων τε καὶ ὄρων τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἐγγύθεν παρὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐλκόμενος ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων

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τούτων, τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄρδοντός τε καὶ αὖξοντος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸ τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ὁμιλίαις δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων κακαῖς κεχρησθαι, εἰς τὸ μέσον ἐλκόμενος ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἦλθε, καὶ τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν παρέδωκε τῷ μέσῳ τε καὶ φιλονικῶ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ, καὶ ἐγένετο ὑψηλόφρων τε καὶ φιλότιμος ἀνὴρ.

κομιδῇ μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς τὴν τούτου γένεσιν διεληλυθέναι.

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ἔχομεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν τε δευτέραν πολιτείαν καὶ τὸν δευτέρον ἄνδρα. ἔχομεν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου, λέγωμεν,

ἄλλον ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον

Aesch. Seven 451, μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν προτέραν τὴν πόλιν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

εἶτι δέ γ' ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ὀλιγαρχία ἢ μετὰ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν.

λέγεις δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν;

τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτείαν, ἐν ἣ οἱ μὲν

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πλούσιοι ἄρχουσιν, πένητι δὲ οὐ μέτεσιν ἀρχῆς.

μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐκοῦν ὡς μεταβαίνει πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς τιμαρχίας εἰς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ῥητέον; ναί.

καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τυφλῷ γε δῆλον ὡς μεταβαίνει.

πῶς;

τὸ ταμιεῖον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο ἐκάστῳ χρυσοῦσι πληρούμενον ἀπόλλυσι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δαπάνας αὐτοῖς ἐξευρίσκουσιν, καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐπὶ τοῦτο παράγουσιν, ἀπειθοῦντες αὐτοὶ τε καὶ γυναῖκες αὐτῶν.

εἰκός, ἔφη.

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ἐπειτά γε οἶμαι ἄλλος ἄλλον ὁρῶν καὶ εἰς ζῆλον ἰὼν τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν ἀπηργάσαντο.

εἰκός.

τοῦντεῦθεν τοίνυν, εἶπον, προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ὅσω ἂν τοῦτο τιμώτερον ἡγῶνται, τοσοῦτῳ ἀρετὴν ἀτιμότεραν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέσθηκεν, ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου ἑκατέρου, αἰεὶ τοῦναντίον ῥέποντε;

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

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τιμωμένου δὴ πλούτου ἐν πόλει καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἀτιμότερα ἀρετὴ τε καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί.

δῆλον.

ἀσκεῖται δὴ τὸ αἰεὶ τιμώμενον, ἀμελεῖται δὲ τὸ ἀτιμαζόμενον.

οὕτω.

ἀντὶ δὴ φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτίμων ἀνδρῶν φιλοχρηματισταὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι τελευτῶντες ἐγένοντο, καὶ τὸν μὲν πλούσιον ἐπαινοῦσιν τε καὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγουσι, τὸν δὲ πένητα ἀτιμάζουσι.

πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν τότε δὴ νόμον τίθενται ὅρον πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς

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ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων, οὗ μὲν μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχία, πλεόν, οὗ δ' ἥττον, ἔλαττον, προειπόντες ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχειν ὧ ἂν μὴ ἦ οὐσία εἰς τὸ ταχθὲν τίμημα, ταῦτα δὲ ἢ βίᾳ μεθ' ὅπλων διαπράττονται, ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου φοβήσαντες κατεστήσαντο τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτω μὲν οὔν.

ἢ μὲν δὴ κατάστασις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν αὕτη.

ναί, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ ὁ τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας; καὶ ποῖα

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ἐστὶν ἃ ἔφαμεν αὐτὴν ἀμαρτήματα ἔχειν;

πρῶτον μὲν, ἔφην, τοῦτο αὐτό, ὅρος αὐτῆς οἷός ἐστιν. ἄθρει γάρ, εἰ νεῶν οὕτω τις ποιοῖτο κυβερνήτας, ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τῷ δὲ πένητι, εἰ καὶ κυβερνητικώτερος εἴη, μὴ ἐπιτρέποι—

πονηράν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτίλλεσθαι.

οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ ἄλλου οὕτως ὁπουοῦν ἢ τινος ἀρχῆς;

οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

πλὴν πόλεως; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἢ καὶ πόλεως πέρι;

πολύ γ', ἔφη, μάλιστα, ὅσω χαλεπωτάτη καὶ μεγίστη ἡ ἀρχή.

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ἐν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον ὀλιγαρχία ἂν ἔχοι ἀμάρτημα.

φαίνεται.

τί δέ; τόδε ἄρα τι τούτου ἔλαττον;

τὸ ποῖον;

τὸ μὴ μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν, τὴν μὲν πενήτων,

τῇν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἰεὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἀλλήλοις.
οὐδὲν μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ἔλαττον.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν, τὸ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι ἴσως πόλεμόν τινα πολεμεῖν
διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἢ χρωμένους

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τῷ πλήθει ὠπλισμένῳ δεδιέναι μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἢ μὴ χρωμένους
ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς φανῆναι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα χρήματα
μὴ ἐθέλειν εἰσφέρειν, ἅτε φιλοχρημάτων.

οὐ καλόν.

τί δέ; ὁ πάλαι ἐλοιδοροῦμεν, τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν γεωργοῦντας

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καὶ χρηματιζομένους καὶ πολεμοῦντας ἅμα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ
πολιτείᾳ, ἣ δοκεῖ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν;
οὐδ' ὅπωςιοῦν.

ὄρα δὴ, τούτων πάντων τῶν κακῶν εἰ τόδε μέγιστον αὕτη πρώτη
παραδέχεται.

τὸ ποῖον;

τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι, καὶ ἄλλῳ κτήσασθαι τὰ τοῦτου, καὶ
ἀποδόμενον οἰκεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν τῆς πόλεως μερῶν, μήτε
χρηματιστὴν μήτε δημιουργὸν μήτε ἱππέα μήτε ὀπλίτην, ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ
ἄπορον κεκλημένον.

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πρώτη, ἔφη.

οὐκουν διακωλύεται γε ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις τὸ τοιοῦτον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ
μὲν ὑπὲρπλουτοὶ ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ παντάπασιν πένητες.

ὀρθῶς.

τόδε δὲ ἄθρει· ἄρα ὅτε πλούσιος ὢν ἀνήλπισκεν ὁ τοιοῦτος, μᾶλλον τι τότε
ἦν ὄφελος τῇ πόλει εἰς ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν; ἢ ἐδόκει μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναι,
τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ οὐτε ἀρχων οὐτε ὑπηρέτης ἦν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐτοιμῶν
ἀναλωτῆς;

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οὕτως, ἔφη· ἐδόκει, ἦν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀναλωτῆς.

βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶμεν αὐτόν, ὡς ἐν κηρίῳ κηφὴν ἐγγίγνεται,
σμήνους νόσημα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν οἰκίᾳ κηφὴνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι,
νόσημα πόλεως;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

οὐκοῦν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, τοὺς μὲν πτηνοὺς κηφῆνας πάντας ἀκέντρους ὁ θεὸς
πεποίηκεν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους ἐνίους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀκέντρους, ἐνίους δὲ
δεινὰ κέντρα ἔχοντας; καὶ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀκέντρων πτωχοὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας
τελευτῶσιν, ἐκ δὲ

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τῶν κεκεντρωμένων πάντες ὅσοι κέκληνται κακοῦργοι;

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

δῆλον ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν πόλει οὗ ἂν ἴδης πτωχοὺς, ὅτι εἰσὶ που ἐν τούτῳ
τῷ τόπῳ ἀποκεκρυμμένοι κλέπται τε καὶ βαλλαντιατοῖμοι καὶ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ
πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημιουργοί.

δῆλον, ἔφη.

τί οὖν; ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις πόλεσι πτωχοὺς οὐχ ὀρᾷς ἐνόντας;
ὀλίγου γ', ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῶν ἀρχόντων.

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μὴ οὖν οἰόμεθα, ἔφη ἐγώ, καὶ κακούργους πολλοὺς ἐν αὐταῖς εἶναι κέντρα
ἔχοντας, οὓς ἐπιμελεία βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί;

οἰόμεθα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακὴν τροφήν καὶ κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας
φήσομεν τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτόθι ἐγγίγνεσθαι;

φήσομεν.

ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ τοιαύτη γέ τις ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀλιγαρχουμένη πόλις καὶ τοσαῦτα κακὰ
ἔχουσα, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω.

σχεδὸν τι, ἔφη.

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ἀπειργάσθω δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ αὕτη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ πολιτεία, ἣν ὀλιγαρχίαν
καλοῦσιν, ἐκ τιμημάτων ἔχουσα τοὺς ἀρχοντας· τὸν δὲ ταύτη ὅμοιον μετὰ
ταῦτα σκοπῶμεν, ὥς τε γίνεται οἷός τε γενόμενός ἐστιν.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν ὧδε μάλιστα εἰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου
μεταβάλλει;

πῶς;

ὅταν αὐτοῦ παῖς γενόμενος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ζηλοῖ τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ
ἐκείνου ἵχνη διώκη, ἔπειτα αὐτὸν ἴδῃ ἐξαίφνης

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πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐκχέαντα τὰ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ
ἐαυτόν, ἢ στρατηγήσαντα ἢ τιν' ἄλλην μεγάλην ἀρχὴν ἄρξαντα, εἴτα εἰς
δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ
ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν ἀποβαλόντα.

εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

ἰδὼν δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, ταῦτα καὶ παθὼν καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὄντα, δείσας οἶμαι
εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου

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τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐκείνο, καὶ
ταπεινωθεὶς ὑπὸ πενίας πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος γλίσχρος καὶ κατὰ
σμικρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος χρήματα συλλέγεται. ἄρ' οὐκ οἶει τὸν
τοιούτον τότε εἰς μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκείνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τε καὶ
φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίζειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν ἐν ἐαυτῷ, τιάρας τε καὶ
στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας παραζωννύνα;

ἐγὼ γ', ἔφη.

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τὸ δὲ γε οἶμαι λογιστικόν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς χαμαὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν
παρακαθίσας ὑπ' ἐκείνων καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος, τὸ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔᾶ
λογίζεσθαι οὐδὲ σκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ ὁπόθεν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων χρημάτων πλείω
ἔσται, τὸ δὲ αὖ θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτόν τε καὶ
πλουσίους, καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι μηδ' ἐφ' ἐνὶ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ
ἐάν τι ἄλλο εἰς τοῦτο φέρῃ.
οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη, ἔφη, μεταβολὴ οὕτω ταχεῖα τε καὶ ἰσχυρὰ ἐκ φιλοτίμου νέου
εἰς φιλοχρήματον.

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ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλιγαρχικός ἐστίν;
ἢ γοῦν μεταβολὴ αὐτοῦ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἀνδρός ἐστι τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ἐξ ἧς ἢ
ὀλιγαρχία μετέστη.
σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὁμοίος ἂν εἴη.

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σκοπῶμεν.
οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τῷ χρήματα περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι ὁμοίος ἂν εἴη;
πῶς δ' οὐ;
καὶ μὴν τῷ γε φειδωλὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐργάτης, τὰς ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας μόνον
τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ ἀποπιμπλάς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα μὴ παρεχόμενος, ἀλλὰ
δουλούμενος τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ὡς ματαιούς.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

αὐχμηρός γέ τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς περιουσίαν ποιούμενος,
θησαυροποῖδς ἀνήρ—οὓς δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος

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—ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ὁμοίος;
ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ· χρήματα γοῦν μάλιστα ἔντιμα τῇ τε πόλει καὶ παρὰ
τῷ τοιούτῳ.

οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παιδεία ὁ τοιοῦτος προσέσχηκεν.

οὐ δοκῶ, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ χοροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα
μάλιστα.

εὔ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τότε δὲ σκόπει· κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν
ἀπαιδευσίαν μὴ φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι, τὰς μὲν

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πτωχικάς, τὰς δὲ κακούργους, κατεχομένας βίᾳ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας;
καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

οἷσθ' οὖν, εἶπον, οἷ ἀποβλέψας κατόψει αὐτῶν τὰς κακουργίας;
ποῖ; ἔφη.

εἰς τὰς τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιτροπεύσεις, καὶ εἴ ποῦ τι αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτον
συμβαίνει, ὥστε πολλῆς ἐξουσίας λαβέσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

ἀληθῆ.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτω δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἐν οἷς
εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπικεῖ

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τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνοῦσας, οὐ πείθων ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ' ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων;

καὶ πάννυ γ', ἔφη.

καὶ νῆ Δία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν ἐνευρήσεις, ὅταν δέῃ τάλλοτρία ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος συγγενεῖς ἐνοῦσας ἐπιθυμίας.

καὶ μάλα, ἣ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα.

οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ἀστασίαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἷς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὡς τὸ πολὺ

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κρατούσας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίους χειρόνων.

ἔστιν οὕτω.

διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οἶμαι εὐσχημονέστερος ἂν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἴη.

ὁμοιοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμωσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθῆς ἀρετῇ πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτόν.

δοκεῖ μοι.

καὶ μὴν ἀνταγωνιστῆς γε ἰδίᾳ ἐν πόλει ὁ φειδωλὸς

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φᾶυλος ἢ τινος νίκης ἢ ἄλλης φιλοτιμίας τῶν καλῶν, χρήματά τε οὐκ ἐθέλων εὐδοξίας ἔνεκα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγώνων ἀναλίσκειν, δεδιώς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἀναλωτικὰς ἐγείρειν καὶ συμπαρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ συμμαχίαν τε καὶ φιλονικίαν, ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἑαυτοῦ πολεμῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἡττᾶται καὶ πλουτεῖ.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

ἔτι οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπιστοῦμεν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχουμένην πόλιν

ὁμοιότητι τὸν φειδωλὸν τε καὶ χρηματιστὴν

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τετάχθαι;

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.

δημοκρατίαν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, τίνα τε γίγνεται τρόπον, γενομένη τε ποῖόν τινα ἔχει, ἵν' αὖ τὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρὸς τρόπον γνόντες παραστησώμεθ' αὐτὸν εἰς κρίσιν.

ὁμοίως γοῦν ἂν, ἔφη, ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πορευοίμεθα.

οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβάλλει μὲν τρόπον τινὰ τοιόνδε ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν, δι' ἀπληστίαν τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ὡς πλουσιώτατον δεῖν γίνεσθαι;

πῶς δὴ;

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ἅτε οἶμαι ἄρχοντες ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸ πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν εἰργεῖν νόμῳ τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἂν ἀκόλαστοι γίγνωνται, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀναλίσκειν τε καὶ ἀπολλύναι τὰ αὐτῶν, ἵνα ὠνούμενοι τὰ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ εἰσδανεῖζοντες ἔτι πλουσιώτεροι καὶ ἐντιμότεροι γίγνωνται.

παντὸς γε μᾶλλον.

οὐκοῦν δῆλον ἤδη τοῦτο ἐν πόλει, ὅτι πλοῦτον τιμᾶν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἅμα
ἱκανῶς κτᾶσθαι ἐν τοῖς πολίταις

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ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἢ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀμελεῖν ἢ τοῦ ἐτέρου;
ἐπεικῶς, ἔφη, δῆλον.

παραμελοῦντες δὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ἐφιέντες ἀκολασταίνειν οὐκ
ἀγενεῖς ἐνίστε ἀνθρώπους πένητας ἠνάγκασαν γενέσθαι.

μάλα γε.

κάθηνται δὴ οἷμαι οὗτοι ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι τε καὶ ἐξωπλισμένοι, οἱ
μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντές τε
καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις,

νεωτερισμοῦ

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ἐρῶντες.

ἐστι ταῦτα.

οἱ δὲ δὴ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκύψαντες, οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες τοὺτους ὄρᾶν, τῶν
λοιπῶν τὸν αἰεὶ ὑπεῖκοντα ἐνιέντες ἀργῦριον τιτρώσκοντες, καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς
ἐκγόνους τόκους πολλαπλασίους

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κομιζόμενοι, πολὺν τὸν κηφῆνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ πόλει.

πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, οὐ πολὺν;

καὶ οὔτε γ' ἐκείνη, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκκαόμενον ἐθέλουσιν
ἀποσβεννύναι, εἰργοντες τὰ αὐτοῦ ὅπῃ τις βούλεται τρέπειν, οὔτε τῇδε, ἣ
αὖ κατὰ ἕτερον νόμον τὰ τοιαῦτα λύεται.

κατὰ δὴ τίνα;

ὅς μετ' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι δεύτερος καὶ ἀναγκάζων ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς
πολίτας. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κινδύνῳ

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τὰ πολλὰ τις τῶν ἐκουσίῳ συμβολαίων προστάτῃ συμβάλλειν,
χρηματίζονται μὲν ἂν ἥττον ἀναιδῶς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐλάττω δ' ἐν αὐτῇ φύοιτο
τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν οἷων νυνδὴ εἵπομεν.

καὶ πολὺ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς μὲν δὴ ἀρχομένους οὔτω
διατιθέασιν ἐν τῇ πόλει οἱ ἄρχοντες· σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν—ἄρ'
οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ
πρὸς

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τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀργούς;
τί μήν;

αὐτοὺς δὲ πλὴν χρηματισμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμεληκότας, καὶ οὐδὲν πλείω
ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένους ἀρετῆς ἢ τοὺς πένητας;

οὐ γὰρ οὔν.

οὔτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν ἀλλήλοις οἳ τε ἄρχοντες καὶ

οἱ ἀρχόμενοι ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν πορείαις ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις, ἢ κατὰ
θεωρίας ἢ κατὰ στρατείας, ἢ συμπλοὶ γιγνόμενοι ἢ συστρατιῶται, ἢ καὶ ἐν
αὐτοῖς τοῖς

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κινδύνους ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι μηδαμῇ ταύτῃ καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ
τῶν πλουσίων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἰσχνὸς ἀνὴρ πένης, ἡλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς
ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ ἐσκιατροφηκότι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἴδῃ
ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, ἄρ' οἶει αὐτὸν οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι κακία τῇ
σφετέρᾳ πλουτεῖν τοὺς τοιοῦτους, καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλῳ παραγγέλλειν, ὅταν ἰδίᾳ
συγγίγνωνται, ὅτι ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι·

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εἰσὶ γὰρ οὐδέν;

εὔ οἶδα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσιν.

οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ σῶμα νοσῶδες μικρᾷς ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι
πρὸς τὸ κάμνειν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, οὕτω δὴ
καὶ ἡ κατὰ ταῦτά ἐκείνῳ διακειμένη πόλις ἀπὸ μικρᾷς προφάσεως, ἔξωθεν
ἐπαγομένων ἢ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐξ ὀλιγαρχουμένης πόλεως συμμαχίαν ἢ τῶν
ἐτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατουμένης, νοσεῖ τε καὶ αὐτὴ αὐτῇ μάχεται, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ
ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει;

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καὶ σφόδρα γε.

δημοκρατία δὴ οἷμαι γίγνεται ὅταν οἱ πένητες νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν
ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἐτέρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐκβάλωσι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐξ ἴσου
μεταδῶσι πολιτείας τε καὶ ἀρχῶν, καὶ ὥς τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ κλήρων αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν
αὐτῇ γίνονται.

ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας, ἐάντε καὶ δι' ὅπλων γένηται
ἐάντε καὶ διὰ φόβον ὑπεξεληθόντων τῶν ἐτέρων.

τίνα δὴ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτοι τρόπον οἴκοῦσι; καὶ ποία

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τις ἢ τοιαύτη αὖ πολιτεία; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ δημοκρατικὸς τις
ἀναφανήσεται.

δῆλον, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ
παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅτι τις βούλεται;
λέγεται γε δὴ, ἔφη.

ὅπου δέ γε ἐξουσία, δῆλον ὅτι ἰδιαν ἕκαστος ἂν κατασκευὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βίου
κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ, ἥτις ἕκαστον ἀρέσκοι.

δῆλον.

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παντοδαποὶ δὴ ἂν οἷμαι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ μάλιστ' ἐγγίγνοιτο ἄνθρωποι.
πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

κινδυνεύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι· ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον
ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἡθεσιν

πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο. καὶ ἴσως μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταύτην, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ ποικίλα θεώμενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

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καὶ ἔστιν γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπιτήδειον ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτείαν. τί δῃ;

ὅτι πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ βουλομένῳ πόλιν κατασκευάζειν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς δημοκρατουμένην ἐλθόντι πόλιν, ὅς ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρέσκη τρόπος, τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι, ὥσπερ εἰς παντοπώλιον ἀφικομένῳ πολιτειῶν, καὶ ἐκλεξαμένῳ οὕτω κατοικίσειν.

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ἴσως γοῦν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἂν ἀποροῖ παραδειγμάτων.

τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην, εἶπον, εἶναι ἄρχειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, μὴδ' ἂν ἥς ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν, μὴδὲ αὖ ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ βούλῃ, μὴδὲ πολεμεῖν πολεμούντων, μὴδὲ εἰρήνην ἄγειν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγόντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιθυμῇς εἰρήνης, μὴδὲ αὖ, ἐὰν τις ἄρχειν νόμος σε διακωλύῃ ἢ δικάζειν, μὴδὲν ἦττον καὶ

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ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν, ἐὰν αὐτῷ σοι ἐπίῃ, ἄρ' οὐ θεσπεσία καὶ ἡδεῖα ἡ τοιαύτη διαγωγή ἐν τῷ παραντίκῃ;

ἴσως, ἔφη, ἐν γε τούτῳ.

τί δέ; ἡ πρῶτης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἢ οὐπω εἶδες, ἐν τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς, οὐδὲν ἦττον αὐτῶν μενόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφόμενων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὀρῶντος οὐδενὸς περινοστεῖ ὥσπερ ἥρως;

καὶ πολλοὺς γ', ἔφη.

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ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη καὶ οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν σμικρολογία αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύνοντες, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν ὠκίζομεν, ὡς εἰ μὴ τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι, οὐποτ' ἂν γένοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὧν εὐθύς παίζειο ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδεῦοι τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς καταπατήσας ἅπαντ' αὐτὰ οὐδὲν φροντίζει ἐξ ὁποίων ἂν τις ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ πολιτικά ἰὼν πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ τιμᾷ,

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ἐὰν φῇ μόνον εὖνους εἶναι τῷ πλήθει;

πάνυ γ', ἔφη, γενναία.

ταῦτά τε δῇ, ἔφην, ἔχοι ἂν καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, καὶ εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἀναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, γνώριμα λέγεις.

ἄθρει δῇ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἰδίᾳ. ἢ πρῶτον σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ τὴν

πολιτείαν ἔσκεψάμεθα, τίνα τρόπον γίγνεται;

ναί, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὥδε; τοῦ φειδωλοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ

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γένοιτ' ἂν οἷμαι ὑὸς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου ἡθεσι;

τί γὰρ οὐ;

βίαι δὴ καὶ οὗτος ἄρχων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν, ὅσαι ἀναλωτικαὶ μὲν,

χρηματιστικά δὲ μὴ· αἱ δὴ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι κέκληνται—

δῆλον, ἔφη.

βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς διαλεγώμεθα, πρῶτον ὀρισώμεθα

τάς τε ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰς μὴ;

βούλομαι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐκοῦν ἅς τε οὐκ ἂν οἰοί τ' εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι, δικαίως

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ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο, καὶ ὅσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελούσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων

γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη. ἦ οὐ;

καὶ μάλα.

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δικαίως δὴ τοῦτο ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἐροῦμεν, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

δικαίως.

τί δέ; ἅς γέ τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἂν, εἰ μελετῷ ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν

ἐνοῦσαι δρῶσιν, αἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦναντίον, πάσας ταύτας εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαίους

φαῖμεν εἶναι, ἄρ' οὐ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;

καλῶς μὲν οὖν.

προελώμεθα δὴ τι παράδειγμα ἑκατέρων αἱ εἰσιν, ἵνα τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς;

οὐκοῦν χρή.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡ τοῦ φαγεῖν μέχρι ὑγιείας τε καὶ εὐεξίας

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καὶ αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου ἀναγκαῖος ἂν εἴη;

οἶμαι.

ἦ μὲν γέ που τοῦ σίτου κατ' ἀμφοτέρα ἀναγκαῖα, ἦ τε ὠφελίμος ἦ τε μὴ

παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή.

ναί.

ἦ δὲ ὄψου, εἴ πῃ τίνα ὠφελίαν πρὸς εὐεξίαν παρέχεται,

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

τί δὲ ἡ πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίων ἐδεσμάτων ἢ τοιούτων ἐπιθυμία, δυνατὴ δὲ

κολαζομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ παιδευομένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, καὶ

βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι, βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τε φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν;

ἄρα

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γε ὁρθῶς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἂν καλοῖτο;

ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀναλωτικὰς φῶμεν εἶναι ταύτας, ἐκείνας δὲ χρηματιστικὰς διὰ

τὸ χρησίμους πρὸς τὰ ἔργα εἶναι;

τί μήν;

οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φήσομεν;

οὕτω.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὃν νυνδὴ κηφῆνα ὠνομάζομεν, τοῦτον ἐλέγομεν τὸν τῶν τοιοῦτων ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα καὶ

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ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων φειδωλὸν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν;

ἀλλὰ τί μήν;

πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγωμεν ὡς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ δημοκρατικὸς γίγνεται. φαίνεται δέ μοι τὰ γε πολλὰ ὧδε γίνεσθαι.

πῶς;

ὅταν νέος, τεθραμμένος ὡς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀπαιδεύτως τε καὶ φειδωλῶς, γεύσῃται κηφῆνων μέλιτος, καὶ συγγένῃται αἰθωσι θηρσί καὶ δεινοῖς, παντοδαπὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἐχούσας δυναμένοις σκευάζειν, ἐνταῦθ' αὖ ποῦ

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οἷου εἶναι ἀρχὴν αὐτῷ μεταβολῆς ... ὀλιγαρχικῆς τῆς ἐαυτῷ εἰς δημοκρατικὴν.

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ ἡ πόλις μετέβαλλε βοηθησάσης τῷ ἑτέρῳ μέρει συμμαχίας ἔξωθεν, ὁμοίας ὁμοίῳ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νεανίας μεταβάλλει βοηθοῦντος αὐτῷ εἰδούς ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔξωθεν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν παρ' ἐκείνῳ, συγγενοῦς τε καὶ ὁμοίου;

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε οἷμαι ἀντιβοηθήσῃ τις τῷ ἐν ἐαυτῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ συμμαχία, ἢ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ καὶ τῶν

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ἄλλων οἰκείων νουθετούντων τε καὶ κακιζόντων, στάσις δὴ καὶ ἀντίστασις καὶ μάχη ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν τότε γίγνεται.

τί μήν;

καὶ ποτὲ μὲν οἷμαι τὸ δημοκρατικὸν ὑπεχώρησε τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ, καὶ τινες τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν διεφθάρησαν, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξέπεσον, αἰδοῦς τινος ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, καὶ κατεκοσμήθη πάλιν.

γίγνεται γὰρ ἐνίοτε, ἔφη.

αὐθις δὲ οἷμαι τῶν ἐκπεσουσῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄλλαι ὑποτρεφόμεναι

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συγγενεῖς δι' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς πατρὸς πολλαὶ τε καὶ ἰσχυραὶ ἐγένοντο.

φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίνεσθαι.

οὐκοῦν εἰλκυσάν τε πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ὁμιλίαις, καὶ λάθρα συγγιγνόμεναι πλῆθος ἐνέτεκον.

τί μήν;

τελευτῶσαι δὴ οἶμαι κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν,
αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ λόγων
ἀληθῶν, οἳ δὴ ἄριστοι φρουροὶ τε καὶ φύλακες ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσι
διανοίαις.

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καὶ πολὺ γ', ἔφη.

ψευδεῖς δὴ καὶ ἀλαζόνες οἶμαι λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι ἀντ' ἐκείνων
ἀναδραμόντες κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιούτου.

σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς Λωτοφάγους ἐλθὼν φανερώς
κατοικεῖ, καὶ ἐὰν παρ' οἰκείων τις βοήθεια τῷ φειδωλῷ αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς
ἀφικνῆται, κλήσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι ἐκείνοι τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους
ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας οὔτε αὐτὴν τὴν συμμαχίαν παριᾶσιν, οὔτε πρέσβεις
πρεσβυτέρων

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λόγους ἰδιωτῶν εἰσδέχονται, αὐτοὶ τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν
αἰδῶ ἡλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες ὠθοῦσιν ἔξω ἀτίμως φυγάδα, σωφροσύνην δὲ
ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές τε καὶ προπηλακίζοντες ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ
καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὔσαν πείθοντες
ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν;
σφόδρα γε.

τούτων δέ γε που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ

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κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μεγάλοισι τέλεσι, τὸ μετὰ
τοῦτο ἤδη ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναιδείαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ
πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατὰγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ
ὑποκοριζόμενοι, ὕβριν μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦντες, ἀναρχίαν δὲ
ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν

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δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν, ἀναιδείαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν.

ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτω πως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νέος ὢν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις
ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν
ἐλευθέρωσιν τε καὶ ἄνεσιν;

καὶ μάλα γ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναργῶς.

Ζῇ δὴ οἶμαι μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἢ μὴ
ἀναγκαίους ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκων καὶ χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς· ἀλλ'
ἐὰν εὐτυχὴς ᾗ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῇ, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος
τοῦ πολλοῦ

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θορυβοῦ παρελθόντος μέρη τε καταδέξεται τῶν ἐκπεσόντων καὶ τοῖς
ἐπεισελθοῦσι μὴ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν ἐνδῶ, εἰς ἴσον δὴ τι καταστήσας τὰς ἡδονὰς
διάγει, τῇ παραπιπτούσῃ αἰεὶ ὥσπερ λαχοῦσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν παραδιδούς

ἔως ἂν πληρωθῇ, καὶ αὖθις ἄλλῃ, οὐδεμίαν ἀτιμάζων ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου τρέφων.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

καὶ λόγον γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ οὐ προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ παριεῖς εἰς τὸ
φρούριον, ἔαν τις λέγῃ ὡς αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῶν

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καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἡδοναί, αἱ δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν
χρῆ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ κολάζειν τε καὶ δουλοῦσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι
τούτοις ἀνανεύει τε καὶ ὁμοίας φησὶν ἀπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἴσου.

σφόδρα γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτω διακείμενος τοῦτο δρᾷ.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ διαζῇ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν οὕτω χαριζόμενος τῇ
προσπιπτούσῃ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, τοτὲ μὲν μεθῶν καὶ καταυλούμενος, αὖθις δὲ
ὑδροποτῶν καὶ καπισχαινόμενος,

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τοτὲ δ' αὖ γυμναζόμενος, ἔστιν δ' ὅτε ἀργῶν καὶ πάντων ἀμελῶν, τοτὲ δ' ὡς
ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων. πολλάκις δὲ πολιτεύεται, καὶ ἀναπηδῶν ὅτι ἂν
τύχῃ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει· κἄν ποτέ τινας πολεμικοὺς ζηλώσῃ, ταύτῃ
φέρεται, ἢ χρηματιστικοὺς, ἐπὶ τοῦτ' αὖ. καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη
ἔπεστιν αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ' ἡδὺν τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν
τὸν βίον τοῦτον χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ παντός.

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παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, διεληλυθας βίον ἰσονομικοῦ τινος ἀνδρός.

οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ παντοδαπὸν τε καὶ πλείστων ἡθῶν μεστόν, καὶ
τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα
εἶναι· ὃν πολλοὶ ἂν καὶ πολλὰι ζηλώσειαν τοῦ βίου, παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν
τε καὶ τρόπων πλεῖστα ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχοντα.

οὗτος γάρ, ἔφη, ἔστιν.

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τί οὖν; τετάχθω ἡμῖν κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ, ὡς δημοκρατικὸς
ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενος;

τετάχθω, ἔφη.

ἢ καλλίστῃ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτεία τε καὶ ὁ κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ λοιπὰ ἂν ἡμῖν
εἴη διελθεῖν, τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος.

κομιδῇ γ', ἔφη.

φέρε δὴ, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ὧ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ
δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει σχεδὸν δῆλον.

δῆλον.

ἄρ' οὖν τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔκ τε ὀλιγαρχίας δημοκρατία

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γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τυραννίς;

πῶς;

ὃ προῦθεντο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι' ὃ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καθίστατο—τοῦτο δ'
ἦν ὑπερπλοῦτος· ἦ γάρ; —

ναί.

ἡ πλοῦτου τοίνυν ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια διὰ χρηματισμὸν αὐτὴν ἀπώλλυ.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὁ δημοκρατία ὀρίζεται ἀγαθόν, ἡ τοῦτου ἀπληστία καὶ ταύτην καταλύει;

λέγεις δ' αὐτὴν τί ὀρίζεσθαι;

τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἶπον. τοῦτο γάρ που ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ

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πόλει ἀκούσας ἂν ὡς ἔχει τε κάλλιστον καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ ταύτῃ ἄξιον οἰκεῖν ὅστις φύσει ἐλεύθερος.

λέγεται γὰρ δὴ, ἔφη, καὶ πολὺ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἦν νυνδὴ ἐρῶν, ἡ τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια καὶ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν μεθίστησιν τε καὶ παρασκευάζει τυραννίδος δεηθῆναι;

πῶς; ἔφη.

ὅταν οἷμαι δημοκρατουμένη πόλις ἐλευθερίας διψήσασα

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κακῶν οἰνοχόων προστατούντων τύχῃ, καὶ πορρωτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς μεθυσθῇ, τοὺς ἄρχοντας δὴ, ἂν μὴ πάνυ πρᾶοι ὥσι καὶ πολλὴν παρέχωσι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κολάζει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μιαρούς τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς.

δρῶσιν γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο.

τοὺς δέ γε, εἶπον, τῶν ἀρχόντων κατηκόους προπηλακίζει ὡς ἐθελοδούλους τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀρχομένοις, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἄρχουσιν ὁμοίους ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἐπαινεῖ τε καὶ τιμᾷ. ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν τοιαύτῃ

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πόλει ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἰέναι;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

καὶ καταδύεσθαι γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ φίλε, εἷς τε τὰς ἰδίας οἰκίας καὶ τελευτᾶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην.

πῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν;

οἶον, ἔφην, πατέρα μὲν ἐθίζεσθαι παιδὶ ὅμοιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ὑεῖς, ὑὸν δὲ πατρὶ, καὶ μήτε αἰσχύνεσθαι μήτε δεδιέναι τοὺς γονέας, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾦ· μέτοικον δὲ

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ἄστῳ καὶ ἄστὸν μετοίκῳ ἐξισοῦσθαι, καὶ ξένον ὡσαύτως.

γίνεται γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη.

ταῦτά τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σμικρὰ τοιάδε ἄλλα γίνεται· διδάσκαλός τε ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβεῖται καὶ θωπεύει, φοιτητὰς τε διδασκάλων

ὀλιγωροῦσιν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγῶν· καὶ ὅλως οἱ μὲν νέοι πρεσβυτέροις ἀπεικάζονται καὶ διαμιλλῶνται καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις, οἱ δὲ γέροντες συγκαθιέντες τοῖς νέοις εὐτραπείας τε καὶ χαριεντισμοῦ

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ἐμπιμπλάνται, μιμούμενοι τοὺς νέους, ἵνα δὴ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀηδεῖς εἶναι μηδὲ δεσποτικοί.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

τὸ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔσχατον, ὦ φίλε, τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον γίγνεται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει, ὅταν δὴ οἱ ἐωνημένοι καὶ αἱ ἐωνημένοι μηδὲν ἦττον ἐλευθεροὶ ὦσι τῶν πριαμένων. ἐν γυναιξὶ δὲ πρὸς ἄνδρας καὶ ἀνδράσι πρὸς γυναῖκας ὅση ἡ ἰσονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία γίγνεται, ὀλίγου ἐπελαθόμεθ' εἰπεῖν.

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οὐκοῦν κατ' Αἰσχύλον, ἔφη, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι νῦν ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα;

πάνυ γε, εἶπον· καὶ ἔγωγε οὕτω λέγω· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θηρίων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅσω ἐλευθερώτερά ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ, οὐκ ἂν τις πείθοιτο ἄπειρος. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ αἱ τε κύνες κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν οἷά περ αἱ δέσποιναι γίνονται τε δὴ καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὄνοι, πάνυ ἐλευθέρως καὶ σεμνῶς εἰθισμένοι πορεύεσθαι, κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐμβάλλοντες τῷ αἰεὶ ἀπαντῶντι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξίστηται, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω

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μεστὰ ἐλευθερίας γίγνεται.

τὸ ἐμόν γ', ἔφη, ἐμοὶ λέγεις ὄναρ· αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς ἀγρὸν πορευόμενος θαμὰ αὐτὸ πάσχω.

τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντων τούτων συνηθροισμένων, ἐννοεῖς ὡς ἀπαλὴν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ποιεῖ, ὥστε καὶ ὅτιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται, ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι; τελευτῶντες γὰρ που οἴσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων φροντίζουσιν γεγραμμένων ἢ ἀγράφων, ἵνα δὴ μηδαμῇ

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μηδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἢ δεσπότης.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, οἶδα.

αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἡ ἀρχὴ οὕτωςι καλὴ καὶ νεανικὴ, ὅθεν τυραννὶς φύεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.

νεανικὴ δὴ τα, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;

ταῦτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ νόσημα ἐγγενόμενον ἀπώλεσεν αὐτήν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλέον τε καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐγγενόμενον καταδουλοῦται δημοκρατίαν. καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην φιλεῖ εἰς τοῦναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναί, ἐν ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν

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φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασιν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα.

εἰκὸς, ἔφη.

ἢ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ πόλει.

εἰκὸς γάρ.

εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας, ἐξ οἷμαι τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία πλείστη τε καὶ

ἀγριωτάτη.

ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.

ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ' οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡρώτας, ἀλλὰ ποῖον

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νόσημα ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τε φυόμενον ταῦτόν καί ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δουλοῦται αὐτήν.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

ἐκεῖνο τοίνυν, ἔφην, ἔλεγον τὸ τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ δαστανηρῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος, τὸ μὲν ἀνδρειότατον ἡγούμενον αὐτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀνανδρότερον ἐπόμενον· οὐς δὴ ἀφομοιοῦμεν κηφῆσι, τοὺς μὲν κέντρα ἔχουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἀκέντροις.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

τοῦτω τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταραττετον ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐγγιγνομένω, οἷον περὶ σῶμα φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή· ὦ δὴ καὶ

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δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν τε καὶ νομοθέτην πόλεως μὴ ἦττον ἢ σοφὸν μελιττουργὸν πόρρωθεν εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγενήσεσθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὅτι τάχιστα σὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον.

ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, παντάπασι γε.

ὦδε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λάβωμεν, ἴν' εὐκρινέστερον ἴδωμεν ὃ βουλόμεθα.

πῶς;

τριχῇ διαστησώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν,

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ὥπερ οὖν καὶ ἔχει. Ἐν μὲν γάρ που τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφύεται δι' ἐξουσίαν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχουμένῃ.

ἔστιν οὕτω.

πολὺ δέ γε δριμύτερον ἐν ταύτῃ ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ.

πῶς;

ἐκεῖ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔντιμον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀγύμναστον καὶ οὐκ ἐρρωμένον γίγνεται· ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ τοῦτό που τὸ προεστώς αὐτῆς, ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, τὸ δ' ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσίζον βομβεῖ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ

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ἄλλα λέγοντος, ὥστε πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου διοικεῖται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ χωρὶς τινων ὀλίγων.

μάλα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἄλλο τοίνυν τοιόνδε ἀεὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους.

τὸ ποῖον;

χρηματιζομένων που πάντων, οἱ κοσμιώτατοι φύσει ὥς τὸ πολὺ πλουσιώτατοι γίνονται.

εἰκός.

πλεῖστον δὴ οἶμαι τοῖς κηφῆσι μέλι καὶ εὐπορώτατον ἐντεῦθεν βλίττει.

πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, παρὰ γε τῶν σμικρὰ ἐχόντων τις βλίσειεν;

πλούσιοι δὴ οἶμαι οἱ τοιοῦτοι καλοῦνται κηφήνων βοτάνη.

σχεδόν τι, ἔφη.

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δῆμος δ' ἂν εἷη τρίτον γένος, ὅσοι αὐτουργοὶ τε καὶ ἀπράγμονες, οὐ πάνυ πολλὰ κεκτημένοι· ὃ δὴ πλεῖστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ὅτανπερ ἄθροισθῇ.

ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλ' οὐ θαμὰ ἐθέλει ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ μέλιτός τι μεταλαμβάνῃ.

οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἰεὶ, καθ' ὅσον δύνανται οἱ προεστῶτες, τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρούμενοι, διανέμοντες τῷ δήμῳ, τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν.

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μεταλαμβάνει γὰρ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως.

ἀναγκάζονται δὴ οἷμαι ἀμύνεσθαι, λέγοντές τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ πράττοντες ὅπῃ δύνανται, οὗτοι ὦν ἀφαιροῦνται.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

αἰτίαν δὴ ἔσχον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων, κἄν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι νεωτερίζειν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύουσι τῷ δήμῳ καὶ εἰσιν ὀλιγαρχικοί.

τί μήν;

οὐκοῦν καὶ τελευτῶντες, ἐπειδὴν ὀρώσι τὸν δῆμον, οὐχ ἐκόντα ἀλλ' ἀγνοήσαντά τε καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν

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διαβαλλόντων, ἐπιχειροῦντα σφᾶς ἀδικεῖν, τότε ἤδη, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικοὶ γίγνονται, οὐχ ἐκόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κακὸν ἐκεῖνος ὃ κηφὴν ἐντίκτει κεντῶν αὐτούς.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

εἰσαγγελία δὴ καὶ κρίσεις καὶ ἀγῶνες περὶ ἀλλήλων γίγνονται.

καὶ μάλα.

οὐκοῦν ἓνα τινὰ αἰεὶ δῆμος εἴωθεν διαφερόντως προϊστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν;

εἴωθε γάρ.

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τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δῆλον, ὅτι, ὅτανπερ φύηται τύραννος, ἐκ προστατικῆς ρίξης καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἐκβλαστάνει.

καὶ μάλα δῆλον.

τίς ἀρχὴ οὖν μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ τύραννον; ἦ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπειδὴν ταύτῳ ἄρξηται δρᾶν ὁ προστάτης τῷ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὅς περὶ τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερὸν λέγεται;

τίς; ἔφη.

ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχχνου, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἐνδὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ

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τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι. ἦ οὐκ ἀκήκοας τὸν λόγον;

ἔγωγε.

ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὃς ἂν δήμου προεστώς, λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον, μὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐμφυλίου αἵματος, ἀλλ' ἀδίκως ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια ἄγων μαιφονῇ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων, γλώττη τε καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίῳ γευόμενος φόνου συγγενοῦς, καὶ ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ
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566a

ἀποκτεινύῃ καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, ἄρα τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἵμαρται ἢ ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι;

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

οὗτος δὴ, ἔφην, ὁ στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας.

οὗτος.

ἄρ' οὖν ἐκπεσὼν μὲν καὶ κατελθὼν βίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τύραννος

ἀπειργασμένος κατέρχεται;

δῆλον.

566b

ἐὰν δὲ ἀδύνατοι ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὸν ὥσιν ἢ ἀποκτεῖναι διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει, βιαιῶ δὴ θανάτῳ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἀποκτεινύναι λάθρᾳ.

φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.

τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἵτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ἐπὶ τοῦτω πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ἦ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

διδόασι δὴ οἷμαι δείσαντες μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, θαρρήσαντες δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν.

566c

καὶ μάλα.

οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ὅταν ἴδῃ ἀνὴρ χρήματα ἔχων καὶ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων αἰτίαν μισόδημος εἶναι, τότε δὴ οὗτος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατὰ τὸν Κροίσῳ γεγόμενον χρησμὸν—

... πολυψήφιδά παρ' Ἑρμον

φεύγει, οὐδὲ μένει, οὐδ' αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι.

Hdt. 1.55

οὐ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, δεύτερον αὖθις αἰδεσθεῖν.

ὁ δὲ γε οἷμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταληφθεὶς θανάτῳ διδοται.

ἀνάγκη.

ὁ δὲ δὴ προστάτης ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς δῆλον δὴ ὅτι

μέγας

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μεγαλωστὶ

Hom. Il. 16.776 οὐ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ καταβαλὼν ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἔστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ τῆς πόλεως, τύραννος ἀντὶ προστάτου ἀποτετελεσμένος.

τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη.

διέλθωμεν δὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἐν

ἦ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος βροτὸς ἐγγένηται;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, διέλθωμεν.

ἄρ' οὖν, εἶπον, οὐ ταῖς μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελᾷ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται πάντας, ὧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ, καὶ

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οὔτε τύραννός φησιν εἶναι ὑπισχνεῖται τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, χρεῶν τε ἡλευθέρωσε καὶ γῆν διένειμε δῆμῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ πᾶσιν ἰλεῶς τε καὶ πρῶτος εἶναι προσποιεῖται;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

ὅταν δέ γε οἷμαι πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῇ, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ, καὶ ἡσυχία ἐκείνων γένηται, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς ἀεὶ κινεῖ, ἵν' ἐν χρεῖα ἡγεμόνος ὁ δῆμος ᾗ.

εἰκὸς γε.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πένητες γιγνόμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζονται εἶναι καὶ ἦττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσι;

δῆλον.

καὶ ἂν γέ τινας οἷμαι ὑποπτεύῃ ἐλεύθερα φρονήματα ἔχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέψειν αὐτῷ ἄρχειν, ὅπως ἂν τούτους μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολλύῃ ἐνδοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις; τούτων πάντων ἕνεκα τυράννῳ ἀεὶ ἀνάγκη πόλεμον ταραττεῖν;

ἀνάγκη.

ταῦτα δὴ ποιοῦντα ἔτοιμον μάλλον ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς

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πολίταις;

πῶς γάρ οὐ;

οὐκοῦν καὶ τινας τῶν συγκαταστησάντων καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐπιπλήττοντας τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οἳ ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἀνδρικώτατοι ὄντες;

εἰκὸς γε.

ὑπεξαίρειν δὴ τούτους πάντας δεῖ τὸν τύραννον, εἰ μέλλει ἄρξειν, ἕως ἂν μήτε φίλων μήτ' ἐχθρῶν λίπη μηδένα ὅτου τι ὄφελος.

δῆλον.

ὁξέως ἄρα δεῖ ὁρᾶν αὐτὸν τίς ἀνδρεῖος, τίς μεγαλόφρων,

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τίς φρόνιμος, τίς πλούσιος· καὶ οὕτως εὐδαίμων ἐστίν, ὥστε τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, εἴτε βούλεται εἴτε μὴ, πολεμίῳ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειν, ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ τὴν πόλιν.

καλὸν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμόν.

ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἱατροὶ τὰ σώματα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χεῖριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὁ δὲ τὸ ὑναντίον.

ὥς ἔοικε γάρ, αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἄρξει.

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ἐν μακαρίᾳ ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη δέδεται, ἢ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ

φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν οἰκεῖν, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισοῦμενον, ἢ μὴ ζῆν.
ἐν τοιαύτῃ, ἣ δ' ὅς.
ἄρ' οὖν οὐχὶ ὅσω ἂν μᾶλλον τοῖς πολίταις ἀπεχθάνηται ταῦτα δρῶν,
τοσοῦτ' πλειόνων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων δεήσεται;
πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

τίνες οὖν οἱ πιστοί; καὶ πόθεν αὐτοὺς μεταπέμψεται;
αὐτόματοι, ἔφη, πολλοὶ ἤξουσι πετόμενοι, ἐὰν τὸν μισθὸν διδῶ.
κηφῆνας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νῆ τὸν κύνα, δοκεῖς αὖ τινάς μοι
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λέγειν ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαπούς.
ἀληθῆ γάρ, ἔφη, δοκῶ σοι.
τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθελήσειεν—
πῶς;

τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος τοὺς πολίτας, ἐλευθερώσας, τῶν περὶ ἑαυτὸν
δορυφόρων ποιήσασθαι.

σφόδρα γ', ἔφη· ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ πιστότατοι αὐτῷ οὗτοί εἰσιν.
ἦ μακάριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα, εἰ τοιούτοις
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φίλοις τε καὶ πιστοῖς ἀνδράσι χρῆται, τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους ἀπολέσας.
ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, τοιούτοις γε χρῆται.
καὶ θαυμάζουσι δὴ, εἶπον, οὗτοι οἱ ἐταῖροι αὐτὸν καὶ σύνεισιν οἱ νέοι
πολιῖται, οἱ δ' ἐπικεκῖς μισοῦσιν τε καὶ φεύγουσι;

τί δ' οὐ μέλλουσιν;
οὐκ ἐτός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τε τραγωδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης
διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ.

τί δὴ;
ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόμενον ἐφθέγγατο, ὥς
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ἄρα σοφοὶ τυράννοι εἰσὶ τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ. καὶ ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους
εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς οἷς σύνεστιν.

καὶ ὥς ἰσόθεόν γ', ἔφη, τὴν τυραννίδα ἐγκωμιάζει, καὶ ἕτερα πολλά, καὶ
οὗτος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί.

τοιγάρτοι, ἔφην, ἅτε σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τῆς τραγωδίας ποιηταὶ συγγιγνώσκουσιν
ἡμῖν τε καὶ ἐκείνοις ὅσοι ἡμῶν ἐγγὺς πολιτεύονται, ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν
πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα ἅτε τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς.

οἴμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη, συγγιγνώσκουσιν ὅσοιπέρ γε αὐτῶν
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κομποί.

εἰς δὲ γε οἴμαι τὰς ἄλλας περιόντες πόλεις, συλλέγοντες τοὺς ὄχλους, καλὰς
φωνὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ πιθανὰς μισθωσάμενοι, εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ
δημοκρατίας ἔλκουσι τὰς πολιτείας.

μάλα γε.

οὐκοῦν καὶ προσέτι τούτων μισθοὺς λαμβάνουσι καὶ τιμῶνται, μάλιστα μὲν,

ὥσπερ τὸ εἰκός, ὑπὸ τυράννων, δεύτερον δὲ ὑπὸ δημοκρατίας· ὅσω δ' ἂν ἄνωτέρω ἴωσιν πρὸς

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τὸ ἄναντες τῶν πολιτειῶν, μᾶλλον ἀπαγορεύει αὐτῶν ἢ τιμή, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος ἀδυνατοῦσα πορεύεσθαι.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἀλλὰ δὴ, εἶπον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐξέβημεν· λέγωμεν δὲ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατόπεδον, τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ πολὺ καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐδέποτε ταῦτόν, πόθεν θρέπεται.

δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ἢ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα ἀναλώσει, ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐξαρκῇ τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων, ἐλάττους εἰσφορὰς ἀναγκάζων τὸν δῆμον εἰσφέρειν.

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τί δ' ὅταν δὴ ταῦτα ἐπιλίπη;

δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατρῶων θρέπεται αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ ἑταῖραι.

μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅτι ὁ δῆμος ὁ γεννήσας τὸν τύραννον θρέφει αὐτόν τε καὶ ἑταίρους.

πολλὴ αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη.

πῶς δὲ λέγεις; εἶπον· ἐάν δὲ ἀγανακτῇ τε καὶ λέγῃ ὁ δῆμος ὅτι οὐτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὕδν ἡβῶντα, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον ὑπὸ ὑέος πατέρα, οὐτε τοῦτου αὐτὸν ἔνεκα

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ἐγέννησέν τε καὶ κατέστησεν, ἵνα, ἐπειδὴ μέγας γένοιτο, τότε αὐτὸς δουλεύων τοῖς αὐτοῦ δούλοις τρέφοι ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τοὺς δούλους μετὰ συγκλύδων ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κάγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθεῖ ἐκείνου προστάντος, καὶ νῦν κελεῦει ἀπιέναι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὥσπερ πατήρ ὕδν ἐξ οἰκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν συμποτῶν ἐξελαύνων;

γνώσεται γε, νῆ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, τότε ἤδη ὁ δῆμος οἶος οἶον

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θρέμμα γεννῶν ἡσπάζετό τε καὶ ἠϋξεν, καὶ ὅτι ἀσθενέστερος ὦν ἰσχυροτέρους ἐξελαύνει.

πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις; τολμήσει τὸν πατέρα βιάζεσθαι, καὶ μὴ πείθηται, τύπτειν ὁ τύραννος;

ναί, ἔφη, ἀφελόμενός γε τὰ ὅπλα.

πατραλοῖαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τύραννον καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτο δὴ ὁμολογουμένη ἂν ἦδη τυραννὶς εἴη, καί, τὸ λεγόμενον, ὁ δῆμος φεύγων ἂν καπνὸν

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δουλείας ἐλευθέρων εἰς πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας ἂν ἐμπεπτωκὼς εἴη, ἀντὶ τῆς πολλῆς ἐκείνης καὶ ἀκαίρου ἐλευθερίας τὴν χαλεπωτάτην τε καὶ πικροτάτην δούλων δουλείαν μεταμπίσχομενος.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτω γίγνεται.

τί οὖν; εἶπον· οὐκ ἔμμελῶς ἡμῖν εἰρήσεται, ἔὰν φῶμεν ἱκανῶς διεληλυθῆναι
ὡς μεταβαίνει τυραννὶς ἐκ δημοκρατίας, γενομένη τε οἷα ἐστίν;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.

Republic

English translation

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Very good. We are agreed then, Glaucon, that the state which is to achieve the height of good government must have community[*] of wives and children and all education, and also that the pursuits of men and women must be the same in peace and war, and that the rulers or kings[*] over them[*] are to be those who have approved themselves the best in both war and philosophy. We are agreed, he said. And we further granted this,

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that when the rulers are established in office they shall conduct these soldiers and settle them in habitations[*] such as we described, that have nothing private for anybody but are common for all, and in addition to such habitations we agreed, if you remember, what should be the nature of their possessions.[*] Why, yes, I remember, he said, that we thought it right that none of them should have anything that ordinary men[*] now possess, but that, being as it were athletes[*]

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of war and guardians, they should receive from the others as pay[*] for their guardianship each year their yearly sustenance, and devote their entire attention to the care of themselves and the state. That is right, I said. But now that we have finished this topic let us recall the point at which we entered on the digression[*] that has brought us here, so that we may proceed on our way again by the same path. That is easy, he said; for at that time, almost exactly as now, on the supposition that you had finished the description of the city, you were going on to say[*] that you assumed such a city

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as you then described and the corresponding type of man to be good, and that too though, as it appears, you had a still finer city and type of man to tell of;

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but at any rate you were saying that the others are aberrations,[*] if this city is right. But regarding the other constitutions, my recollection is that you said there were four species[*] worth speaking of[*] and observing their defects[*] and the corresponding types of men, in order that when we had seen them all and come to an agreement about the best and the worst man, we might determine whether the best is the happiest and the worst most wretched or whether it is otherwise.[*] And when I was asking what were

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the four constitutions you had in mind, Polemarchus and Adeimantus thereupon broke in, and that was how you took up the discussion again and brought to this point.[*]Your memory is most exact, I said. A second time then, as in a wrestling-match, offer me the same hold,[*] and when I repeat my question try to tell me what you were then about to say. I will if I can, said I. And indeed, said he, I am eager myself to hear what four forms of government you meant.

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There will be no difficulty about that, said I. For those I mean are precisely those that have names[*] in common usage: that which the many praised,[*] your[*] Cretan and Spartan constitution; and the second in place and in honor, that which is called oligarchy, a constitution teeming with many ills, and its sequent counterpart and opponent, democracy ; and then the noble[*] tyranny surpassing them all, the fourth and final malady[*] of a state.

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Can you mention any other type[*] of government, I mean any other that constitutes a distinct species[*]? For, no doubt, there are hereditary principalities[*] and purchased[*] kingships, and similar intermediate constitutions which one could find in even greater numbers among the barbarians than among the Greeks.[*] Certainly many strange ones are reported, he said.

Are you aware, then, said I, that there must be as many types of character among men as there are forms of government[*]? Or do you suppose that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak or rock[*] and not from the characters[*] of the citizens,

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which, as it were, by their momentum and weight in the scales[*] draw other things after them? They could not possibly come from any other source, he said. Then if the forms of government are five, the patterns of individual souls must be five also. Surely. Now we have already described the man corresponding to aristocracy[*] or the government of the best, whom we aver to be the truly good and just man.

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We have. Must we not, then, next after this, survey the inferior types, the man who is contentious and covetous of honor,[*] corresponding to the Laconian constitution, and the oligarchical man in turn, and the democratic and the tyrant, in order that,[*] after observing the most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of the possessor, so that we may either follow the counsel of Thrasymachus and pursue injustice

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or the present argument and pursue justice?Assuredly, he said, that is what we

have to do.[*] Shall we, then, as we began by examining moral qualities in states before individuals, as being more manifest there, so now consider first the constitution based on the love of honor? I do not know of any special name[*] for it in use. We must call it either timocracy[*] or timarchy. And then in connection with this

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we will consider the man of that type, and thereafter oligarchy and the oligarch, and again, fixing our eyes on democracy, we will contemplate the democratic man: and fourthly, after coming to the city ruled by a tyrant and observing it, we will in turn take a look into the tyrannical soul,[*] and so try to make ourselves competent judges[*] of the question before us. That would be at least[*] a systematic and consistent way of conducting the observation and the decision, he said.

Come, then, said I, let us try to tell in what way a timocracy would arise out of an aristocracy.

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Or is this the simple and unvarying rule, that in every form of government revolution takes its start from the ruling class itself,[*] when dissension arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself, however small it be, innovation is impossible? Yes, that is so. How, then, Glaucon, I said, will disturbance arise in our city, and how will our helpers and rulers fall out and be at odds with one another and themselves? Shall we, like Homer, invoke the Muses[*] to tell

how faction first fell upon them,

Hom. Il. 1.6

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and say that these goddesses playing with us and teasing us as if we were children address us in lofty, mock-serious tragic[*] style?

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How?

Somewhat in this fashion. Hard in truth[*] it is for a state thus constituted to be shaken and disturbed; but since for everything that has come into being destruction is appointed,[*] not even such a fabric as this will abide for all time, but it shall surely be dissolved, and this is the manner of its dissolution. Not only for plants that grow from the earth but also for animals that live upon it there is a cycle of bearing and barrenness[*] for soul and body as often as the revolutions of their orbs come full circle, in brief courses for the short-lived and oppositely for the opposite; but the laws of prosperous birth or infertility for your race,

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the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined with sensation,[*] but they will escape them, and there will be a time when they will beget children out of season. Now for divine

begettings there is a period comprehended by a perfect number,[*] and for mortal by the first in which augmentations dominating and dominated when they have attained to three distances and four limits of the assimilating and the dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render all things conversable[*] and commensurable

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with one another, whereof a basal four-thirds wedded to the pempad yields two harmonies at the third augmentation, the one the product of equal factors taken one hundred times, the other of equal length one way but oblong,—one dimension of a hundred numbers determined by the rational diameters of the pempad lacking one in each case, or of the irrational[*] lacking two; the other dimension of a hundred cubes of the triad. And this entire geometrical number is determinative of this thing, of better and inferior births.

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And when your guardians, missing this, bring together brides and bridegrooms unseasonably,[*] the offspring will not be well-born or fortunate. Of such offspring the previous generation will establish the best, to be sure, in office, but still these, being unworthy, and having entered in turn[*] into the powers of their fathers, will first as guardians begin to neglect us, paying too little heed to music[*] and then to gymnastics, so that our young men will deteriorate in their culture; and the rulers selected from them

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will not approve themselves very efficient guardians for testing

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Hesiod's and our races of gold, silver, bronze and iron.[*]

And this intermixture of the iron with the silver and the bronze with the gold will engender unlikeness[*] and an unharmonious unevenness, things that always beget war and enmity wherever they arise.

Of this lineage, look you,

Hom. Il. 6.211 we must aver the dissension to be, wherever it occurs and always. And rightly too, he said, we shall affirm that the Muses answer. They must needs, I said, since they are[*] Muses.

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Well, then, said he, what do the Muses say next? When strife arose, said I, the two groups were pulling against each other, the iron and bronze towards money-making and the acquisition of land and houses and gold and silver, and the other two, the golden and silvern, not being poor, but by nature rich in their souls,[*] were trying to draw them back to virtue and their original constitution, and thus, striving and contending against one another, they compromised[*] on the plan of distributing and taking for themselves the land and the houses,

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enslaving and subjecting as perioeci and serfs[*] their former friends[*] and

supporters, of whose freedom they had been the guardians, and occupying themselves with war and keeping watch over these subjects. I think, he said, that this is the starting-point of the transformation. Would not this polity, then, said I, be in some sort intermediate between aristocracy and oligarchy ? By all means.

By this change, then, it would arise. But after the change

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what will be its way of life? Is it not obvious that in some things it will imitate the preceding polity, in some the oligarchy, since it is intermediate, and that it will also have some qualities peculiar to itself? That is so, he said. Then in honoring its rulers and in the abstention of its warrior class from farming[*] and handicraft and money-making in general, and in the provision of common public tables[*] and the devotion to physical training and expertness in the game and contest of war—in all these traits it will copy the preceding state?

Yes. But in its fear

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to admit clever men to office, since the men it has of this kind are no longer simple[*] and strenuous but of mixed strain, and in its inclining rather to the more high-spirited and simple-minded type, who are better suited for war

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than for peace, and in honoring the stratagems and contrivances of war and occupying itself with war most of the time—in these respects for the most part its qualities will be peculiar to itself?

Yes. Such men, said I, will be avid of wealth, like those in an oligarchy, and will cherish a fierce secret lust for gold[*] and silver, owning storehouses[*] and private treasuries where they may hide them away, and also the enclosures[*] of their homes, literal private love-nests[*] in which they can lavish their wealth on their women[*]

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and any others they please with great expenditure. Most true, he said. And will they not be stingy about money, since they prize it and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of others' wealth[*] because of their appetites, enjoying[*] their pleasures stealthily, and running away from the law as boys from a father,[*] since they have not been educated by persuasion[*] but by force because of their neglect of the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy,

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and because of their preference of gymnastics to music? You perfectly describe, he said, a polity that is a mixture[*] of good and evil. Why, yes, the elements have been mixed, I said, but the most conspicuous[*] feature in it is one thing only, due to the predominance of the high-spirited element, namely contentiousness and covetousness of honor.[*] Very much so, said he. Such, then, would be the origin and nature of this polity if we may merely outline

the figure

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of a constitution in words and not elaborate it precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show us the most just and the most unjust type of man, and it would be an impracticable task to set forth all forms[*] of government without omitting any, and all customs and qualities of men. Quite right, he said.

What, then, is the man that corresponds to this constitution? What is his origin and what his nature? I fancy, Adeimantus said, that he comes rather close[*] to Glaucon here

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in point of contentiousness. Perhaps, said I, in that, but I do not think their natures are alike in the following respects. In what?

He will have to be somewhat self-willed[*] and lacking in culture,[*] yet a lover of music and fond of listening[*] to talk and speeches, though by no means himself a rhetorician;

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and to slaves such a one would be harsh,[*] not scorning them as the really educated do, but he would be gentle with the freeborn and very submissive to officials, a lover of office and of honor,[*] not basing his claim to office[*] on ability to speak or anything of that sort but on his exploits in war or preparation for war, and he would be a devotee of gymnastics and hunting. [*]Why, yes, he said, that is the spirit of that polity.[*] And would not such a man

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be disdainful of wealth too in his youth, but the older he grew the more he would love it because of his participation in the covetous nature and because his virtue is not sincere and pure since it lacks the best guardian? What guardian? said Adeimantus. Reason, said I, blended with culture,[*] which is the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout life in the soul that possesses it. Well said, he replied. This is the character, I said, of the timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his name. By all means.

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His origin[*] is somewhat on this wise: Sometimes he is the young son of a good father who lives in a badly governed state and avoids honors and office and law-suits and all such meddlesomeness[*] and is willing to forbear something of his rights[*] in order to escape trouble.[*] How does he originate? he said. Why, when, to begin with, I said, he hears his mother complaining[*]

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that her husband is not one of the rulers and for that reason she is slighted among the other women, and when she sees that her husband is not much concerned about money and does not fight and brawl in private lawsuits and in the public assembly, but takes all such matters lightly, and when she

observes that he is self-absorbed[*] in his thoughts and neither regards nor disregards her overmuch,[*] and in consequence of all this laments and tells the boy that his father is too slack[*] and no kind of a man, with all the other complaints

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with which women[*] nag[*] in such cases. Many indeed, said Adeimantus, and after their kind.[*]

You are aware, then, said I, that the very house-slaves of such men, if they are loyal and friendly, privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and if they observe a debtor or any other wrongdoer whom the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to punish all such when he grows to manhood

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and prove himself more of a man than his father, and when the lad goes out he hears and sees the same sort of thing.[*] Men who mind their own affairs[*] in the city are spoken of as simpletons and are held in slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people's affairs are honored and praised. Then it is[*] that the youth, hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand listening to the words of his father, and with a near view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other men, is solicited by both, his father

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watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle[*] in his soul and the others the appetitive and the passionate[*]; and as he is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications,[*] under these two solicitations he comes to a compromise[*] and turns over the government in his soul[*] to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul[*] and covetous of honor.[*] You have, I think, most exactly described his origin.

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Then, said I, we have our second polity and second type of man. We have, he said.

Shall we then, as Aeschylus: would say, tell of another champion before another gate,

Aesch. Seven 451 [*] or rather, in accordance with our plan,[*] the city first? That, by all means, he said. The next polity, I believe, would be oligarchy. And what kind of a regime, said he, do you understand by oligarchy? That based on a property qualification,[*] said I, wherein the rich hold office

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and the poor man is excluded. I understand, said he. Then, is not the first thing to speak of how democracy passes over into this? Yes. And truly, said I, the manner of the change is plain even to the proverbial blind man.[*] How so? That treasure-house[*] which each possesses filled with gold destroys that polity; for first they invent ways of expenditure for themselves and pervert the laws to this end,

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and neither they nor their wives obey them. That is likely, he said. And then, I take it, by observing and emulating one another they bring the majority of them to this way of thinking. That is likely, he said. And so, as time goes on, and they advance[*] in the pursuit of wealth, the more they hold that in honor the less they honor virtue. May not the opposition of wealth and virtue[*] be conceived as if each lay in the scale[*] of a balance inclining opposite ways? Yes, indeed, he said.

So, when wealth is honored

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in a state, and the wealthy, virtue and the good are less honored. Obviously. And that which men at any time honor they practise, [*] and what is not honored is neglected. It is so. Thus, finally, from being lovers of victory and lovers of honor they become lovers of gain-getting and of money, and they commend and admire the rich man and put him in office but despise the man who is poor. Quite so. And is it not then that they pass a law

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defining the limits[*] of an oligarchical polity, prescribing[*] a sum of money, a larger sum where it is more[*] of an oligarchy, where it is less a smaller, and proclaiming that no man shall hold office whose property does not come up to the required valuation? And this law they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting to that they establish their government by terrorization.[*] Is not that the way of it? It is. The establishment then, one may say, is in this wise. Yes, he said, but what is the character of this constitution, and what are the defects that we said

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it had?

To begin with, said I, consider the nature of its constitutive and defining principle. Suppose men should appoint the pilots[*] of ships in this way, by property qualification, and not allow[*] a poor man to navigate, even if he were a better pilot. A sorry voyage they would make of it, he said. And is not the same true of any other form of rule? I think so. Except of a city, said I, or does it hold for a city too? Most of all, he said, by as much as that is the greatest and most difficult[*] rule of all.

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Here, then, is one very great defect in oligarchy. So it appears. Well, and is this a smaller one? What? That such a city should of necessity be not one, [*] but two, a city of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and always plotting[*] against one another. No, by Zeus, said he, it is not a bit smaller. Nor, further, can we approve of this—the likelihood that they will not be able to wage war, because of the necessity of either arming and employing the multitude, [*]

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and fearing them more than the enemy, or else, if they do not make use of them, of finding themselves on the field of battle, oligarchs indeed,[*] and rulers over a few. And to this must be added their reluctance to contribute money, because they are lovers of money. No, indeed, that is not admirable. And what of the trait we found fault with long ago[*]—the fact that in such a state the citizens are busy-bodies and jacks-of-all-trades, farmers,

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financiers and soldiers all in one? Do you think that is right? By no manner of means. Consider now whether this polity is not the first that admits that which is the greatest of all such evils. What? The allowing a man to sell all his possessions,[*] which another is permitted to acquire, and after selling them to go on living in the city, but as no part of it,[*] neither a money-maker, nor a craftsman, nor a knight, nor a foot-soldier, but classified only as a pauper[*] and a dependent.

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This is the first, he said. There certainly is no prohibition of that sort of thing in oligarchical states. Otherwise some of their citizens would not be excessively rich, and others out and out paupers. Right. But observe this.

When such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he then of any more use to the state in the matters of which we were speaking, or did he merely seem to belong to the ruling class, while in reality he was neither ruler nor helper in the state, but only a consumer of goods[*]? It is so, he said; he only seemed, but was

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just a spendthrift. Shall we, then, say of him that as the drone[*] springs up in the cell, a pest of the hive, so such a man grows up in his home, a pest of the state? By all means, Socrates, he said. And has not God, Adeimantus, left the drones which have wings and fly stingless one and all, while of the drones here who travel afoot he has made some stingless but has armed others with terrible stings? And from the stingless finally issue beggars in old age,[*]

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but from those furnished with stings all that are denominated[*] malefactors? Most true, he said. It is plain, then, said I, that wherever you see beggars in a city, there are somewhere in the neighborhood concealed thieves and cutpurses and temple-robbers and similar artists in crime. Clearly, he said. Well, then, in oligarchical cities do you not see beggars? Nearly all are such, he said, except the ruling class. Are we not to suppose, then,

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that there are also many criminals in them furnished with stings, whom the rulers by their surveillance forcibly[*] restrain? We must think so, he said. And shall we not say that the presence of such citizens is the result of a defective culture and bad breeding and a wrong constitution of the state? We shall. Well, at any rate such would be the character of the oligarchical state,

and these, or perhaps even more than these, would be the evils that afflict it. Pretty nearly these, he said.

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Then, I said, let us regard as disposed of the constitution called oligarchy, whose rulers are determined by a property qualification.[*] And next we are to consider the man who resembles it—how he arises and what after that his character is. Quite so, he said.

Is not the transition from that timocratic youth to the oligarchical type mostly on this wise? How? When a son born to the timocratic man at first emulates his father, and follows in his footsteps[*] and then sees him

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suddenly dashed,[*] as a ship on a reef,[*] against the state, and making complete wreckage[*] of both his possessions and himself perhaps he has been a general, or has held some other important office, and has then been dragged into court by mischievous sycophants and put to death or banished[*] or outlawed and has lost all his property— It is likely, he said. And the son, my friend, after seeing and suffering these things, and losing his property, grows timid, I fancy, and forthwith thrusts headlong[*] from his bosom's throne[*]

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that principle of love of honor and that high spirit, and being humbled by poverty turns to the getting of money, and greedily[*] and stingily and little by little by thrift and hard work collects property. Do you not suppose that such a one will then establish on that throne the principle of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of gold, and girt with the Persian sword? I do, he said. And under this domination he will force the rational

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and high-spirited principles to crouch lowly to right and left[*] as slaves, and will allow the one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of making more money from a little,[*] and the other to admire and honor nothing but riches and rich men, and to take pride in nothing but the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to that? There is no other transformation so swift and sure of the ambitious youth into the avaricious type.

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Is this, then, our oligarchical man? said I. He is developed, at any rate, out of a man resembling the constitution from which the oligarchy sprang.

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Let us see, then, whether he will have a like character.

Let us see.

Would he not, in the first place, resemble it in prizing wealth above everything? Inevitably. And also by being thrifty and laborious, satisfying only

his own necessary[*] appetites and desires and not providing for expenditure on other things, but subduing his other appetites as vain and unprofitable? By all means. He would be a squalid[*] fellow, said I, looking for a surplus of profit[*] in everything,

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and a hoarder, the type the multitude approves.[*] Would not this be the character of the man who corresponds to such a polity? I certainly think so, he said. Property, at any rate, is the thing most esteemed by that state and that kind of man. That, I take it, said I, is because he has never turned his thoughts to true culture. I think not, he said, else he would not have made the blind[*] one leader of his choir and first in honor.[*] Well said, I replied. But consider this. Shall we not say that owing to this lack of culture the appetites of the drone spring up in him,

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some the beggarly, others the rascally, but that they are forcibly restrained by his general self-surveillance and self-control[*]? We shall indeed, he said. Do you know, then, said I, to what you must look to discern the rascalities of such men? To what? he said. To guardianships of orphans,[*] and any such opportunities of doing injustice with impunity. True. And is it not apparent by this that in other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a seeming just man, he by some better[*] element in himself

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forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling within,[*] not persuading them that it is better not[*] nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his possessions generally. Quite so, he said. Yes, by Zeus, said I, my friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to spend the money of others, you will discover the existence of drone-like appetites. Most emphatically. Such a man, then, would not be free from internal dissension.[*] He would not be really one, but in some sort a double[*] man. Yet for the most part,

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his better desires would have the upper hand over the worse. It is so. And for this reason, I presume, such a man would be more seemly, more respectable, than many others; but the true virtue of a soul in unison and harmony[*] with itself would escape him and dwell afar. I think so.

And again, the thrifty stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally

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in the city for any prize of victory or in any other honorable emulation. He is unwilling to spend money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into alliance for the winning of the victory, he fights in true oligarchical[*] fashion with a small part of his resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds himself rich![*] Yes indeed, he said. Have we any further doubt, then, I said, as to the

correspondence and resemblance[*] between the thrifty and money-making man

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and the oligarchical state? None, he said.

We have next to consider, it seems, the origin and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the character of that type of man and range him beside the others for our judgement.[*] That would at least be a consistent procedure.

Then, said I, is not the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected in some such way as this—by the insatiate greed for that which it set before itself as the good,[*] the attainment of the greatest possible wealth?

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In what way? Why, since its rulers owe their offices to their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law the prodigals who arise among the youth from spending and wasting their substance. Their object is, by lending money on the property of such men, and buying it in, to become still richer and more esteemed. By all means. And is it not at once apparent in a state that this honoring of wealth is incompatible with a sober and temperate citizenship,[*]

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but that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably neglected. That is pretty clear, he said. And such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness[*] in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty men of no ignoble quality.[*] It surely has. And there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens,

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and eager for revolution.[*] 'Tis so.

But these money-makers with down-bent heads,[*] pretending not even to see[*] them, but inserting the sting of their money[*] into any of the remainder who do not resist, and harvesting from them in interest as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum,

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foster the drone and pauper element in the state. They do indeed multiply it, he said. And they are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing as he likes with his own,[*] or in this way, by a second law that does away with such abuses. What law? The law that is next best, and compels the citizens to pay heed to virtue.[*] For if a law commanded that most voluntary contracts[*] should be at the contractor's risk,

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the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke just now would grow up there. Much fewer, he said. But as it is, and for all these reasons, this is the plight to which the rulers in

the state reduce their subjects, and as for themselves and their off-spring, do they not make the young spoiled[*] wantons averse to toil of body and mind, 555c

and too soft to stand up against pleasure and pain,[*] and mere idlers? Surely. And do they not fasten upon themselves the habit of neglect of everything except the making of money, and as complete an indifference to virtue as the paupers exhibit? Little they care. And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the ruled are brought together on the march, in wayfaring, or in some other common undertaking, either a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow-soldiers

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or, for that matter, in actual battle, and observe one another, then the poor are not in the least scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, sunburnt[*] pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous flesh,[*] and sees him panting and helpless[*]—do you not suppose he will think that such fellows keep their wealth by the cowardice[*] of the poor, and that when the latter are together in private,

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one will pass the word to another our men are good for nothing? Nay, I know very well that they do, said he. And just as an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse[*] from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that, all the man is one internal war, in like manner does not the corresponding type of state need only a slight occasion,[*] the one party bringing in[*] allies from an oligarchical state, or the other from a democratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, and sometimes even

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apart from any external impulse faction arises[*]?

Most emphatically. And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out[*] others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share[*] in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.[*] Why, yes, he said, that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by force of arms or by terrorism[*] resulting in the withdrawal of one of the parties.

What, then, said I, is the manner of their life

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and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man. It is plain, he said. To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every man licence[*] to do as he likes? So it is said, he replied. And where there is such licence, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan[*] for leading his own life in the way that pleases him.

Obvious. All sorts[*] and conditions of men,

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then, would arise in this polity more than in any other? Of course. Possibly, said I, this is the most beautiful of polities as a garment of many colors, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps, I said, many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women[*] when they see bright-colored things.

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Yes indeed, he said. Yes, said I, and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution. Why so? Because, owing to this licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar[*] of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own. Perhaps at any rate, he said,

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he would not be at a loss for patterns.

And the freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a city, even if you are qualified,[*] or again, to submit to rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest are at war,[*] or to keep the peace when the others do so, unless you desire peace; and again, the liberty, in defiance of any law that forbids you, to hold office and sit on juries none the less,

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if it occurs to you to do so, is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment[*] for the time being?Perhaps, he said, for so long. And is not the placability[*] of some convicted criminals exquisite[*]? Or have you never seen in such a state men condemned to death or exile who none the less stay on, and go to and fro among the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the man slips in and out[*] like a revenant[*]? Yes, many, he said. And the tolerance of democracy,

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its superiority[*] to all our meticulous requirements, its disdain or our solemn[*] pronouncements[*] made when we were founding our city, that except in the case of transcendent[*] natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things fair and good,—how superbly[*] it tramples under foot all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices[*] and way of life a man turns to politics, but honoring him

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if only he says that he loves the people![*] It is a noble[*] polity, indeed! he said. These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful[*] form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike![*]

Yes, he said, everybody knows that.

Observe, then, the corresponding private character. Or must we first, as in the case of the polity, consider the origin of the type? Yes, he said. Is not this, then, the way of it? Our thrifty[*] oligarchical man

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would have a son bred in his father's ways. Why not? And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary. Obviously. And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define[*] our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites[*]? Let us do so. Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary,

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and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction.

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Is not that so? Most assuredly.

Then we shall rightly use the word necessary of them? Rightly. And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary? Fairly indeed. Let us select an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend the type.[*] Let us do so. Would not the desire of eating to keep in health and condition and the appetite

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for mere bread and relishes[*] be necessary? I think so. The appetite for bread is necessary in both respects, in that it is beneficial and in that if it fails we die. Yes. And the desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness? By all means. And should we not rightly pronounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these and seeks other varieties of food, and that by correction[*] and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul's attainment of

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intelligence and sobriety? Nay, most rightly. And may we not call the one group the spendthrift desires and the other the profitable,[*] because they help production? Surely. And we shall say the same of sexual and other appetites? The same. And were we not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the drone is the man who teems[*] with such pleasures and appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary desires, while the one who is ruled

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by his necessary appetites is the thrifty oligarchical man? Why, surely.

To return, then, said I, we have to tell how the democratic man develops from the oligarchical type. I think it is usually in this way. How? When a youth, bred in the illiberal and niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste of the honey of the drones and associates with fierce[*] and cunning creatures

who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety[*] and condition, there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning
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of the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy. Quite inevitably, he said. May we not say that just as the revolution in the city was brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside, coming to the support of the similar and corresponding party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized when a like and kindred[*] group of appetites from outside comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul? By all means, he said.

And if, I take it, a counter-alliance[*] comes to the rescue of the oligarchical part of his soul, either it may be from his father

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or from his other kin, who admonish and reproach him, then there arises faction[*] and counter-faction and internal strife in the man with himself. Surely. And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic element retires before the oligarchical, some of its appetites having been destroyed and others[*] expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man's soul and order is restored. That sometimes happens, he said. And sometimes, again, another brood of desires akin to those expelled

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are stealthily nurtured to take their place, owing to the father's ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong. Yes, that is wont to be the way of it. And they tug and pull back to the same associations and in secret intercourse engender a multitude. Yes indeed. And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel[*] of the young man's soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen

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and guardians[*] in the minds of men who are dear to the gods. Much the best, he said. And then false and braggart words[*] and opinions charge up the height and take their place and occupy that part of such a youth. They do indeed. And then he returns, does he not, to those Lotus-eaters[*] and without disguise lives openly with them. And if any support[*] comes from his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those braggart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress within him

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and refuse admission to the auxiliary force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys to the words of older friends in private life. And they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming reverence and awe folly[*] thrust it forth, a dishonored fugitive. And temperance they call want of manhood and banish it with contumely, and they teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are rusticity and illiberality, and they combine with a gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive them over the border.[*] They do indeed. And when

they have emptied

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and purged[*] of all these the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed[*] and occupied, and whom they are initiating with these magnificent and costly rites,[*] they proceed to lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and prodigality and shamelessness, resplendent[*] in a great attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in celebration of their praises they euphemistically denominate insolence good breeding, licence liberty, prodigality magnificence,

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and shamelessness manly spirit.

And is it not in some such way as this, said I, that in his youth the transformation takes place from the restriction to necessary desires in his education to the liberation and release of his unnecessary and harmful desires? Yes, your description is most vivid, said he. Then, in his subsequent life, I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time no more on his necessary than on his unnecessary pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the period of storm and stress does not last too long, and as he grows older

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the fiercest tumult within him passes, and he receives back a part of the banished elements and does not abandon himself altogether to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality, forsooth,[*] and so lives turning over the guard-house[*] of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them all equally.[*] Quite so. And he does not accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth when anyone tells him

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that some pleasures arise from honorable and good desires, and others from those that are base,[*] and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he shakes his head[*] at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed. Such is indeed his state of mind and his conduct. And does he not, said I, also live out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the day, now wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute[*] and again drinking only water and dieting;

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and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up[*] and says and does whatever enters his head.[*] And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and

freedom and happiness and

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cleaves to it to the end. That is a perfect description, he said, of a devotee of equality. I certainly think, said I, that he is a manifold[*] man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that like that city[*] he is the fair and many-colored one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities. Yes, that is so, he said.

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Shall we definitely assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with democracy and would properly be designated as democratic? Let that be his place, he said.

And now, said I, the fairest[*] polity and the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny and the tyrant. Certainly, he said. Come then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises.[*] That it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain. Yes, plain. Is it, then, in a sense, in the same way in which democracy arises out of oligarchy that tyranny arises from democracy?

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How is that? The good that they proposed to themselves[*] and that was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it was wealth,[*] was it not? Yes. Well, then, the insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything else for the sake of money-making was the cause of its undoing. True, he said. And is not the avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and criterion of good the thing which dissolves it[*] too? What do you say its criterion to be? Liberty.[*] I replied; for you may hear it said that this is best managed in a democratic city,

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and for this reason that is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care to live.[*] Why, yes, he replied, you hear that saying everywhere. Then, as I was about to observe,[*] is it not the excess and greed of this and the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of a dictatorship? How? he said. Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers

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for its leaders[*] and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine,[*] and then, if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly, it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed[*] oligarchs.[*] Yes, that is what they do, he replied. But those who obey the rulers, I said, it reviles as willing slaves[*] and men of naught,[*] but it commends and honors in public and private rulers who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers.

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Is it not inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty should go to all

lengths[*]? Of course. And this anarchical temper, said I, my friend, must penetrate into private homes and finally enter into the very animals.[*] Just what do we mean by that? he said.

Why, I said, the father habitually tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his sons, and the son likens himself to the father and feels no awe or fear of his parents,[*]

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so that he may be forsooth a free man.[*] And the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner likewise. Yes, these things do happen, he said. They do, said I, and such other trifles as these. The teacher in such case fears and fawns upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the teacher or to their overseers either. And in general the young ape their elders and vie with them in speech and action, while the old, accommodating[*] themselves to the young,

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are full of pleasantry[*] and graciousness, imitating the young for fear they may be thought disagreeable and authoritative. By all means, he said. And the climax of popular liberty, my friend, I said, is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free[*] than the owners who paid for them. And I almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men.

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Shall we not, then, said he, in Aeschylean phrase,[*] say whatever rises to our lips? Certainly, I said, so I will. Without experience of it no one would believe how much freer the very beasts[*] subject to men are in such a city than elsewhere. The dogs literally verify the adage[*] and like their mistresses become. And likewise the horses and asses are wont to hold on their way with the utmost freedom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets them and who does not step aside.[*] And so all things everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of liberty.[*]

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It is my own dream[*] you are telling me, he said; for it often happens to me when I go to the country. And do you note that the sum total of all these items when footed up is that they render the souls of the citizens so sensitive[*] that they chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude[*] and will not endure it? For you are aware that they finally pay no heed even to the laws[*] written or unwritten,[*]

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so that forsooth they may have no master anywhere over them. I know it very well, said he.

This, then, my friend, said I, is the fine and vigorous root from which tyranny grows, in my opinion. Vigorous indeed, he said; but what next?

The same malady, I said, that, arising in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more

widely diffused and more violent as a result of this licence, enslaves democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to bring about a corresponding reaction[*] to the opposite in the seasons,

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in plants, in animal bodies,[*] and most especially in political societies.

Probably, he said. And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state. Yes, that is probable.

Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution[*] than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude. That is reasonable, he said. That, however, I believe, was not your question,[*] but what identical[*] malady

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arising in democracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it? You say truly, he replied. That then, I said, was what I had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men, the most enterprising and vigorous portion being leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were likening them to drones,[*] some equipped with stings and others stingless. And rightly too, he said. These two kinds, then, I said, when they arise in any state, create a disturbance like that produced in the body[*] by phlegm and gall.

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And so a good physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and chiefly[*] to prevent their springing up, but if they do arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells and all. Yes, by Zeus, he said, by all means. Then let us take it in this way, I said, so that we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly.[*] How? Let us in our theory make a tripartite[*] division of the democratic state, which is in fact its structure. One such class,

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as we have described, grows up in it because of the licence, no less than in the oligarchic state. That is so. But it is far fiercer in this state than in that. How so? There, because it is not held in honor, but is kept out of office, it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the speaker's stand and keeps up a buzzing[*] and

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tolerates[*] no dissent, so that everything with slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a state. Quite so, he said. And so from time to time there emerges or is secreted from the multitude another group of this sort. What sort? he said. When all are pursuing wealth the most orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become the richest. It is likely. Then they are the most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and it is the easiest to extract.[*] Why, yes, he said, how could one squeeze it out of those who have

little? The capitalistic[*] class is, I take it, the name by which they are designated—the pasture of the drones. Pretty much so, he said.

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And the third class,[*] composing the people, would comprise all quiet[*] cultivators of their own farms[*] who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly. Yes, it is, he said, but it will not often do that,[*] unless it gets a share of the honey. Well, does it not always share, I said, to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing[*] to the people what they take from the well-to-do,[*] to keep the lion's share for themselves[*]? Why, yes, he said, it shares

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in that sense. And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their power. Of course. And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.[*] Surely. And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will[*] but through misapprehension,[*] and being misled

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by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then,[*] whether they wish it or not,[*] they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them. Precisely. And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side. Yes, indeed. And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector[*] and cherish and magnify him? Yes, it is. This, then, is plain,

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said I, that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root[*] and from nothing else. Very plain. What, then, is the starting-point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the protector's acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia[*]? What is that? he said. The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims

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is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale? I have. And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob,[*] does not withhold his hand from the shedding of tribal blood,[*] but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, blotting out[*] a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood,

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banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands[*]—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate[*] that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf? It is quite inevitable, he said. He it is, I said, who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property.[*] Yes, he. May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant? Obviously. And if they are unable

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to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth. That is certainly wont to happen, said he. And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition[*] of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe[*] for the friend of democracy.

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They do indeed, he said. And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves. Yes, indeed. And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth the repute of hostility to democracy,[*] then in the words of the oracle delivered to Croesus, By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos Swift is his flight, he stays not nor blushes to show the white feather.

Hdt. 1.55 No, for he would never get a second chance to blush. And he who is caught, methinks, is delivered to his death. Inevitably. And then obviously that protector does not lie prostrate, mighty with far-flung limbs,

Hom. Il. 16.776 in Homeric overthrow,[*] but

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overthrowing many others towers in the car of state[*] transformed from a protector into a perfect and finished tyrant. What else is likely? he said. Shall we, then, portray the happiness, said I, of the man and the state in which such a creature arises? By all means let us describe it, he said. Then at the start and in the first days does he not smile[*] upon all men and greet everybody he meets and deny that he is a tyrant,

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and promise many things in private and public, and having freed men from debts, and distributed lands to the people and his own associates, he affects a gracious and gentle manner to all? Necessarily, he said. But when, I suppose, he has come to terms with some of his exiled enemies[*] and has got others destroyed and is no longer disturbed by them, in the first place he is always stirring up some war[*] so that the people may be in need of a leader. That is likely.

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And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him? Obviously. And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking wars[*]? Yes, he is compelled to do so. And by such conduct

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will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens? Of course. And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish[*] and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest? Yes, it is likely. Then the tyrant must do away[*] with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe. Obviously. He must look sharp to see, then,

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who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city.[*] A fine purgation, he said. Yes, said I, just the opposite of that which physicians practise on our bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse. Yes, for apparently he must, he said, if he is to keep his power.

Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him,

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said I, which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life. Such it is, he said. And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards? Of course. Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them? Unbidden, he said, they will wing their way[*] to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage. Drones, by the dog, I said, I think you are talking of again,

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an alien[*] and motley crew.[*] You think rightly, he said. But what of the home supply,[*] would he not choose to employ that? How? By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard. Assuredly, he said, since these are those whom he can most trust. Truly, said I, this tyrant business[*] is a blessed[*] thing on your showing, if such are the friends and trustees

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he must employ after destroying his former associates. But such are indeed those he does make use of, he said. And these companions admire him, I said, and these new citizens are his associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him. Why should they not? Not for nothing,[*] said I, is tragedy in general

esteemed wise, and Euripides beyond other tragedians.[*] Why, pray?

Because among other utterances of pregnant thought[*] he said,

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Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.[*]

He meant evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise. Yes, he and the other poets, he said, call the tyrant's power likest God's[*] and praise it in many other ways. Wherefore, said I, being wise as they are, the poets of tragedy will pardon us and those whose politics resemble ours for not admitting them[*] into our polity, since they hymn the praises of tyranny. I think, he said, that the subtle minds[*]

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among them will pardon us. But going about to other cities, I fancy, collecting crowds and hiring fine, loud, persuasive voices,[*] they draw the politics towards tyrannies or democracies. Yes, indeed. And, further, they are paid and honored for this, chiefly, as is to be expected, by tyrants, and secondly by democracy.[*] But the higher they go, breasting constitution hill, the more their honor fails,

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as it were from lack of breath[*] unable to proceed. Quite so.

But this, said I, is a digression.[*] Let us return to that fair, multitudinous, diversified and ever-changing bodyguard of the tyrant and tell how it will be supported. Obviously, he said, if there are sacred treasures in the city he will spend these as long as they last and the property of those he has destroyed, thus requiring smaller contributions from the populace.

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But what when these resources fail[*]? Clearly, he said, his father's estate will have to support him and his wassailers, his fellows and his she-fellows. I understand, I said, that the people which begot the tyrant[*] will have to feed him and his companions. It cannot escape from that, he said.

And what have you to say, I said, in case the people protests and says that it is not right that a grown-up son should be supported by his father, but the reverse,

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and that it did not beget and establish him in order that, when he had grown great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector, it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and the so-called better classes,[*] and that it now bids him and his crew depart from the city as a father expels[*] from his house a son together with troublesome revellers? The demos, by Zeus, he said, will then learn to its cost[*]

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what it is and what[*] a creature it begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to expel the stronger. What do you mean? said

I; will the tyrant dare to use force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to strike him[*]? Yes, he said, after he has once taken from him his arms. A very parricide, said I, you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged

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into the fire[*] of enslavement to slaves, and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable liberty[*] has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel and bitter servile servitude.[*] Yes indeed, he said, that is just what happens. Well, then, said I, shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we have sufficiently described the transformation of a democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the tyranny itself? Quite sufficiently, he said.

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αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τυραννικὸς ἀνὴρ σκέψασθαι, πῶς τε μεθίσταται ἐκ δημοκρατικοῦ, γενόμενός τε ποῖός τις ἔστιν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζῆν, ἄθλιον ἢ μακάριον.

λοιπὸς γάρ οὖν ἔτι οὗτος, ἔφη.

οἷσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ποθῶ ἔτι;

τὸ ποῖον;

τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οἷαι τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰσίν, οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν ἱκανῶς διηρησθαι. τοῦτου δὲ ἐνδεῶς ἔχοντος, ἀσαφεστέρα

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ἔσται ἡ ζήτησις οὗ ζητοῦμεν.

οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτ' ἐν καλῷ;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ σκόπει γε ὁ ἐν αὐταῖς βούλομαι ἰδεῖν. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε. τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαιῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δοκοῦσι τινές μοι εἶναι παράνομοι, αἱ κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ἐγγίγνεσθαι παντί, κολαζόμεναι δὲ ὑπὸ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν μετὰ λόγου ἐνίων μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἢ παντάπασιν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἢ ὀλίγαι λείπεσθαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς,

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τῶν δὲ ἰσχυρότεραι καὶ πλείους.

λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας, ἔφη, ταύτας;

τὰς περὶ τὸν ὕπνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐγειρομένας, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τῆς ψυχῆς εὖδῃ, ὅσον λογιστικὸν καὶ ἡμερον καὶ ἄρχον ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ θηριῶδές τε καὶ ἄγριον, ἢ σίτων ἢ μέθης πλησθέν, σκιρτᾷ τε καὶ ἀπωσάμενον τὸν ὕπνον ζητῇ ἰέναι καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ αὐτοῦ ἡθη· οἷσθ' ὅτι πάντα ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τολμᾷ ποιεῖν, ὥς ἀπὸ πάσης λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον αἰσχύνης καὶ φρονήσεως, μητρί τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖν

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μειγνυσθαι, ὥς οἶεται, οὐδὲν ὀκνεῖ, ἄλλω τε ὀτρωοῦν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων, μαιφονεῖν τε ὅτιοῦν, βρώματός τε ἀπέχεσθαι μηδενός· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ οὔτε ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἐλλεῖπει οὐτ' ἀναισχυντίας.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

ὅταν δέ γε οἷμαι ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ σωφρόνως, καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕπνον ἵη τὸ λογιστικὸν μὲν ἐγείρας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐστιάσας λόγων καλῶν καὶ σκέψεων, εἰς σύννοιαν

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αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀφικόμενος, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν δὲ μήτε ἐνδεία δοὺς μήτε πλησμονῇ, ὅπως ἂν κοιμηθῇ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ θόρυβον

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τῷ βελτίστῳ χαῖρον ἢ λυπούμενον, ἀλλ' ἐᾷ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι του αἰσθάνεσθαι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἢ τι τῶν γεγονότων ἢ

ὄντων ἢ καὶ μελλόντων,
ὥσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς πραΰνας καὶ μὴ τισιν εἰς ὀργὰς ἐλθὼν
κεκινημένῳ τῷ θυμῷ καθεύδῃ, ἀλλ' ἡσυχάσας μὲν τῷ δύο εἶδη, τὸ τρίτον
δὲ κινήσας ἐν ᾧ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐγγίγνεται, οὕτως ἀναπαύηται, οἷσθ' ὅτι τῆς τ'
ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ μάλιστα ἄπτεται καὶ ἥκιστα παράνομοι τότε αἱ
ᾄψεις

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φαντάζονται τῶν ἐνυπνίων.

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἷμαι οὕτως.

ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐξήχθημεν εἰπεῖν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμεθα γινῶναι τόδ'
ἐστίν, ὡς ἄρα δεινόν τι καὶ ἄγριον καὶ ἄνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἐκάστω
ἔνεστι, καὶ πάννυ δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίοις μετρίοις εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς
ὑπνοῖς γίγνεται ἔνδηλον. εἰ οὖν τι δοκῶ λέγειν καὶ συγχωρεῖς, ἄθρει.
ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ.

τὸν τοίνυν δημοτικὸν ἀναμνήσθητι οἷον ἔφαμεν εἶναι.

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ἦν δὲ που γεγινώς ἐκ νέου ὑπὸ φειδωλῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος, τὰς
χρηματιστικὰς ἐπιθυμίας τιμῶντι μόνας, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς
τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα γιγνομένης ἀτιμάζοντι. ἦ γάρ;
ναί.

συγγενόμενος δὲ κομφοτέροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ἄρτι διήλθομεν
ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὀρμήσας εἰς ὕβριν τε πᾶσαν καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων εἶδος μίσει τῆς τοῦ
πατρὸς φειδωλίας, φύσιν δὲ τῶν διαφθειρόντων βελτίῳ ἔχων, ἀγόμενος
ἀμφοτέρωσε

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κατέστη εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν τρόποιν, καὶ μετρίως δὴ, ὡς ᾤετο, ἐκάστων
ἀπολαύων οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον βίον ζῆν, δημοτικὸς ἐξ
ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γεγονώς.

ἦν γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα περὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον.

θὲς τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἤδη πρεσβυτέρου γεγονότος νέον
ὑὸν ἐν τοῖς τούτου αὖ ἦθεσιν τεθραμμένον.

τίθημι.

τίθει τοίνυν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα περὶ αὐτὸν γιγνόμενα ἅπερ καὶ περὶ τὸν
πατέρα αὐτοῦ, ἀγόμενόν τε εἰς πᾶσαν

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παρανομίαν, ὀνομαζομένην δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγόντων ἐλευθερίαν ἅπασαν,
βοηθοῦντά τε ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ ταύταις ἐπιθυμίαις πατέρα τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
οἰκείους, τοὺς δ' αὖ παραβοηθοῦντας·

ὅταν δ' ἐλπίσωσιν οἱ δεινοὶ μάγοι τε καὶ τυραννοποιοὶ οὗτοι μὴ ἄλλως τὸν
νέον καθεῖξιν, ἔρωτά τινα αὐτῷ μηχανωμένους ἐμποιῆσαι προστάτην τῶν
ἀργῶν καὶ τὰ

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ἔτοιμα διανεμομένων ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφῆνά τινα—ἦ τί

ἄλλο οἶε εἶναι τὸν τῶν τοιοῦτων ἔρωτα; —

οὐδὲν ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἄλλ' ἢ τοῦτο.

οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν βομβοῦσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, θυμιαμάτων τε γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οἴνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων, ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὐξοῦσαι τε καὶ τρέφουσαι πόθου κέντρον ἐμποιήσωσι τῷ κηφῇ, τότε δὴ δορυφορεῖται τε ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ

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οἰστρᾷ οὗτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἐάν τινας ἐν αὐτῷ δόξας ἢ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὠθεῖ παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἔως ἂν καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης, μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ.

παντελῶς, ἔφη, τυραννικοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέγεις γένεσιν.

ἄρ' οὕν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ πάλαι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον τύραννος ὁ Ἔρωις λέγεται; κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, εἶπον, καὶ μεθυσθεὶς ἀνὴρ τυραννικόν τι

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φρόνημα ἴσχει;

ἴσχει γάρ.

καὶ μὴν ὃ γε μαινόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκινηκῶς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν ἐπιχειρεῖ τε καὶ ἐλπίζει δυνατὸς εἶναι ἄρχειν.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

τυραννικὸς δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀνὴρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν ἡ φύσει ἢ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις μεθυστικός τε καὶ ἐρωτικός καὶ μελαγχολικός γένηται.

παντελῶς μὲν οὕν.

γίγνεται μὲν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ· ζῆ δὲ δὴ πῶς;

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τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, ἔφη, τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς.

λέγω δὴ, ἔφην. οἷμαι γάρ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑορταὶ γίνονται παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κῶμοι καὶ θάλειαι καὶ ἐταῖραι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὧν ἂν Ἔρωις τύραννος ἔνδον οἰκῶν διακυβερνᾷ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα.

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὕν οὐ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ παραβλαστάνουσιν ἐπιθυμίαι ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἐκάστης, πολλῶν δεόμεναι;

πολλὰ μὲντοι.

ταχὺ ἄρα ἀναλίσκονται ἐάν τινες ὥσι πρόσοδοι.

πῶς δ' οὕ;

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καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ δανεισμοὶ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας παραιρέσεις.

τί μὴν;

ὅταν δὲ δὴ πάντ' ἐπιλείπῃ, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὲν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας βοᾶν πυκνάς τε καὶ σφοδράς ἐννενοστυεμένας, τοὺς δ' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κέντρων ἐλαυνομένους τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ διαφερόντως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ

Ἔρωτος, πάσαις ταῖς ἄλλαις ὥσπερ δορυφόροις ἡγούμενου, οἴστρᾱν καὶ σκοπεῖν τίς τι ἔχει, ὃν δυνατὸν ἀφελέσθαι ἀπατήσαντα ἢ

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βιασάμενον;

σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

ἀναγκαῖον δὴ πανταχόθεν φέρειν, ἢ μεγάλας ὠδίσι τε καὶ ὀδύναις συνέχεσθαι.

ἀναγκαῖον.

ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τῶν ἀρχαίων πλέον εἶχον καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων ἀφηροῦντο, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀξιώσει νεώτερος ὢν πατρός τε καὶ μητρὸς πλέον ἔχειν, καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐὰν τὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἀναλώσῃ, ἀπονειμάμενος τῶν πατρώων;

ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη.

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ἂν δὲ δὴ αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἄρ' οὐ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπιχειροῖ ἂν κλέπτειν καὶ ἀπατᾶν τοὺς γονέας;

πάντως.

ὅποτε δὲ μὴ δύναιτο, ἀρπάξοι ἂν καὶ βιάζοιτο μετὰ τοῦτο;

οἶμαι, ἔφη.

ἀντεχομένων δὴ καὶ μαχομένων, ὧ θαυμάσιε, γέροντός τε καὶ γραός, ἄρ' εὐλαβηθεῖη ἂν καὶ φείσαιο μὴ τι δρᾶσαι τῶν τυραννικῶν;

οὐ πάνν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε θαρρῶ περὶ τῶν γονέων τοῦ τοιοῦτου.

ἀλλ', ὧ Ἀδεῖμαντε, πρὸς Διός, ἔνεκα νεωστὶ φίλης καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας ἐταίρας γεγονυίας τὴν πάλαι φίλην καὶ ἀναγκαίαν

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μητέρα, ἢ ἔνεκα ὠραίου νεωστὶ φίλου γεγονότος οὐκ ἀναγκαίου τὸν ἄωρόν τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον πρεσβύτην πατέρα καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀρχαιότατον δοκεῖ ἂν σοι ὁ τοιοῦτος πληγαῖς τε δοῦναι καὶ καταδουλώσασθαι ἂν αὐτοὺς ὑπ' ἐκείνοις, εἰ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν ἀγάγοιτο;

ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

σφόδρα γε μακάριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ τυραννικὸν ὑδὸν τεκεῖν.

πάνν γ', ἔφη.

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τί δ', ὅταν δὴ τὰ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς ἐπιλείπῃ τὸν τοιοῦτον, πολὺ δὲ ἤδη συνειλεγμένον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν σμῆνος, οὐ πρῶτον μὲν οἰκίας τινὸς ἐφάπεται τοίχου ἢ τινος ὀψὲ νύκτωρ ἰόντος τοῦ ἱμαπίου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἱερὸν τι νεωκορήσει; καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν, αἷς πάλαι εἶχεν δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχυρῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιούμενας, αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμένα, δορυφοροῦσαι τὸν ἔρωτα, κρατήσουσι μετ' ἐκείνου, αἱ πρότερον μὲν ὄναρ

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ἐλύοντο ἐν ὕπνῳ, ὅτε ἦν αὐτὸς ἔτι ὑπὸ νόμοις τε καὶ πατρὶ δημοκρατούμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

τυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ Ἑρωτος, οἷος ὀλιγάκις ἐγίγνετο ὄναρ, ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος αἰεὶ γενόμενος, οὔτε τινὸς φόνου δεινοῦ ἀφέξεται οὔτε βρώματος οὔτ' ἔργου,

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ἀλλὰ τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἑρως ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ ζῶν, ἅτε αὐτὸς ὢν μόναρχος, τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ πόλιν ἄξει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τόλμαν, ὅθεν αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν θόρυβον θρέψει, τὸν μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσεληλυθότα ἀπὸ κακῆς ὁμιλίας, τὸν δ' ἔνδοθεν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεθέντα καὶ ἐλευθερωθέντα· ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ὁ βίος τοῦ τοιούτου; οὗτος μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

καὶ ἂν μὲν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐν πόλει

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ᾧσι καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πλῆθος σωφρονῇ, ἐξελθόντες ἄλλον τινὰ δορυφοροῦσι τύραννον ἢ μισθοῦ ἐπικουροῦσιν, ἔαν που πόλεμος ᾗ· ἔαν δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ γένωνται, αὐτοῦ δὴ ἐν τῇ πόλει κακὰ δρῶσι σμικρὰ πολλὰ. τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

οἷα κλέπτουσι, τοιχωρυχοῦσι, βαλλαντιοτομοῦσι, λωποδυτοῦσιν, ἱεροσυλοῦσιν, ἀνδραποδιζονται· ἔστι δ' ὅτε συκοφαντοῦσιν, ἔαν δυνατοὶ ᾧσι λέγειν, καὶ ψευδομαρτυροῦσι καὶ δωροδοκοῦσιν.

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σμικρὰ γ', ἔφη, κακὰ λέγεις, ἔαν ὀλίγοι ᾧσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι.

τὰ γὰρ σμικρὰ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ ἔστιν, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πρὸς τύραννον πονηρίᾳ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι πόλεως, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐδ' ἵκταρ βάλλει. ὅταν γὰρ δὴ πολλοὶ ἐν πόλει γένωνται οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ συνεπόμενοι αὐτοῖς, καὶ αἰσθῶνται ἑαυτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, τότε οὗτοι εἰσιν οἱ τὸν τύραννον γεννῶντες μετὰ δήμου ἀνοίας ἐκείνων, ὅς ἂν αὐτῶν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ μέγιστον καὶ πλεῖστον

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ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύραννον ἔχη.

εἰκότως γ', ἔφη· τυραννικώτατος γὰρ ἂν εἴη.

οὐκοῦν ἔαν μὲν ἐκόντες ὑπείκωσιν· ἔαν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπη ἡ πόλις, ὥσπερ τότε μητέρα καὶ πατέρα ἐκόλαζεν, οὕτω πάλιν τὴν πατρίδα, ἔαν οἷός τ' ᾗ, κολάζεται ἐπεισαγόμενος νέους ἐταίρους, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις δὴ δουλεύουσιν τὴν πάλαι φίλην μητρίδα τε, Κρηῖτές φασι, καὶ πατρίδα ἔξει τε καὶ θρέψει. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τέλος ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρός.

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τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, παντάπασί γε.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτοι γε τοιοῖδε γίνονται ἰδίᾳ καὶ πρὶν ἄρχειν· πρῶτον μὲν οἷς ἂν συνῶσιν, ἢ κόλαξιν ἑαυτῶν συνόντες καὶ πᾶν ἐτοίμοις ὑπηρετεῖν, ἢ ἔαν τοῦ τι δέωνται,

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αὐτοὶ ὑποπεσόντες, πάντα σχήματα τολμῶντες ποιεῖν ὥς οἰκεῖοι,

διαπραξάμενοι δὲ ἄλλότριοι;

καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ἐν παντὶ ἄρα τῷ βίῳ ζῶσι φίλοι μὲν οὐδέποτε οὐδενί, αἰεὶ δέ του
δεσπόζοντες ἢ δουλεύοντες ἄλλῳ, ἐλευθερίας δὲ καὶ φιλίας ἀληθοῦς
τυραννικὴ φύσις αἰεὶ ἄγευστος.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀπίστους καλοῖμεν;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

καὶ μὴν ἀδίκους γε ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς

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ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡμολογήσαμεν περὶ δικαιοσύνης οἶόν ἐστιν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἣ δ' ὅς, ὀρθῶς γε.

κεφαλαιωσώμεθα τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν κάκιστον. ἔστιν δέ που, οἶον ὄναρ
διήλθομεν, ὃς ἂν ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος ᾗ.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν οὗτος γίγνεται ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος φύσει ὢν μοναρχήσῃ, καὶ ὅσω
ἂν πλείω χρόνον ἐν τυραννίδι βιῶ, τοσοῦτ' ἂν μᾶλλον τοιοῦτος.

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη διαδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον ὁ Γλαῦκων.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὃς ἂν φαίνεται πονηρότατος, καὶ

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ἀθλιώτατος φανήσεται; καὶ ὃς ἂν πλεῖστον χρόνον καὶ μάλιστα τυραννεύσῃ,
μάλιστα τε καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον τοιοῦτος γεγονώς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ; τοῖς δὲ
πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ.

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ταῦτα γοῦν οὕτως ἔχειν.

ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἂν
εἴῃ ὁμοίωται, δημοτικὸς δὲ κατὰ δημοκρατουμένην, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὕτω;

τί μὴν;

οὐκοῦν, ὅτι πόλις πρὸς πόλιν ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, τοῦτο καὶ ἀνὴρ πρὸς
ἄνδρα;

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πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

τί οὖν ἀρετῇ τυραννουμένη πόλις πρὸς βασιλευομένην οἶαν τὸ πρῶτον
διήλθομεν;

πᾶν τοῦναντίον, ἔφη· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρίστη, ἢ δὲ κακίστη.

οὐκ ἐρήσομαι, εἶπον, ὅποτέραν λέγεις· δῆλον γάρ. ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ
καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις; καὶ μὴ ἐκπληττώμεθα πρὸς τὸν
τύραννον ἔνα ὄντα βλέποντες, μηδ' εἴ τινες ὀλίγοι περὶ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ' ὡς χρὴ
ὅλην

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τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθόντας θεάσασθαι, καταδύντες εἰς ἅπασαν καὶ ἰδόντες, οὕτω
δόξαν ἀποφαινώμεθα.

ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, προκαλεῖ· καὶ δῆλον παντὶ ὅτι τυραννουμένης μὲν οὐκ
ἔστιν ἀθλιωτέρα, βασιλευομένης δὲ οὐκ εὐδαιμονεστέρα.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα

προκαλούμενος ὀρθῶς ἂν προκαλοίμην, ἀξιῶν κρίνειν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνον, ὃς δύναται τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἥθος ἐνδύς διδεῖν καὶ μὴ καθάπερ παῖς ἔξωθεν ὀρῶν ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως ἣν πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω σχηματίζονται, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς διορᾷ; εἰ οὖν οἰοίμην δεῖν ἐκείνου πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀκούειν, τοῦ δυνατοῦ μὲν κρίναι, συνωκηκότος δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ παραγεγονότος ἔν τε ταῖς κατ' οἰκίαν πράξεσιν, ὡς πρὸς ἐκάστους τοὺς οἰκείους ἔχει, ἐν οἷς

μάλιστα γυμνὸς ἂν ὀφθῇ τῆς τραγικῆς σκευῆς, καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς δημοσίοις κινδύνοις, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἰδόντα κελεύοιμεν ἐξαγγέλλειν πῶς ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὁ τύραννος πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους; ὀρθότατ' ἂν, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα προκαλοῖτο.
βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, προσποιησώμεθα ἡμεῖς εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἂν κρίναι καὶ ἤδη ἐντυχόντων τοιούτοις, ἵνα ἔχωμεν ὅστις ἀποκρινεῖται ἃ ἐρωτῶμεν; πάνυ γε.

ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἔφην, ὧδε σκόπει. τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἀναμιμνησκόμενος τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός, οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει ἀθρῶν, τὰ παθήματα ἐκατέρου λέγε.

τὰ ποῖα; ἔφη.

πρῶτον μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς πόλιν εἰπεῖν, ἐλευθέραν ἢ δούλην τὴν τυραννουμένην ἔρεῖς;

ὡς οἷόν τ', ἔφη, μάλιστα δούλην.

καὶ μὴν ὀρᾷς γε ἐν αὐτῇ δεσπότης καὶ ἐλευθέρους.

ὀρῶ, ἔφη, σμικρὸν γέ τι τοῦτο· τὸ δὲ ὅλον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικέστατον ἀτίμως τε καὶ ἀθλίως δοῦλον.

εἰ οὖν, εἶπον, ὅμοιος ἀνὴρ τῇ πόλει, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἐνεῖναι, καὶ πολλῆς μὲν δουλείας τε καὶ ἀνελευθερίας γέμειν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη δουλεύειν, ἅπερ ἦν ἐπιεικέστατα, μικρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχθηρότατον καὶ μανικώτατον δεσποδεῖν; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

τί οὖν; δούλην ἢ ἐλευθέραν τὴν τοιαύτην φήσεις εἶναι ψυχὴν;

δούλην δῆπου ἔγωγε.

οὐκοῦν ἢ γε αὖ δούλη καὶ τυραννουμένη πόλις ἥκιστα ποιεῖ ἃ βούλεται; πολὺ γε.

καὶ ἡ τυραννουμένη ἄρα ψυχὴ ἥκιστα ποιήσει ἃ ἂν βουληθῇ, ὡς περὶ ὅλης εἰπεῖν ψυχῆς· ὑπὸ δὲ οἴστρου αἰεὶ ἐλκομένη βίᾳ ταραχῆς καὶ μεταμελείας μεστή ἔσται.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

πλουσίαν δὲ ἢ πενομένην ἀνάγκη τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν εἶναι;

πενομένην.

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καὶ ψυχὴν ἄρα τυραννικὴν πενιχρὰν καὶ ἄπληστον ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι.
οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς.

τί δέ; φόβου γέμειν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὴν τε τοιαύτην πόλιν τὸν τε τοιοῦτον
ἄνδρα;

πολλὴ γε.

ὀδυρμούς τε καὶ στεναγμούς καὶ θρήνους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας οἶε ἔν τινι ἄλλῃ
πλείους εὐρήσειν;

οὐδαμῶς.

ἐν ἀνδρὶ δὲ ἡγῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ πλείω εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ μαινομένῳ
ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμιῶν τε καὶ ἐρώτων τούτῳ τῷ τυραννικῷ;

πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη.

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εἰς πάντα δὴ οἶμαι ταῦτά τε καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας τὴν τε πόλιν τῶν
πόλεων ἀθλιωτάτην ἔκρινας—

οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς; ἔφη.

καὶ μάλα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὖ τοῦ τυραννικοῦ τί λέγεις εἰς
ταῦτά ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων;

μακρῶ, ἔφη, ἀθλιώτατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.

τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτ' ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

πῶς; ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὕτω, ἔφην, οἶμαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα.

ἀλλὰ τίς μήν;

ὅδε ἴσως σοι ἔτι δόξει εἶναι τούτου ἀθλιώτερος.

ποῖος;

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ὅς ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυραννικὸς ὢν μὴ ἰδιωτὴν βίον καταβιῶ, ἀλλὰ δυστυχὴς ἦ
καὶ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ τινος συμφορᾶς ἐκπορισθῇ ὥστε τυράννῳ γενέσθαι.

τεκμαίρομαι σε, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶεσθαι χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα τῷ τοιούτῳ
λόγῳ σκοπεῖν· περὶ γάρ τοι τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ σκέψεις, ἀγαθοῦ τε βίου καὶ
κακοῦ.

ὀρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

σκόπει δὴ εἰ ἄρα τι λέγω. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι δεῖν ἐννοῆσαι

578d

ἐκ τῶνδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοποῦντας.

ἐκ τίνων;

ἐξ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι πλούσιοι ἐν πόλεσιν ἀνδράποδα πολλὰ
κέκτηνται. οὗτοι γὰρ τοῦτο γε προσόμοιον ἔχουσιν τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ
πολλῶν ἄρχειν· διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἐκείνου πλῆθος.

διαφέρει γάρ.

οἴσθ' οὖν ὅτι οὗτοι ἀδεῶς ἔχουσιν καὶ οὐ φοβοῦνται τοὺς οἰκέτας;

τί γάρ ἂν φοβοῖντο;
οὐδέν, εἶπον· ἀλλὰ τὸ αἵτιον ἐννοεῖς;
ναί, ὅτι γε πᾶσα ἡ πόλις ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ βοηθεῖ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν.

578e

καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. τί δέ; εἰ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα ἓνα, ὅτῳ ἔστιν ἀνδράποδα
πεντήκοντα ἢ καὶ πλείω, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ
παῖδας θείη εἰς ἐρημίαν μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τε καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν, ὅπου
αὐτῷ μηδεὶς τῶν ἐλευθέρων μέλλοι βοηθήσειν, ἐν ποιῶ ἄν τινα καὶ ὁπόσω
φόβῳ οἷε γενέσθαι αὐτὸν περὶ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ παιδῶν καὶ γυναικός, μὴ
ἀπόλοιτο ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν;
ἐν παντί, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε.

579

579a

οὐκοῦν ἀναγκάζεται ἂν τινὰς ἤδη θωπεύειν αὐτῶν τῶν δούλων καὶ
ὑποσχνεῖσθαι πολλὰ καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν οὐδὲν δεόμενος, καὶ κόλαξ αὐτὸς ἂν
θεραπόντων ἀναφανείη;

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ἢ ἀπολωλέναι.

τί δ', εἰ καὶ ἄλλους, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεὸς κύκλῳ κατοικίσειεν γείτονας πολλοὺς
αὐτῷ, οἳ μὴ ἀνέχοντο εἰ τις ἄλλος ἄλλου δεσποῖεν ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' εἴ ποῦ τινα
τοιοῦτον λαμβάνοιεν, ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωροῖντο τιμωρίαις;

579b

ἔτι ἂν, ἔφη, οἶμαι, μᾶλλον ἐν παντί κακοῦ εἶη, κύκλῳ φρουρούμενος ὑπὸ
πάντων πολεμίῳν.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τοιούτῳ μὲν δεσμωτηρίῳ δέδετα ὁ τύραννος, φύσει ὦν οἶον
διελγλῦθαι, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἐρώτων μεστός· λίχνῳ δὲ
ὄντι αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχὴν μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἀποδημῆσαι ἔξεστιν
οὐδαμῶς, οὔτε θεωρῆσαι ὅσων διὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταὶ εἰσιν,
καταδεδουκὼς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῆ,

579c

φθονῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ἐὰν τις ἔξω ἀποδημῇ καὶ τι ἀγαθὸν ὁρᾷ;
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς πλείω καρποῦται ἀνὴρ ὃς ἂν κακῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ
πολιτευόμενος, ὃν νυνδὴ σὺ ἀθλιώτατον ἔκρινας, τὸν τυραννικόν, ὡς μὴ
ἰδιώτης καταβιῶ, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκασθῇ ὑπὸ τινος τύχης τυραννεῦσαι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ
ὦν ἀκράτωρ ἄλλων ἐπιχειρήσῃ ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ εἰ τις κάμνοντι σώματι καὶ
ἀκράτορι ἑαυτοῦ μὴ ἰδιωτεύων ἀλλ' ἀγωνιζόμενος

579d

πρὸς ἄλλα σώματα καὶ μαχόμενος ἀναγκάζεται διάγειν τὸν βίον.

παντάπασι, ἔφη, ὁμοιότατά τε καὶ ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαῦκων, παντελῶς τὸ πάθος ἄθλιον, καὶ τοῦ
ὑπὸ σοῦ κριθέντος χαλεπώτατα ζῆν χαλεπώτερον ἔτι ζῆ ὁ τυραννῶν;
κομιδῇ γ', ἔφη.

ἔστιν ἄρα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, κἄν εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ, ὁ τῷ ὄντι τύραννος τῷ ὄντι
δοῦλος τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας

579e

καὶ κόλαξ τῶν πονηροτάτων, καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν
ἀποπιμπλάς, ἀλλὰ πλείστων ἐπιδεέστατος καὶ πένης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ φαίνεται,
ἐὰν τις ὅλην ψυχὴν ἐπίστηται θεάσασθαι, καὶ φόβου γέμων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ
βίου, σφαδασμῶν τε καὶ ὀδυνῶν πλήρης, εἴπερ τῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ἦς
ἄρχει ἔοικεν. ἔοικεν δέ· ἦ γάρ;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

580

580a

οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι ἀποδώσομεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρότερον
εἵπομεν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον γίνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον
διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθονερῷ, ἀπίστῳ, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ καὶ πάσης κακίας
πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ, καὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεῖ
εἶναι, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον αὐτῷ τοιοῦτους ἀπεργάζεσθαι.
οὐδεὶς σοι, ἔφη, τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ἀντερεῖ.

ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἤδη ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων

580b

κριτῆς ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ οὕτω, τίς πρῶτος κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν
εὐδαιμονία καὶ τίς δεῦτερος, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξῆς πέντε ὄντας κρῖνε,
βασιλικόν, τιμοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικόν, δημοκρατικόν, τυραννικόν.
ἀλλὰ ῥαδίᾳ, ἔφη, ἢ κρίσις. καθάπερ γὰρ εἰσιῆλθον ἐγωγε ὥσπερ χοροὺς
κρίνω ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ.
μισθωσώμεθα οὖν κήρυκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἀνείπω ὅτι ὁ Ἀρίστωνος υἱὸς
τὸν ἄριστόν τε καὶ δικαιοτάτον εὐδαιμονέστατον

580c

ἔκρινε, τοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα αὐτοῦ, τὸν δὲ
κάκιστόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτατον ἀθλιώτατον, τοῦτον δὲ αὖ τυγχάνειν ὄντα ὃς ἂν
τυραννικώτατος ὦν ἑαυτοῦ τε ὅτι μάλιστα τυραννῇ καὶ τῆς πόλεως;
ἀνειρήσθω σοι, ἔφη.

ἦ οὖν προσαναγορεύω, εἶπον, ἐάντε λανθάνωσιν τοιοῦτοι ὄντες ἐάντε μὴ
πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεούς;

προσαναγόρευε, ἔφη.

εἶεν δὴ, εἶπον· αὕτη μὲν ἡμῖν ἢ ἀπόδειξις μία ἂν εἴη,

580d

δευτέραν δὲ ἰδὲ τήνδε, ἐάν τι δόξη εἶναι.

τίς αὕτη;

ἐπειδὴ, ὥσπερ πόλις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διήρηται κατὰ τρία εἶδη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ
ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τριχῇ, λογιστικὸν δέξεται, ὡς ἑμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἑτέραν
ἀπόδειξιν.

τίνα ταύτην;

τήνδε. τριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναὶ μοι φαίνονται, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μία ἰδία·
ἐπιθυμιαὶ τε ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί.

πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

τὸ μὲν, φασκέν, ἦν ᾧ μανθάνει ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ ᾧ θυμοῦται, τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ

πολυειδίαν ἐνὶ οὐκ ἔσχομεν ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν

580e

ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ὁ μέγιστον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον εἶχεν ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦτῳ ἐπωνομάσαμεν·

ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλήκαμεν διὰ σφοδρότητα τῶν τε περὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ πόσιν καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοῦτοις ἀκόλουθα, καὶ φιλοχρήματον δὴ, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται

581

581a

αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμίαι.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλίαν εἰ φαῖμεν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους, μάλιστα ἂν εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπεριδοίμεθα τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε τι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς δηλοῦν, ὅποτε τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος λέγοιμεν, καὶ καλοῦντες αὐτὸ φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν;

ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

τί δέ; τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν μέντοι φαμέν καὶ νικᾶν καὶ εὐδοκιμεῖν ἀεὶ ὅλον ὠρμηῖσθαι;

581b

καὶ μάλα.

εἰ οὖν φιλόνικον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγορεύοιμεν, ἢ ἐμμελῶς ἂν ἔχοι; ἐμμελέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧ γε μανθάνομεν, παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὅπῃ ἔχει πᾶν ἀεὶ τέταται, καὶ χρημάτων τε καὶ δόξης ἥκιστα τούτων τοῦτῳ μέλει.

πολύ γε.

φιλομαθὲς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἄρχει ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν μὲν

581c

τοῦτο, τῶν δὲ τὸ ἕτερον ἐκείνων, ὁπότερον ἂν τύχη;

οὕτως, ἔφη.

διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι,

φιλόσοφον, φιλόνικον, φιλοκερδὲς;

κομιδῇ γε.

καὶ ἡδονῶν δὴ τρία εἶδη, ὑποκείμενον ἐν ἐκάστῳ τούτων;

πάνυ γε.

οἷσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ ἑτέλοις τρεῖς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον ἀνερωτᾶν τίς τούτων τῶν βίων ἡδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος μάλιστα ἐγκωμιάσεται; ὃ τε

581d

χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς τὸ κερδαίνειν τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ μανθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἰ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ; ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

τί δὲ ὁ φιλότιμος; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν
φορτικὴν τινα ἡγεῖται, καὶ αὖ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν, ὅτι μὴ μάθημα τιμὴν
φέρει, καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν;

οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει.

τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί οἰώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας

581e

ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τάληθές ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ
ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα; τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω; καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὄντι
ἀναγκαίᾳς, ὥς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν;

εὔ, ἔφη, δεῖ εἰδέναι;

ὅτε δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἐκάστου τοῦ εἰδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς
ὁ βίος, μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἄμεινον,
ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ

582

582a

ἡδιον καὶ ἀλυπότερον, πῶς ἂν εἰδεῖμεν τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα λέγει;
οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε ἔχω εἰπεῖν.

ἀλλ' ὥδε σκόπει· τινὶ χρὴ κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι; ἄρ'
οὐκ ἐμπειρία τε καὶ φρονήσῃ καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ τούτων ἔχοι ἂν τις βέλτιον
κριτήριον;

καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἔφη.

σκόπει δὴ· τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐμπειρότατος πασῶν ὧν εἵπομεν
ἡδονῶν; πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδής, μανθάνων αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν οἷόν ἐστιν,
ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τῆς

582b

ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ὁ φιλόσοφος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν;
πολὺ, ἔφη, διαφέρει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι τῶν ἑτέρων ἐκ παιδὸς
ἀρξαμένῳ· τῷ δὲ φιλοκερδεῖ, ὅπῃ πέφυκε τὰ ὄντα μανθάνοντι, τῆς ἡδονῆς
ταύτης, ὥς γλυκεῖα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι οὐδ' ἐμπείρῳ γίγνεσθαι,
μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένῳ οὐ ῥάδιον.

πολὺ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρει τοῦ γε φιλοκερδοῦς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐμπειρίᾳ
ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἡδονῶν.

582c

πολὺ μέντοι.

τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου; ἄρα μᾶλλον ἄπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς
ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν;

ἀλλὰ τιμὴ μὲν, ἔφη, ἐάνπερ ἐξεργάζωνται ἐπὶ ὃ ἕκαστος ὥρμηκε, πᾶσιν
αὐτοῖς ἔπεται—καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεὺς καὶ
σοφός—ὥστε ἀπὸ γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οἷόν ἐστιν, πάντες τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔμπειροι·
τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θεας, οἷαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ γεγεῦσθαι πλὴν
τῷ φιλοσόφῳ.

582d

ἐμπειρίας μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ἔνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίνει οὗτος.

πολὺ γε.

καὶ μὴν μετὰ γε φρονήσεως μόνος ἔμπειρος γεγονώς ἔσται.

τί μὴν;

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ δι' οὗ γε δεῖ ὄργανον κρίνεσθαι, οὐ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς τοῦτο ὄργανον οὐδὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου.

τὸ ποῖον;

διὰ λόγων που ἔφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι. ἦ γάρ;

ναί.

λόγοι δὲ τούτου μάλιστα ὄργανον.

πῶς δ' οὗ;

οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει ἄριστα ἐκρίνετο τὰ

582e

κρινόμενα, ἃ ἐπὶ ἡγεῖται ὁ φιλοκερδὴς καὶ ἔψεγεν, ἀνάγκη ἂν ᾦν ταῦτα ἀληθέστατα εἶναι.

πολλή γε.

εἰ δὲ τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ, ἅρ' οὐχ ἃ ὁ φιλότιμός τε καὶ φιλόνομος; δῆλον.

ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἃ ὁ φιλόσοφος τε καὶ ὁ φιλόλογος ἐπαινεῖ, ἀληθέστατα εἶναι.

583

583a

τριῶν ἅρ' οὐσῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ τούτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ὧς μανθάνομεν ἡδίστη ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἄρχει, ὁ τούτου βίος ἡδιστος;

πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη· κύριος γοῦν ἐπαινέτης ὧν ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον ὁ φρόνιμος.

τίνα δὲ δευτέρον, εἶπον, βίον καὶ τίνα δευτέραν ἡδονὴν φησιν ὁ κριτὴς εἶναι; δῆλον ὅτι τὴν τοῦ πολεμικοῦ τε καὶ φιλοτίμου· ἐγγυτέρω γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ ἢ τοῦ χρηματιστοῦ.

ὑστάτην δὲ τὴν τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς, ὡς ἔοικεν.

τί μὴν; ἦ δ' ὅς.

583b

ταῦτα μὲν τοῖνον οὕτω δὴ ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ δις νενικηκώς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον· τὸ δὲ τρίτον Ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτῆρι τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Δίῃ, ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθὴς ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῇ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινος ἀκηκοέναι. καίτοι τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων. πολὺ γε· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις;

583c

ὦδ', εἶπον, ἐξευρήσω, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ζητῶν ἅμα.

Ἐρώτα δὲ, ἔφη.

λέγε δὲ, ᾗ δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμέν λυπὴν ἡδονῇ; καὶ μάλα.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι εἶναι τι;

εἶναι μέντοι.

μεταξὺ τούτοις ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ὃν ἡσυχίαν τινὰ περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὸ λέγεις;
οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς.
ἄρ' οὖν μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν;

ποίους;
ὥς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἥδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς
583d

ἐλελήθει, πρὶν κάμνειν, ἥδιστον ὄν.

μέμνημαι, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν περιωδυνία τινὲς ἐχομένων ἀκούεις λεγόντων ὥς οὐδὲν ἥδιον τοῦ παύσασθαι ὀδυνώμενον;

ἀκούω.

καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε οἶμαι πολλοῖς τοιοῦτοις αἰσθάνῃ γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπῶνται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὥς ἥδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν.

τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἡδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται, ἡσυχία.

583e

καὶ ὅταν παύσῃται ἄρα, εἶπον, χαίρων τις, ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν ἔσται.

ἴσως, ἔφη.

ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα νυνδὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτο ποτε ἀμφοτέρα ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή.

ἔοικεν.

ἦ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὃν ἀμφοτέρα γίνεσθαι;

οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

καὶ μὴν τὸ γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κινήσεις τις ἀμφοτέρω ἑστόν· ἢ οὐ;

ναί.

584

584a

τὸ δὲ μήτε λυπηρὸν μήτε ἡδὺ οὐχὶ ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτοις ἐφάνη ἄρτι;

ἐφάνη γάρ.

πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἡδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀνιαρόν; οὐδαμῶς.

οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἢ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις.

ὥς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει.

584b

ἰδὲ τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἡδονάς, αἱ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις οἰηθῆς ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω τοῦτο πεφυκέναι, ἡδονὴν μὲν παῦλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ ἡδονῆς.

ποῦ δὴ, ἔφη, καὶ ποίας λέγεις;
πολλοὶ μὲν, εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλοι, μάλιστα δ' εἰ 'θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς
ὁσμάς ἡδονάς. αὗται γὰρ οὐ προλυπηθέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος
γίνονται, παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλείπουσιν.
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

584c

μὴ ἄρα πειθόμεθα καθαρὰν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν λύπης ἀπαλλαγὴν, μηδὲ λύπην
τὴν ἡδονῆς.

μὴ γάρ.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, αἱ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι καὶ
λεγόμεναι ἡδοναί, σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται τε καὶ μέγισται, τοῦτου τοῦ εἶδους
εἰσὶ, λυπῶν τινες ἀπαλλαγαί.

εἰσὶ γάρ.

οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ πρὸ μελλόντων τούτων ἐκ προσδοκίας γιγνόμεναι
προησθήσεις τε καὶ προλυπήσεις κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχουσιν;
κατὰ ταῦτά.

584d

οἷσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷαι εἰσιν καὶ ᾧ μάλιστα εὐοίκασιν;

τῷ; ἔφη.

νομίζεις τι, εἶπον, ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ κάτω, τὸ δὲ μέσον;
ἔγωγε.

οἷει οὖν ἂν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κάτω φερόμενον πρὸς μέσον ἄλλο τι οἷεσθαι ἢ ἄνω
φέρεσθαι; καὶ ἐν μέσῳ στάντα, ἀφορῶντα ὅθεν ἐνήνεκται, ἄλλοθι ποῦ ἂν
ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄνω, μὴ ἑωρακότα τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω;

μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἄλλως οἷμαι οἰηθῆναι ἂν τὸν τοιοῦτον.

584e

ἀλλ' εἰ πάλιν γ', ἔφην, φέροιτο, κάτω τ' ἂν οἷοιτο φέρεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ
οἷοιτο;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

οὐκοῦν ταῦτα πάσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔμπειρος εἶναι τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω
τε ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω;

δῆλον δὴ.

θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν εἰ καὶ οἱ ἄπειροι ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων μὴ
ὕγιεῖς δόξας ἔχουσιν, πρὸς τε ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων οὕτω
διάκεινται, ὥστε, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ

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585a

λυπηρὸν φέρωνται, ἀληθῆ τε οἷονται καὶ τῷ ὄντι λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ
λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξὺ, σφόδρα μὲν οἷονται πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ
γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ πρὸς μέλαν φαιὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρία λευκοῦ, καὶ
πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρία ἡδονῆς ἀπατῶνται;
μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει.
ὥδέ γ' οὖν, εἶπον, ἐννόει· οὐχὶ πεῖνα καὶ δίψα καὶ τὰ

585b

τοιαῦτα κενώσεις τινές εἰσιν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἔξεως;

τί μὴν;

ἄγνοια δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη ἄρ' οὐ κενότης ἐστὶ γῆς περὶ ψυχὴν αὐτῆς ἔξεως;
μᾶλα γε.

οὐκοῦν πληροῖτ' ἂν ὅ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἰσχων;
πῶς δ' οὐ;

πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἡττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος;

δηλὸν ὅτι τοῦ μᾶλλον.

πότερα οὖν ἡγήτῃ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας μετέχειν, τὰ οἷον σίτου τε
καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὕδου καὶ συμπάσης τροφῆς, ἢ τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ
ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ

585c

συλλήβδην αὐτῆς πάσης ἀρετῆς; ὥδε δὲ κρῖνε· τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ
ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὃν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον,
μᾶλλον εἶναι σοὶ δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ
τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον;

πολὺ, ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου.

ἢ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει;
οὐδαμῶς.

τί δ'; ἀληθείας;

οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἡττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας;

ἀνάγκη.

585d

οὐκοῦν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν αὐτῶν
περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἡττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει;

πολὺ γε.

σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἶει οὕτως;

ἐγωγε.

οὐκοῦν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ὃν ὄντως

μᾶλλον πληροῦται ἢ τὸ τῶν ἡττον ὄντων καὶ αὐτὸ ἡττον ὄν;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδὺ ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν
ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον

585e

ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέως χαίρειν ἂν ποιοῖ ἡδονὴ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἡττον
ὄντων μεταλαμβάνον ἡττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ
ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἡττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι.

ἀναγκαιότατα, ἔφη.

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586a

οἱ ἄρα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι, εὐωχίαις δὲ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀεὶ
συνόντες, κάτω, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονται τε καὶ
ταύτην πλανῶνται διὰ βίου, ὑπερβάντες δὲ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε

ἀνέβλεψαν πώποτε οὔτε ἠνέχθησαν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος τῷ ὄντι ἐπληρώθησαν,
οὐδὲ βεβαίου τε καὶ καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἐγεύσαντο, ἀλλὰ βοσκομάτων δίκην
κάτω αἰεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται
χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες,

586b

καὶ ἔνεκα τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας λακτίζοντες καὶ κυρίττοντες ἀλλήλους
σιδηροῖς κέρασι τε καὶ ὀπλαῖς ἀποκτείνουσι δι' ἀπληστίαν, ἅτε οὐχὶ τοῖς
οὔσιν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν πιμπλάντες.

παντελῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρησιμωδεῖς βίον.
ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡδοναῖς συνεῖναι μεμειγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοισι τῆς
ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις,

586c

ὑπὸ τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχραινομέναις, ὥστε σφοδροῦς ἑκατέρας
φαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔρωτας ἑαυτῶν λυτῶντας τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἐντίκτειν καὶ
περιμαχῆτους εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης εἰδῶλον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ
Σητσίχορος φησι γενέσθαι περιμάχητον ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς;

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι.

τί δέ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἔτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ὅς ἂν αὐτὸ
τοῦτο διαπράττηται ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βίᾳ διὰ φιλονικίαν ἢ θυμῷ
διὰ δυσκολίαν,

586d

πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ;
τοιαῦτα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι.

τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδὲς καὶ τὸ
φιλόνικον ὅσαι ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶν, αἱ μὲν ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐπόμεναι
καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσαι, αἷς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγῇται,
λαμβάνωσι, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήφονται, ὡς οἷόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς

586e

λαβεῖν, ἅτε ἀληθεῖα ἐπομένων, καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκείας, εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον
ἐκάστω, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον;

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, οἰκειότατόν γε.

τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἐπομένης ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης
ἐκάστω τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἷς τε τᾶλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι,
καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας καὶ εἰς τὸ
δυνατὸν τὰς

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587a

ἀληθεστάτας καρποῦσθαι.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ὅταν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἐτέρων τι κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ μήτε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
ἡδονὴν ἐξευρίσκειν, τὰ τε ἄλλ' ἀναγκάζειν ἄλλοτριαν καὶ μὴ ἀληθῆ ἡδονὴν
διώκειν.

οὕτως, ἔφη.

οὕκοῦν ἂν πλεῖστον φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ λόγου ἀφέστηκεν, μάλιστα' ἂν τοιαῦτα

ἐξεργάζοιτο;

πολύ γε.

πλεῖστον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμου τε καὶ τάξεως;

δῆλον δὴ.

ἐφάνησαν δὲ πλεῖστον ἀφεστῶσαι οὐχ αἱ ἐρωτικάι τε

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καὶ τυραννικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι;

πολύ γε.

ἐλάχιστον δὲ αἱ βασιλικάι τε καὶ κόσμιαί;

ναί.

πλεῖστον δὴ οἶμαι ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ οἰκείας ὁ τύραννος ἀφεστήξει, ὁ δὲ ὀλίγιστον.

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ ἀηδέστατα ἄρα, εἶπον, ὁ τύραννος βιώσεται, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἡδιστα.

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

οἷσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσω ἀηδέστερον ζῆν τύραννος βασιλέως;

ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔφη.

τριῶν ἡδονῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐσῶν, μιᾶς μὲν γνησίας, δυοῖν

587c

δὲ νόθαιν, τῶν νόθων εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα ὑπερβὰς ὁ τύραννος, φυγῶν νόμον τε

καὶ λόγον, δούλαις τισὶ δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς συνοικεῖ, καὶ ὀπόσω

ἐλαττοῦται οὐδὲ πάνυ ῥάδιον εἰπεῖν, πλὴν ἴσως ᾧδε.

πῶς; ἔφη.

ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τρίτος που ὁ τύραννος ἀφειστήκει· ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ

αὐτῶν ὁ δημοτικὸς ἦν.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡδονῆς τρίτῳ εἰδῶλῳ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀπ' ἐκείνου συνοικοῖ ἂν,

εἰ τὰ πρόσθεν ἀληθῆ;

οὕτω.

ὁ δέ γε ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ αὖ τρίτος, ἐὰν

587d

εἰς ταῦτὸν ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν τιθῶμεν.

τρίτος γάρ.

τριπλασίου ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τριπλάσιον ἀριθμῷ ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς ἀφέστηκεν

τύραννος.

φαίνεται.

ἐπίπεδον ἄρ', ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ εἶδωλον κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμὸν

ἡδονῆς τυραννικῆς ἂν εἴη.

κομιδῇ γε.

κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὖξιν δῆλον δὴ ἀπόστασιν ὅσιν ἀφεστηκῶς

γίγνεται.

δῆλον, ἔφη, τῷ γε λογιστικῷ.

οὐκοῦν ἐὰν τις μεταστρέψας ἀληθεία ἡδονῆς τὸν βασιλέα

587e

τοῦ τυράννου ἀφεστηκότα λέγῃ ὅσον ἀφέστηκεν,
ἐννεακαικικοσικαιεπτακοσιοπλασιάκις ἥδιον αὐτὸν ζῶντα εὐρήσει
τελειωθείσῃ τῇ πολλαπλασιώσει, τὸν δὲ τύραννον ἀνιαιρότερον τῇ αὐτῇ
ταύτῃ ἀποστάσει.

ἀμῆχανον, ἔφη, λογισμὸν καταπεφόρηκας τῆς διαφορότητος
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588a

τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου, πρὸς ἡδονὴν τε καὶ λύπην.
καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντά γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βίοις ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ
αὐτοῖς προσήκουσιν ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες καὶ μῆνες καὶ ἐνιαυτοί.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, προσήκουσιν.

οὐκοῦν εἰ τοσοῦτον ἡδονῇ νικᾷ ὁ ἀγαθός τε καὶ δίκαιος τὸν κακὸν τε καὶ
ἄδικον, ἀμῆχάνω δὴ ὅσω πλείονι νικήσει εὐσχημοσύνη τε βίου καὶ κάλλει
καὶ ἀρετῇ;

ἀμῆχάνω μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἔφη.

588b

εἶεν δὴ, εἶπον· ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα λόγου γεγόναμεν, ἀναλάβωμεν τὰ πρῶτα
λεχθέντα, δι' ἃ δεῦρ' ἤκομεν. ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν τῷ
τελέως μὲν ἀδίκῳ, δοξαζομένῳ δὲ δικαίῳ· ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἐλέχθη;
οὕτω μὲν οὔν.

νῦν δὴ, ἔφην, αὐτῷ διαλεγώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ διωμολογησάμεθα τὸ τε ἀδικεῖν
καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἦν ἐκότερον ἔχει δύναμιν.

πῶς; ἔφη.

εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ, ἵνα εἰδῇ ὁ ἐκεῖνα λέγων οἷα ἔλεγεν.

588c

ποῖαν τινά; ἢ δ' ὅς.

τῶν τοιούτων τινά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷα μυθολογοῦνται παλαιαὶ γενέσθαι φύσεις,
ἢ τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἡ Σκύλλης καὶ Κερβέρου, καὶ ἄλλα τινὲς συχναὶ λέγονται
συμπεφυκυῖαι ἰδέαι πολλαὶ εἰς ἓν γενέσθαι.

λέγονται γάρ, ἔφη.

πλάττε τοίνυν μίαν μὲν ἰδέαν θηρίου ποικίλου καὶ πολυκεφάλου, ἡμέρων δὲ
θηρίων ἔχοντος κεφαλὰς κύκλῳ καὶ ἀγρίων, καὶ δυνατοῦ μεταβάλλειν καὶ
φύειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα.

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δεινοῦ πλάστου, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον· ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ
τῶν τοιούτων λόγος, πεπλάσθω.

μίαν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλην ἰδέαν λέοντος, μίαν δὲ ἀνθρώπου· πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον
ἔστω τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον τὸ δεύτερον.

ταῦτα, ἔφη, ῥάω, καὶ πέπλασται.

συναπτε τοίνυν αὐτὰ εἰς ἓν τρία ὄντα, ὥστε πῃ συμπεφυκέναι ἀλλήλοις.
συνῆπτai, ἔφη.

περίπλασον δὴ αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν ἐνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε τῷ μὴ
δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ

588e

ἔξω μόνον ἔλυτρον ὀρώντι, ἐν ζῶον φαίνεσθαι, ἄνθρωπον.

περιπέπλαστα, ἔφη.

λέγωμεν δὴ τῷ λέγοντι ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τοῦτω ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν οὐ συμφέρει, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο φησὶν ἢ λυσιτελεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ παντοδαπὸν θηρίον εὐωχοῦντι ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα, τὸν

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δὲ ἄνθρωπον λιμοκτονεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀσθενῆ, ὥστε ἔλκεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκείνων ὁπότερον ἄγῃ, καὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ συνεθίζειν μηδὲ φίλον ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔἴαν αὐτὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς δάκνεσθαι τε καὶ μαχόμενα ἐσθίειν ἄλληλα. παντάπασι γάρ, ἔφη, ταῦτ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐπαινῶν.

οὐκοῦν αὖ ὁ τὰ δίκαια λέγων λυσιτελεῖν φαίη ἂν δεῖν ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν, ὅθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἐντὸς

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ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ἐγκρατέστατος, καὶ τοῦ πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελήσεται ὥσπερ γεωργός, τὰ μὲν ἡμερα τρέφων καὶ τιθασεύων, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι, σύμμαχον ποιησάμενος τὴν τοῦ λέοντος φύσιν, καὶ κοινῇ πάντων κηδόμενος, φίλα ποιησάμενος ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ αὐτῷ, οὕτω θρέψει;

κομιδῇ γὰρ αὖ λέγει ταῦτα ὁ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπαινῶν.

κατὰ πάντα τρόπον δὴ ὁ μὲν τὰ δίκαια ἐγκωμιάζων ἀληθῆ

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ἂν λέγοι, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἄδिका ψεύδοιτο. πρὸς τε γὰρ ἡδονὴν καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν καὶ ὠφελίαν σκοπούμεν ὁ μὲν ἐπαινέτης τοῦ δικαίου ἀληθεύει, ὁ δὲ ψέκτης οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' εἰδῶς ψέγει ὅτι ψέγει.

οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδαμῇ γε.

πειθωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὸν πρῶτος—οὐ γὰρ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει —ἐρωτῶντες· ὦ μακάριε, οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχροῦ νόμιμα διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἂν φαίμεν γεγενῆσθαι· τὰ μὲν καλὰ τὰ ὑπὸ

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τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ θεῷ τὰ θηριώδη ποιοῦντα τῆς φύσεως, αἰσχροῦ δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀγρίῳ τὸ ἡμερον δουλούμενα; συμφήσει· ἢ πῶς;

ἐάν μοι, ἔφη, πειθηται.

ἔστιν οὖν, εἶπον, ὅτῳ λυσιτελεῖ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου χρυσίον λαμβάνειν ἀδίκως, εἴπερ τοιόνδε τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων τὸ χρυσίον ἅμα καταδουλοῦται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτοῦ

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τῷ μοχθηροτάτῳ; ἢ εἰ μὲν λαβὼν χρυσίον ὑὸν ἢ θυγατέρα ἐδουλοῦτο, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς ἀγρίων τε καὶ κακῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἔλυσιτέλει οὐδ' ἂν πάμπολυ ἐπὶ τοῦτω λαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ θεϊότατον ὑπὸ τῷ ἀθεωτάτῳ τε καὶ μιαιρωτάτῳ δουλοῦται καὶ μηδὲν ἐλεεῖ, οὐκ ἄρα ἀθλιός ἐστι καὶ πολὺ

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ἐπὶ δεινότερῳ ὀλέθρῳ χρυσὸν δωροδοκεῖ ἢ Ἐριφύλῃ ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς
ψυχῇ τὸν ὄρμον δεξαμένη;

πολὺ μέντοι, ἣ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων· ἐγὼ γάρ σοι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρινοῦμαι.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν οἷε διὰ τοιαῦτα πάλαι ψέγεσθαι, ὅτι ἀνίεται
ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο καὶ πολυειδὲς θρέμμα, πέρα τοῦ
δέοντος;

δῆλον, ἔφη.

ἢ δ' αὐθάδεια καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντῶδές

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τε καὶ ὀφεῶδες αὐξήται καὶ συντείνεται ἀναρμόστως;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

τρυφή δὲ καὶ μαλθακία οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ τούτου χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει
ψέγεται, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δειλίαν ἐμποιῇ;

τί μήν;

κολακεία δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδές, ὑπὸ
τῷ ὀχλῳδεῖ θηρίῳ ποιῇ καὶ ἔνεκα χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας
προπηλακίζομενον ἐθίζῃ ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον γίνεσθαι;

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καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

βανασία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία διὰ τί οἷε ὄνειδος φέρει; ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι φήσομεν
ἢ ὅταν τις ἀσθενὲς φύσει ἔχῃ τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι
ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θρεμμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τὰ θωπεύματα
αὐτῶν μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν;

ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἷουπερ ὁ βέλτιστος,

δοῦλον αὐτὸν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου

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καὶ ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου
οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ὦετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους,
ἀλλ' ὥς ἄμεινον ὂν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν
οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν
πάντες ὅμοιοι ὦμεν καὶ φίλοι, τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι;

καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

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δηλοῖ δέ γε, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ νόμος ὅτι τοιοῦτον βούλεται, πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ
πόλει σύμμαχος ὢν·

καὶ ἢ τῶν παιδῶν ἀρχή, τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, ἕως ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς
ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον

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θεραπεύσαντες τῷ παρ' ἡμῖν τοιοῦτῳ ἀντικαταστήσωμεν φύλακα ὅμοιον καὶ
ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε δὴ ἐλευθέρων ἀφίεμεν.

δηλοῖ γάρ, ἣ δ' ὅς.

πῆ δὴ οὖν φήσομεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ κατὰ τίνα λόγον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν, ἢ ἀκολασταίνειν ἢ τὴν αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν, ἐξ ὧν πονηρότερος μὲν ἔσται, πλείω δὲ χρήματα ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ δύναμιν κεκτήσεται; οὐδαμῇ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

πῆ δ' ἀδικοῦντα λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ διδόναι δίκην λυσιτελεῖν;
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ἦ οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λανθάνων ἔτι πονηρότερος γίγνεται, τοῦ δὲ μὴ λανθάνοντος καὶ κολαζομένου τὸ μὲν θηριῶδες κοιμίζεται καὶ ἡμεροῦται, τὸ δὲ ἡμερον ἐλευθεροῦται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὴν βελτίστην φύσιν καθισταμένη τιμιωτέραν ἔξιν λαμβάνει, σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως κτωμένη, ἢ σῶμα ἰσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ ὑγιείας λαμβάνον, τοσοῦτω ὅσῳ περ ψυχὴ σώματος τιμιωτέρα;
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

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οὐκοῦν ὃ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο συντείνας βιώσεται, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ μαθήματα τιμῶν, ἃ τοιαύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεργάσεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀτιμάζων;
δῆλον, ἔφη.

ἔπειτά γ', εἶπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔξιν καὶ τροφήν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἥδονῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγιής ἢ καλὸς ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ

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καὶ σωφρονήσιν μέλλῃ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἁρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔνεκα συμφωνίας ἁρμοττόμενος φανεῖται.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐάν περ μέλλῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μουσικὸς εἶναι. οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει σύνταξιν τε καὶ συμφωνίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ πλήθους οὐκ ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ ἄπειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων; οὐκ οἴομαι, ἔφη.

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ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων γε, εἶπον, πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν, καὶ φυλάττων μὴ τι παρακινῇ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας ἢ δι' ὀλιγότητα, οὕτως κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἷός τ' ᾖ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

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ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμάς γε, εἰς ταῦτόν ἀποβλέπων, τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται ἐκῶν, ἃς ἂν ἡγήται ἀμείνω αὐτὸν ποιήσιν, ἃς δ' ἂν λύσειν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἔξιν, φεύξεται ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

οὐκ ἄρα, ἔφη, τὰ γε πολιτικὰ ἐθελήσει πράττειν, ἐάν περ τούτου κήδηται. νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως ἔν γε τῇ πατρίδι, ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις συμβῇ τύχη.

μανθάνω, ἔφη· ἐν ᾗ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις

κειμένῃ, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι

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αὐτὴν εἶναι.

ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὀρᾶν
καὶ ὀρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε ἔσται·
τὰ γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξειεν, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς.

εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

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English translation

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There remains for consideration, said I, the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy. Why, yes, he still remains, he said. Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss? What? In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking

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our inquiry will lack clearness. Well, said he, will our consideration of them not still be opportune[*]? By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures[*] and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled[*] by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain,

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while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous. What desires do you mean? he said. Those, said I, that are awakened in sleep[*] when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts.[*] You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother

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in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly[*] and shamelessness. Most true, he said. But when, I suppose, a man's condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved

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nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep[*]

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and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future;
and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep[*] with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case[*] he is most likely to apprehend truth, and

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the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.[*] I certainly think so, he said. This description has carried us too far,[*] but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,[*] a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it. Well, I do.

Now recall[*] our characterization of the democratic man.

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His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so? Yes. And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father's niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters,

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being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise[*] between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth,[*] as he supposes,[*] he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat. That was and is our belief about this type. Assume,[*] then, again, said I, that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn[*] in his ways of life. I so assume. And suppose the experience of his father

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to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his other kin lend support to[*] these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group.

And when these dread magi[*] and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in his soul a ruling passion[*] to be the protector[*]

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of his idle and prodigal[*] appetites, a monstrous winged[*] drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else? Nothing but that, he said. And when the other appetites, buzzing[*] about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,[*] why then this protector of the soul has madness for his body-guard and runs amuck,[*] and if it finds in the man

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any opinions or appetites accounted[*] worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges[*] him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.[*] A perfect description, he said, of the generation of the tyrannical man. And is not this analogy, said I, the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant[*]? That may well be, he said. And does not a drunken man,[*] my friend, I said,

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have something of this tyrannical temper? Yes, he has. And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods. Yes indeed, he does, he said. Then a man becomes tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend, I said, when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal.

Assuredly.

Such, it seems, is his origin and character,[*] but what is his manner of life?

As the wits say,

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you shall tell me.[*] I do, I said; for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans[*] and all the doings of those whose[*] souls are entirely swayed[*] by the indwelling tyrant Eros. Inevitably, he said. And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things? Many indeed. And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended. Of course.

And after this

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there are borrowings and levyings[*] upon the estate? Of course. And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings[*] of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit

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or violence? Most certainly. And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every source[*] or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.[*] He is. And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of

his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better[*] of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father's estate. Of course, he said, what else? And if they resist him,

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would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them? Certainly. And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force? I think so, he said. And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant? I am not without my fears, he said, for the parents of such a one. Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven's name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother,

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his by necessity[*] and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows[*] upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favorites if he brought them under the same roof? Yes, by Zeus, he said. A most blessed lot it seems to be, said I, to be the parent of a tyrant son. It does indeed, he said. And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted[*] and fail such a one,

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and the swarm[*] of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall[*] of someone's house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep[*] of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honorable and the base, the opinions accounted just,[*] will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated[*] and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep,

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when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul.

But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed,

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but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity,[*] so to speak, of him in whom it dwells[*] to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen,[*] in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one? It is

this, he said. And if, I said, there are only a few of this kind in a city,
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and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquillity they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils. What kind of evils do you mean? Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap,[*] and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes.

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Yes, small evils indeed,[*] he said, if the men of this sort are few. Why, yes, I said, for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don't come within hail[*] of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out of that one of them who has

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the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul. Naturally, he said, for he would be the most tyrannical. Then if the people yield willingly—'tis well,[*] but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastized his mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear motherland[*]—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man's desire.[*]

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Yes, he said, this, just this.

Then, said I, is not this the character of such men in private life and before they rule the state: to begin with they associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything to serve them,

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or, if they themselves want something, they themselves fawn[*] and shrink from no contortion[*] or abasement in protest of their friendship, though, once the object gained, they sing another tune.[*] Yes indeed, he said. Throughout their lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedom[*] or true friendship. Quite so. May we not rightly call such men faithless[*]? Of course. Yes, and unjust to the last degree,

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if we were right in our previous agreement about the nature of justice. But surely, he said, we were right. Let us sum up,[*] then, said I, the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who, in his waking hours, has the

qualities we found in his dream state. Quite so. And he is developed from the man who, being by nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and the longer he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger this quality becomes.

Inevitably, said Glaucon, taking up the argument.

And shall we find, said I, that the man who is shown to be the most evil
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will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserable[*] in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.[*] That much, certainly, he said, must needs be true.

Does not the tyrannical man, said I, correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude,[*] the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise?

Surely. And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness

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is the same as that of the man to the man? Of course. What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it? They are direct contraries, he said; the one is the best, the other the worst. I'll not ask which is which, I said, because that is obvious. But again in respect of happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the same or different? And let us not be dazzled[*] by fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few[*] of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire city,
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as is right, and declare our opinion only after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses and contemplated its life as a whole. That is a fair challenge, he said, and it is clear to everybody that there is no city more wretched than that in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than that governed by a true king.

[*]

And would it not also be a fair challenge, said I,

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to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing him from outside, overawed by the tyrants' great attendance,[*] and the pomp and circumstance which they assume[*] in the eyes of the world, but is able to see through it all? And what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity of judgement and who has lived under the same roof with a tyrant[*] and has witnessed his conduct in his own home and observed in person

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his dealings with his intimates in each instance where he would best be seen stripped[*] of his vesture of tragedy,[*] and who had likewise observed his behavior in the hazards of his public life—and if we should ask the man who has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the happiness or misery of

the tyrant as compared with other men? That also would be a most just challenge, he said. Shall we, then, make believe, said I, that we are of those who are thus able to judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions? By all means.

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Come, then, said I, examine it thus. Recall the general likeness between the city and the man, and then observe in turn what happens to each of them. What things? he said. In the first place, said I, will you call the state governed by a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state? Utterly enslaved, he said. And yet you see in it masters and freemen. I see, he said, a small portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.[*] If, then, I said,

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the man resembles the state, must not the same proportion[*] obtain in him, and his soul teem[*] with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most frenzied, plays the despot? Inevitably, he said. Then will you say that such a soul is enslaved or free? Enslaved, I should suppose. Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it really wishes[*]? Decidedly so. Then the tyrannized soul—

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to speak of the soul as a whole[*]—also will least of all do what it wishes, but being always perforce driven and drawn by the gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repentance.[*] Of course. And must the tyrannized city

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be rich or poor? Poor.

Then the tyrant soul also must of necessity always be needy[*] and suffer from unfulfilled desire. So it is, he said. And again, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be full of terrors and alarms? It must indeed. And do you think you will find more lamentations and groans and wailing and anguish in any other city? By no means. And so of man, do you think these things will more abound in any other than in this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and passions? How could it be so? he said. In view of all these

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and other like considerations, then, I take it, you judged that this city is the most miserable of cities. And was I not right? he said. Yes, indeed, said I. But of the tyrant man, what have you to say in view of these same things? That he is far and away the most miserable of all, he said. I cannot admit, said I, that you are right in that too. How so? said he. This one, said I, I take it, has not yet attained the acme of misery.[*] Then who has? Perhaps you will regard the one I am about to name as still more wretched.

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What one? The one, said I, who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live

out[*] his life in private station[*] but is so unfortunate that by some unhappy chance he is enabled to become an actual tyrant. I infer from what has already been said, he replied, that you speak truly. Yes, said I, but it is not enough to suppose such things. We must examine them thoroughly by reason and an argument such as this.[*] For our inquiry concerns the greatest of all things, [*] the good life or the bad life. Quite right, he replied. Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say.

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For I think we must get a notion of the matter from these examples. From which? From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant's numbers are greater.[*] Yes, they are. You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves? What should they fear? Nothing, I said; but do you perceive the reason why? Yes, because the entire state

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is ready to defend each citizen. You are right, I said. But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves[*] and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no freeman could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear,[*] do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves? The greatest in the world,[*] he said, if you ask me.

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And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wish[*]? And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants. He would certainly have to, he said, or else perish. But now suppose, said I, that god established round about him numerous neighbors who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another,[*] but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands. I think, he said,

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that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies. And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? Yet greedy[*] and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivals[*] that other freemen yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman,[*]

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envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing. Most certainly, he said.

And does not such a harvest of ills[*] measure the difference between the man

who is merely ill-governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical temper, whom you just now judged to be most miserable, and the man who, having this disposition, does not live out his life in private station but is constrained by some ill hap to become an actual tyrant, and while unable to control himself[*] attempts to rule over others, as if a man with a sick and incontinent body[*] should not live the private life but should be compelled
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to pass his days in contention and strife with other persons? Your analogy is most apt and true.[*] Socrates, he said. Is not that then, dear Glaucon, said I, a most unhappy experience in every way? And is not the tyrant's life still worse than that which was judged by you to be the worst? Precisely so, he said. Then it is the truth, though some may deny it,[*] that the real tyrant is really enslaved
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to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety; and throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the city which he rules; and he is like it, is he not?
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Yes, indeed, he said.

And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,[*] envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse[*] of all iniquity, and so in consequence be himself most unhappy[*] make all about him so? No man of sense will gainsay that, he said. Come then, said I,

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now at last, even as the judge of last instance[*] pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man. Nay, he said, the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary. Shall we hire a herald,[*] then, said I, or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best man[*] and the most righteous to be the happiest,[*]
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and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself;[*] and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, become, most of a tyrant over himself and over the state? Let it have been so

proclaimed by you, he said. Shall I add the clause alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not known[*]? Add that to the proclamation, he said.

Very good, said I; this, then, would be one of our proofs,

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but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it. What is it? Since, said I, corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite,[*] it will admit,[*] I think, of another demonstration also. What is that? The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls. What do you mean? he said. One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms,[*] we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name, [*]

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but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element; for we called it the appetitive part[*] because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part,[*] because money is the chief instrument

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for the gratification of such desires. And rightly, he said. And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring it together under one head[*] in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part? I, at any rate, think so, he said. And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute?

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Yes, indeed. And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honor? Most appropriately. But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is ever towards[*] knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and reputation. Much the least. Lover of learning[*] and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that. Quite so, he said. Is it not also true, I said,

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that the ruling principle[*] of men's souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen? That is so, he said. And that is why we say that the primary classes[*] of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain. Precisely so. And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to each? By all means. Are you aware, then said I, that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn,[*] which is the most pleasurable

of these lives, each will chiefly commend his own[*]? The financier
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will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning
area of no value except in so far as they produce money. True, he said. And
what of the lover of honor[*]? I said; does he not regard the pleasure that
comes from money as vulgar[*] and low, and again that of learning, save in so
far as the knowledge confers honor, mere fume[*] and moonshine? It is so, he
said. And what, said I, are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other
pleasures

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compared with the delight of knowing the truth[*] and the reality, and being
always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far
removed from true pleasure,[*] and call[*] them literally[*] the pleasures of
necessity,[*] since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid
upon him?

We may be sure of that, he said.

Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the
lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more
base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurable[*]
or free from pain,

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how could we determine which of them speaks most truly? In faith, I cannot
tell, he said. Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are
to be judged[*] rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and
discussion[*]? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these? How could
he? he said. Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most
experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of
gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience

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of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which
results from gain? There is a vast difference, he said; for the one, the
philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from
childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or
experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of
things,[*] but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it. The
lover of wisdom, then, said I, far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of
both kinds of pleasure.

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Yes, far. And how does he compare with the lover of honor? Is he more
unacquainted with the pleasure of being honored than that other with that
which comes from knowledge? Nay, honor, he said, if they achieve their
several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is honored by many and the
brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure

that honor brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savored the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings.

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Then, said I, so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three. By far. And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompanied[*] by intelligence. Surely. And yet again, that which is the instrument, or ὄργανον, of judgement[*] is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honor, but of the lover of wisdom. What is that? It was by means of words and discussion[*] that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not? Yes. And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher. Of course. Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged,

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the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real. Quite necessarily. And if honor, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honor and victory?

Obviously. But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows? Of necessity, he said, that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true.

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There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasurable. How could it be otherwise? he said. At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life. And to what life and to what pleasure, I said, does the judge assign the second place? Obviously to that of the warrior and honor-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker. And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems. Surely, said he.

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That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the saviour[*] and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even real[*] or pure,[*] but is a kind of scene-painting,[*] as I seem to have heard from some wise man[*]; and yet[*] this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.[*] Much the greatest. But what do you mean? I shall discover it, I said,

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if you will answer my questions while I seek. Ask, then, he said. Tell me, then, said I, do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure? We certainly do. And is there not such a thing as a neutral state[*] There is. Is it not intermediate between them, and in the mean,[*] being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it? It is that, said he.

Do you not recall the things men say in sickness? What sort of things? Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well,[*]

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though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were ill. I remember, he said. And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering? I do. And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight. Yes, he said, for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace.

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And so, I said, when a man's delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful. It may be so, he said. What, then, we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure. It seems so. Is it really possible for that which is neither to become both[*]? I think not. And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion,[*] are they not?

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Yes.

And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two? Yes, we did. How, then, can it be right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful? In no way. This is not a reality, then, but an illusion, said I; in such case the quietude in juxtaposition[*] with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these illusions have no real bearing[*] on the truth of pleasure, but are a kind of jugglery.[*] So at any rate our argument signifies, he said. Take a look, then,

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said I, at pleasures which do not follow on pain, so that you may not haply suppose for the present that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain and pain from pleasure. Where shall I look, he said, and what pleasures do you mean? There are many others, I said, and especially, if you please to note them, the pleasures connected with smell.[*] For these with no antecedent pain[*] suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them. Most true, he said. Let us not believe, then,

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that the riddance of pain is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain. No, we must not. Yet, surely, said I, the affections that find their way through the body[*] to the soul[*] and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain.[*]? Yes, they are. And is not this also the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains that precede them and arise from the expectation of them? It is.

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Do you know, then, what their quality is and what they most resemble? What? he said. Do you think that there is such a thing in nature[*] as up and down and in the middle? I do. Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is transported from below to the center would have any other opinion than that he was moving upward[*]? And if he took his stand at the center and looked in the direction from which he had been transported, do you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere but above, never having seen that which is really above? No, by Zeus, he said, I do not think that such a person would have any other notion.

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And if he were borne back, I said, he would both think himself to be moving downward and would think truly. Of course. And would not all this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance with the true and real up and down and middle? Obviously.

Would it surprise you, then, said I, if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that, when they are moved in the direction of the painful,

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they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black,[*] so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain? No, by Zeus, he said, it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so. In this way, then, consider it.[*] Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or emptinesses[*]

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of the bodily habit? Surely. And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul? It is indeed. And he who partakes of nourishment[*] and he who gets, wisdom fills the void and is filled? Of course. And which is the truer filling and fulfillment, that of the less or of the more real being? Evidently that of the more real. And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,[*]

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knowledge and reason,[*] and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent[*]? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing? That which cleaves to what is ever the same far

surpasses, he said. Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge? By no means. Or of truth and reality? Not of that, either. And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence? Necessarily. And is it not generally true
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that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than those that serve the soul? Much less. And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul? I do. Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things? Of course. If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things
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would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure. Most inevitably, he said.

Then those who have no experience

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of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to[*] feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam[*] to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted[*] stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth[*] and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle,[*]

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grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights; and in their greed[*] kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part[*] of their souls. You describe in quite oracular style,[*] Socrates, said Glaucon, the life of the multitude. And are not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure, illusions of scene-painting, so colored by contrary juxtaposition[*]

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as to seem intense in either kind, and to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls, and to be fought for,[*] as Stesichorus says the wraith of Helen[*] was fought for at Troy through ignorance of the truth? It is quite inevitable, he said, that it should be so.

So, again, must not the like hold of the high-spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satisfying that part of his nature—his covetousness of honor by envy, his love of victory by violence, his ill-temper by indulgence in anger,

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pursuing these ends without regard to consideration and reason? The same sort of thing, he said, must necessarily happen in this case too. Then, said I, may we not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them,[*] take only those pleasures which reason approves,[*] will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest[*] pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their own,

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if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its own[*]? But indeed, he said, it is most truly its very own.

Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension,[*] the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task[*] and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and,

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so far as such a thing is possible,[*] the truest. Precisely so. And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien pleasure and not the true. That is so, he said. And would not that which is furthest removed from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this effect[*]? Quite so, he said. And is not that furthest removed from reason which is furthest from law and order? Obviously. And was it not made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic and tyrannical appetites? Quite so.

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And least so the royal and orderly? Yes. Then the tyrant's place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest remove[*] from true and proper pleasure, and the king's at the least. Necessarily. Then the tyrant's life will be least pleasurable and the king's most. There is every necessity of that. Do you know, then, said I, how much less pleasurable the tyrant lives than the king? I'll know if you tell me,[*] he said. There being as it appears three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious,

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the tyrant in his flight from law and reason crosses the border beyond[*] the spurious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not easy to express except perhaps thus. How? he said. The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came between. Yes. And would he not also dwell with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three stages removed from that other, if all that we have said is true? That is so. And the oligarch in turn is at the third remove from the royal man

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if we assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king.[*] Yes, the third.
Three times three, then, by numerical measure is the interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure. Apparently. The phantom[*] of the tyrant's pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number. Quite so. But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this separation becomes. It is clear, he said, to a reckoner. Then taking it the other way about,
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if one tries to express the extent of the interval between the king and the tyrant in respect of true pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplication that he lives 729 times as happily and that the tyrant's life is more painful by the same distance.[*]

An overwhelming[*] and baffling calculation, he said, of the difference[*] between the just and

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the unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain! And what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the lives of men if days and nights and months and years pertain to them. They certainly do, he said. Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good and just man over the bad and unjust is so great as this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and beauty of life and virtue. Inconceivably indeed, by Zeus, he said.

Very good, said I. And now that we have come to this point in the argument,
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let us take up again the statement with which we began and that has brought us to this pass.[*] It was, I believe, averred that injustice is profitable to the completely unjust[*] man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposition? Yes, that. Let us, then, reason with its proponent now that we have agreed on the essential nature of injustice and just conduct. How? he said. By fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition may see precisely what it is that he was saying.

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What sort of an image? he said. One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of, said I, as that of the Chimaera[*] or Scylla[*] or Cerberus,[*] and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one. Yes, they do tell of them. Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast[*] that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths.

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It is the task of a cunning artist,[*] he said, but nevertheless, since speech is more plastic than wax[*] and other such media, assume that it has been so fashioned. Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest[*] and the second second in size. That is easier, he said, and is done. Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together. They are so united, he said. Then mould about them outside the likeness of

one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable

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to look within[*] but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man. The sheath is made fast about him, he said.

Let us, then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that it profits him to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion,

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but to starve the man[*] and so enfeeble him that he can be pulled about[*] whithersoever either of the others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile with one another the two creatures but suffer them to bite and fight and devour one another.[*] Yes, he said, that is precisely what the panegyrist of injustice will be found to say. And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us[*]

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complete domination[*] over the entire man and make him take charge[*] of the many-headed beast—like a farmer[*] who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of the wild—and he will make an ally[*] of the lion's nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth. Yes, that in turn is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice. From every point of view, then, the panegyrist of justice

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speaks truly and the panegyrist of injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real knowledge of what he censures in him who disparages it. None whatever, I think, said he. Shall we, then, try to persuade him gently,[*] for he does not willingly err,[*] by questioning him thus: Dear friend, should we not also say that the things which law and custom deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like reason—

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the fair and honorable things being those that subject the brutish part of our nature to that which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that which is divine,[*] while the foul and base are the things that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he assent or not? He will if he is counselled by me. Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the worst?

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Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to fierce and evil men, it would not profit him,[*] no

matter how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be deemed wretched

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and is not taking the golden bribe much more disastrously than Eriphyle[*] did when she received the necklace as the price[*] of her husband's life?

Far more, said Glaucon, for I will answer you in his behalf.

And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because that sort of thing emancipates that dread, [*] that huge and manifold beast overmuch? Obviously, he said. And do we not censure self-will[*]

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and irascibility when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snake[*] in us? By all means. And do we not reprobate luxury and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it? Surely. And flattery and illiberality when they reduce this same high-spirited element under the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth up and become an ape[*] instead of a lion?

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Yes, indeed, he said. And why do you suppose that base mechanic[*] handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them? So it seems, he said. Then is it not in order that such an one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave

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of that best man[*] who has within himself the divine governing principle, not because we suppose, as Thrasymachus[*] did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same? Yes, and rightly so, he said.

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And it is plain, I said, that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally of all classes in the state,

and this is the aim of our control of children, [*] our not leaving them free before we have established, so to speak, a constitutional government within them[*] and, by fostering the best element in them

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with the aid of the like in ourselves, have set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler in the child, and then, and then only, we leave it free. Yes, that is plain, he said. In what way, [*] then, Glaucon, and on what principle, shall we say that it profits a man to be unjust or licentious or do any shameful thing that will make him a worse man, but otherwise will bring him more wealth or power? In no way, he said. And how that it pays him to escape detection in wrongdoing and not pay the penalty [*]?

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Or is it not true that he who evades detection becomes a still worse man, while in the one who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best, attains to a much more precious condition in acquiring sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom, than the body [*] does when it gains strength and beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is more precious than the body? Most assuredly, he said.

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Then the wise man will bend all his endeavors [*] to this end throughout his life; he will, to begin with, prize the studies that will give this quality to his soul and disprize the others. Clearly, he said. And then, I said, he not only will not abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face set in that direction, but he will not even make health his chief aim, [*] nor give the first place to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless these things are likely to bring with them soberness of spirit,

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but he will always be found attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in his soul. [*] By all means, he replied, if he is to be a true musician. [*] And will he not deal likewise with the ordering and harmonizing of his possessions? He will not let himself be dazzled [*] by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up the mass [*] of his wealth without measure, [*] involving himself in measureless ills. No, I think not, he said.

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He will rather, I said, keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul, [*] and taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess or deficiency of wealth, [*] will so steer his course and add to or detract from his wealth on this principle, so far as may be. Precisely so, he said.

And in the matter of honors and office too this will be his guiding principle:

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He will gladly take part in and enjoy those which he thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private life he will shun those that may overthrow the established habit [*] of his soul. Then, if that is his chief concern, he said, he will not willingly take part in politics. [*] Yes, by the dog,

[*] said I, in his own city he certainly will, yet perhaps not in the city of his birth, except in some providential conjuncture.[*] I understand, he said; you mean the city whose establishment we have described, the city whose home is in the ideal;[*]

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for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth.[*] Well, said I, perhaps there is a pattern[*] of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen.[*] But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being.[*] The politics of this city only will be his and of none other. That seems probable, he said.

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καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, ὥς παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ὠκίζομεν τὴν πόλιν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως λέγω.

τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὄση μιμητική· παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα διήρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς

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εἶδη.

πῶς λέγεις;

ὥς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρήσθαι—οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγωδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς—λῶβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα.

πῇ δὴ, ἔφη, διανοοῦμενος λέγεις;

ῥητέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδῶς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὀμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν. ἔοικε μὲν

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γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν γενέσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον.

πάνυ μὲν οὔν, ἔφη.

ἄκουε δὴ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποκρίνου.

Ἐρώτα.

μίμησιν ὅλως ἔχοις ἂν μοι εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι αὐτὸς πάνυ τι συννοῶ τί βούλεται εἶναι.

ἦ που ἄρ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ συννοήσω.

οὐδέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄτοπον, ἐπεὶ πολλὰ τοι ὀξύτερον

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βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὀρῶντες πρότεροι εἶδον.

ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτως· ἀλλὰ σοῦ παρόντος οὐδ' ἂν προθυμηθῆναι οἷός τε εἶην εἰπεῖν, εἰ τί μοι καταφαίνεται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὄρα.

βούλει οὔν ἐνθένδε ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες, ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου; εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἐν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ, οἷς ταῦτόν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν. ἦ οὐ μανθάνεις;

μανθάνω.

θῶμεν δὴ καὶ νῦν ὅτι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν. οἷον, εἰ

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ᾗ' ἐλεις, πολλὰι πού εἰσι κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἀλλὰ ἰδέαι γέ που περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκευὴ δύο, μία μὲν κλίνης, μία δὲ τραπέζης.
ναί.

οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν ὅτι ὁ δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους πρὸς
τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν τὰς κλίνας, ὁ δὲ τὰς τραπέζας, αἷς ἡμεῖς
χρώμεθα, καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ ταῦτά; οὐ γάρ που τὴν γε ἰδέαν αὐτὴν δημιουργεῖ
οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν· πῶς γάρ;

οὐδαμῶς.

ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόνδε τίνα καλεῖς τὸν δημιουργόν.

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τὸν ποῖον;

ὅς πάντα ποιεῖ, ὅσαπερ εἷς ἕκαστος τῶν χειροτεχνῶν.

δεινὸν τίνα λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα.

οὐπω γε, ἀλλὰ τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις. ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ οὗτος χειροτέχνης οὐ
μόνον πάντα οἷός τε σκευὴ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα
ἅπαντα ποιεῖ καὶ ζῶα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ἑαυτὸν, καὶ πρὸς
τούτοις γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν
Ἄιδου ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται.

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πάνυ θαυμαστὸν, ἔφη, λέγεις σοφιστήν.

ἂπιστεῖς; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἶπέ, τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι
τοιοῦτος δημιουργός, ἢ τινὲ μὲν τρόπῳ γενέσθαι ἂν τούτων ἁπάντων
ποιητής, τινὲ δὲ οὐκ ἂν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνη ὅτι κἂν αὐτὸς οἷός τ' εἴης πάντα
ταῦτα ποιῆσαι τρόπῳ γέ τι;

καὶ τίς, ἔφη, ὁ τρόπος οὗτος;

οὐ χαλεπός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ πολλαχῇ καὶ ταχὺ δημιουργούμενος, τάχιστα δέ
που, εἰ 'θέλεις λαβὼν κάτοπτρον

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περιφέρειν πανταχῇ· ταχὺ μὲν ἥλιον ποιήσεις καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ
γῆν, ταχὺ δὲ σαυτὸν τε καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα καὶ σκευὴ καὶ φυτὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα
νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο.

ναί, ἔφη, φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γέ που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.

καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εἰς δέον ἔρχη τῷ λόγῳ. τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ οἶμαι
δημιουργῶν καὶ ὁ ζωγράφος ἐστίν. ἦ γάρ;

πῶς γάρ οὐ;

ἀλλὰ φήσεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ οἶμαι αὐτὸν ποιεῖν ἢ ποιεῖ. καίτοι τρόπῳ γέ τι καὶ
ὁ ζωγράφος κλίνην ποιεῖ· ἦ οὐ;

ναί, ἔφη, φαινομένην γε καὶ οὗτος.

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τί δὲ ὁ κλινοποιός; οὐκ ἄρτι μέντοι ἔλεγες ὅτι οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, ὃ δὴ φαμεν
εἶναι ὃ ἔστι κλίνη, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά;

ἔλεγον γάρ.

οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ὃ ἔστιν ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὄν ποιοῖ, ἀλλὰ τι τοιοῦτον οἶον τὸ

ὄν, ὃν δὲ οὐ· τελέως δὲ εἶναι ὃν τὸ τοῦ κλινουργοῦ ἔργον ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς
χειροτέχνου εἴ τις φαίη, κινδυνεύει οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγειν;
οὐκουν, ἔφη, ὥς γ' ἂν δόξειεν τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τοιοῦσδε λόγους διατρίβουσιν.
μηδὲν ἄρα θαυμάζωμεν εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἄμυδρόν τι τυγχάνει ὃν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.
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μὴ γάρ.

βούλει οὖν, ἔφην, ἐπ' αὐτῶν τούτων ζητήσωμεν τὸν μιμητὴν τοῦτον, τίς
ποτ' ἐστίν;

εἰ βούλει, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τριτταὶ τινες κλῖναι αὗται γίνονται· μία μὲν ἢ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὔσα, ἣν
φαῖμεν ἄν, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι. ἢ τίν' ἄλλον;

οὐδέν, οἶμαι.

μία δέ γε ἦν ὁ τέκτων.

ναί, ἔφη.

μία δὲ ἦν ὁ ζωγράφος. ἦ γάρ;

ἔστω.

ζωγράφος δὴ, κλινοποιός, θεός, τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπιστάται τρισὶν εἶδεσι κλινῶν.

ναὶ τρεῖς.

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ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, εἴτε οὐκ ἐβούλετο, εἴτε τις ἀνάγκη ἐπῆν μὴ πλεόν ἢ μίαν ἐν
τῇ φύσει ἀπεργάσασθαι αὐτὸν κλίνην, οὕτως ἐποίησεν μίαν μόνον αὐτὴν
ἐκείνην ὃ ἔστιν κλίνη· δύο δὲ τοιαῦται ἢ πλείους οὔτε ἐφυτεύθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ
θεοῦ οὔτε μὴ φυῶσιν.

πῶς δὴ; ἔφη.

ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δύο μόνας ποιήσειεν, πάλιν ἂν μία ἀναφανείη ἥς ἐκεῖναι ἂν
αὐτὴ ἀμφοτέραι τὸ εἶδος ἔχοιεν, καὶ εἴη ἂν ὃ ἔστιν κλίνη ἐκείνη ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ
δύο.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

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ταῦτα δὴ οἶμαι εἰδὼς ὁ θεός, βουλόμενος εἶναι ὄντως κλίνης ποιητὴς ὄντως
οὔσης, ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίνης τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις, μίαν φύσει αὐτὴν ἔφυσεν.
ἔοικεν.

βούλει οὖν τοῦτον μὲν φυτουργὸν τούτου προσαγορεύωμεν, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον;
δίκαιον γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὴ περ φύσει γε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα
πεποίηκεν.

τί δὲ τὸν τέκτονα; ἄρ' οὐ δημιουργὸν κλίνης;

ναί.

ἦ καὶ τὸν ζωγράφον δημιουργὸν καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τοιοῦτου;

οὐδαμῶς.

ἀλλὰ τί αὐτὸν κλίνης φήσεις εἶναι;

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τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ μετριώτατ' ἂν προσαγορεύεσθαι, μιμητὴς οὗ
ἐκεῖνοι δημιουργοί.

εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸν τοῦ τρίτου ἄρα γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως μιμητὴν

καλεῖς;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

τοῦτ' ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγωδοποιός, εἴπερ μιμητής ἐστι, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μιμηταί.

κινδυνεύει.

τὸν μὲν δὴ μιμητὴν ὠμολογῆκαμεν. εἶπε δέ μοι περὶ

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τοῦ ζωγράφου τόδε· πότερα ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἕκαστον δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιχειρεῖν μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα;

τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν, ἔφη.

ἄρα οἷα ἔστιν ἢ οἷα φαίνεται; τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον.

πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

ᾧδε· κλίνη, ἅντε ἐκ πλαγίου αὐτὴν θεᾷ ἔαντε καταντικρὺ ἢ ὀπιοῦν, μὴ τι διαφέρει αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς, ἢ διαφέρει μὲν οὐδέν, φαίνεται δὲ ἄλλοια; καὶ τᾶλλα ὡσαύτως;

οὕτως, ἔφη· φαίνεται, διαφέρει δ' οὐδέν.

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τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ σκόπει· πρὸς πότερον ἢ γραφικὴ πεποιήται περὶ ἕκαστον;

πότερα πρὸς τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει, μιμήσασθαι, ἢ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς

φαίνεται, φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὔσα μίμησις;

φαντάσματος, ἔφη.

πόρρω ἄρα που τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἢ μιμητικὴ ἐστὶν καί, ὡς ἔοικεν, διὰ τοῦτο πάντα ἀπεργάζεται, ὅτι σμικρόν τι ἑκάστου ἐφάπτεται, καὶ τοῦτο εἶδωλον.

οἷον ὁ ζωγράφος, φάμεν, ζωγραφῆσει ἡμῖν σκυτοτόμον, τέκτονα, τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς,

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περὶ οὐδενὸς τούτων ἐπαίων τῶν τεχνῶν· ἀλλ' ὅμως παῖδάς γε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους, εἰ ἀγαθὸς εἴη ζωγράφος, γράψας ἂν τέκτονα καὶ πόρρωθεν ἐπιδεικνὺς ἐξαπατῶ ἂν τῷ δοκεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τέκτονα εἶναι.

τί δ' οὐ;

ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι ᾧ φίλε, τόδε δεῖ περὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων διανοεῖσθαι·

ἐπειδάν τις ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλῃ περὶ του, ὡς ἐνέτυχεν ἀνθρώπῳ πάσας

ἐπισταμένῳ τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσα εἷς ἕκαστος οἶδεν, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐχὶ

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ἀκριβέστερον ὅπου οὖν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅτι

εὐήθης τις ἀνθρώπος, καί, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐντυχὼν γόητι τινι καὶ μιμητῇ

ἐξηπατήθη, ὥστε ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ πάσοφος εἶναι, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἶός τ'

εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μίμησιν ἐξετάσαι.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον τὴν τε τραγωδίαν καὶ τὸν

ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον, ἐπειδὴ τινων

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ἀκούομεν ὅτι οὗτοι πάσας μὲν τέχνας ἐπίστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τὰ γε θεῖα· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ καλῶς ποιήσῃν, εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι ποιεῖν.

δεῖ δὴ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον μιμηταῖς τούτοις οὗτοι ἐντυχόντες ἐξηπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὀρώντες

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οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ῥάδια ποιεῖν μὴ εἰδότες τὴν ἀλήθειαν—φαντάσματα γὰρ ἄλλ’ οὐκ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν—ἢ τι καὶ λέγουσιν καὶ τῷ ὄντι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἴσασιν περὶ ὧν δοκοῦσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς εὖ λέγειν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐξεταστέον.

οἶει οὖν, εἴ τις ἀμφοτέρα δύναιτο ποιεῖν, τὸ τε μιμηθῆσόμενον καὶ τὸ εἰδῶλον, ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν εἰδῶλων δημιουργίᾳ ἑαυτὸν ἀφεῖναι ἂν σπουδάζειν καὶ τοῦτο προστήσασθαι τοῦ

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ἑαυτοῦ βίου ὡς βέλτιστον ἔχοντα;

οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ἀλλ’ εἴπερ γε οἶμαι ἐπιστήμων εἴη τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων περὶ ἅπερ καὶ μιμεῖται, πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἂν σπουδάσειεν ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς μιμήμασι, καὶ πειρώτο ἂν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἑαυτοῦ καταλιπεῖν μνημεῖα, καὶ εἶναι προθυμοῖτ’ ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ ἐγκωμιαζόμενος ἢ ὁ ἐγκωμιάζων.

οἶμαι, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ἢ τε τιμὴ καὶ ἡ ὠφελία.

τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων περὶ μὴ ἀπαιτῶμεν λόγον Ὅμηρον

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ἢ ἄλλον ὄντινοῦν τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐρωτῶντες εἰ ἱατρικὸς ἦν τις αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ μιμητὴς μόνον ἱατρικῶν λόγων, τίνας ὑγιεῖς ποιητὴς τις τῶν παλαιῶν ἢ τῶν νέων λέγεται πεποικῆναι, ὥσπερ Ἀσκληπιός, ἢ τίνας μαθητὰς ἱατρικῆς κατελίπετο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς ἐκγόνους, μηδ’ αὖ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας αὐτοὺς ἐρωτῶμεν, ἀλλ’ ἐώμεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν μεγίστων τε καὶ καλλίστων ἐπιχειρεῖ λέγειν Ὅμηρος, πολέμων τε περὶ καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ διοικήσεων πόλεων, καὶ

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παιδείας περὶ ἀνθρώπου, δίκαιόν που ἐρωτᾷν αὐτὸν πυνθανομένους· ὦ φίλε Ὅμηρε, εἴπερ μὴ τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἰ ἀρετῆς περὶ, εἰδῶλου δημιουργός, ὃν δὴ μιμητὴν ὠρισάμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεῦτερος, καὶ οἷός τε ἦσθα γινώσκειν ποῖα ἐπιτηδεύματα βελτίους ἢ χεῖρους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, λέγε ἡμῖν τίς τῶν πόλεων διὰ σὲ βέλτιον ὤκησεν, ὥσπερ διὰ Λυκοῦργον Λακεδαιμῶν καὶ δι’ ἄλλους πολλοὺς

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πολλὰ μεγάλα τε καὶ σμικραί; σὲ δὲ τίς αἰπιᾶται πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγενῆσθαι καὶ σφᾶς ὠφελῆκέναι; Χαρῶνδαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἡμεῖς Σόλων· σὲ δὲ τίς; ἔξει τινὰ εἰπεῖν;

οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων· οὐκ οὐκ λέγεται γε οὐδ’ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν Ὀμηριδῶν.

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600a

ἀλλὰ δὴ τις πόλεμος ἐπὶ Ὀμήρου ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἄρχοντος ἢ συμβουλευόντος
εὔπολεμηθεις μνημονεύεται;

οὐδείς.

ἀλλ' οἷα δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς πολλαὶ ἐπίνοιαί καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς
τέχνας ἢ τινας ἄλλας πράξεις λέγονται, ὥσπερ αὖ Θάλεω τε περὶ τοῦ
Μιλησίου καὶ Ἀναχάρσιος τοῦ Σκύθου;

οὐδαμῶς τοιοῦτον οὐδέν.

ἀλλὰ δὴ εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμῶν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται
Ὀμηρὸς γενέσθαι, οἱ ἐκείνον ἡγάπων ἐπὶ

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συνουσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις ὁδὸν τινα παρέδωκαν βίου Ὀμηρικὴν, ὥσπερ
Πυθαγόρας αὐτὸς τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἡγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι ἔτι καὶ
νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πη δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις;

οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ Κρεῶφυλος, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἴσως,
ὁ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἐταῖρος, τοῦ ὀνόματος ἂν γελοιότερος ἔτι πρὸς παιδείαν
φανείη, εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ Ὀμήρου ἀληθῆ. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς πολλή τις
ἀμέλεια περὶ

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αὐτὸν ἦν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, ὅτε ἔζη.

λέγεται γὰρ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' οἶει, ὦ Γλαῦκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οἷός τ' ἦν
παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι Ὀμηρὸς, ἅτε περὶ τούτων
οὐ μιμεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ γινώσκειν δυνάμενος, οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν πολλοὺς ἐταίρους
ἐποίησας καὶ ἐτιμᾶτο καὶ ἡγαπᾶτο ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα
ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ'
ἐαυτῶν παριστάναι ἰδίᾳ συγγιγνόμενοι

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ὡς οὔτε οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν οἷοι τ' ἔσονται, ἐὰν μὴ σφεῖς
αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσιν τῆς παιδείας, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα
φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ
ἐταῖροι. Ὀμηρον δ' ἄρα οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ οἷός τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὄνῃσαι
ἀνθρώπους, ἢ Ἡσίοδον ῥαψωδεῖν ἂν περιόντας εἶων, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἂν
αὐτῶν ἀντειχόντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ

600e

ἡνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίσιν οἴκοι εἶναι, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδαγώγουν
ὅπῃ ἦσαν, ἕως ἱκανῶς παιδείας μεταλάβοιεν;

παντάπασι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

οὐκοῦν τιθῶμεν ἀπὸ Ὀμήρου ἀρξαμένους πάντας τοὺς ποιητικοὺς μιμητὰς
εἰδῶλων ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ποιοῦσιν, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας
οὐχ ἅπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὁ ζωγράφος σκυτοτόμον ποιήσει
δοκοῦντα

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εἶναι, αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαίων περὶ σκυτοτομίας καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπαίουσιν, ἐκ τῶν
χρωμάτων δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσιν;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὕτω δὴ οἶμαι καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματα ἅττα ἐκάστων τῶν
τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαίοντα ἀλλ'
ἢ μιμεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἑτέροις τοιοῦτοις ἐκ τῶν λόγων θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, ἐάντε
περὶ σκυτοτομίας τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ, πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν
λέγεσθαι, ἐάντε περὶ στρατηγίας ἐάντε περὶ ἄλλου

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ὁπουοῦν· οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ
γυμνωθέντα γε τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς χρωμάτων τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν, αὐτὰ ἐφ'
αὐτῶν λεγόμενα, οἶμαί σε εἰδέναι οἷα φαίνεται. τεθέασαι γάρ που.

ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικεν τοῖς τῶν ὠραίων προσώποις, καλῶν δὲ μή, οἷα
γίγνεται ἰδεῖν ὅταν αὐτὰ τὸ ἄνθος προλίπη;

παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

ἴθι δὴ, τόδε ἄθρει· ὁ τοῦ εἰδώλου ποιητῆς, ὁ μιμητῆς, φαμέν, τοῦ μὲν ὄντος
οὐδὲν ἐπαίει, τοῦ δὲ φαινομένου· οὐχ

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οὕτως;

ναί.

μὴ τοίνυν ἡμίσεως αὐτὸ καταλίπωμεν ῥηθέν, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς ἴδωμεν.
λέγε, ἔφη.

ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ἡνίας τε γράφει καὶ χαλινόν;

ναί.

ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς;

πάνυ γε.

ἄρ' οὖν ἐπαίει οἷας δεῖ τὰς ἡνίας εἶναι καὶ τὸν χαλινὸν ὁ γραφεύς; ἢ οὐδ' ὁ
ποιήσας, ὃ τε χαλκεύς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ὅσπερ τούτοις ἐπίσταται
χρηῖσθαι, μόνος ὁ ἵππικός;

ἀληθέστατα.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ πάντα οὕτω φήσομεν ἔχειν;

πῶς;

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περὶ ἕκαστον ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν,
μιμησομένην;

ναί.

οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἐκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζώου καὶ
πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐστίν, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον ἦ
πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός;

οὕτως.

πολλὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἐκάστῳ ἐμπειρότατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἄγγελον
γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρεῖᾳ ᾧ χρηται· οἷον

αὐλητῆς που αὐλοποιῶ

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ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν, οἳ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει
οἷους δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὁ δ' ὑπηρετήσῃ.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ
πιστεῦων ποιήσῃ;

ναί.

τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητῆς πίστιν ὀρθὴν ἔξει περὶ κάλλους τε
καὶ πονηρίας, συνὼν τῷ εἰδῶτι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος

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ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην.

πάνυ γε.

ὁ δὲ μιμητῆς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἔξει περὶ ὧν ἂν γράφῃ,
εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε μὴ, ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ
εἰδῶτι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα χρὴ γράφειν;

οὐδέτερα.

οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητῆς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς
κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

χαρίεις ἂν εἴῃ ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσῃ μιμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ.

οὐ πάνυ.

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ἀλλ' οὐν δὴ ὅμως γε μιμήσεται, οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἐκάστου ὅπῃ πονηρὸν ἢ
χρηστὸν· ἀλλ', ὥς ἔοικεν, οἷον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ
μηδὲν εἰδόσιν, τοῦτο μιμήσεται.

τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὥς γε φαίνεται, ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν διωμολόγηται, τὸν τε μιμητικὸν
μηδὲν εἰδέναι ἄξιον λόγου περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἀλλ' εἶναι παιδιὰν τινα καὶ οὐ
σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τοὺς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ἀπτομένους ἐν
ἰαμβείοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεισι πάντας εἶναι μιμητικοὺς ὥς οἷον τε μάλιστα.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτο οὐ περὶ τρίτον μὲν τί ἐστὶν
ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; ἦ γάρ;

ναί.

πρὸς δὲ δὴ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει;

τοῦ ποίου τινὸς πέρι λέγεις;

τοῦ τοιοῦδε· ταῦτόν που ἡμῖν μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε καὶ πόρρωθεν διὰ τῆς
ὄψεως οὐκ ἴσον φαίνεται.

οὐ γάρ.

καὶ ταῦτ' αὖ καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὕδατι τε θεωμένοις καὶ ἔξω, καὶ κοῦλα
τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχοντα διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώματα αὐτῶν πλάνην τῆς ὄψεως, καὶ

πᾶσά τις ταραχή δήλη

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ἡμῖν ἐνοῦσα αὕτη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ὥ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει, καὶ ἡ θαυματοποιία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται μηχαναί.

ἀληθῆ.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἰστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μεῖζον ἢ ἑλάττων ἢ πλεόν ἢ βαρύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ μετρήσαν ἢ καὶ στήσαν; πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

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ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργον.

τοῦτου γὰρ οὖν.

τοῦτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἅττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἐτέρων ἢ ἴσα τάναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι; καὶ ὀρθῶς γ' ἔφαμεν.

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τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτόν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦον βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη τῆς ψυχῆς.

τί μὴν;

τὸ ἄρα τοῦτῳ ἐναντιούμενον τῶν φαύλων ἂν τι εἴη ἐν ἡμῖν.

ἀνάγκη.

τοῦτο τοίνυν διομολογήσασθαι βουλόμενος ἔλεγον ὅτι ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ μιμητικὴ πόρρω μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας ὅν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, πόρρω δ' αὖ φρονήσεως ὄντι τῷ

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ἐν ἡμῖν προσομιλεῖ τε καὶ ἑταῖρα καὶ φίλη ἐστὶν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ οὐδ' ἀληθεῖ.

παντάπασι, ἢ δ' ὅς.

φαύλη ἄρα φαύλῳ συγγιγνομένη φαῦλα γεννᾷ ἢ μιμητικῇ.

ἔοικεν.

πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον, ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἦν δὴ ποίησιν ὀνομάζομεν;

εἰκός γ', ἔφη, καὶ ταύτην.

μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ εἰκότι μόνον πιστεύσωμεν ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸ αὖ ἔλθωμεν τῆς διανοίας

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τοῦτο ὧς προσομιλεῖ ἢ τῆς ποιήσεως μιμητικῇ, καὶ ἴδωμεν φαῦλον ἢ σπουδαῖόν ἐστιν.

ἀλλὰ χρή.

ὣδε δὴ προθώμεθα· πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἢ μιμητικῇ βιαίους ἢ ἐκουσίας πράξεις, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν ἢ λυπουμένους ἢ χαίροντας. μή τι ἄλλο ἦν παρὰ ταῦτα;

οὐδέν.

ἄρ' οὖν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ὁμονοητικῶς ἄνθρωπος διάκειται;

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ἢ ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἐστασίαζεν καὶ ἐναντίας εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δόξας ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι στασιάζει τε καὶ μάχεται αὐτὸς αὐτῷ; ἀναμιμνήσκομαι δὲ ὅτι τοῦτο γε νῦν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἡμᾶς διομολογεῖσθαι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις ἱκανῶς πάντα ταῦτα διωμολογησάμεθα, ὅτι μυρίων τοιούτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἢ ψυχὴ γέμει ἡμῶν.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

ὀρθῶς γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὁ τότε ἀπελίπομεν, νῦν μοι

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δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διεξελθεῖν.

τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

ἀνὴρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπεικὴς τοιαύδε τύχης μετασχών, ὕδὼν ἀπολέσας ἢ τι ἄλλο ὦν περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖται, ἐλέγομέν· που καὶ τότε ὅτι ῥῆστα οἴσει τῶν ἄλλων.

πάνυ γε.

νῦν δέ γε τὸδ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, πότερον οὐδὲν ἀχθέσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον, μετριάσει δὲ πως πρὸς λύπην.

οὕτω μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τὸ γε ἀληθές.

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τόδε νῦν μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέ· πότερον μᾶλλον αὐτὸν οἶει τῇ λύπῃ μαχεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν, ὅταν ὀρᾷται ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἢ ὅταν ἐν ἐρημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν γίγνηται;

πολύ που, ἔφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὀρᾷται.

μονωθεὶς δέ γε οἶμαι πολλὰ μὲν τολμήσει φθέγγασθαι, ἃ εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἀκούοι αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν, πολλὰ δὲ ποιήσει, ἃ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτό τινα ἰδεῖν δρῶντα.

οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀντιτείνειν διακελευόμενον λόγος καὶ νόμος

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ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ ἔλκον ἐπὶ τὰς λύπας αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος;

ἀληθῆ.

ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα, δύο φαμέν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἔτοιμον πείθεσθαι, ἢ ὁ νόμος ἐξηγεῖται;

πῶς;

λέγει που ὁ νόμος ὅτι κάλλιστον ὅτι μάλιστα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐν ταῖς

συμφοραῖς καὶ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὥς οὔτε δήλου ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων, οὔτε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαῖνον τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι, οὔτε τι τῶν

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ἀνθρωπίνων ἄξιον ὃν μεγάλης σπουδῆς, ὃ τε δεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅτι τάχιστα παραγίγνεσθαι ἡμῖν, τοῦτω ἐμποδῶν γιγνόμενον τὸ λυπεῖσθαι.

τῖνι, ἢ δ' ὅς, λέγεις;

τῷ βουλευέσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ πράγματα, ὅπη ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπταίσαντας καθάπερ παῖδας ἐχομένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοᾷ διατρίβειν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐθίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ὅτι

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τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἰᾶσθαι τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ νοσήσαν, ἱατρικῇ θρηνηδίαν ἀφανίζοντα.

ὀρθότατα γοῦν ἂν τις, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰς τύχας οὔτω προσφέροιτο.

οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὸ μὲν βέλτιστον τοῦτω τῷ λογισμῷ ἐθέλει ἔπεσθαι.

δῆλον δῆ.

τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναμνήσεις τε τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς ἄγον καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχον αὐτῶν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀλόγιστόν τε φήσομεν εἶναι καὶ ἀργὸν καὶ δειλίαν φίλον;

φήσομεν μὲν οὔν.

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οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν πολλὴν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλῃν ἔχει, τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν, τὸ δὲ φρόνιμόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος, παραπλήσιον ὃν αἰεὶ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, οὔτε ῥάδιον μιμήσασθαι οὔτε μιμουμένου εὐπετές καταμαθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς θέατρα συλλεγομένοις· ἀλλοτρίου γάρ που πάθους ἢ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται.

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παντάσας μὲν οὔν.

ὁ δὲ μιμητικὸς ποιητῆς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκέν τε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τοῦτω ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν, εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκίμησιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος διὰ τὸ εὐμίμητον εἶναι.

δῆλον.

οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐπιλαμβανοίμεθα, καὶ τιθεῖμεν ἀντίστροφον αὐτὸν τῷ ζωγράφῳ· καὶ γὰρ τῷ φαῦλα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἔοικεν αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον τοιοῦτον

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ὁμιλεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, καὶ ταῦτη ὁμοίωται. καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἂν ἐν δίκῃ οὐ παραδεχοίμεθα εἰς μέλλουσιν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν, ὅτι τοῦτο ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει ὅταν τις μοχθηροὺς ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῶν παραδιδῷ τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ χαριεστέρους φθείρῃ· ταῦτόν τε καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν

φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἔμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς

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χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν μεγάλα ἡγουμένῳ, τοτὲ δὲ μικρά, εἰδῶλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐ μέντοι πῶ τό γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπικεικὺς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάνδεινόν που. τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, εἴπερ γε δρᾷ αὐτό;

ἀκούων σκόπει. οἱ γὰρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὀμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν μιμουμένου

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τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὁδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἷσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ.

οἶδα· πῶς δ' οὐ;

ὅταν δὲ οἰκελὸν τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς αὖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν δυνώμεθα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν

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καὶ καρτερεῖν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, ὃ τότε ἐπιηνοῦμεν.

ἐννοῶ, ἔφη.

ἦ καλῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ ἔπαινος ἔχει, τὸ ὁρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτὸν τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αἰσχύνοιτο ἂν, μὴ βδελύττεσθαι ἀλλὰ χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν;

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν.

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ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ἐκείνη γ' αὐτὸ σκοποῖης.

πῇ;

εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαι τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὃν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότε ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαῖρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίησιν τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ

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θρηνώδους τούτου, ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲν αἰσχροὺν ὄν εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαίρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο κερδαίνειν ἡγεῖται, τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι καταφρονήσας ὅλου τοῦ ποιήματος. λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἷμαι ὀλίγοις τισὶν μέτεστιν ὅτι ἀπολαβεῖν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα· θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλείνδον οὐ ῥάδιον ἐν τοῖς

αὐτοῦ πάθει κατέχειν.

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ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου; ὅτι, ἂν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμῇσι δὲ κωμωδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῆς καὶ μὴ μισῆς ὡς πονηρά, ταῦτόν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις; ὁ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὸ κατεῖχες ἐν σαυτῷ βουλόμενον γελωτοποιεῖν, φοβούμενος δόξαν βωμολοχίας, τότ' αὐτὸ ἀνιῖς, καὶ ἐκεῖ νεανικὸν ποιήσας ἔλαθες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐξενεχθεὶς ὥστε κωμωδοποιὸς γενέσθαι.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

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καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἡδέων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἃ δὴ φαμεν πάσῃ πράξει ἡμῖν ἔπεσθαι, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιητικὴ μίμησις ἐργάζεται· τρέφει γὰρ ταῦτα ἄρδουσα, δέον αὐχμεῖν, καὶ ἄρχοντα ἡμῖν καθίστησιν, δέον ἄρχεσθαι αὐτὰ ἵνα βελτίους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἀντὶ χειρόνων καὶ ἀθλιωτέρων γινώμεθα. οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως φάναι, ἢ δ' ὅς.

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οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ὅταν Ὀμήρου ἐπαινέταις ἐντύχῃς λέγουσιν ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαιδεύκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ πρὸς διοίκησιν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἄξιος ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν τε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον κατασκευασάμενον ζῆν,

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φιλεῖν μὲν χρὴ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται, καὶ συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν·

εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονὴ σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

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ταῦτα δὴ, ἔφην, ἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν ἀναμνησθεῖσιν περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστελλόμεν τοιαύτην οὔσαν· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἤρει. προσεῖπμεν δὲ αὐτῇ, μὴ καὶ τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῶ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μὲν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητικὴ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ λακέρυζα πρὸς δεσπόταν κύων

ἐκείνη

κραυγάζουσα

Unknown καὶ

μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίασι

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καὶ ὁ

τῶν διασόφων ὄχλος κρατῶν

καὶ οἱ

λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες

, ὅτι ἄρα

πένονται

, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία σημεία παλαιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως τούτων. ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω ὅτι ἡμεῖς γε, εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὡς χρή αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένη, ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς σύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθές οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. ἥ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλῇ ὑπ' αὐτῆς

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καὶ σὺ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν δι' Ὀμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν;

πολὺ γε.

οὐκοῦν δικαία ἐστὶν οὕτω κατιέναι, ἀπολογησαμένη ἐν μέλει ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ μέτρῳ;

πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

δοῖμεν δέ γε που ἂν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταὶ δέ, ἄνευ μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν· καὶ εὐμένως ἀκουσόμεθα.

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κερδανοῦμεν γάρ που ἐὰν μὴ μόνον ἡδεῖα φανῇ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη.

πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλομεν, ἔφη, κερδαίνειν;

εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ὥσπερ οἱ ποτέ του ἐρασθέντες, ἐὰν ἡγήσωνται μὴ ὠφέλιμον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, βίᾳ μὲν, ὅμως δὲ ἀπέχονται, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως, διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τοιαύτης ποιήσεως ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν

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τροφῆς, εὗνοι μὲν ἐσόμεθα φανῆναι αὐτὴν ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀλθεσεστάτην, ἕως δ' ἂν μὴ οἷα τ' ἦ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροασόμεθ' αὐτῆς ἐπ' αἰδῶντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπωδὴν, εὐλαβούμενοι πάλιν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικόν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα. ἄσόμεθα δ' οὖν ὡς οὐ σπουδαστέον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει ὡς ἀληθείας τε ἀπτομένη καὶ σπουδαία, ἀλλ' εὐλαβητέον

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αὐτὴν ὃν τῷ ἀκρωμένῳ, περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας δεδιότι, καὶ νομιστέα ἅπερ εἰρήκαμεν περὶ ποιήσεως.

παντάπασιν, ἥ δ' ὅς, σύμφημι.

μέγας γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε

ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ ἄξιον ἀμελῆσαι δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς.

σύμφημί σοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν· οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινον.

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καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἄθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν.

ἀμήχανόν τι, ἔφη, λέγεις μέγεθος, εἰ τῶν εἰρημένων μείζω ἐστὶν ἄλλα.

τί δ' ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ μέγα γένοιτο; πᾶς γὰρ οὗτός γε ὁ ἐκ παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτου χρόνος πρὸς πάντα ὀλίγος ποὺ τις ἂν εἴη.

οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

τί οὖν; οἶε ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσούτου δεῖν

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χρόνου ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός;

οἴμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

οὐκ ἦσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται;

καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέψας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε· μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε· σὺ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχεις λέγειν;

εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γ', ἔφην. οἴμαι δὲ καὶ σὺ· οὐδὲν γὰρ χαλεπόν.

ἔμοιγ', ἔφη· σοῦ δ' ἂν ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμι τὸ οὐ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο.

ἀκούοις ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

λέγε μόνον, ἔφη.

ἀγαθόν τι, εἶπον, καὶ κακὸν καλεῖς;

ἔγωγε.

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ἄρ' οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ περὶ αὐτῶν διανοῇ;

τὸ ποῖον;

τὸ μὲν ἀπολλύον καὶ διαφθεῖρον πᾶν τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ σῶζον καὶ ὠφελοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν.

ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

τί δέ; κακὸν ἐκάστω τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν λέγεις; οἶον ὀφθαλμοῖς

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ὀφθαλμίαν καὶ σύμπαντι τῷ σώματι νόσον, σίτω τε ἐρυσίβην, σηπεδόνα τε ζύλοις, χαλκῷ δὲ καὶ σιδήρῳ ἰόν, καί, ὅπερ λέγω, σχεδὸν πᾶσι σύμφυτον ἐκάστω κακόν τε καὶ νόσημα;

ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν ὅταν τῷ τι τούτων προσγένηται, πονηρόν τε ποιεῖ ὧς προσεγένετο, καὶ τελευτῶν ὅλον διέλυσεν καὶ ἀπώλεσεν;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

τὸ σύμφυτον ἄρα κακὸν ἐκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία ἕκαστον ἀπόλλυσιν, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ ἔτι

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διαφθείρειεν. οὐ γὰρ τὸ γε ἀγαθὸν μὴ ποτέ τι ἀπολέσει, οὐδὲ αὖ τὸ μήτε

κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθόν.

πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη.

ἐὰν ἄρα τι εὐρίσκωμεν τῶν ὄντων, ὧς ἔστι μὲν κακὸν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν, τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτὸ λυεῖν ἀπολλύνον, οὐκ ἤδη εἰσόμεθα ὅτι τοῦ πεφυκότες οὕτως ὀλεθρος οὐκ ἦν;

οὕτως, ἔφη, εἰκός.

τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· ψυχῇ ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κακὴν; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· ἃ νυνδὴ διῆμεν πάντα, ἀδικία τε καὶ

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ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀμαθία.

ἦ οὖν τι τούτων αὐτὴν διαλύει τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσι; καὶ ἐννόει μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν οἰηθέντες τὸν ἄδικον ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνόητον, ὅταν ληφθῇ ἀδικῶν, τότε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, πονηρίας οὔσης ψυχῆς. ἀλλ' ὥδε ποιεῖ· ὥσπερ σῶμα ἢ σώματος πονηρία νόσος οὖσα τήκει καὶ διόλλυσι καὶ ἄγει εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν

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ἅπαντα ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κακίας, τῷ προσκαθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνεῖναι διαφθειρούσης, εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀφικνεῖται—οὐχ οὕτω; ναί.

ἴθι δὴ, καὶ ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον σκόπει. ἄρα ἐνοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κακία τῷ ἐνεῖναι καὶ προσκαθῆσθαι φθείρει αὐτὴν καὶ μαραινει, ἕως ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγαγοῦσα τοῦ σώματος χωρίσῃ;

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἐκεῖνό γε ἄλογον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν μὲν ἄλλου πονηρίαν ἀπολλύναι τι, τὴν δὲ αὐτοῦ μὴ.

ἄλογον.

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ἐννόει γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧς Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν σιτίων πονηρίας, ἢ ἂν ἦ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, εἴτε παλαιότης εἴτε σαπρότης εἴτε ἡτισοῦν οὖσα, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν σῶμα ἀπόλλυσθαι·

ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἐμποιῇ ἡ αὐτῶν πονηρία τῶν σιτίων τῷ σώματι σώματος μοχθηρίαν, φήσομεν αὐτὸ δι' ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ κακίας νόσου οὔσης ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπὸ

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δὲ σιτίων πονηρίας ἄλλων ὄντων ἄλλο ὄν τὸ σῶμα, ὑπ' ἄλλοτρίου κακοῦ μὴ ἐμποιήσαντος τὸ ἔμφυτον κακόν, οὐδέποτε ἀξιόσομεν διαφθεῖρεσθαι. ὀρθότατ' αὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐὰν μὴ σώματος πονηρία ψυχῇ ψυχῆς πονηρίαν ἐμποιῇ, μὴ ποτε ἀξιῶμεν ὑπὸ ἄλλοτρίου κακοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ἰδίας πονηρίας ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρου κακῷ ἕτερον.

ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.

ἦ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἐξελέγξωμεν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν, ἢ

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ἔως ἂν ἡ ἀνέλεγκτα, μή ποτε φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ μηδ' αὖ ὑπ' ἄλλης νόσου
μηδ' αὖ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, μηδ' εἴ τις ὅτι σμικρότατα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα κατατέμοι,
ἔνεκα τούτων μηδὲν μᾶλλον ποτε ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἀποδείξῃ
ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα τοῦ σώματος αὐτῇ ἐκείνη ἀδικώτερα καὶ
ἀνοσιώτερα γίνεταί· ἀλλοτρίου δὲ κακοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένου, τοῦ δὲ ἰδίου
ἐκάστῳ μὴ ἐγγιγνομένου,

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μήτε ψυχὴν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν ἐῷμεν φάναι τινὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτ' οὐ γέ οὐδεὶς ποτε δείξει, ὡς τῶν ἀποθνήσκοντων
ἀδικώτεροι αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ τὸν θάνατον γίνονται.

ἐὰν δέ γέ τις, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἵεναι καὶ λέγειν ὡς
πονηρότερος καὶ ἀδικώτερος γίνεταί ὁ ἀποθνήσκων, ἵνα δὴ μὴ
ἀναγκάζεται ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, ἀξιόσομέν που, εἰ ἀληθῆ
λέγει ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, τὴν ἀδικίαν εἶναι θανάσιμον τῷ ἔχοντι ὥσπερ νόσον,
καὶ ὑπ'

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αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ἀποκτεινόντος τῇ ἐαυτοῦ φύσει, ἀποθνήσκειν τοὺς λαμβάνοντας
αὐτό, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα θᾶπτον, τοὺς δ' ἥττον σχολαίτερον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ
νῦν διὰ τοῦτο ὑπ' ἄλλων δίκην ἐπιτιθέντων ἀποθνήσκουσιν οἱ ἄδικοι.

μὰ Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄρα πάνδεινον φανεῖται ἡ ἀδικία, εἰ θανάσιμον ἔσται τῷ
λαμβάνοντι—ἀπαλλαγὴ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κακῶν—ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οἶμαι αὐτὴν
φανήσεσθαι πᾶν τοῦναντίον

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τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποκτεινῶσαν, εἴπερ οἷόν τε, τὸν δ' ἔχοντα καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν
παρέχουσιν, καὶ πρὸς γ' ἔτι τῷ ζωτικῷ ἄγρυπνον· οὕτω πόρρω που, ὡς
ἔοικεν, ἐσκήνηται τοῦ θανάσιμος εἶναι.

καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ὁπότε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἱκανὴ ἦ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ
οἰκεῖον κακὸν ἀποκτείνει καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχὴν, σχολῇ τὸ γε ἐπ' ἄλλου
ὀλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ, πλὴν ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται.
σχολῇ γ', ἔφη, ὡς γε τὸ εἰκός.

οὐκοῦν ὁπότε μηδ' ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ, μήτε

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οἰκείου μήτε ἀλλοτρίου, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὄν εἶναι· εἰ δ' ἀεὶ ὄν,
ἀθάνατον.

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτως ἐχέτω· εἰ δ' ἔχει, ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν
αἱ αὐταί. οὕτε γὰρ ἂν που ἐλάττους γένοιτο μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυμένης, οὕτε
αὖ πλείους· εἰ γὰρ ὅτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλέον γίγνοιτο, οἷσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ
θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα.

ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτε τοῦτο οἰώμεθα—ὁ γὰρ λόγος οὐκ

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ἑάσει—μήτε γε αὖ τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχὴν, ὥστε πολλῆς

ποικιλίας καὶ ἀνομοιοτήτος τε καὶ διαφορᾶς γέμειν αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτό.
πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

οὐ ῥάδιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἰδιδιον εἶναι σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ
καλλίστῃ κεκρημένον συνθέσει, ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχὴ.

οὕκουν εἰκός γε.

ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ, καὶ ὁ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν
ἄν· οἷον δ' ἐστὶν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οὐ λελωβημένον

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δεῖ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι ὑπὸ τε τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν,
ὥσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐστὶν καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον
ἱκανῶς λογισμῷ διαθεατέον, καὶ πολὺ γε κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὕρησει καὶ
ἐναργέστερον δικαιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας διόψεται καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν
διήλοθμεν. νῦν δὲ εἵπομεν μὲν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ, οἷον ἐν τῷ παρόντι
φαίνεται· θεθεάμεθα μέντοι διακειμένον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν

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θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον ὀρώντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥαδίως αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν
φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰ τε παλαιὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ
συντετριῖσθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων, ἀλλὰ δὲ
προσπεφυκέναι, ὄστρεά τε καὶ φυκία καὶ πέτρας, ὥστε παντὶ μᾶλλον θηρίῳ
ἐοικέναι ἢ οἷος ἦν φύσει, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα διακειμένην
ὑπὸ μυρίων κακῶν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ἐκεῖσε βλέπειν.

ποῖ; ἦ δ' ὅς.

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εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐννοεῖν ὧν ἅπτεται καὶ οἷων ἐφίεται
ὀμιλιῶν, ὡς συγγενῆς οὕσα τῷ τε θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ αἰεὶ ὄντι, καὶ
οἷα ἂν γένοιτο τῷ τοιούτῳ πᾶσα ἐπισπομένη καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὁρμῆς
ἐκκομισθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ πόντου ἐν ᾧ νῦν ἐστίν, καὶ περικρουσθεῖσα πέτρας

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τε καὶ ὄστρεα ἃ νῦν αὐτῇ, ἅτε γῆν ἐστιωμένην, γεηρὰ καὶ πετρώδη πολλὰ
καὶ ἄγρια περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων λεγομένων ἐστιάσεων.
καὶ τότε ἂν τις ἴδοι αὐτῆς τὴν ἀληθῆ φύσιν, εἴτε πολυειδῆς εἴτε μονοειδής,
εἴτε ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ὅπως· νῦν δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ πάθη τε καὶ εἶδη,
ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐπικεικῶς αὐτῆς διεληλύθαμεν.

παντάσας μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

οὕκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ,

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καὶ οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπηνέκαμεν, ὥσπερ
Ἡσίοδον τε καὶ Ὅμηρον ὑμεῖς ἔφατε, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ
ἄριστον ἠϋρομεν, καὶ ποιητέον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάντ' ἔχη τὸν Γύγου
δακτύλιον, ἐάντε μὴ, καὶ πρὸς τοιούτῳ δακτυλίῳ τὴν Αἴδος κυνήν;
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονόν ἐστιν πρὸς ἐκείνοις
καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῇ

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ἄλλη ἀρετῇ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅσους τε καὶ οἷους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ' ἀνθρώπων
τε καὶ θεῶν, ζῶντός τε ἔτι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ;
παντάσας μὲν οὖν, ἧ δ' ὅς.

ἄρ' οὖν ἀποδώσετέ μοι ἃ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ;

τί μάλιστα;

ἔδωκα ὑμῖν τὸν δίκαιον δοκεῖν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἄδικον δίκαιον· ὑμεῖς
γὰρ ἡτέισθε, κἂν εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν εἴη ταῦτα λανθάνειν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ
ἀνθρώπους, ὅμως δοτέον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα, ἵνα αὐτὴ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς
ἀδικίαν αὐτήν

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κριθεῖη. ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις;

ἀδικοῖην μεντᾶν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ.

ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κεκριμέναι εἰσὶ, πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης,
ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἡμᾶς ὁμολογεῖν
περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖσθαι οὕτω, ἵνα καὶ τὰ νικητήρια κομισηται, ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν
κτωμένη ἃ διδωσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτήν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ
διδούσα ἐφάνη καὶ οὐκ ἐξαπατῶσα τοὺς τῷ ὄντι λαμβάνοντας αὐτήν.

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δίκαια, ἔφη, αἰτῇ.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἀποδώσετε, ὅτι θεοὺς γε οὐ λανθάνει
ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷός ἐστιν;

ἀποδώσομεν, ἔφη.

εἰ δὲ μὴ λανθάνετον, ὁ μὲν θεοφιλὴς ἂν εἴη, ὁ δὲ θεομισῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ'
ἀρχὰς ὡμολογοῦμεν.

ἔστι ταῦτα.

τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ θεῶν

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γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὥς οἷόν τε ἄριστα, εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν
ἐκ προτέρας ἁμαρτίας ὑπῆρχεν;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάντ' ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται
ἐάντ' ἐν νόσοις ἢ τινι ἄλλῃ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὥς τοῦτω ταῦτα εἰς
ἀγαθὸν τι τελευτήσῃ ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε θεῶν ποτε
ἀμελεῖται ὅς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων

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ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ.

εἰκός γ', ἔφη, τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου.

οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τάναντία τούτων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι;

σφόδρα γε.

τὰ μὲν δὴ παρὰ θεῶν τοιαῦτ' ἄττ' ἂν εἴη νικητήρια τῷ δικαίῳ.

κατὰ γοῦν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ἔφη.

τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρ' ἀνθρώπων; ἄρ' οὐχ ὥδε ἔχει, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ὄν τιθέναι; οὐχ

οἱ μὲν δεινοὶ τε καὶ ἄδικοι δρωσιν ὅπερ οἱ δρομῆς ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μῆ; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁξέως ἀποπηδῶσιν, τελευτῶντες

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δὲ καταγέλαστοι γίνονται, τὰ ὦτα ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμων ἔχοντες καὶ ἀστεφάνωτοι ἀποτρέχοντες· οἱ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δρομικοὶ εἰς τέλος ἐλθόντες τὰ τε ἄθλα λαμβάνουσιν καὶ στεφανοῦνται. οὐχ οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνει; πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης πράξεως καὶ ὁμιλίας καὶ τοῦ βίου εὐδοκίμοῦσι τε καὶ τὰ ἄθλα παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φέρονται; καὶ μάλα.

ἀνέξη ἄρα λέγοντος ἑμοῦ περὶ τούτων ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἔλεγε

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περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων; ἐρῶ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι, ἐπειδὴν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται, ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν πόλει ἄρχουσι τε ἂν βούλωνται τὰς ἀρχάς, γαμοῦσι τε ὁπόθεν ἂν βούλωνται, ἐκδιδοῶσι τε εἰς οὓς ἂν ἐθέλωσι· καὶ πάντα ἃ σὺ περὶ ἐκείνων, ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω περὶ τῶνδε. καὶ αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων, ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐὰν νέοι ὄντες λάθωσιν, ἐπὶ τέλους τοῦ δρόμου αἵρεθέντες καταγέλαστοι εἰσιν καὶ γέροντες γιγνόμενοι ἄθλιοι προπηλακίζονται ὑπὸ ξένων τε

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καὶ ἀστῶν, μαστιγούμενοι καὶ ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι, ἀληθῆ λέγων—εἴτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται—πάντα ἐκεῖνα οἴου καὶ ἑμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι ὡς πάσχουσιν. ἀλλ' ὃ λέγω, ὅρα εἰ ἀνέξη.

καὶ πάνυ, ἔφη· δίκαια γὰρ λέγεις.

ἂ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ζῶντι τῷ δικαίῳ παρὰ θεῶν τε

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καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄθλα τε καὶ μισθοὶ καὶ δῶρα γίγνεται πρὸς ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς αὐτὴ παρῆχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, καλὰ τε καὶ βέβαια.

ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν ἔστι πλήθει οὐδὲ μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ τελευτήσαντα ἐκάτερον περιμένει· χρὴ δ' αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν ἀπειλήφῃ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὀφειλόμενα ἀκοῦσαι.

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λέγοις ἂν, ἔφη, ὡς οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλ' ἥδιον ἀκούοντι.

ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, Ἡρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου, τὸ γένος Παμφύλου· ὅς ποτε ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας, ἀναιρεθέντων δεκαταίων τῶν νεκρῶν ἥδη διεφθαρμένων, ὑγιῆς μὲν ἀνηρέθη, κομισθεὶς δ' οἴκαδε μέλλων θάπτεσθαι δωδεκαταῖος ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενος ἀνεβίω, ἀναβιοὺς δ' ἔλεγεν ἃ ἐκεῖ ἴδοι. ἔφη δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκβῆναι, τὴν ψυχὴν πορεύεσθαι

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μετὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον, ἐν ᾧ τῆς τε γῆς δὺ' εἶναι χάσματα ἐχομένῳ ἀλλήλοισιν καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω

ἄλλα καταντικρύ· δικαστὰς δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων καθῆσθαι, οὕς, ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν, τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιὰν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω, ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὀπισθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν

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ἔπραξαν. ἔαντοῦ δὲ προσελθόντος εἰπεῖν ὅτι δέοι αὐτὸν ἄγγελον ἀνθρώποις γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ διακελεύοιντό οἱ ἀκούειν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ. ὁρᾷν δὴ ταύτη μὲν καθ' ἑκάτερον τὸ χάσμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ τῆς γῆς ἀπιούσας τὰς ψυχάς, ἐπειδὴ αὐταῖς δικασθεῖν, κατὰ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνιέναι ἐκ τῆς γῆς μεστὰς αὐχμοῦ τε καὶ κόνεως, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου καταβαίνειν ἑτέρας ἐκ τοῦ

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οὐρανοῦ καθαρὰς. καὶ τὰς αἰὶ ἀφικνουμένας ὥσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πορείας φαίνεσθαι ἥκειν, καὶ ἀσμένας εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα ἀπιούσας οἷον ἐν πανηγύρει κατασκηναῖσθαι, καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τε ἀλλήλας ὅσαι γινώριμαι, καὶ πυνθάνεσθαι τὰς τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἠκούσας παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων τὰ ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ παρ' ἐκείναις.

διηγεῖσθαι δὲ ἀλλήλαις τὰς

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μὲν ὁδυρομένας τε καὶ κλαούσας, ἀναμνησκομένας ὅσα τε καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορεία—εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη—τὰς δ' αὖ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εὐπαθείας διηγεῖσθαι καὶ θεὰς ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ, ὧ Γλαῦκων, πολλοῦ χρόνου διηγῆσασθαι· τὸ δ' οὖν κεφάλαιον ἔφη τότε εἶναι, ὅσα πώποτε τινα ἠδίκησαν καὶ ὅσους ἕκαστοι, ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων δίκην δεδωκέναι ἐν μέρει, ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου δεκάκις—τοῦτο δ' εἶναι κατὰ ἑκατονταετηρίδα

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ἐκάστην, ὡς βίου ὄντος τοσούτου τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου—ἵνα δεκαπλάσιον τὸ ἔκτεισμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοιεν, καὶ οἷον εἴ τινες πολλοῖς θανάτων ἦσαν αἵτιοι, ἢ πόλεις προδόντες ἢ στρατόπεδα, καὶ εἰς δουλείας ἐμβεβληκότες ἢ τινος ἄλλης κακουχίας μεταίτιοι, πάντων τούτων δεκαπλάσιας ἀλγυδόνας ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου κομίσαιντο, καὶ αὖ εἴ τινες εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετηκότες καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἶεν, κατὰ ταῦτα

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τὴν ἀξίαν κομίζοιντο. τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένων καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων περὶ ἄλλα ἔλεγεν οὐκ ἄξια μνήμης. εἰς δὲ θεοὺς ἀσεβείας τε καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ γονέας καὶ αὐτόχειρος φόνου μείζους ἔτι τοὺς μισθοὺς διηγεῖτο. ἔφη γὰρ δὴ παραγενέσθαι ἐρωτῶμένῳ ἑτέρῳ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου ὅπου εἴη Ἀρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας. ὁ δὲ Ἀρδιαῖος οὗτος τῆς Παμφυλίας ἐν τινὶ πόλει τύραννος ἐγεγόνει, ἥδη χιλιοστὸν ἔτος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, γέροντά τε πατέρα ἀποκτείνας

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καὶ πρεσβύτερον ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ τε καὶ ἀνόσια εἰργασμένος,
ὥς ἐλέγετο. ἔφη οὖν τὸν ἐρωτῶμενον εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ἦκει, φάναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἤξει
δεῦρο. ἐθεασάμεθα γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων· ἐπειδὴ
ἐγγὺς τοῦ στομίου ἦμεν μέλλοντες ἀνιέναι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα πεπονθότες,
ἐκεῖνόν τε κατειδομένον ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἄλλους—σχεδόν τι αὐτῶν τοὺς
πλείστους τυράννους· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶται τινες τῶν
615e

μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκότων—οὓς οἰομένους ἤδη ἀναβήσεσθαι οὐκ ἐδέχετο τὸ
στόμιον, ἀλλ' ἐμυκᾶτο ὅποτε τις τῶν οὕτως ἀνιάτως ἐχόντων εἰς πονηρίαν ἢ
μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδωκὼς δίκην ἐπιχειροῖ ἀνιέναι.

ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἰδεῖν, παρεστῶτες καὶ
καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα, τοὺς μὲν διαλαβόντες ἦγον, τὸν δὲ Ἀρδιαῖον
καὶ ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες

616

616a

χεῖράς τε καὶ πόδας καὶ κεφαλὴν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδείραντες, εἵλκον
παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ' ἀσπαλάθων κνάμπτοντες, καὶ τοῖς αἰεὶ παριοῦσι
σημαίνοντες ὧν ἕνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσοῦμενοι ἄγοιντο.
ἔνθα δὴ φόβων, ἔφη, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν σφίσι γεγονότων, τοῦτον
ὑπερβάλλειν, μὴ γένοιτο ἐκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα ὅτε ἀναβαῖνοι, καὶ
ἀσμενέστατα ἕκαστον σιγήσαντος ἀναβῆναι. καὶ τὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ
τιμωρίας τοιαύτας τινὰς

616b

εἶναι, καὶ αὖ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ταύταις ἀντιστρόφους. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ
λειμῶνι ἐκάστοις ἐπτά ἡμέραι γένοιτο, ἀναστάντας ἐντεῦθεν δεῖν τῇ ὁγδόῃ
πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους ὅθεν καθορᾶν ἄνωθεν διὰ παντός
τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον φῶς εὐθύ, οἷον κίονα, μάλιστα τῇ ἱριδι
προσφερῇ, λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον· εἰς ὃ ἀφικέσθαι προελθόντες
ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κατὰ

616c

μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταμένα—εἶναι
γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς σύνδεσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἷον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν
τριήρων, οὕτω πᾶσαν συνέχον τὴν περιφορὰν—ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων τεταμένον
ἀνάγκης ἄτρακτον, δι' οὗ πάσας ἐπιστρέφεσθαι τὰς περιφοράς· οὗ τὴν μὲν
ἡλακάτην τε καὶ τὸ ἄγκιστρον εἶναι ἐξ ἀδάμαντος, τὸν δὲ σφόνδυλον
μεικτὸν ἕκ τε τούτου καὶ ἄλλων γενῶν. τὴν δὲ

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τοῦ σφονδύλου φύσιν εἶναι τοιάνδε· τὸ μὲν σχῆμα οἷαπερ ἡ τοῦ ἐνθάδε,
νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔλεγεν τοιόνδε αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐν ἐνὶ μεγάλῳ
σφονδύλῳ κοίλῳ καὶ ἐξεγλυμμένῳ διαμπερὲς ἄλλος τοιοῦτος ἐλάττων
ἐγκέοιτο ἀρμόττων, καθάπερ οἱ κάδοι οἱ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀρμόττοντες, καὶ
οὕτω δὴ τρίτον ἄλλον καὶ τέταρτον καὶ ἄλλους τέτταρας. ὁκτῷ γὰρ εἶναι
τοὺς σύμπαντας σφονδύλους, ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐγκειμένους,

616e

κύκλους ἄνωθεν τὰ χεῖλη φαίνοντας, νῶτον συνεχῆς ἐνὸς σφονδύλου ἀπεργαζομένους περὶ τὴν ἡλακάτην· ἐκείνην δὲ διὰ μέσου τοῦ ὀγδοῦ διαμπερὲς ἐληλάσθαι. τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτον τε καὶ ἐξωτάτω σφόνδυλον πλατύτατον τὸν τοῦ χεῖλους κύκλον ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἔκτου δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ὀγδοῦ, πέμπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἐβδόμου, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ πέμπτου, ἕβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ὄγδοον δὲ τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου.

καὶ τὸν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου ποικίλον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐβδόμου λαμπρότατον, τὸν δὲ

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617a

τοῦ ὀγδοῦ τὸ χρῶμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐβδόμου ἔχειν προσλάμποντος, τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πέμπτου παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις, ξανθότερα ἐκείνων, τρίτον δὲ λευκότερον χρῶμα ἔχειν, τέταρτον δὲ ὑπερύθρον, δεύτερον δὲ λευκότητι τὸν ἕκτον. κυκλεῖσθαι δὲ δὴ στρεφόμενον τὸν ἄτρακτον ὅλον μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν φορὰν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ περιφερομένῳ τοὺς μὲν ἐντὸς ἐπτὰ κύκλους τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ ὅλῳ ἡρέμα περιφέρεσθαι, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τάχιστα μὲν ἰέναι τὸν ὄγδοον, δευτέρους δὲ καὶ ἅμα

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ἀλλήλοις τὸν τε ἕβδομον καὶ ἕκτον καὶ πέμπτον· τὸν τρίτον δὲ φορᾷ ἰέναι, ὡς σφίσι φαίνεσθαι, ἐπανακυκλούμενον τὸν τέταρτον, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τρίτον καὶ πέμπτον τὸν δεύτερον. στρέφεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς ἀνάγκης γόνασιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ ἄνωθεν ἐφ' ἐκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρήνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἰέισαν, ἓνα τόνον· ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὅκτῳ οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν συμφωνεῖν. ἄλλας δὲ καθημένας

617c

πέριξ δι' ἴσου τρεῖς, ἐν θρόνῳ ἐκάστην, θυγατέρας τῆς ἀνάγκης, Μοίρας, λευχειμονούσας, στέμματα ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν ἐχούσας, Λάχεσιν τε καὶ Κλωθῷ καὶ Ἄτροπον, ὑμνεῖν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Σειρήνων ἁρμονίαν, Λάχεσιν μὲν τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθῷ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, Ἄτροπον δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα. καὶ τὴν μὲν Κλωθῷ τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ ἐφαπτομένην συνεπιστρέφειν τοῦ ἀτράκτου τὴν ἔξω περιφορὰν, διαλείπουσαν χρόνον, τὴν δὲ Ἄτροπον τῇ ἀριστερᾷ τὰς ἐντὸς αὐτῶν τῶν τῆν δὲ Λάχεσιν

617d

ἐν μέρει ἐκατέρας ἐκατέρᾳ τῇ χειρὶ ἐφάπτεσθαι. σφᾶς οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ἀφικέσθαι, εὐθύς δεῖν ἰέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν. προφήτην οὖν τινα σφᾶς πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τάξει διασπῆσαι, ἔπειτα λαβόντα ἐκ τῶν τῆς Λαχέσεως γονάτων κλήρους τε καὶ βίων παραδείγματα, ἀναβάντα ἐπὶ τι βῆμα ὑψηλὸν εἰπεῖν—

ἀνάγκης θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος. Ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι, ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους θανατηφόρου.

617e

οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε. πρῶτος δ' ὁ λαχὼν πρῶτος αἰρείσθω βίον ᾧ συνέσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἄρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον,

ἥν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἔξει. αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος.

ταῦτα εἰπόντα ῥῖψαι ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κλήρους, τὸν δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν πεσόντα ἕκαστον ἀναιρεῖσθαι πλὴν οὗ, ἔ δὲ οὐκ ἔαν· τῷ δὲ ἀνελομένῳ δῆλον εἶναι ὀπότος εἰλήχει.

618

618a

μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν σφῶν θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, πολὺ πλείω τῶν παρόντων. εἶναι δὲ παντοδαπά· ζῶων τε γὰρ πάντων βίους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους ἅπαντας. τυραννίδας τε γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, τὰς μὲν διατελεῖς, τὰς δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ διαφθειρομένας καὶ εἰς πενίας τε καὶ φυγὰς καὶ εἰς πτωχείας τελευτώσας· εἶναι δὲ καὶ δοκίμων ἀνδρῶν βίους, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ εἵδεσιν καὶ κατὰ κάλλη καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἰσχὺν

618b

τε καὶ ἀγωνίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ γένεσιν καὶ προγόνων ἀρεταῖς, καὶ ἀδοκίμων κατὰ ταῦτα, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν. ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν οὐκ ἐνεῖναι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαιῶς ἔχειν ἄλλον ἐλομένην βίον ἄλλοιαν γίγνεσθαι· τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἀλλήλοισ τε καὶ πλούτοις καὶ πενίαις, τὰ δὲ νόσοις, τὰ δ' ὑγίαις μεμεῖχθαι, τὰ δὲ καὶ μεσοῦν τούτων. ἔνθα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα

618c

ἐπιμελητέον ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητῆς καὶ μαθητῆς ἔσται, ἐάν ποθεν οἷός τ' ἦ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν τίς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατόν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίῳ ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἰρεῖσθαι· ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ ῥηθέντα καὶ συντιθέμενα ἀλλήλοισ καὶ διαιρούμενα πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου πῶς ἔχει, εἰδέναι τι κάλλος πενία ἢ πλούτῳ κραθὲν καὶ

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μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἔξεως κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τί εὐγένειαι καὶ δυσγένειαι καὶ ἰδιωτεῖαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἰσχυρεῖς καὶ ἀσθένειαι καὶ εὐμαθίαι καὶ δυσμαθίαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἐπικτήτων τί συγκεραννύμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐργάζεται, ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν δυνατόν εἶναι συλλογισάμενον αἰρεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀποβλέποντα, τὸν τε χεῖρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω

618e

βίον, χεῖρω μὲν καλοῦντα ὃς αὐτὴν ἐκέισε ἄξει, εἰς τὸ ἀδικωτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμείνω δὲ ὅστις εἰς τὸ δικαιοτέραν. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαίρειν ἔασει· ἐωράκαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ζῶντι τε καὶ τελευτήσαντι αὕτη κρατίστη αἵρεσις. ἀδαμαντίνως δὴ

619

619a

δεῖ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα εἰς Ἄιδου ἰέναι, ὅπως ἂν ἦ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἀνέκπληκτος ὑπὸ πλούτων τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐμπεσὼν εἰς

τυραννίδας καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας πράξεις πολλὰ μὲν ἐργάσεται καὶ ἀνήκεστα
κακά, ἔτι δὲ αὐτὸς μείζω πάθη, ἀλλὰ γινῶ τὸν μέσον ἀεὶ τῶν τοιούτων βίον
αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἐκατέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ βίῳ
κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔπειτα· οὕτω γὰρ

619b

εὐδαιμονέστατος γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος.

καὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ τότε ὁ ἐκεῖθεν ἄγγελος ἡγγελλε τὸν μὲν προφήτην οὕτως
εἰπεῖν· καὶ τελευταίῳ ἐπὶόντι, ξὺν νῷ ἐλομένῳ, συντόνως ζῶντι κεῖται βίος
ἀγαπητός, οὐ κακός· μήτε ὁ ἄρχων αἰρέσεως ἀμελείτω μήτε ὁ τελευτῶν
ἀθυμεῖτω.

εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τὸν πρῶτον λαχόντα ἔφη εὐθὺς ἐπὶόντα τὴν μεγίστην
τυραννίδα ἐλέσθαι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαιμαργίας οὐ πάντα ἱκανῶς
ἀνασκεψάμενον ἐλέσθαι, ἀλλ’

619c

αὐτὸν λαθεῖν ἐνοῦσαν εἰμαρμένην παίδων αὐτοῦ βρώσεις καὶ ἄλλα κακά·
ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν σκέψασθαι, κόπτεσθαι τε καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν,
οὐκ ἐμμένοντα τοῖς προρρηθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου· οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν
αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τύχην τε καὶ δαίμονας καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ’
ἑαυτοῦ. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ
πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει

619d

ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεिल्φότα. ὥς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι
ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀλισκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκοντας, ἅτε πόνων
ἀγυμνάστους· τῶν δ’ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τοὺς πολλούς, ἅτε αὐτοὺς τε πεπονηκότας
ἄλλους τε ἑωρακότας, οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς τὰς αἰρέσεις ποιεῖσθαι. διὸ δὴ καὶ
μεταβολὴν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πολλαῖς τῶν ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι
καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τύχην· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις ἀεὶ, ὁπότε εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον
ἀφικνοῖτο, ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῖ

619e

καὶ ὁ κληρὸς αὐτῷ τῆς αἰρέσεως μὴ ἐν τελευταίοις πίπτοι, κινδυνεύει ἐκ
τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλομένων οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε καὶ δεῦρο πάλιν πορείαν οὐκ ἂν χθονίαν καὶ τραχεῖαν
πορεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λείαν τε καὶ οὐρανίαν.

ταύτην γὰρ δὴ ἔφη τὴν θέαν ἀξίαν εἶναι ἰδεῖν, ὥς ἔκασται

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620a

αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡροῦντο τοὺς βίους· ἐλεινὴν τε γὰρ ἰδεῖν εἶναι καὶ γελοῖαν καὶ
θαυμασίαν. κατὰ συνήθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αἰρεῖσθαι.
ἰδεῖν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν ἔφη τὴν ποτε Ὀρφέως γενομένην κύκνου βίον
αἰρουμένην, μίσει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους διὰ τὸν ὑπ’ ἐκείνων θάνατον οὐκ
ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικὶ γεννηθεῖσαν γενέσθαι· ἰδεῖν δὲ τὴν Θαμύρου ἀηδόνας
ἐλομένην· ἰδεῖν δὲ καὶ κύκνον μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου αἵρεσιν,
καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα μουσικὰ ὡσαύτως.

620b

εἰκοστήν δὲ λαχοῦσαν ψυχὴν ἐλέσθαι λέοντος βίον· εἶναι δὲ τὴν Αἴαντος τοῦ Τελαμωνίου, φεύγουσαν ἄνθρωπον γενέσθαι, μεμνημένην τῆς τῶν ὀπλων κρίσεως. τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ Ἀγαμέμνωνος· ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ταύτην τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους διὰ τὰ πάθη ἀετοῦ διαλλάξαι βίον. ἐν μέσοις δὲ λαχοῦσαν τὴν Ἀταλάντης ψυχὴν, κατιδοῦσαν μεγάλας τιμὰς ἀθλητοῦ ἀνδρός, οὗ δύνασθαι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ λαβεῖν. μετὰ
620c

δὲ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὴν Ἐπειοῦ τοῦ Πανοπέως εἰς τεχνικῆς γυναικὸς ἰοῦσαν φύσιν· πόρρω δ' ἐν ὑστάτοις ἰδεῖν τὴν τοῦ γελωτοποιοῦ Θεροῖτου πύθικον ἐνδυομένην. κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν Ὀδυσσεὺς λαχοῦσαν πασῶν ὑστάτην αἵρησομένην ἰέναι, μνήμη δὲ τῶν προτέρων πόνων φιλοτιμίας λεωφηνκυῖαν ζητεῖν περιοῦσαν χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος, καὶ μόγις εὔρεῖν κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον
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ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἰδοῦσαν ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξεν καὶ πρώτη λαχοῦσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἐλέσθαι. καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ θηρίων ὡσαύτως εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἰέναι καὶ εἰς ἄλληλα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα εἰς τὰ ἄγρια, τὰ δὲ δίκαια εἰς τὰ ἡμερα μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ πάσας μεῖξεις μεῖγνυσθαι.

ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ἥρῃσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔλαχον ἐν τάξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν· ἐκείνην δ' ἐκάστῳ ὃν εἴλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα συμπέμπειν
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τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἵρεθέντων. ὃν πρῶτον μὲν ἄγειν αὐτὴν πρὸς τὴν Κλωθῶ ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνης χειρὰ τε καὶ ἐπιστροφὴν τῆς τοῦ ἀτράκτου δίνης, κυροῦντα ἦν λαχὼν εἴλετο μοῖραν· ταύτης δ' ἐφαπάμενον αὐθις ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς Ἀτρόπου ἄγειν νῆσιν, ἀμετάστροφα τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα ποιοῦντα·

ἐντεῦθεν δὲ δὴ ἀμεταστρεπτὶ ὑπὸ τὸν τῆς
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ἀνάγκης ἰέναι θρόνον, καὶ δι' ἐκείνου διεξελθόντα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διῆλθον, πορεύεσθαι ἅπαντας εἰς τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίον διὰ καύματός τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὸ κενὸν δένδρων τε καὶ ὅσα γῆ φύει. σκηναῖσθαι οὖν σφᾶς ἤδη ἐσπέρας γιγνομένης παρὰ τὸν Ἀμέλητα ποταμόν, οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν στέγειν. μέτρον μὲν οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει μὴ σωζομένους πλέον πίνειν τοῦ μέτρον· τὸν δὲ αἰεὶ πίνοντα
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πάντων ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, βροντὴν τε καὶ σεισμὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐξαπίνης ἄλλον ἄλλῃ φέρεσθαι ἄνω εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, ἄπτοντας ὥσπερ ἀστέρας. αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος κωλυθῆναι πιεῖν· ὅπῃ μέντοι καὶ ὅπως εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀφίκοιτο, οὐκ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν ἔωθεν αὐτὸν κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ. καὶ οὕτως, ὧ Γλαῦκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο,

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καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸν τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸν εὖ διαβησόμεθα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ μιανθησόμεθα. ἀλλ' ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθώμεθα, νομίζοντες ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν καὶ δυνατὴν πάντα μὲν κακὰ ἀνέχεσθαι, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθὰ, τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ ἀεὶ ἐξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσομεν, ἵνα καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς φίλοι ὦμεν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε μένοντες ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἐπειδὴν τὰ ἄθλα

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αὐτῆς κομιζώμεθα, ὥσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι περιαιγερόμενοι, καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιέτει πορεῖα, ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, εὖ πράττωμεν.

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English translation

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And truly, I said, many other considerations assure me that we were entirely right in our organization of the state, and especially, I think, in the matter of poetry.[*] What about it? he said. In refusing to admit[*] at all so much of it as is imitative[*]; for that it is certainly not to be received is, I think,

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still more plainly apparent now that we have distinguished the several parts[*] of the soul. What do you mean? Why, between ourselves[*]—for you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all other imitators—that kind of art seems to be a corruption[*] of the mind of all listeners who do not possess, as an antidote[*] a knowledge of its real nature. What is your idea in saying this? he said. I must speak out, I said, though a certain love and reverence for Homer[*] that has possessed me from a boy would stay me from speaking.

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For he appears to have been the first teacher and beginner of all these beauties of tragedy. Yet all the same we must not honor a man above truth,[*] but, as I say, speak our minds. By all means, he said. Listen, then, or rather, answer my question. Ask it, he said. Could you tell me in general what imitation is? For neither do I myself quite apprehend what it would be at. It is likely, then,[*] he said, that I should apprehend!

It would be nothing strange, said I, since it often happens

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that the dimmer vision sees things in advance of the keener.[*] That is so, he said; but in your presence I could not even be eager to try to state anything that appears to me, but do you yourself consider it. Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point by our customary procedure[*]? We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form[*] in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name. Do you not understand? I do. In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please;

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for example, there are many couches and tables. Of course. But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table. Yes. And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes[*] on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he? By no means. But now consider

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what name you would give to this craftsman. What one? Him who makes all the things[*] that all handicraftsmen severally produce. A truly clever and wondrous man you tell of. Ah, but wait,[*] and you will say so indeed, for this same handicraftsman is not only able to make all implements, but he produces all plants and animals, including himself,[*] and thereto earth and heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in Hades under the earth. A most marvellous sophist,[*]

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he said. Are you incredulous? said I. Tell me, do you deny altogether the possibility of such a craftsman, or do you admit that in a sense there could be such a creator of all these things, and in another sense not? Or do you not perceive that you yourself would be able to make all these things in a way? And in what way,[*] I ask you, he said. There is no difficulty, said I, but it is something that the craftsman can make everywhere and quickly. You could do it most quickly if you should choose to take a mirror and carry it about everywhere.

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You will speedily produce the sun and all the things in the sky, and speedily the earth and yourself and the other animals and implements and plants and all the objects of which we just now spoke. Yes, he said, the appearance of them, but not the reality and the truth. Excellent, said I, and you come to the aid of the argument opportunely. For I take it that the painter too belongs to this class of producers, does he not? Of course. But you will say, I suppose, that his creations are not real and true. And yet, after a fashion, the painter[*] too makes a couch, does he not? Yes, he said, the appearance of one, he too.

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What of the cabinet-maker? Were you not just now saying that he does not make the idea or form which we say is the real couch, the couch in itself,[*] but only some particular couch? Yes, I was. Then if he does not make that which really is, he could not be said to make real being but something that resembles real being but is not that. But if anyone should say that being in the complete sense[*] belongs to the work of the cabinet-maker or to that of any other handicraftsman, it seems that he would say what is not true. That would be the view, he said, of those who are versed[*] in this kind of reasoning. We must not be surprised, then, if this too is only a dim adumbration in

comparison with reality.

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No, we must not. Shall we, then, use these very examples in our quest for the true nature of this imitator? If you please, he said. We get, then, these three couches, one, that in nature[*] which, I take it, we would say that God produces,[*] or who else? No one, I think. And then there was one which the carpenter made. Yes, he said. And one which the painter. Is not that so? So be it. The painter, then, the cabinet-maker, and God, there are these three presiding over three kinds of couches. Yes,three.

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Now God,whether because he so willed or because some compulsion was laid upon him[*] not to make more than one couch in nature, so wrought and created one only,[*] the couch which really and in itself is. But two or more such were never created by God and never will come into being. How so? he said. Because, said I, if he should make only two, there would again appear one of which they both would possess the form or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in and of itself, and not the other two. Right, he said. God, then, I take it, knowing this and wishing

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to be the real author of the couch that has real being and not of some particular couch, nor yet a particular cabinet-maker, produced it in nature unique. So it seems. Shall we, then, call him its true and natural begetter, or something of the kind? That would certainly be right, he said, since it is by and in nature[*] that he has made this and all other things. And what of the carpenter? Shall we not call him the creator of a couch? Yes. Shall we also say that the painter is the creator and maker of that sort of thing? By no means. What will you say he is in relation to the couch?

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This, said he, seems to me the most reasonable designation for him, that he is the imitator of the thing which those others produce. Very good, said I; the producer of the product three removes[*] from nature you call the imitator? By all means, he said. This, then, will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three removes from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators. It would seem so.

We are in agreement, then, about the imitator.

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But tell me now this about the painter. Do you think that what he tries to imitate is in each case that thing itself in nature or the works of the craftsmen? The works of the craftsmen, he said. Is it the reality of them or the appearance? Define that further point.[*] What do you mean? he said. This: Does a couch differ from itself according as you view it from the side or the front or in any other way? Or does it differ not at all in fact though it appears different, and so of other things? That is the way of it, he said: it appears other

but differs not at all.

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Consider, then, this very point. To which is painting directed in every case, to the imitation of reality as it is[*] or of appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of a phantasm or of the truth? Of a phantasm,[*] he said. Then the mimetic art is far removed[*] from truth, and this, it seems, is the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches or lays hold of only a small part of the object and that a phantom[*]; as, for example, a painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, and other craftsmen,

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though he himself has no expertness in any of these arts,[*] but nevertheless if he were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a carpenter he would deceive children and foolish men,[*] and make them believe it to be a real carpenter. Why not? But for all that, my friend, this, I take it, is what we ought to bear in mind in all such cases: When anyone reports to us of someone, that he has met a man who knows all the crafts and everything else[*] that men severally know,

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and that there is nothing that he does not know[*] more exactly than anybody else, our tacit rejoinder must be that he is a simple fellow, who apparently has met some magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator and has been deceived by him into the belief that he is all-wise,[*] because of his own inability to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance[*] and imitation. Most true, he said.

Then, said I, have we not next to scrutinize tragedy and its leader Homer,[*] since some people tell us that these poets know all the arts

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and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all things divine? For the good poet, if he is to poetize things rightly, must, they argue, create with knowledge or else be unable to create.

So we must consider whether these critics have not fallen in with such imitators and been deceived by them, so that looking upon their works

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they cannot perceive that these are three removes from reality, and easy to produce without knowledge of the truth. For it is phantoms,[*] not realities, that they produce. Or is there something in their claim, and do good poets really know the things about which the multitude fancy they speak well? We certainly must examine the matter, he said. Do you suppose, then, that if a man were able to produce both the exemplar and the semblance, he would be eager to abandon himself to the fashioning of phantoms[*] and set this in the forefront

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of his life as the best thing he had? I do not. But, I take it, if he had genuine

knowledge of the things he imitates he would far rather devote himself to real things[*] than to the imitation of them, and would endeavor to leave after him many noble deeds[*] and works as memorials of himself, and would be more eager to be the theme of praise than the praiser. I think so, he said; for there is no parity in the honor and the gain. Let us not, then, demand a reckoning[*] from Homer

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or any other of the poets on other matters by asking them, if any one of them was a physician and not merely an imitator of a physician's talk, what men any poet, old or new, is reported to have restored to health as Asclepius did, or what disciples of the medical art he left after him as Asclepius did his descendants; and let us dismiss the other arts and not question them about them; but concerning the greatest and finest things of which Homer undertakes to speak, wars and generalship[*]

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and the administration of cities and the education of men, it surely is fair to question him and ask, Friend Homer, if you are not at the third remove from truth and reality in human excellence, being merely that creator of phantoms whom we defined as the imitator, but if you are even in the second place and were capable of knowing what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what city was better governed owing to you,[*] even as Lacedaemon was because of Lycurgus,[*] and many other cities

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great and small because of other legislators. But what city credits you with having been a good legislator and having benefited them? Italy and Sicily say this of Charondas and we of Solon.[*] But who says it of you? Will he be able to name any? I think not, said Glaucon; at any rate none is mentioned even by the Homerids themselves.

Well, then,

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is there any tradition of a war in Homer's time that was well conducted by his command or counsel?None. Well, then, as might be expected of a man wise in practical affairs, are many and ingenious inventions[*] for the arts and business of life reported of Homer as they are of Thales[*] the Milesian and Anacharsis[*] the Scythian?Nothing whatever of the sort. Well, then, if no public service is credited to him, is Homer reported while he lived to have been a guide in education to men who took pleasure in associating with him

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and transmitted to posterity a certain Homeric way of life[*] just as Pythagoras[*] was himself especially honored for this, and his successors, even to this day, denominating a certain way of life the Pythagorean,[*] are distinguished among their contemporaries?No, nothing of this sort either is reported; for Creophylos,[*] Socrates, the friend of Homer, would perhaps be

even more ridiculous than his name[*] as a representative of Homeric culture and education, if what is said about Homer is true. For the tradition is that Homer was completely neglected in his own lifetime by that friend of the flesh.

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Why, yes, that is the tradition, said I; but do you suppose, Glaucon, that, if Homer had really been able to educate men[*] and make them better and had possessed not the art of imitation but real knowledge, he would not have acquired many companions and been honored and loved by them? But are we to believe that while Protagoras[*] of Abdera and Prodicus[*] of Ceos and many others are able by private teaching

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to impress upon their contemporaries the conviction that they will not be capable of governing their homes or the city[*] unless they put them in charge of their education, and make themselves so beloved for this wisdom[*] that their companions all but[*] carry them about on their shoulders,[*] yet, forsooth, that Homer's contemporaries, if he had been able to help men to achieve excellence,[*] would have suffered him or Hesiod to roam about rhapsodizing and would not have clung to them far rather than to their gold, [*] and constrained them to dwell with them[*] in their homes,

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or failing to persuade them, would themselves have escorted them wheresoever they went until they should have sufficiently imbibed their culture? What you say seems to me to be altogether true, Socrates, he said. Shall we, then, lay it down that all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer,[*] are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things that they create, [*] and do not lay hold on truth? but, as we were just now saying, the painter will fashion,

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himself knowing nothing of the cobbler's art, what appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to those who know nothing but judge only by forms and colors[*]?Certainly.And similarly, I suppose, we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases[*] the colors of the several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant, who see things only through words,[*] will deem his words most excellent,

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whether he speak in rhythm, meter and harmony about cobbling or generalship or anything whatever. So mighty is the spell[*] that these adornments naturally exercise; though when they are stripped bare of their musical coloring and taken by themselves,[*] I think you know what sort of a showing these sayings of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed them.I have, he said. Do they not, said I, resemble the faces of adolescents,

young but not really beautiful, when the bloom of youth abandons them?[*]
By all means, he said. Come, then, said I, consider this point: The creator of the phantom, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of the reality but only the appearance.

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Is not that so? Yes. Let us not, then, leave it half said but consider it fully. Speak on, he said. The painter, we say, will paint both reins and a bit. Yes. But the maker[*] will be the cobbler and the smith. Certainly. Does the painter, then, know the proper quality of reins and bit? Or does not even the maker, the cobbler and the smith, know that, but only the man who understands the use of these things, the horseman[*]? Most true. And shall we not say

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that the same holds true of everything? What do you mean? That there are some three arts concerned with everything, the user's art,[*] the maker's, and the imitator's. Yes. Now do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightness[*] of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the use[*] for which each is made or by nature adapted? That is so. It quite necessarily follows, then, that the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by experience, and that he reports to the maker the good or bad effects in use of the thing he uses.

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As, for example, the flute-player reports to the flute-maker which flutes respond and serve rightly in flute-playing, and will order the kind that must be made, and the other will obey and serve him. Of course. The one, then, possessing knowledge, reports about the goodness or the badness of the flutes, and the other, believing, will make them. Yes.

Then in respect of the same implement the maker will have right belief[*] about its excellence and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to listen to him,

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but the user will have true knowledge. Certainly. And will the imitator from experience or use have knowledge whether the things he portrays are or are not beautiful and right, or will he, from compulsory association with the man who knows and taking orders from him for the right making of them, have right opinion[*]? Neither. Then the imitator will neither know nor opine rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations. It seems not. Most charming,[*] then, would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in respect of true wisdom about his creations. Not at all.

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Yet still he will none the less[*] imitate, though in every case he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant multitude. Why,

what else? On this, then, as it seems, we are fairly agreed, that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play,[*] not to be taken seriously,[*] and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or heroic verse,[*] are all altogether imitators. By all means.

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In heaven's name, then, this business of imitation is concerned with the third remove from truth, is it not? Yes. And now again, to what element[*] in man is its function and potency related? Of what are you speaking? Of this: The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far[*] does not appear equal. Why, no. And the same things appear bent and straight[*] to those who view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colors, and there is

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obviously every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so scene-painting in its exploitation[*] of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of witchcraft,[*] and so do jugglery and many other such contrivances. True. And have not measuring and numbering and weighing[*] proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparently[*] greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned[*] and numbered or even weighed?

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Certainly. But this surely would be the function[*] of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates.[*] Why, yes, of that. And often when this has measured[*] and declares that certain things are larger or that some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at the same time an appearance of the contrary. Yes. And did we not say[*] that it is impossible for the same thing at one time to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing?

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And we were right in affirming that.

The part of the soul, then, that opines in contradiction of measurement could not be the same with that which conforms to it. Why, no. But, further, that which puts its trust in measurement and reckoning must be the best part of the soul. Surely. Then that which opposes it must belong to the inferior elements of the soul. Necessarily. This, then, was what I wished to have agreed upon when I said that poetry, and in general the mimetic art, produces a product that is far removed from truth in the accomplishment of its task, and associates with the part in us

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that is remote from intelligence, and is its companion and friend[*] for no sound and true purpose.[*] By all means, said he. Mimetic art, then, is an inferior thing cohabiting with an inferior and engendering inferior offspring. [*] It seems so. Does that, said I, hold only for vision or does it apply also to

hearing and to what we call poetry? Presumably, he said, to that also. Let us not, then, trust solely to the plausible analogy[*] from painting, but let us approach in turn

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that part of the mind to which mimetic poetry appeals and see whether it is the inferior or the nobly serious part. So we must. Let us, then, put the question thus: Mimetic poetry, we say, imitates human beings acting under compulsion or voluntarily,[*] and as a result of their actions supposing themselves to have fared well or ill and in all this feeling either grief or joy. Did we find anything else but this? Nothing. Is a man, then, in all this

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of one mind with himself, or just as in the domain of sight there was faction and strife and he held within himself contrary opinions at the same time about the same things,[*] so also in our actions there is division and strife[*] of the man with himself? But I recall that there is no need now of our seeking agreement on this point, for in our former discussion[*] we were sufficiently agreed that our soul at any one moment teems with countless such self-contradictions. Rightly, he said. Yes, rightly, said I; but what we then omitted[*] must now, I think,

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be set forth. What is that? he said. When a good and reasonable man, said I, experiences such a stroke of fortune as the loss of a son or anything else that he holds most dear, we said, I believe, then too,[*] that he will bear it more easily than the other sort. Assuredly. But now let us consider this: Will he feel no pain, or, since that is impossible, shall we say that he will in some sort be moderate[*] in his grief? That, he said, is rather the truth.

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Tell me now this about him: Do you think he will be more likely to resist and fight against his grief when he is observed by his equals or when he is in solitude alone by himself? He will be much more restrained, he said, when he is on view. But when left alone, I fancy, he will permit himself many utterances which, if heard by another, would put him to shame, and will do many things which he would not consent to have another see him doing. So it is, he said.

Now is it not reason and law

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that exhorts him to resist, while that which urges him to give way to his grief is the bare feeling itself? True. And where there are two opposite impulses[*] in a man at the same time about the same thing we say that there must needs be two things[*] in him. Of course. And is not the one prepared to follow the guidance of the law as the law leads and directs? How so? The law, I suppose, declares that it is best to keep quiet as far as possible in calamity and not to chafe and repine, because we cannot know what is really good and evil in

such things[*] and it advantages us nothing to take them hard,

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and nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern,[*] and our grieving checks[*] the very thing we need to come to our aid as quickly as possible in such case. What thing, he said, do you mean? To deliberate,[*] I said, about what has happened to us, and, as it were in the fall of the dice,[*] to determine the movements of our affairs with reference to the numbers that turn up, in the way that reason indicates[*] would be the best, and, instead of stumbling like children, clapping one's hands to the stricken spot[*] and wasting the time in wailing,

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ever to accustom the soul to devote itself at once to the curing of the hurt and the raising up of what has fallen, banishing threnody[*] by therapy. That certainly, he said, would be the best way to face misfortune and deal with it. Then, we say, the best part of us is willing to conform to these precepts of reason. Obviously. And shall we not say that the part of us that leads us to dwell in memory on our suffering and impels us to lamentation, and cannot get enough of that sort of thing, is the irrational and idle part of us, the associate of cowardice[*]? Yes, we will say that. And does not

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the fretful part of us present[*] many and varied occasions for imitation, while the intelligent and temperate disposition, always remaining approximately the same, is neither easy to imitate nor to be understood when imitated, especially by a nondescript mob assembled in the theater? For the representation imitates a type

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that is alien to them.

By all means. And is it not obvious that the nature of the mimetic poet is not related to this better part of the soul and his cunning is not framed[*] to please it, if he is to win favor with the multitude, but is devoted to the fretful and complicated type of character because it is easy to imitate? It is obvious. This consideration, then, makes it right for us to proceed to lay hold of him and set him down as the counterpart[*] of the painter; for he resembles him in that his creations are inferior in respect of reality; and the fact that his appeal is to the inferior part of the soul

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and not to the best part is another point of resemblance. And so we may at last say that we should be justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters this element in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational part, just as when in a state[*] one puts bad men in power and turns the city over to them and ruins the better sort. Precisely in the same manner we shall say that the mimetic poet sets up in each individual soul a vicious constitution by fashioning phantoms far

removed from reality, and by currying favor with the senseless element
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that cannot distinguish the greater from the less, but calls the same thing now one, now the other. By all means.

But we have not yet brought our chief accusation against it. Its power to corrupt, with rare exceptions, even the better sort is surely the chief cause for alarm. How could it be otherwise, if it really does that? Listen and reflect. I think you know that the very best of us, when we hear Homer[*] or some other of the makers of tragedy

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imitating one of the heroes who is in grief,[*] and is delivering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating his breast, feel pleasure,[*] and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness,[*] and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way. I do know it, of course. But when in our own lives some affliction comes to us, you are also aware that we plume ourselves upon the opposite, on our ability to remain calm and endure,

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in the belief that this is the conduct of a man, and what we were praising in the theatre that of a woman.[*] I do note that. Do you think, then, said I, that this praise is rightfully bestowed when, contemplating a character that we would not accept but would be ashamed of in ourselves, we do not abominate it but take pleasure and approve? No, by Zeus, he said, it does not seem reasonable.

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Oh yes,[*] said I, if you would consider it in this way. In what way? If you would reflect that the part of the soul that in the former case, in our own misfortunes,[*] was forcibly restrained, and that has hungered for tears and a good cry[*] and satisfaction, because it is its nature to desire these things, is the element in us that the poets satisfy and delight, and that the best element in our nature, since it has never been properly educated by reason or even by habit, then relaxes its guard[*] over the plaintive part,

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inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief; but it thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain, [*] and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether. That is, I think, because few are capable of reflecting that what we enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves.[*] For after feeding fat[*] the emotion of pity there, it is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings.

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Most true, he said. Does not the same principle apply to the laughable,[*] namely, that if in comic representations,[*] or for that matter in private talk,[*]

you take intense pleasure in buffooneries that you would blush to practise yourself, and do not detest them as base, you are doing the same thing as in the case of the pathetic? For here again what your reason, for fear of the reputation of buffoonery, restrained in yourself when it fain would play the clown, you release in turn, and so, fostering its youthful impudence, let yourself go so far that often ere you are aware you become yourself
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a comedian in private. Yes, indeed, he said. And so in regard to the emotions of sex and anger, and all the appetites and pains and pleasures of the soul which we say accompany all our actions,[*] the effect of poetic imitation is the same. For it waters[*] and fosters these feelings when what we ought to do is to dry them up, and it establishes them as our rulers when they ought to be ruled, to the end that we may be better and happier men instead of worse and more miserable. I cannot deny it, said he.

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Then, Glaucon, said I, when you meet encomiasts of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator of Hellas,[*] and that for the conduct and refinement[*] of human life he is worthy of our study and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet,

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we must love[*] and salute them as doing the best they can,[*] and concede to them that Homer is the most poetic[*] of poets and the first of tragedians,[*] but we must know the truth, that we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men.[*]

For if you grant admission to the honeyed muse[*] in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best. Most true, he said.

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Let us, then, conclude our return to the topic of poetry and our apology, and affirm that we really had good grounds then for dismissing her from our city, since such was her character. For reason constrained us.[*] And let us further say to her, lest she condemn us for harshness and rusticity, that there is from of old a quarrel[*] between philosophy and poetry. For such expressions as the yelping hound barking at her master and mighty in the idle babble

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of fools,

[*] and

the mob that masters those who are too wise for their own good,

Unknown and the subtle thinkers who reason that after all they are poor, and countless others are tokens of this ancient enmity. But nevertheless let it be

declared that, if the mimetic and dulcet poetry can show any reason for her existence in a well-governed state, we would gladly admit her, since we ourselves are very conscious of her spell. But all the same it would be impious to betray what we believe to be the truth.[*]

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Is not that so, friend? Do not you yourself feel her magic[*] and especially when Homer[*] is her interpreter? Greatly. Then may she not justly return from this exile after she has pleaded her defence, whether in lyric or other measure? By all means. And we would allow her advocates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to plead her cause[*] in prose without metre, and show that she is not only delightful but beneficial to orderly government and all the life of man. And we shall listen benevolently,

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for it will be clear gain for us if it can be shown that she bestows not only pleasure but benefit. How could we help being the gainers? said he. But if not, my friend, even as men who have fallen in love, if they think that the love is not good for them, hard though it be,[*] nevertheless refrain, so we, owing to the love of this kind of poetry inbred in us by our education in these fine[*] politics of ours,

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will gladly have the best possible case made out for her goodness and truth, but so long as she is unable to make good her defence we shall chant over to ourselves[*] as we listen the reasons that we have given as a counter-charm to her spell, to preserve us from slipping back into the childish loves of the multitude; for we have come to see that we must not take such poetry seriously as a serious thing[*] that lays hold on truth, but that he who lends an ear to it must be on his guard

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fearing for the polity in his soul[*] and must believe what we have said about poetry. By all means, he said, I concur. Yes, for great is the struggle,[*] I said, dear Glaucon, a far greater contest than we think it, that determines whether a man prove good or bad, so that not the lure of honor or wealth or any office, no, nor of poetry either, should incite us[*] to be careless of righteousness and all excellence. I agree with you, he replied, in view of what we have set forth, and I think that anyone else would do so too.

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And yet, said I, the greatest rewards of virtue and the prizes proposed for her we have not set forth. You must have in mind an inconceivable[*] magnitude, he replied, if there are other things greater than those of which we have spoken.[*]? For surely the whole time from the boy to the old man would be small compared with all time.[*] Nay, it is nothing, he said. What then? Do you think that an immortal thing[*] ought to be seriously concerned for such a little time,

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and not rather for all time? I think so, he said; but what is this that you have in mind? Have you never perceived, said I, that our soul is immortal and never perishes? And he, looking me full in the face[*] in amazement,[*] said, No, by Zeus, not I; but are you able to declare this? I certainly ought to be,[*] said I, and I think you too can, for it is nothing hard. It is for me, he said; and I would gladly hear from you this thing that is not hard.[*] Listen, said I. Just speak on, he replied. You speak of[*] good

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and evil, do you not? I do. Is your notion of them the same as mine? What is it? That which destroys and corrupts in every case is the evil; that which preserves and benefits is the good. Yes, I think so, he said.

How about this: Do you say that there is for everything its special good and evil,

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as for example for the eyes ophthalmia, for the entire body disease, for grain mildew, rotting for wood, rust for bronze and iron, and, as I say, for practically everything its congenital evil and disease[*]? I do, he said. Then when one of these evils comes to anything does it not make the thing to which it attaches itself bad, and finally disintegrate and destroy it? Of course. Then the congenital evil of each thing and its own vice destroys it, or if that is not going to destroy it, nothing else

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remains that could; for obviously[*] the good will never destroy anything, nor yet again will that which is neutral and neither good nor evil[*]. How could it? he said. If, then, we discover[*] anything that has an evil which vitiates it, yet is not able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not thereupon know that of a thing so constituted there can be no destruction? That seems likely, he said. Well, then, said I, has not the soul something that makes it evil? Indeed it has, he said, all the things that we were just now enumerating,

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injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and ignorance. Does any one of these things dissolve and destroy it? And reflect, lest we be misled by supposing that when an unjust and foolish man is taken in his injustice he is then destroyed by the injustice, which is the vice of soul. But conceive it thus: Just as the vice of body which is disease wastes and destroys it so that it no longer is a body at all,[*] in like manner in all the examples of which we spoke it is the specific evil which,

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by attaching itself to the thing and dwelling in it with power to corrupt, reduces it to nonentity. Is not that so? Yes. Come, then, and consider the soul in the same way.[*] Do injustice and other wickedness dwelling in it, by their indwelling and attachment to it, corrupt and wither it till they bring it to death

and separate it from the body? They certainly do not do that, he said. But surely, said I, it is unreasonable to suppose that the vice of something else destroys a thing while its own does not. Yes, unreasonable. For observe, Glaucon,

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said I, that we do not think it proper to say of the body either that it is destroyed by the badness of foods themselves, whether it be staleness or rottenness or whatever it is;[*]

but when the badness of the foods themselves engenders in the body the defect of body, then we shall say that it is destroyed owing to these foods, but by[*] its own vice, which is disease.

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But the body being one thing and the foods something else, we shall never expect the body to be destroyed by their badness, that is by an alien evil that has not produced in it the evil that belongs to it by nature. You are entirely right, he replied.

On the same principle, said I, if the badness of the body does not produce in the soul the soul's badness we shall never expect the soul to be destroyed by an alien evil apart from its own defect—one thing, that is, by the evil of another. That is reasonable, he said. Either, then, we must refute this

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and show that we are mistaken, or,[*] so long as it remains unrefuted, we must never say that by fever or any other disease, or yet by the knife at the throat or the chopping to bits of the entire body, there is any more likelihood of the soul perishing because of these things, until it is proved that owing to these affections of the body the soul itself becomes more unjust and unholy. But when an evil of something else occurs in a different thing and the evil that belongs to the thing is not engendered in it,

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we must not suffer it to be said that the soul or anything else is in this way destroyed. But you may be sure, he said, that nobody will ever prove this, that the souls of the dying are made more unjust by death. But if anyone, said I, dares to come to grips with the argument[*] and say, in order to avoid being forced to admit the soul's immortality, that a dying man does become more wicked and unjust,[*] we will postulate that, if what he says is true, injustice must be fatal

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to its possessor as if it were a disease, and that those who catch it die because it kills them by its own inherent nature, those who have most of it quickest, and those who have less more slowly, and not, as now in fact happens, that the unjust die owing to this but by the action of others who inflict the penalty. Nay, by Zeus, he said, injustice will not appear a very terrible thing after all if it is going to be[*] fatal to its possessor, for that would be a release from all

troubles.[*] But I rather think it will prove to be quite the contrary,

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something that kills others when it can, but renders its possessor very lively indeed,[*] and not only lively but wakeful,[*] so far, I ween, does it dwell[*] from deadliness. You say well, I replied; for when the natural vice and the evil proper to it cannot kill and destroy the soul, still less[*] will the evil appointed for the destruction of another thing destroy the soul or anything else, except that for which it is appointed.[*] Still less indeed, he said, in all probability. Then since it is not destroyed by any evil whatever,

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either its own or alien, it is evident that it must necessarily exist always, and that if it always exists it is immortal.Necessarily, he said.

Let this, then, I said, be assumed to be so. But if it is so, you will observe that these souls must always be the same. For if none perishes they could not, I suppose, become fewer nor yet more numerous.[*] For if any class of immortal things increased you are aware that its increase would come from the mortal and all things would end by becoming immortal.[*] You say truly. But, said I, we must not suppose this,

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for reason will not suffer it nor yet must we think that in its truest nature the soul is the kind of thing that teems with infinite diversity and unlikeness and contradiction in and with itself.[*] How am I to understand that? he said. It is not easy, said I, for a thing to be immortal that is composed of many elements[*] not put together in the best way, as now appeared to us[*] to be the case with the soul. It is not likely. Well, then, that the soul is immortal our recent argument and our other[*] proofs would constrain us to admit. But to know its true nature

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we must view it not marred by communion with the body[*] and other miseries as we now contemplate it, but consider adequately in the light of reason what it is when it is purified, and then you will find it to be a far more beautiful thing and will more clearly distinguish justice and injustice and all the matters that we have now discussed. But though we have stated the truth of its present appearance, its condition as we have now contemplated it

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resembles that of the sea-god Glaucus[*] whose first nature can hardly be made out by those who catch glimpses of him, because the original members of his body are broken off and mutilated and crushed and in every way marred by the waves, and other parts have attached themselves[*] to him, accretions of shells[*] and sea-weed and rocks, so that he is more like any wild creature than what he was by nature—even such, I say, is our vision of the soul marred by countless evils. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucon. Where? said he. To its love of wisdom.

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And we must note the things of which it has apprehensions, and the associations for which it yearns, as being itself akin to the divine[*] and the immortal and to eternal being, and so consider what it might be if it followed the gleam unreservedly and were raised by this impulse out of the depths of this sea in which it is now sunk, and were cleansed and scraped free[*] of the rocks and barnacles which,

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because it now feasts on earth, cling to it in wild profusion of earthy and stony accretion by reason of these feastings that are accounted happy.[*]

And then one might see whether in its real nature[*] it is manifold[*] or single in its simplicity, or what is the truth about it and how.[*] But for the present we have, I think, fairly well described its sufferings and the forms it assumes in this human life of ours. We certainly have, he said.

Then, said I, we have met all the other demands

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of the argument, and we have not invoked the rewards and reputes of justice as you said Homer and Hesiod[*] do, but we have proved that justice in itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and that the soul ought to do justice whether it possess the ring of Gyges[*] or not,[*] or the helmet of Hades[*] to boot. Most true, he said. Then, said I, Glaucon, there can no longer be any objection,[*] can there, to our assigning to justice and

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virtue generally, in addition, all the various rewards and wages that they bring to the soul from men and gods, both while the man still lives and, after his death? There certainly can be none, he said. Will you, then, return to me what you borrowed[*] in the argument? What, pray? I granted to you that the just man should seem and be thought to be unjust and the unjust just; for you thought that, even if the concealment of these things from gods and men was an impossibility in fact, nevertheless, it ought to be conceded for the sake of the argument,[*] in order that the decision might be made

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between absolute justice and absolute injustice. Or do you not remember? It would be unjust of me,[*] he said, if I did not. Well, then, now that they have been compared and judged, I demand back from you in behalf of justice the repute that she in fact enjoys[*] from gods and men, and I ask that we admit that she is thus esteemed in order that she may gather in the prizes[*] which she wins from the seeming and bestows on her possessors, since she has been proved to bestow the blessings that come from the reality and not to deceive those who truly seek and win her. That is a just demand, he said.

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Then, said I, will not the first of these restorations be that the gods certainly[*] are not unaware[*] of the true character of each of the two, the just and the

unjust? We will restore that, he said. And if they are not concealed, the one will be dear to the gods[*] and the other hateful to them, as we agreed in the beginning.[*] That is so.

And shall we not agree that all things that come from the gods

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work together for the best[*] for him that is dear to the gods, apart from the inevitable evil caused by sin in a former life[*]? By all means. This, then, must be our conviction about the just man, that whether he fall into poverty or disease or any other supposed evil, for him all these things will finally prove good, both in life and in death. For by the gods assuredly that man will never be neglected who is willing and eager to be righteous, and by the practice of virtue to be likened unto god[*]

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so far as that is possible for man. It is reasonable, he said, that such a one should not be neglected by his like.[*] And must we not think the opposite of the unjust man? Most emphatically. Such then are the prizes of victory which the gods bestow upon the just. So I think, at any rate, he said. But what, said I, does he receive from men? Is not this the case, if we are now to present the reality? Do not your smart but wicked men fare as those racers do who run well[*] from the scratch but not back from the turn? They bound nimbly away at the start, but in the end

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are laughed to scorn and run off the field uncrowned and with their ears on their shoulders.[*] But the true runners when they have come to the goal receive the prizes and bear away the crown. Is not this the usual outcome for the just also, that towards the end of every action and association and of life as a whole they have honor and bear away the prizes from men? So it is indeed. Will you, then, bear with me if I say of them

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all that you said[*] of the unjust? For I am going to say that the just, when they become older, hold the offices in their own city if they choose, marry from what families they will, and give their children in marriage to what families they please, and everything that you said of the one I now repeat of the other; and in turn I will say of the unjust that the most of them, even if they escape detection in youth, at the end of their course are caught and derided, and their old age is made miserable by the contumelies of strangers and townfolk.

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They are lashed and suffer all things[*] which you truly said are unfit for ears polite.[*] Suppose yourself to have heard from me a repetition of all that they suffer. But, as I say, consider whether you will bear with me. Assuredly, he said, for what you say is just.

Such then while he lives are the prizes, the wages, and the gifts

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that the just man receives from gods and men in addition to those blessings which justice herself bestowed. And right fair and abiding rewards, he said. Well, these, I said, are nothing in number and magnitude compared with those that await both[*] after death. And we must listen to the tale of them, said I, in order that each may have received in full[*] what is due to be said of him by our argument. Tell me, he said,

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since there are not many things to which I would more gladly listen. It is not, let me tell you, said I, the tale[*] to Alcinous told[*] that I shall unfold, but the tale of a warrior bold,[*] Er, the son of Armenius, by race a Pamphylian. [*] He once upon a time was slain in battle, and when the corpses were taken up on the tenth day already decayed, was found intact, and having been brought home, at the moment of his funeral, on the twelfth day[*] as he lay upon the pyre, revived,[*] and after coming to life related what, he said, he had seen in the world beyond. He said that when his soul[*] went forth from his body he journeyed with a great company

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and that they came to a mysterious region[*] where there were two openings side by side in the earth, and above and over against them in the heaven two others, and that judges were sitting[*] between these, and that after every judgement they bade the righteous journey to the right and upwards through the heaven with tokens attached[*] to them in front of the judgement passed upon them, and the unjust to take the road to the left[*] and downward, they too wearing behind signs

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of all that had befallen them, and that when he himself drew near they told him that he must be the messenger[*] to mankind to tell them of that other world,[*] and they charged him to give ear and to observe everything in the place. And so he said that here he saw, by each opening of heaven and earth, the souls departing after judgement had been passed upon them, while, by the other pair of openings, there came up from the one in the earth souls full of squalor and dust, and from the second there came down from heaven a second procession of souls clean and pure,

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and that those which arrived from time to time appeared to have come as it were from a long journey and gladly departed to the meadow[*] and encamped[*] there as at a festival,[*] and acquaintances greeted one another, and those which came from the earth questioned the others about conditions up yonder, and those from heaven asked how it fared with those others. And they told their stories to one another, the one lamenting

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and wailing as they recalled how many and how dreadful things they had suffered and seen in their journey beneath the earth[*]—it lasted a thousand years[*]—while those from heaven related their delights and visions of a beauty beyond words. To tell it all, Glaucon, would take all our time, but the sum, he said, was this. For all the wrongs they had ever done to anyone and all whom they had severally wronged they had paid the penalty in turn tenfold for each, and the measure of this was by periods of a hundred years each,[*]
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so that on the assumption that this was the length of human life the punishment might be ten times the crime; as for example that if anyone had been the cause of many deaths or had betrayed cities and armies and reduced them to slavery, or had been participant in any other iniquity, they might receive in requital pains tenfold for each of these wrongs, and again if any had done deeds of kindness and been just

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and holy men they might receive their due reward in the same measure; and other things not worthy of record he said of those who had just been born[*] and lived but a short time; and he had still greater requitals to tell of piety and impiety towards the gods and parents[*] and of self-slaughter. For he said that he stood by when one was questioned by another Where is Ardiaeus[*] the Great? Now this Ardiaeos had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia just a thousand years before that time and had put to death his old father

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and his elder brother, and had done many other unholy deeds, as was the report. So he said that the one questioned replied, He has not come, said he, nor will he be likely to come here.

For indeed this was one of the dreadful sights we beheld; when we were near the mouth and about to issue forth and all our other sufferings were ended, we suddenly caught sight of him and of others, the most of them, I may say, tyrants.[*] But there were some

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of private station, of those who had committed great crimes. And when these supposed that at last they were about to go up and out, the mouth would not receive them, but it bellowed when anyone of the incurably wicked[*] or of those who had not completed their punishment tried to come up.

And thereupon, he said, savage men of fiery aspect[*] who stood by and took note of the voice laid hold on them[*] and bore them away. But Ardiaeus

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and others they bound hand and foot and head and flung down and flayed them and dragged them by the wayside, carding them on thorns and signifying to those who from time to time passed by for what cause they were borne away, and that they were to be hurled into Tartarus.[*] And then, though many and manifold dread things had befallen them, this fear exceeded all—

lest each one should hear the voice when he tried to go up, and each went up most gladly when it had kept silence. And the judgements and penalties were somewhat after this manner,

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and the blessings were their counterparts. But when seven days had elapsed for each group in the meadow, they were required to rise up on the eighth and journey on, and they came in four days to a spot whence they discerned, extended from above throughout the heaven and the earth, a straight light like a pillar, most nearly resembling the rainbow, but brighter and purer. To this they came

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after going forward a day's journey, and they saw there at the middle of the light the extremities of its fastenings stretched from heaven; for this light was the girdle of the heavens like the undergirders[*] of triremes, holding together in like manner the entire revolving vault. And from the extremities was stretched the spindle of Necessity,[*] through which all the orbits turned. Its staff and its hook were made of adamant, and the whorl of these and other kinds was commingled. And the nature of the whorl was this:

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Its shape was that of those in our world, but from his description we must conceive it to be as if in one great whorl, hollow and scooped out, there lay enclosed, right through, another like it but smaller, fitting into it as boxes that fit into one another,[*] and in like manner another, a third, and a fourth, and four others, for there were eight of the whorls in all, lying within one another,

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showing their rims as circles from above and forming the continuous back of a single whorl about the shaft, which was driven home through the middle of the eighth. Now the first and outmost whorl had the broadest circular rim, that of the sixth was second, and third was that of the fourth, and fourth was that of the eighth, fifth that of the seventh, sixth that of the fifth, seventh that of the third, eighth that of the second;

and that of the greatest was spangled, that of the seventh brightest, that of the eighth

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took its color from the seventh, which shone upon it. The colors of the second and fifth were like one another and more yellow than the two former. The third had the whitest color, and the fourth was of a slightly ruddy hue; the sixth was second in whiteness. The staff turned as a whole in a circle with the same movement, but within the whole as it revolved the seven inner circles revolved gently in the opposite direction to the whole,[*] and of these seven the eighth moved most swiftly,

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and next and together with one another the seventh, sixth and fifth; and

third[*] in swiftness, as it appeared to them, moved the fourth with returns upon itself, and fourth the third and fifth the second. And the spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and up above on each of the rims of the circles a Siren stood, borne around in its revolution and uttering one sound, one note, and from all the eight there was the concord of a single harmony.[*] And there were another three

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who sat round about at equal intervals, each one on her throne, the Fates,[*] daughters of Necessity, clad in white vestments with filleted heads, Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, who sang in unison with the music of the Sirens, Lachesis singing the things that were, Clotho the things that are, and Atropos the things that are to be. And Clotho with the touch of her right hand helped to turn the outer circumference of the spindle, pausing from time to time. Atropos with her left hand in like manner helped to turn the inner circles, and Lachesis

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alternately with either hand lent a hand to each.

Now when they arrived they were straight-way bidden to go before Lachesis, and then a certain prophet[*] first marshalled them in orderly intervals, and thereupon took from the lap of Lachesis lots and patterns of lives and went up to a lofty platform and spoke, This is the word of Lachesis, the maiden daughter of Necessity, Souls that live for a day,[*] now is the beginning of another cycle of mortal generation where birth is the beacon of death.

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No divinity[*] shall cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own deity. Let him to whom falls the first lot first select a life to which he shall cleave of necessity. But virtue has no master over her,[*] and each shall have more or less of her as he honors her or does her despite. The blame is his who chooses: God is blameless.[*] So saying, the prophet flung the lots out among them all, and each took up the lot that fell by his side, except himself; him they did not permit.[*] And whoever took up a lot saw plainly what number he had drawn.

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And after this again the prophet placed the patterns of lives before them on the ground, far more numerous than the assembly. They were of every variety, for there were lives of all kinds of animals and all sorts of human lives, for there were tyrannies among them, some uninterrupted till the end[*] and others destroyed midway and issuing in penuries and exiles and beggaries; and there were lives of men of repute for their forms and beauty and bodily strength otherwise

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and prowess and the high birth and the virtues of their ancestors, and others of ill repute in the same things, and similarly of women. But there was no determination of the quality of soul, because the choice of a different life

inevitably[*] determined a different character. But all other things were commingled with one another and with wealth and poverty and sickness and health and the intermediate[*] conditions. —And there, dear Glaucon, it appears, is the supreme hazard[*] for a man.

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And this is the chief reason why it should be our main concern that each of us, neglecting all other studies, should seek after and study this thing[*]—if in any way he may be able to learn of and discover the man who will give him the ability and the knowledge to distinguish the life that is good from that which is bad, and always and everywhere to choose the best that the conditions allow, and, taking into account all the things of which we have spoken and estimating the effect on the goodness of his life of their conjunction or their severance, to know how beauty commingled with poverty or wealth and combined with

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what habit of soul operates for good or for evil, and what are the effects of high and low birth and private station and office and strength and weakness and quickness of apprehension and dullness and all similar natural and acquired habits of the soul, when blended and combined with one another,[*] so that with consideration of all these things he will be able to make a reasoned choice between the better and the worse life,

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with his eyes fixed on the nature of his soul, naming the worse life that which will tend to make it more unjust and the better that which will make it more just. But all other considerations he will dismiss, for we have seen that this is the best choice,

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both for life and death.

And a man must take with him to the house of death an adamantine[*] faith in this, that even there he may be undazzled[*] by riches and similar trumpery, and may not precipitate himself into tyrannies and similar doings and so work many evils past cure and suffer still greater himself, but may know how always to choose in such things the life that is seated in the mean[*] and shun the excess in either direction, both in this world so far as may be and in all the life to come;

619b

for this is the greatest happiness for man.

And at that time also the messenger from that other world reported that the prophet spoke thus: Even for him who comes forward last, if he make his choice wisely and live strenuously, there is reserved an acceptable life, no evil one. Let not the foremost in the choice be heedless nor the last be discouraged. When the prophet had thus spoken he said that the drawer of the first lot at once sprang to seize the greatest tyranny,[*] and that in his folly and

greed he chose it

619c

without sufficient examination, and failed to observe that it involved the fate of eating his own children, and other horrors, and that when he inspected it at leisure he beat his breast and bewailed his choice, not abiding by the forewarning of the prophet. For he did not blame himself[*] for his woes, but fortune and the gods and anything except himself. He was one of those who had come down from heaven, a man who had lived in a well-ordered polity in his former existence,

619d

participating in virtue by habit[*] and not by philosophy; and one may perhaps say that a majority of those who were thus caught were of the company that had come from heaven, inasmuch as they were unexercised in suffering. But the most of those who came up from the earth, since they had themselves suffered and seen the sufferings of others, did not make their choice precipitately. For which reason also there was an interchange of good and evil for most of the souls, as well as because of the chances of the lot. Yet if at each return to the life of this world

619e

a man loved wisdom sanely, and the lot of his choice did not fall out among the last, we may venture to affirm, from what was reported thence, that not only will he be happy here but that the path of his journey thither and the return to this world will not be underground and rough but smooth and through the heavens.

For he said that it was a sight worth seeing to observe how the several souls selected their lives.

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620a

He said it was a strange, pitiful, and ridiculous spectacle, as the choice was determined for the most part by the habits of their former lives.[*] He saw the soul that had been Orpheus', he said, selecting the life of a swan,[*] because from hatred of the tribe of women, owing to his death at their hands, it was unwilling to be conceived and born of a woman. He saw the soul of Thamyras[*] choosing the life of a nightingale; and he saw a swan changing to the choice of the life of man, and similarly other musical animals.

620b

The soul that drew the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion; it was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telamon, which, because it remembered the adjudication of the arms of Achilles, was unwilling to become a man. The next, the soul of Agamemnon, likewise from hatred of the human race because of its sufferings, substituted the life of an eagle.[*] Drawing one of the middle lots the soul of Atalanta caught sight of the great honors attached to an athlete's life and could not pass them by but snatched at them.

620c

After her, he said, he saw the soul of Epeius,[*] the son of Panopeus, entering into the nature of an arts and crafts woman. Far off in the rear he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites[*] clothing itself in the body of an ape. And it fell out that the soul of Odysseus drew the last lot of all and came to make its choice, and, from memory of its former toils having flung away ambition, went about for a long time in quest of the life of an ordinary citizen who minded his own business,[*] and with difficulty found it lying in some corner disregarded by the others,

620d

and upon seeing it said that it would have done the same had it drawn the first lot, and chose it gladly. And in like manner, of the other beasts some entered into men[*] and into one another, the unjust into wild creatures, the just transformed to tame, and there was every kind of mixture and combination. But when, to conclude, all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of their lots, they were marshalled and went before Lachesis. And she sent with each, 620e

as the guardian of his life and the fulfiller of his choice, the genius[*] that he had chosen, and this divinity led the soul first to Clotho, under her hand and her turning[*] of the spindle to ratify the destiny of his lot and choice; and after contact with her the genius again led the soul to the spinning of Atropos[*] to make the web of its destiny[*] irreversible, and then without a backward look it passed beneath the throne of Necessity.

621

621a

And after it had passed through that, when the others also had passed, they all journeyed to the Plain of Oblivion,[*] through a terrible and stifling heat, for it was bare of trees and all plants, and there they camped at eventide by the River of Forgetfulness,[*] whose waters no vessel can contain. They were all required to drink a measure of the water, and those who were not saved by their good sense drank more than the measure, and each one as he drank forgot all things.

621b

And after they had fallen asleep and it was the middle of the night, there was a sound of thunder and a quaking of the earth, and they were suddenly wafted thence, one this way, one that, upward to their birth like shooting stars.[*] Er himself, he said, was not allowed to drink of the water, yet how and in what way he returned to the body he said he did not know, but suddenly recovering his sight[*] he saw himself at dawn lying on the funeral pyre.—And so, Glaucon, the tale was saved,[*] as the saying is, and was not lost.

621c

And it will save us[*] if we believe it, and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our soul unspotted from the world.[*] But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and

pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever, that we may be dear to ourselves[*] and to the gods both during our sojourn here and when we receive our reward,

621d

as the victors in the games[*] go about to gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well.[*]